GIFT  OF 
W.   H.    Ivie 


;ra 


WYCH. 


iflflABY 


•  m 


|l-  ;■  ■    .^ 


^  -    . 

.«'%•■■  -% 


■*- ..  ^#  # 


I 


NEW  AND  EXTENSIYE 
ANALYTICAL  EXAMIKATION  Jlr 


«. 


tmtnts   ai   Mental   Sthntt: 


CONTAIMIKO 

a 

EVIDENCES  OF  DIFFERENCE,  DISTINGUISHING  BETWEEN  ELE- 
MENTS OF  MIND  WHICH  LIE  AT  THE  FOUNDATION  OF 
MENTAL  ACTION,  AND  ELEMENTS  OP  MIND 
WHICH  LIE  AT  THE  FOUNDATION  OF 
MORAL  ACTION. 

BY  REV.  MOSES  SMITH,  A.M. 

IN  TWO  VOLUMES. 
VOL.  I. 

"Know  thyself." 


dtnctnnatt: 

PRINTED  AT  THE  METHODIST  BOOK  CONCERN, 
FOR  THE   AUTHOR. 

U.    P.    THOMPSON,    PEIKTER. 

1855. 


^4 


!•»     .O  ') 


w 


EDUC. 
LIBRARY 


Entered,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1855, 

BY  MOSES  SMITH, 

in  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  United  States  for  the 
District  of  Ohio. 


QIFTOF 


PREFACE. 


The  design  of  laying  this  work  before  the  pub- 
lic, is  to  present  the  Philosophy  of  Mind  in  as 
clear  a  light  as  possible — adapting  the  sentiments 
and  arguments  to  the  demands  of  the  present  age, 
and  freed  from  many  embarrassments  hitherto  con- 
nected with  the  examination  of  the  elements  of 
mind.  It  is  most  ardently  desired,  that  the  true 
principles  constituting  the  science  should  be  cor- 
rectly defined,  and  that  the  entire  work  be  auxil- 
iary to  the  investigation  and  knowledge  of  truth. 
Yet  the  best  efforts  are  of  humble  pretensions  and 
partial  claims.  We  could  not  aspire  to  solicit 
recommendations  favoring  the  circulation  of  these 
volumes,  unless  they  can  exist  in  the  judgment 
and  by  the  decisions  of  the  student  and  the  phi- 
losopher, who  carefully  and  understandingly  exam- 
ine each  page  and  sentence  of  the  work. 

The  Author. 
3 


i     905112 


ADVANTAGES. 


The  advantages  of  this  work  are  only  partially 
expressed  in  the  following  order : 

1.  An  Introduction,  designed  as  preparatory  to 
the  science  intended  to  be  taught,  commencing  with 
man,  an  existent — a  compound  being;  his  primi- 
tive, present,  and  future  state. 

2.  Psychology,  established  from  the  nature,  har- 
mony, and  distinct  qualities  of  elements  only  adapted 
to  an  immaterial  existence. 

3.  Anthropology,  established  from  the  nature  and 
distinct  qualities  of  elements,  which  are  only  adapted 
to  the  existence  of  matter. 

4.  The  speculations  of  materialists  examined  and 
refuted,  which  closes  abstract  examinations  of  ele- 
ments belonging  to  physical  science. 

5.  This  work  is  divided  into  two  volumes.  The 
jSrst  volume  embraces  the  examination  of  elements 
of  mind  which  lie  at  the  foundation  of  mental  ac- 
tion. The  second  volume  embraces  the  examination 
of  elements  of  mind  which  lie  at  the  foundation  of 
moral  action. 

6.  Reasons  naturally  arise  as  to  the  necessity  of 
such  a  distinction  in  tracing  each  faculty,  either  ab- 
stractly or  in  its  combined  relationship  with  other 
powers. 

7.  Elements  which  have  not  hitherto  been  ac- 
knowledged as  having  any  important  place  in  the 

1*  5 


b  ADVANTAGES. 

philosophy  of  mind,  have  been  inserted  in  this  work, 
with  reasons  why  they  should  be  acknowledged. 

8.  Some  of  the  primary  faculties  of  the  mind  hav- 
ing ever  been  left  in  great  obscurity,  are  defined, 
with  a  brief  defense  in  favor  of  their  position  and 
claims. 

9.  The  value  of  this  work  has  been  increased  by 
the  correct  opinions  and  sound  arguments  of  all  the 
principal  philosophers  W'ho  have  written  upon  men- 
tal science ;  but  we  have  avoided  referring  to  their 
various  speculative  opinions  foreign  to  the  true  ex- 
amination of  the  elements  of  mind. 

10.  A  design  of  this  work  is  to  present  each  item 
distinctly,  and  with  few  words.  The  subjects  and 
items  are  all  numbered  in  the  chaptei-s  and  sections. 
Immediate  reference  can  be  had,  from  the  Index,  to 
any  part  or  item  of  the  work. 

11.  When  any  element  appears  to  have  a  mental 
and  moral  position,  or  influence  in  the  mind,  it  will 
be  so  defined. 

12.  As  far  as  ability  and  labor  could  go,  the  effort 
has  been  to  adapt  this  work  to  the  science  as  it  is, 
and  not  to  adapt  the  science  to  the  work. 

13.  A  decided  advantage  is,  that  the  student  is 
under  no  obligations  to  receive  the  contents  of  this 
work,  in  whole  or  in  part;  yet  the  objector  should 
be  willing  to  render  an  equivalent,  or  give  better 
reasons  against  the  arguments  used,  than  can  be 
given  in  favor  of  them. 


an 


INTRODUCTION. 

SECTION  I. 
1.  Man  exists.  Of  non-existences  we  can  have  no 
satisfactory  knowledge,  and  to  define  them  would  be 
utterly  impossible.  But  man  is  a  definite  existent, 
occupying  a  point  in  unbounded  space.  The  cer- 
tainty of  his  being  is  neither  imaginary  nor  ideal ; 
but  he  is  a  certain  entity,  possessing  a  real  place  as 
truly  as  he  does  a  relative  position  in  the  range  and 
limitless  extent  of  existences.  He  vies  in  reality 
and  importance  with  all  finite  elements  and  beings 
around  him,  and  the  idea  of  his  entity  transcends 
all  possibility  of  doubt.  2.  He  either  exists  or  has 
no  existence.  If  he  has  no  existence,  all  arguments 
about  that  which  is  incapable  of  occupying  any 
point  in  space,  or  of  having  being,  either  in  entity 
or  nonentity,  must  necessarily  pause  in  perpetual 
silence.  But  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  of  nonen- 
tity as  tangible,  and  having  form,  size,  weight,  and 
action,  or  that  entity  could  be,  in  nature  and  essence, 
non-existence.  Therefore,  all  existences  may  be  de- 
nominated truths,  or  facts.  3.  These/ac^  or  truths^ 
may  be  made  known  to  us  by  demonstration,  or  be 
received  as  self-evident  realities.  The  former  will 
produce  a  result  worthy  of  full  confidence,  when 

7 


8 

correctly  deduced  from  true  premises.  The  latter 
may  be  regarded  as  an  axiom  of  knowledge,  being 
independent  of  either  proof  or  disproof.  Then  the 
certainty  of  our  existence  is  not  a  matter  of  either 
conjecture  or  of  doubt,  but  of  knowledge.  4.  The 
reasondbleness  of  our  existence  is  found  in  the  limit- 
less goodness  of  God.  He  is  the  antecedent  power  or 
cause  of  our  being.  It  is  impossible  for  us  to  con- 
ceive that  any  imperfect  or  unhappy  designs  were 
originally  intended  by  him,  but  that  the  created 
should  glorify  the  creator,  and  be  happy  in  his  un- 
ending favor.  A  being  perfectly  holy  and  happy 
could  not  create  shame,  misery,  and  death  as  an  ob- 
ject of  pleasure  to  exist  in  the  midst  of  his  absolute 
perfections ;  if  so,  we  can  not  understand  the  perfect 
purity,  will,  action,  and  infinite  glory  of  Deity,  by 
whose  creative  power  man  is,  and  holds  so  high  a 
position  in  the  range  of  the  intellectual  universe. 
But  it  is  reasonable  for  him  to  live  to  enjoy  God, 
and  to  perpetuate  that  blissful  communion  by  love, 
service,  and  obedience. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  He  exists^  moving  ^A'Ci\  freedom  over  the  earth; 
has  been  called  the  noblest  work  of  God,  and  lord 
of  this  world.  He  has  been  styled  a  compendium 
of  creation,  standing  midway  the  kingdom  of  nature 
and  that  of  immortal  spirits.  He  studies  to  know 
every  thing  below  himself — the  earth,  compounded 
of  its  various  qualities,  and  all  appertaining  to  it. 
He  desires  and  labors  to  comprehend  all  unexplored 
laws  connected  with  zoology,  vegetation,  and  crys- 


HIS    BEING    IKDKSTBUCTIBLE.  ^ 

tallization.  Looking  abroad  upon  yonder  heavens, 
he  traces  the  rolling  orbs  of  the  vast  universe—* 
watches  tempest  and  calm,  rain  and  drouth,  heat 
and  cold,  seed-time  and  harvest.  Why,  then,  should 
he  not  go  still  higher,  and  study  to  know  himself? 
2.  His  faculties  of  mind  are  inalienable,  and  have 
power  of  motion.  He  is  rationally  constituted  a 
being  who  feels,  reflects,  thinks,  judges,  contrives, 
wills,  and  acts.  He  has  power  to  command  ideas 
and  communicate  them  to  others  b}^  articulated 
sounds  or  speech,  by  the  art  of  writing,  or  by  sig- 
nonical  representations  of  thought.  3.  As  a  point 
or  dot  uix)n  canvas,  ever  moving  uniformly  in  size 
and  direction,  forms  a  continued  and  unending  line, 
so  is  the  existence  of  man ;  though  disconnected  with 
the  infinity  of  the  past,  yet  his  being  will  extend  on 
through  the  interminable  future,  incapable  of  lim- 
itation. 


SECTION  III. 
1.  His  being  is  indestructible^  and  can  never  be 
discontinued  by  annihilation.  The  very  nature  and 
action  of  all  the  elements  of  mind  are  averse  to  any 
thing  like  a  return  to  non-existence,  or  to  any  idea 
that  we  shall  ever  cease  to  be.  We  can  have  no 
concej5tion  that  »n  all-wise  Being  could  or  would 
create  us  for  the  purpose  of  causing  our  non-exist- 
ence. This  conclusion  can  be  sustained  by  the  inde- 
structibility of  matter.  2.  Matter  may  be  decom- 
posed, the  elements  united  or  consolidated,  may 
have  the  laws  of  affinity  and  power  of  adhesion  sus- 
pended or  destroyed;  but  we  have  no  evidence  of 


10  HIS    STATES. 

any  possible  cmniJiilation  of  properties.  Actual  ex- 
periments will  show  that  the  existence  of  elements 
or  atoms  of  matter  can  not  be  rendered  inane  by 
any  refining  or  destroying  process.  The  elements 
of  a  block  of  wood  having  been  burned  with  fire, 
still  exist;  the  fire  has  only  separated  the  compound 
into  its  natural  primary  elements,  and  no  property 
has  been  annihilated.  JS'o  evidence  has  ever  been 
found  that  any  projDcrty  of  either  the  body  or  of  the 
soul  can  or  will  ever  cease  to  be.  If  this  be  true, 
and  we  acknowledge  that  both  matter  and  mind  are 
now  real  existences,  we  are  forced  to  the  conclusion 
that  those  existences  will  continue  to  exist  in  some 
way  forever. 


SECTION  IV. 
1.  The  existence  of  man  has  been  divided  into 
periods^  or  states^  arising  from  important  changes. 
(1.)  His  primitive  state  was  one  of  innocence  and 
happiness,  and  to  have  been  perpetuated  by  love, 
service,  and  obedience.  He  was  constituted  with  a 
holy  nature,  and  capable  of  ever  acting  from  pure 
motives.  The  understanding,  affections,  and  will 
were  obedient  to,  and  in  harmony  with,  the  perfect 
law  of  God.  The  injunction  requiring  this  law  to 
be  kept  inviolate,  was  not  the  law  itself,  and  a  sub- 
ordinate or  contingent  law  would  have  been  imper- 
fect, and,  therefore,  could  not  exist.  Hence,  the 
injunction,  suspended  upon  conditions,  could  not  be 
properly  a  law,  till  it  was  signed  and  sealed  as  such 
by  the  voluntary  act  of  our  federal  head.  (2.)  His 
fallen  state  is  a  departure  from  the  primitive  one. 


HIS    STATES.  11 

The  change  was  caused  by  a  perverted  act  of  voli- 
tion. The  object  of  his  creation  was  to  be,  to  have 
enjoyment,  and  to  act  in  glorifying  his  Creator. 
"Without  action  in  rendering  obedience  and  praise, 
the  design  of  his  existence  would  have  been  de- 
stroyed. If  action  is  indispensable  in  glorifying  the 
Creator,  then  he  must  act,  and  he  can  not  act  unless 
he  has  self-power  to  act.  For  if  compelled  to  glo- 
rify God,  it  follows  that  it  is  the  compulsatory  power, 
or  law,  which  acts,  that  renders  service  or  glory, 
while  man  was  and  is  wholly  passive.  If  such  a 
power  or  law  is  operative,  and  is  the  source  of  all 
glory  to  the  Creator,  it  had  that  power  to  as  great  a 
degree  without  as  well  as  with  the  existence  of  man. 
Hence,  there  could  not  have  been  any  object  in  view 
in  our  creation ;  and  if  there  was  no  design  to  be 
met,  we  have  never  had  being,  and  never  can  exist, 
for  all  the  acts  of  Deity  exist  in  infinite  wisdom. 
But  if  man  was  the  actor,  he  must  have  had  power 
to  act ;  and  if  he  had  power  to  act,  that  power  was 
within  himself,  and  was  self-power,  or  volition.  The 
law  of  God  and  volition  in  man  are  not  one  and  the 
same  thing.  The  latter  can  act  without  the  former, 
otherwise  the  object  of  our  creation  would  have  been 
wholly  destroyed  by  law;  then  our  existence  would 
have  been  impossible.  (3.)  ^^probationary  state  we 
understand  man's  recovery,  through  a  Savior,  from 
the  fall.  This  has  been  called  a  gracious  state,  in 
which  life  and  immortality  have  been  brought  to 
light  through  the  Gospel  of  peace.  (4.)  His  futnire 
state  is  that  in  which  the  soul,  and,  finally,  the  body, 
shall  have  an  inseparable  reunion  and  an  intermina- 
ble duration  of  life. 


12  MAN    A    COMPOUND    BEING. 


SECTION  Y. 
1.  Man  is  comjpounded  of  spirit  and  matter;  these 
■united  constitute  but  the  oie  being.  The  ties  of 
affection  connecting  the  two  natures  seem  to  be  so 
arranged,  that  when  severed  bj  death  the  soul  sus- 
tains no  perceptible  loss,  either  of  faculties  or  of 
true  knowledge.  The  body  without  the  soul  is  life- 
less clay.  Therefore,  it  is  incapable  of  containing 
any  powder  of  action  or  item  of  knowledge.  If  the 
soul  is  possessed  of  powers  and  knowledge  before 
death,  it  has  them  after  death,  unless  death  has  anni- 
hilating power,  wdiich  is  contrary  to  all  evidence, 
and  must  be  absurd,  2.  The  spirit  contains  the  ani- 
mating _principle,  or  is  the  principle  of  life.  The 
science  of  psychology  can  not  be  untrue;  for  the 
soul  is  indispensable  to  life  and  a  knowledge  of  self. 
3.  The  soul  of  man  is  the  intelligent  part  of  his 
being.  Reason,  judgment,  and  knowledge  can  not 
be  matter,  nor  a  result  of  material  elements.  4.  It 
is  an  i^nmaterial  or  spiritual  existence,  as  a  w^hole, 
one  and  indivisible.  It  can  not  be  inert,  neither  is 
it  ponderous,  or  capable  of  annihilation.  5.  It  is 
immortal — limitless  in  duration.  Its  faculties  are 
very  numerous,  vivid  in  action,  and  powerful  in  con- 
ception and  demonstrations. 


SECTION  VI. 

1.  Matter  is  distinct  from  mind.     Anthropology 

can  furnish  no  material  element  which,  in  quality  or 

essence,  can  be  called  mind  in  whole  or  in  part. 

Matter  is  divisible,  tangible,  and  ponderous — pos- 


MIND    AND    MATTER.  18 

sessing  density  and  extension,  with  gradations  and 
dissimilar  organic  properties.  2.  Matter  is  said  to 
be  inanimate  when  insensible  and  inactive  within 
itself.  Inert  elements  act  only  from  impinging 
causes,  and  in  conformity  to  the  law  or  force  oi 
gravitation,  but  tbey  can  not  possess  any  self  power 
of  action.  3.  It  is  animate  when  it  possesses  sensi- 
tive motion  or  action  within  itself.  But  the  anima- 
ting principle  is  not  matter;  for  then  all  matter  would 
be  sensitive,  and  have  action  and  life.  Sensitive 
action  belongs  to  that  which  has  life ;  but  matter 
may  have  motion  or  action  without  having  sensation 
or  life.  Otherwise  the  vast  globe  might  be  an  ani- 
mal or  a  being  of  life,  by  reason  of  its  diurnal  mo- 
tion and  orbicular  flight.  But  matter  has  no  power 
of  self-action. 


SECTION  YII. 
1.  Mind  is  not  matter.  It  is  an  internal  and 
intellectual  power.  From  the  esseptial  nature  of  its 
being,  such  an  intellectual  power,  when  in  action,  is 
knowledge.  Mind  must  either  act  itself,  or  act  from 
impinging  causes.  The  natural  tendency  of  matter 
is  to  inactivity,  and  its  nature  is  to  be  and  remain 
at  rest.  If  gcioved  by  any  external  caus^,  rest  is 
restored  so  soon  as  the  impinging  agent  is. wholly 
removed.  Having  no  action  within  itself,  it  is  im- 
possible for  it  either  to  act  or  cause  action.  2.  But 
the  mind  acts  independent  of  remote,  contingent,  or 
intermingling  causes.  It  has  power  to  understand, 
conceive,  judge,  reason,  and  feel.  These  principles 
can  not  apply  to  or  constitute  insensible  and  inert 

2 


14  %        MIND    AND    MATTER. 

matter.  3.  The  term  mind  is  applied  to  a  combina- 
tion of  faculties,  or  an  internal  power,  which  feels, 
thinks,  reasons,  and  wills.  It  is  known  to  us  by 
these  faculties,  and  they  are  made  known  to  us  by 
our  consciousness,  the  affirmations  of  which  we  can 
not  doubt.  4.  The  essence  of  mind  has  been  referred 
to  something  back  of  these  faculties,  or  forming  a 
still  deeper  foundation  of  their  being.  "We  can  have 
no  clear  conception  or  certain  knowledge  of  such 
occult  qualities.  To  advance  in  search  of  such  ele- 
ments would  only  plunge  us  into  darkness  and 
doubt.  All  such  speculations  would  be  uncertain, 
from  our  ignorance  of  the  subject;  therefore,  it  is 
useless  to  try  to  decide  upon  uncertainties,  and  such 
a  process  would  add  nothing  to  true  science.  5. 
Imagine  that  we  remove  consecutively  all  the  facul- 
ties of  the  mind,  and  it  would  be  very  difficult  to 
conceive  of  some  remaining  something  called  es- 
sence. And  if  we  could,  how  could  we  analyze  it, 
further  than  to  call  it  the  power  or  influence  which 
affinitates,  in  common,  all  the  functions  constituting 
the  soul  ?  This  is  stated  to  start  the  mind  to  think- 
ing, but  to  dwell  on  it  would  not  be  profitable. 
Though  this  subject  has  been  the  origin  of  many 
speculative  arguments,  and  in  a  way  that  it  is  not 
capable  of,  words  can  not  define  it  or  make  it  known 
to  us.  It  exists  in  facts  or  truths  wholly  the  objects 
of  consciousness. 


SECTION  YIIT. 
1.   Knowledge^  the  result  of  reasoning^  is  not  so 
clear,  strong,  and   unerring   as   that   arising  from 


MIND    AND    MATTEB.  15 

intuition.  The  latter  is  the  only  primary  source  of 
receiving  facts  as  facts,  without  either  proof  or  dis- 
proof. In  argumentation  an  appeal  to  conscious- 
ness may  be  the  last  acknowledged  resort,  but  it  is 
the  most  conclusive  and  certain.  Finite  objects  of 
the  external  world,  which  strike  the  sense,  can  never 
vie  with  this  internal  influence  or  power,  nor  be  the 
anterior  cause  of  its  existence.  2.  We  feel  intui- 
tively a  power  within  entirely  distinct  from  all  prop- 
erties of  materiality.  This  combination  of  elements 
or  internal  power,  which  feels,  thinks,  reasons,  and 
wills,  can  not  be  questioned  or  doubted.  Yet  we 
have  real  knowledge  of  such  elements  only  by  con- 
sciousness. Matter  combines  properties  which  are 
solid,  ponderous,  extended,  and  divisible.  They  are 
known  to  us  as  such  by  our  senses.  3.  If  ih^ power 
constituting  the  faculties  of  mind,  or  of  blending 
them  together  in  action,  be  matter,  how  could  it  act 
within  itself  in  recalling  the  past,  and  in  contempla- 
ting the  future — the  events  and  occurrences  of  the 
one,  and  the  objects  and  the  hopes  of  the  other? 
And  how  could  it  act  in  examining  the  nature  and 
properties  of  tangible  existences,  and  the  design,  as 
evidenced  in  the  symmetry  and  harmony  naturally 
adapting  them  to  ^l^e  purposes  and  ends  of  their 
being?  Could  it  send  out  pioneer  thoughts  through 
unexplored  creation  and  interminable  duration? 
How  could  it  examine  the  properties  and  laws  of 
existences,  and  reason  from  nature  up  to  nature's 
God?  4.  If  the  principle  within  us  which  thinks 
and  acts  is  matter^  we  are  plunged  into  total  dark- 
ness, and  are  entirely  ignorant  as  to  the  power  of 
perception  or  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  any 


16  MIND     AND    MATTER.  j- 

fact;  for  that  which  thinks  is  known  to  ns  only  by 
thinking.  Matter  is  known  by  solidity,  weight,  and 
extension.  The  former  is  known  by  properties  en- 
tirely different  from  the  latter.  Matter  contains  no 
principle  by  which  we  love,  hate,  fear,  triumph, 
rejoice,  sorrow,  and  suffer  remorse  or  despair. 


SECTIOI^  IX. 
1.  Matter  is  not  mind.  The  substances  compos- 
ipg  the  material  universe  are  severally  ponderous, 
divisible,  and  possessing  density  and  extension;  also 
existing  in  liquids  or  air  form.  The  principles  of 
these  existences  are  known  as  principles  of  matter 
and  not  of  mind.  All  properties  of  matter  are  nat- 
urally inert.  There  are  no  elements  or  atoms  be- 
longing to  the  science  of  physics  which  can  have 
action  within  themselves,  or  self-action.  All  action 
or  motion  produced  in  them  by  operative  causes, 
tends  to  inertness  or  rest  at  the  suspension  of  the 
power  of  those  causes.  2.  All  material  elements 
tend  naturally  to  rest.  And  rest,  or  that  which  is 
at  rest  by  natural  tendency  or  law,  can  not  originate 
action,  neither  can  it  pervade  with  action  either  rest 
or  a  series  of  entities  at  rest.  But  mind  at  rest  has 
power  to  act  within  itself,  and  to  cause  action  in 
insensible  bodies  by  voluntarily  causing  them  to  be 
impinged  while  at  rest,  and  by  accelerating  or  by 
counteracting  their  inertia.  3.  Matter  presents  a 
^phenomena  distinct  from  mind.  Its  properties,  or 
combination  of  substances,  possesses  solidity  and 
divisibility.  Our  knowledge  of  their  existence  and 
qualities  is  gained  by  observatiooi  and  the  test  of 


MIND    AND    MATTER.  17 

the  senses.  4.  The  essence  of  matter  is  difficult 
to  define.  That  properties  exist  is  clearly  demon- 
strable; but  to  go  back  of  these  in  search  of 
some  occult  principle  or  essence  of  being,  would  be 
attended  with  difficulty,  and  add  confusion  to  true 
analysis*  Yet  the  mind  should  be  tested  to  its 
utmost  power  in  trying  to  trace  properties  back  to 
essence,  or  in  discriminating  between  them  by  dis- 
tinguishing their  inhesive  affinity  in  the  union  of 
compounds,  which,  if  dissevered  and  all  the  clus- 
tering properties  removed,  there  is  something  re- 
maining as  unknown  or  imaginary,  to  which  the 
term  essence  may  be  applied.  But  we  can  have  no 
satisfactory  knowledge  of  any  thing  in  physics  ante- 
rior to,  or,  more  correctly,  primary  than  properties. 


•  SECTION  X. 
1.  If  the  ideas  of  materialists  be  true,  that  there 
is  nothing  but  matter  in  the  vast  universe;  and  that 
at  farthest,  the  soul  of  man  is  only  the  result  of  a 
particular  organization  of  matter  in  the  body,  we 
have  no  reasons  favoring  the  knowledge  of  any  ex- 
istence. 2.  For  inert  properties  can  have  no  knowl- 
edge of  their  own  existence,  nor  of  external  existen- 
ces. But  we  can  not  conceive  of  an  immensity  of 
space  filled  with  nothing.  Nonentity  can  have  no 
perception  or  knowledge  of  non-existence,  neither 
can  it  have  knowledge  of  entity.  There  can  be  no 
knowledge  without  existences ;  and  if  there  be  enti- 
ties, and  they  exist  as  insensible  and  inert  matter, 
they  can  not  have  knowledge  of  any  existence. 
Then  there  must  be  an  existence  capable  of  thinking 

2* 


18  MIND     AND    MATTER. 

and  knowing,  and  something  capable  of  being  tbe 
object  of  thought  and  knowledge.  3.  If  all  bodies 
consist  of  unextended  atoms,  moved  only  by  some 
law  or  influence  of  attraction  or  resistance,  how 
could  w^e  account  for  the  existence  and  action  of 
that  law  or  laws?  If  law  can  not  think,  reason,  and 
act  within  and  of  itself,  it  is  clear  that  there  can  be 
no  power  to  think  and  act  contained  in  inanimate 
and  inert  atoms  of  matter.  4.  The  non-existence  of 
matter  is  more  reasonable  than  that  nothing  exists 
but  matter;  for  if  nothing  exists  but  matter,  we 
have  seen  that  there  could  be  no  knowledge  of  any 
reality;  and  if  nothing  could  be  apprehended  or 
known,  then  if  there  could  be  existences,  all  knowl- 
edge of  them  would  be  lost  in  non-existence.  Our 
knowledge  of  the  existence  of  mind  is  as  extensive, 
and  more  to  be  relied  on,  than  is  our  knowledge  of - 
the  existence  of  matter. 


SECTION  XI. 
1.  If  the  soul  is  matter,  it  \i2i.^  power  to  tliinlc  and 
act.  And  as  matter  is  matter,  it  follows  that  all 
matter  has  power  to  think  and  act,  which  is  absurd. 
If  some  definite  portion  possesses  this  power,  the  dif- 
ference is  the  result  of  the  different  modifications, 
magnitude,  figure,  or  motion  of  some  parts  of  matter 
in  respect  to  other  parts,  or  to  the  mass,  or  the  power 
of  thinking  and  acting  must  be  given  to  some  sys- 
tems of  it  and  rejected  from  others.  What  irregu- 
larity in  the  regular,  onward  course  of  nature  could 
have  being  and  power  to  make  this  difference,  when 
no  such  power  can  naturally  exist  in  the  particles 


MIND    AND    MATTER.  1ft 

themselves?  Surely  no  one  will  contend  for  such  a 
position.  2.  If  all  matter  is  cogitative^  it  is  contrary 
to  all  experience  and  knowledge  we  have  of  its 
nature.  And  if  so,  our  senses  and  faculties  are 
formed  only  to  deceive  us.  A  rock  possesses  no 
sign  or  evidence  of  either  cogitation  or  of  sense. 
The  head  is  the  great  battery  of  thought,  and  there 
all  the  ministers  of  sensation  make  their  appeal; 
but  if  all  matter  be  cogitative,  the  feet  would  contain 
proportionably  as  much  thought  and  understanding 
as  the  head,  and  there  would  be  as  much  in  the 
mountain  rock  as  in  either.  Matter  is  not  self-oper- 
ative but  inert,  and  is  no  more  than  a  substance 
extended  and  impenetrable  to  other  matter.  3.  Ma- 
terialism, in  more  recent  and  modified  forms ^  main- 
tains that  mind  is  a  result  of  organization,  or  a 
function  of  the  brain ;  that  the  physical  and  mental 
faculties  coinhering  the  same  primary  substances, 
grow,  mature,  decay,  and  cease  together.  If  the 
brain  is  only  the  organ  of  the  mind,  it  can  not  be 
the  mind  itself.  It  may  form  the  center  in  which 
exists  that  influence  on  which  depends  sensation  and 
motion.  This  organ  is  delicately  connected,  to  a 
limited  extent,  with  the  mind's  states  and  develop- 
ments. Chemical  analysis  will  show  that  all  nerv- 
ous matter  in  the  entire  system  possesses  precisely 
the  same  properties  as  that  of  the  brain.  Then  if 
mind  be  matter,  or  the  result  of  that  kind  of  matter, 
it  would  be  located  all  through  the  system ;  and  if 
we  could  live  we  could  have  knowledge,  to  a  propor- 
tionable extent,  as  well  without  the  head  as  with  it, 
in  some  instances,  or  as  well  without  it  as  without  a 
hand   or  a  foot.     4.  The  various  diseases  of  the 


m 


20  MIND    AND    MATTEE. 

brain  often  modify,  impair,  or  destroy  the  manifesta- 
tions of  mind.  This  sequence,  if  uniform,  would 
not  make  mind  to  be  the  result  of  material  elements, 
but  would  prove  the  brain  to  be  the  organ  through 
which  the  mind  acts  and  has  access  to  external 
things.  An  object  reflecting  light  to  a  perfect  eye 
can  be  seen ;  but  without  liglit  sight  would  be  lost — 
one  of  the  bodily  senses  is  suspended ;  yet  the  mind 
has  power  still  to  retain  a  knowledge  of  the  object 
seen.  Therefore,  the  power  of  the  mind  to  act  is 
not  limited  to  the  senses,  for  it  can  act  when  they 
are  suspended. 


SECTION  XII. 
1.  Mind  is  independent  of  matter  as  to  existence, 
and  as  to  properties  or  essence ;  but  it  is  dependent 
in  the  origin  of  its  knowledge  in  regard  to  them. 
With  this  knowledge  attained,  its  manifestations  are 
operative  and  independent  of  impressions  from  ex- 
ternal things.  It  possesses  self-consciousness  and 
motion.  It  can  retain  distinctly  and  at  pleasure 
correct  ideas  of  that  which  has  ceased  to  exist,  and 
can  recall  long-forgotten  events.  It  can  go  further, 
and  call  up  chains  of  existences,  arrange  them  in 
order,  symmetry,  beauty,  and  grandeur,  and  present 
them  as  facts,  independent  of.  either  nonentity  or  of 
material  reality.  2.  Matter  can  exist  and  be  matter 
without  the  power  to  either  tJiinh  or  act.  Mind 
without  these  ceases  to  be  mind.  If  we  are  wholly 
material,  and  matter  can  think  as  matter,  then  we 
must  continue  to  think  always,  and  in  proportion 
to  the  number  and  size  of  the  particles  contained  in 


MIND     AND    MATTER.  21 

each  compound.  Then  a  large  body  can  think  more 
and  more  powerfully  than  a  smaller  one;  and  both 
must  continue  to  think  on  forever,  or  till  their  being, 
with  all  their  elements,  are  annihilated.  3.  If  mat- 
ter can  not  be  annihilated^  then  materialists  are  im- 
mortal unawares  and  contrary  to  their  purposes  and 
desires,  but  in  perfect  accordance  with  the  premises 
of  their  own  assumption.  At  least  they  must  have 
a  conscious  state  of  being  as  long  as  there  are  any 
elements  of  the  body  existing  after  death.  There- 
fore, embalmed  and  petrified  bodies  must  have  con- 
sciousness, thought,  and  action  for  ages  and  cycles 
of  ages  unnumbered.  4.  If  matter  thinhs  through 
the  fviure^  it  must  have  ahoays  thoiight  in  thepast^ 
and  there  has  been  no  time  of  our  actiml  physical 
existence  when  the  mind  was  not  active  and  think- 
ing. But  this  is  contrary  to  all  experience  and 
knowledge,  and  must  be  absurd. 


SECTION  XIII. 
1.  What  principle  of  materiality  can  ^oQSQsi  sen- 
sation with'm  itself  or  in  common,  or  can  constitute 
that  which  loves,  fears,  joys,  and  sorrows,  and  is 
capable  of  being  ecstatic  with  hope,  quickened  and 
excited  with  enthusiasm,  or  plunged  into  remorse  and 
despair?  These  changes  exist  and  often  alternate, 
without  any  reference  to  changes  impressed  by  ex- 
ternal things  or  of  physical  debility.  In  perfect 
health  passion,  anger,  regret,  and  remorse  may  fill 
the  soul;  and  peace,  tranquillity,  and  hope  often  pos- 
sess the  mind  when  the  body  is  suffering  intensely 
or  is  even  dying.     Whatever  may  be  the  uniformity 


\ 


5555  MIND    AND    MATTER. 

of  physical  entities  and  laws,  they  can  not  produce 
a  corresponding  uniformity  of  mental  states.  2.  The 
septennial  revolutions,  or  renewing  of  the  system  by 
the  changes  of  its  particles,  does  not  change  the 
identity  of  self  nor  the  one  continued  being  in 
which  man  lives,  and  which-  he  feels  and  knows  to 
be  himself.  If  self-action,  self-consciousness,  and 
thinking  constitute  the  elements  of  matter,  or 
are  essential  to  them,  all  elements  of  matter,  ab- 
stractly or  combined,  in  every  system  must  contain 
them;  and  then  they  would  be  impossible  to  any, 
for  every  system  of  materiality  would  possess  self- 
action  and  a  consciousness  of  its  own  existence  indi- 
vidually in  self-thought  or  thinking;  and  no  self- 
consciousness  or  thought  of  an  individual  property 
can  exist  in  common  with  other  properties,  or  of  the 
compound.  Then  no  element  or  atom  of  matter  in 
the  vast  universe  could  have  knowledge  of  the  ex- 
istence of  any  thing  beside  or  beyond  itself;  and 
having  no  power  of  self-knowledge,  it  can  not  determ- 
ine its  own  existence.  Therefore,  there  can  be  no 
knowledge  of  the  existence  of  any  thing.  The  near 
affinity  and  position  of  properties  can  not  blend 
them  as  one,  while  matter  is  divisible  and  incapable 
of  self-action.  3.  If  impressions  made  upon  7)iate- 
rial  organs  constitute  the  knowledge  of  existences, 
the  occurrences  of  early  life  could  not  be  commanded 
or  recalled  in  old  age;  for  the  particles  of  the  sys- 
tem so  often  changing,  and  being  incapable  of  self- 
action,  could  make  no  transfer  of  their  knowledge 
to  those  succeeding  them.  Then  all  knowledge  of 
the  past  would  cease  to  be,  and  we  could  know  noth- 
ing back  of  the  present  moment. 


MIND     AND    MATTEE.  28 

SECTION  XIY. 
1.  Mind  13  dissimilar  and  distinct  from  matter, 
or  even  a  result  of  materiality,  only  so  far  as  matter 
may  be  the  organ  of  the  mind,  or  through  which  it 
holds  intercourse  with  the  external  world.  Think- 
ing can  not  arise  from  the  figure,  size,  or  motion  of 
the  properties  which  think;  for  this  would  only 
result  in  gradations  of  size,  or  as  to  the  appearance 
and  celerity,  which  would  differ  from  thinking.  The 
power  of  the  senses  can  fully  test  that  these  changes 
and  affections  of  matter  are  different  from  the  prin- 
ciple or  causes  of  thinking  and  motion.  They  are 
the  effects  or  results  of  the  action  of  other  material 
particles  in  motion  by  some  acting  cause,  which 
shows  that  matter  within  itself  is  inert  and  can  not 
be  cogitative.  2.  The  human  body  is  incapable  of 
annihilation.  So  far  as  we  can  analyze  and  under- 
stand, it  appears  that  temporal  death  has  no  power 
to  annihilate  the  constitutional  elements  of  the  body. 
The  earth,  air,  and  water  consolidated  in  the  forest 
oak,  may  be  decomposed  or  separated  by  fire ;  yet 
not  one  element  or  particle  of  the  primary  principles 
can  be  utterly  destroyed.  Death  sunders  the  ties  of 
affection  connecting  the  soul  and  body,  and  the 
effect  of  the  change  in  the  body  appears  to  be  no 
more  than  the  change  of  the  arrangements  of  its 
essential  elements.  Chemical  analysis  will  show 
that  it  is  utterly  impossible  to  annihilate  any  of  its 
elements  or  particles  of  elements.  3.  We  have  no 
evidence  of  the  annihilation  of  any  existent,  and  our 
conception  of  such  a  result  is  impossible.  There  is 
no  evidence  of  such  a  possibility  in  physical  analy- 


24:  MIND    AND    MATTER. 

sis,  or  taught  in  revelation,  and  onr  experience  and 
belief  are  against  it.  If  any  element  or  atom  of  a 
constitutional  function  of  the  body  or  of  the  mate- 
rial universe,  which  ever  existed,  has  or  can  ever 
cease  to  be,  we  have  no  proof  of  the  fact  from  any 
source.  Decomposition  can  take  place  in  fallen  ele- 
ments, but  that  is  no  part  of  non-existence. 


SECTION  XT. 
1.  The  accumulating  weakness  of  age  and  the  very 
decay  of  the  body  indicates  no  annihilation  of  mat- 
ter, but  a  change  in  the  affinity  and  position  of  its 
elements,  and  is  an  additional  pi-oof  of  the  continu- 
ation of  the  soul ;  for  this  decay  is  continued  exist- 
ence in  change  and  under  a  new  form  or  abstracted 
entities.  AVe  may  prove  by  experiment  or  analysis, 
that  all  physical  properties  or  particles  of  elements 
are  indestructible,  being  incapable  of  cessation.  If 
this  be  true,  death  has  the  power  only  to  separate 
the  constituent  elements,  and  that  they  exist  as 
fully  when  separated  after  death  as  they  did  before 
it.  The  term  resurrection  does  not  convey  the  idea 
of  a  new  creation,  but  a  resuscitation  of  the  very 
identical  body  that  went  down  to  the  grave,  in  the 
recalling  of  the  primary  elements  to  their  wonted 
affinity  and  order  in  the  new  organized  body;  thence- 
forth their  union  will  be  unbroken.  Should  this  be 
true  of  the  material  system,  and  that  it  is  dissimilar 
and  distinct  in  properties  from  the  immaterial  na- 
ture, who  can  doubt  the  immortality  of  the  soul? 
2.  Animal  life,  as  found  in  the  lower  orders  of  natu- 
ral existences,  is  not  denominated  an  intellectual 


MIND    AND    MATTEB.  25 

one,  but  it  contains  much  of  the  ^Jienomena  of  mind, 
which  is  far  superior  to  mere  vegetable  life  or  the 
growth  of  rocks.  Only  call  it  instinct,  and  it  pos- 
sesses properties  which  differ  from  the  properties  of 
matter.  3.  They  have  the  power  of  voluntary  mo- 
idon,  and  a  sense  of  danger,  and  to  avoid  it ;  also,  a 
knowledge  of  causes.  Some  have  been  observed  to 
go  still  further,  having  comparison,  and,  seemingly, 
an  intuitive  principle  of  affection  or  friendship, 
capable  of  being  cultivated  to  a  limited  extent.  The 
fox  has  been  known  to  run  through  a  fence  with  a 
chunk  in  his  mouth  the  size  of  his  intended  prey, 
then  to  return  and  gather  his  prey  from  the  herd 
and  inin  through  the  very  same  avenue  in  escaping 
from  danger.  The  Newfoundland  dog  evinces  natu- 
ral affection  and  care  for  the  safety  of  children ;  and 
often,  in  rescuing  them  from  drowning,  they  have 
appeared  to  give  evidence  of  judgment,  as  well  as 
affection  and  compassion,  by  going  to  the  best,  and, 
sometimes,  the  only  place  of  escaping  from  the 
water.  4.  It  is  absurd  to  say  that  these  traits  of 
the  phenomena  of  mind  are  the  properties  of  mat- 
ter, possessing  solidity,  extension,  and  divisibility; 
for  they  are  connected  with  the  power  of  life,  sensa- 
tion, and  action.  Vegetable  life  has  no  self  action, 
and  can  only  move  in  expanding  or  growth  by  the 
laws  and  influences  connected  with  the  seasons. 
Petrifaction,  crystallization,  and  the  growth  of  rocks 
is  a  still  lower  and  more  uninterrupted  order  of  life, 
being  independent  of  and  almost  unaffected  by 
either  the  vernal  ray  or  tropical  shadow. 

3 


26  MIND    AND    MATTEK. 

SECTION  XYI. 
1.  Tlioiigh  we  do  not  know  matter  to  be  eternal  in 
duration^  yet  we  have  no  evidence  to  believe  that 
its  properties  will  ever  be  annihilated.  Then,  if 
matter  will  exist  in  some  way  forever,  it  follows  that 
there  is  something  connected  with  animal  life  and 
motion  which  is  superior  in  nature  to  mere  matter, 
and  it  is  of  a  mental  character  and  nature,  clearly 
distinct  from  matter,  and  must  be  called  an  imma- 
terial or  immortal  principle;  and  we  have  as  little 
or  less  proof  of  its  pending  annihilation  as  we  have 
of  the  final  non-existence  of  matter.  2.  The  soul  is 
superior  to  matter  in  the  Jcnowledge  it  has  of  its  own 
existence^  and  of  the  existence  of  matter^  and  its 
power  of  self-action.  These  distinct  differences  show 
an  immaterial  independence,  and  its  states  and 
manifestations  are  incomprehensible — almost  an  in- 
finity of  meaning  within  itself.  To  our  certain 
knowledge  we  can  feel  something  within  us  that  acts 
from  an  internal  principle;  we  experience  liberty, 
the  power  of  choosing,  and  we  have  self-government. 
There  is  an  internal  spiritual  dominion  or  umpiracle 
principle,  in  which  thoughts  arise  and  are  com 
manded,  and  by  and  from  which  they  are  sent  forth 
through  limitless  creation  like  exploring  lights,  dis 
persed  all  abroad.  The  materialist  has  this  power, 
and  is  conscious  that  he  can  employ  his  thoughts 
voluntarily  about  any  business  he  may  choose  or 
desire.  3.  Matter  is  natv/rally  inse^isihle  a/tid  mo- 
tionless^ and  unless  motion  is  communicated  to  it  by 
some  other  acting  agency,  it  must  remain  forever 
stationary  and  dead.     But  the  soul   has  power  of 


MIND    AND    MATTER.  27 

self  action,  with  a  design  in  acting,  with  a  view  of 
an  end  to  be  attained,  while,  at  the  same  time,  the 
means  to  effect  it  are  fully  considered.  Such  an  ex- 
istence as  this,  with  such  energetic  and  vivid  capaci- 
ties and  powers  within  itself,  can  be  neither  material 
in  nature  nor  accidental  in  being  and  results.  Mat- 
ter, abstractly,  can  not  be  excited  within  itself,  or 
moved  by  arguments,  admiration,  love,  sympathy,  or 
sufferings.  But  we  are  moved  to  action  by  reasons 
existing  within  ourselves  and  those  imparted  to  us 
from  others,  and  by  words  spoken  or  written.  4. 
To  hear  of  or  to  see  suffering  will  naturally  move 
the  feelings  of  the  soul,  and  words  written  often  cre- 
ate joy  or  excite  alternately  weeping  and  laughter. 
The  self  in  active  characters  on  the  paper  can  not 
mechanically  or  naturally  move  the  observer  in  any 
way.  If  words  are  spoken  there  can  be  nothing  in 
the  simple  pulsations  of  the  air  that  can  effect  mat- 
ter creating  self  motion,  neither  to  effect  in  any  way 
the  feelings  or  knowledge.  That  power  which  per- 
ceives and  apprehends  the  force  and  sense  of  these 
things  is  far  different  from  any  principle  of  matter. 
Articulated  sounds  can  awake  sensibility  and  arouse 
the  soul  in  feelings  or  passion ;  and  they  can  pro- 
duce mirth,  tranquillity,  or  gloomy  despair.  These 
results  can  not  be  the  physical  effects  of  the  terms 
used,  or  else  the  effect  would  be  the  same  and  as  ex- 
tensive if  not  understood  as  though  they  were.  When 
we  imagine  things  to  have  been  said,  the  mind  is 
affected  in  the  same  way  as  though  they  had  been 
spoken,  till  such  impressions  are  corrected  by  the 
judgment.  It  is  wholly  the  sense  conveyed,  or  sup- 
posed to  be  conveyed  and  received,  which  is  imma- 


MIND    AND    MATTER. 


terial  in  itself,  that  excites  the  soul  and  influences 
physical  action. 


SECTION  XYII. 
1.  He  who  believes  that  matter  -possessed  prima- 
rily causation,  or  that  it  can  of  itself  come  out  of 
nonentity  into  self-existence,  coalesce  its  particles 
and  then  live,  think,  and  act  by  any  process  of  re- 
duction or  arrangements  of  elements,  possessing  fig- 
ure, or  is  excited  to  motion  by  laws  of  affinity  or  of 
repulsion,  should  first  discover  and  define  the  degree 
of  fineness  existing  in  a  divided  hair,  and  be  able  to 
tell  all  the  points  of  intersection,  angling  the  direc- 
tions of  their  localities  respectively.  Then  should 
he  proceed  to  define  the  alteration  in  the  situation 
of  the  particles  of  matter  in  which  they  begin  to 
breathe  life  from  naught,  and  live,  act,  and  cogitate. 
2.  The  self-power  of  particles  to  change  to  or  from 
each  other,  or  in  degrees  of  difference,  is  impossible ; 
and  if  they  could,  it  would  still  remain,  that  form, 
figure,  and  magnitude  are  all  material  accidents. 
The  substance  is  matter,  and,  in  this  respect,  can 
not  differ  in  parts  one  from  another.  Then  if  one 
part  can  think  and  act,  all  matter  can  think  and  act. 
Therefore,  all  particles  of  matter  possess  causation 
and  action,  and  must  be  cogitative.  And  if  there 
is  such  a  thing  as  matter  thinking,  that  influence  or 
power  must  be  superadded,  which  implies  a  princi- 
ple differing  in  essence  or  nature  from  matter,  and 
can  not  be  a  result  of  it,  but  must  have  been  con- 
ferred by  a  superior  or  an  omnipotent  cause.  3.  No 
accident  of  matter  can  produce  action  or  cause  cogi- 


MIND     AND     MATTER.  29 

tation,  either  regularly  or  irregularly;  and  it  can 
not  superadd  that  influence  or  power,  for  matter  is 
divisible,  and  that  which  thinks  must  be  one,  or  of 
parts  united,  so  that  the  action  is  one.  But  matter 
is  not  one  and  indivisible.  However  closely  the 
particles  adhere  together,  they  still  exist  as  parti- 
cles and  without  self-motion,  and  are  powerless  in 
adhering  to  or  in  penetrating  each  other.  If  the 
power  of  thought  existed  in  those  particles,  it  would 
exist  whether  they  were  in  contact  or  remotely  loca- 
ted ;  and  if  these  are  divisible,  or  are  capable  of 
being  sundered  and  scattered  abroad,  there  must  be 
as  many  minds  as  there  are  particles  in  matter. 
Then  the  mountain,  the  globe,  the  sun,  moon,  and 
stars  are  all  built  of  mind,  or  of  a  combination  of 
innumerable  immaterialities,  which  is  absurd.  4. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  it  requires  a  union  of  the  ele* 
ments  of  matter  in  order  to  constitute  a  power  to 
think  and  act,  there  would  be  no  power  to  classify 
these  elements,  and  it  would  require  all  of  the  mate- 
rial elements  in  the  vast  universe  to  form  one  mind 
or  soul.  Should  there  be  some  influence  or  essence 
in  which  they  unite  or  center,  so  their  action  or 
thoughts  may  be  but  one,  that  influence  or  power  is 
not  merely  superadded,  but  is  an  existent  superior 
to  and  independent  of  matter. 


SECTION  XVIII. 

1.  Matter  can  not  contain  abstract  ideas  of  any 

thing,  for  the  particles  could  not  reflect  upon  what 

passes   within   themselves,  much   less   contemplate 

that  which  was  beyond ;  for  within  themselves  they 


30  MIND    AND    MATTER. 

could  find  nothing  but  limited  material  representa- 
tions or  impressions,  and  these  could  not  form  ideas, 
neither  could  they  be  formed  by  ideas,  abstracting 
themselves ;  nor  have  they  self-power  to  form  them- 
selves into  trains  of  thought  and  metaphysical  argu- 
mentation. Mind  being  matter,  our  inward  percep- 
tion of  external  things  could  only  be  in  accordance 
to  the  impressions  they  make  npon  matter.  For  the 
notion  or  idea  of  that  which  would  be  conceived  in 
the  mind,  could  have  no  existence  while  the  object 
was  prospective  or  distant;  but  now  the  idea  is 
present  and  exists  as  it  is  in  itself,  while  the  mind 
has  power  to  instantaneously  grasp  the  object  and 
scan  every  part.  2.  Matter,  within  itself,  possesses 
no  power  capable  of  correcting  a/ppeara/iices  or  irri' 
sessions.  In  seeing  the  topsail  of  a  ship,  far  away 
at  sea,  the  natural  idea  would  be  like  the  appear- 
ance, the  existence  of  something  very  small ;  but  as 
it  is,  there  is  something  within  which  forms  a  more 
correct  idea,  bringing  into  consideration  the  rotund- 
ity of  the  sea  and  the  feebleness  of  sight.  That 
which  commands  our  senses  and  reasons  correctly 
against  appearances  is  not  matter.  Matter  by  and 
in  itself  is  lifeless  and  strictly  passive,  and  acting 
only  when  moved  by  some  separate  cause,  or  in 
conformity  to  laws  of  adhesion  and  gravitation.  3. 
Man  is  conscious  that  he  lives  and  has  liberty  of 
motion,  in  thought  and  in  changing  position  of  place, 
and  by  an  instantaneous  thought  change  his  course 
or  purpose,  and  counteract,  in  some  instances,  the 
laws  both  of  capillary  attraction  and  gravitation. 
Inert  elements  can  not  of  themselves  voluntarily 
suspend  the  operations  or  arrest  the  tendency  and 


MIND    AND    MATTER.  89;> 

action  of  the  laws  of  nature.  Before  matter  can 
effect  this  its  nature  must  be  changed;  it  must  be 
brought  from  death  to  life — from  incapacity  of  self- 
consciousness  and  thinking  to  feeling,  breathing,  and 
cogitation.  And  if  its  nature  is  changed,  it  ceases 
to  be  matter,  for  inertness  or  passiveness  is  essential 
to  its  entity.  4.  No  faculty  or  influence  capable  of 
thinking  can  be  superadded  to  matter,  for  then  by 
such  a  connection  it  would  be  rendered  incapable  of 
action.  And  if  matter  could  constitute  the  power 
of  cogitation,  still  our  idea  of  the  soul  would  be  im- 
perfect; for  it  has  many  faculties,  and  with  the 
thinking  principle  we  must  superadd  perception, 
apprehending,  reflection,  judging,  comparing,  will- 
ing, reasoning,  making  deductions,  and  putting  in 
motion  material  existences. 


SECTION  XIX. 
1.  The  soul  is  not  a  faculty  of  the  body,  nor  a 
remdi  of  matter,  but  it  dwells  within  the  body,  and 
governs  it  in  whole  or  in  part,  as  the  hands,  feet, 
eyes,  and  tongue.  That  which  governs  the  body  is 
not  the  body  nor  particles  of  it,  neither  is  it  a  super- 
added materiality  or  accident,  but  a  superior  spir- 
itual jower  or  soul.  2.  The  soul  is  incapable  of  an- 
nihilation, as  it  is  distinct  and  superior  to  matter; 
and  matter,  so  far  as  we  can  understand,  is  imper- 
ishable, or  its  elements  can  not  cease  to  exist  in 
some  way.  We  know  nothing  of  the  nature  or  the 
essence  of  either  mind  or  matter;  and  to  try  to 
define  them,  or  the  nature  of  their  mysterious  union, 
would  be  fruitless.     We  mav  reason  on  these  sub- 


32  MIND     AND    MATTER. 

jects  with  some  degree  of  satisfaction,  though  cer- 
tain knowledge  is  not  at  our  command.  3.  We 
have  no  evidence  that  any  existent  can  or  will  ever 
pass  into  non-existence.  If  the  elements  of  matter 
are  imperishable,  so  far  as  we  can  comprehend 
them,  and  the  immateriality  of  the  soul  is  estab- 
lished, which  would  render  it  more  incapable  of 
non-existence,  so  far  as  our  knowledge  of  its  ele- 
ments and  being  can  extend,  how  can  we  deny  an 
unwavering  belief  of  its  immortality?  This  truth 
is  accredited  and  exists  in  the  moral  constitution 
resting  upon  evidences  tested  and  known  by  the 
power  of  intuition.  The  soul  has  naturally  an  in- 
disposition to  tarry  with  the  present  moment  and 
circumstances ;  there  is  ever  a  disposition  to  pass  on 
to  the  future,  and  a  desire  for  immortality.  It  can 
now  feel  an  awe  of  the  future  and  of  God.  This 
A^aries  with  its  shades  of  conscientious  rectitude  or 
sense  of  wrong.  We  look  to  the  future  with  fear  or 
hope,  according  to  our  sense  of  guilt  or  innocence ; 
and  without  the  need  of  argument  we  naturally  feel 
that  we  are  responsible  to  some  being  for  all  our 
acts.  How  can  all  these  be  attributed  to  inert 
matter?  Such  an  assumption  requires  no  arguments 
to  reveal  its  falsehood.  4.  Conscience  has  power 
of  self-action^  and  it  is  often  impinged  or  infli^nced 
to  action  by  some  unseen  cause,  both  in  accordance 
with  and  contrary  to  our  will  and  natural  desires. 
He  who  follows  its  dictations,  and  he  who  repels 
them,  are  both  compelled  to  acknowledge  its  quick- 
ening influence  and  its  power.  In  contemplating 
the  infinite  future,  the  righteous  rejoice  while  the 
wicked  sink  under  feelings  of  remorse ;  and  in  both 


MIND    AND    MATTEB.  3S 

cases  they  are  conscious  that  their  feelings  can  not 
result  from  impressions  made  by  external  things,  or 
from  argumentation. 


SECTION  XX. 

1.  The  soul  has  a  conscicma  Jcnowledge  of  sdf 
with  its  continued  being,  while  in  health  or  in  the 
wane  of  life.  There  is  no  condition  of  helplessness 
or  suffering,  this  side  of  death,  while  reason  re- 
mains, but  that  the  soul  feels  its  nature  and  being  to 
be  immortal.  The  immortality  of  the  soul  is  reason- 
able, from  its  vast  capacities  and  dread  of  annihila- 
tion. It  is  evident  from  its  great  improvements, 
boundless  desires,  natural  dissatisfaction  with  time 
and  things  present,  a  desire  for  the  future  and  for 
8ome  kind  of  religion.  Again:  it  is  immortal  by 
the  consent  of  all  nations.  It  is  demonstrated  to  be 
such  in  the  providence  of  God,  and  is  made  known 
by  the  unequal  infliction  of  Divine  justice  and 
judgments  in  this  life.  2.  The  high  moral  obliga- 
tions  resting  upon  a  rational,  immaterial,  and  im- 
mortal spirit,  are  clear  and  of  boundless  importance; 
for  the  real  existence  of  the  human  soul  is  beyond 
all  possibility  of  doubt;  and  in  the  acknowledgment 
of  the  great  government  of  an  infinite  Creator,  we 
are  necessarily  compelled  to  acknowledge  that  all 
elements  and  existences  should  be  adapted  to  the 
claims  and  purity  of  the  same,  and  all  that  is  im- 
pure must  be  rejected  from  the  limitless  purity  of 
God  in  the  future  world.  If  the  soul  was  constitu- 
ted of  material  properties,  and  could  those  proper- 
ties be  dissevered  and  dispersed  by  temporal  death. 


S^  MIND    AND    MATTER. 

he  who  had  power  to  create  them  from  naught 
has  power  to  aflSnitate  those  elements  in  a  reunion, 
and  in  a  future  organization.  3.  One  great  object 
of  our  being  is  to  cultivate  the  powers  bestowed 
upon  us  for  usefulness^  subjecting  tJiem  all  to  the 
will  and  service  of  God.  There  are  impressions 
connected  with  the  consciousness  of  every  rational 
being,  assuring  him  that  the  soul  must  live  forever. 
We  have  power  to  deny  this,  but  there  is  an  internal 
voice  ever  arising  from  intuitive  authority,  thunder- 
ing in  affirmative  appeals  of  truth,  reversing  all 
such  false  assumptions ;  and  it  can  never  be  silenced 
by  any  confession  or  avowed  faith  to  the  reverse. 
This  source  of  truth  is  unerring  and  irresistible.  4. 
If  materialism  or  any  kind  of  infidelity  be  true, 
adherents  to  such  doctrines  are  more  reasonable  in 
rejecting  them,  upon  the  grounds  assumed  as  the 
basis  of  their  own  systems  and  faith,  than  they  are 
to  adopt  them  in  violation  of  revelation  and  its  re- 
quirements ;  for  if  the  former  be  true,  we  shall  all 
fare  just  alike  in  the  future  world.  Then,  if  we 
believe  them  to  be  true,  and  act  accordingly^,  and 
they  should  finally  prove  to  be  false,  our  loss  would 
be  irreparable — all  hope  would  be  involved  in  ruin. 
But  if  we  should  adopt  the  Christian  system  and 
religion,  and  it  should  prove  to  be  true  in  the  final 
test,  we  would  be  perfectly  safe  forever. 


SECTION  XXI. 
1.  It  is  more  reasonable  for  an  Atheist  skeptic  or 
a  materialist  naturally  to  believe  in  revelation,  the 
immortality  of  the  soul,  and  that  that  immortality 


MIND    AND    MATTER.  85 

of  being  may  be  pure  and  holy,  than  it  is  for  them 
to  reject  them  as  false.  It  is  more  reasonable  for 
them  to  believe  in  them  as  true,  and  to  live  accord- 
ingly, even  if  they  should  prove  finally  to  be  false, 
than  it  is  to  reject  them,  from  the  following  reasons : 
(1.)  There  is  no  book  on  earth  which  claims  to  be  a 
revelation  from  God  but  the  Bible.  If  it  be  true^ 
we  are  perfectly  safe  in  believing  it ;  and  as  it  is  the 
only  book  of  the  kind,  we  could  sustain  no  loss  in 
receiving  it  as  true,  even  if  it  should  prove  in  the 
next  world  to  be  false;  for  then  it  would  have  had 
no  power  to  change  our  condition  from  what  it  was 
going  to  be,  nor  to  render  it  worse.  (2.)  As  this  is 
the  only  revelation  we  have  claiming  to  bo  inspired, 
should  it  be  false,  we  will  all  share  the  same  fate  at 
last,  and  can  lose  nothing  by  believing  it,  and  in 
living  accordingly.  Then,  if  it  be  true,  we  have 
gained  every  thing  calculated  to  constitute  us  happy, 
and  if  it  be  false,  it  is  as  equally  clear  that  we  can 
lose  nothing  by  believing  it.  But  if  we  reject  it, 
and  it  proves  to  be  true  at  last,  we  are  lost  forever. 
(3.)  Then,  if  from  reason  we  can  believe  revelation 
to  be  t7'ice,  who  can  doubt  but  that  the  soul  is  im- 
mortal? (4.)  If  the  soul  is  immortal,  according  to 
revealed  truth,  it  is  capable  of  an  immortality  of 
purity  and  happiness.  2.  Man  is  not  a  skeptic  by 
nature,  neither  can  he  become  one  by  the  authority 
of  revelation.  He  has  an  internal  conviction  that 
that  principle  which  thinks,  acts,  reasons,  and  wills, 
must  live  forever.  And  if  the  great  moral  and 
infinite  government  of  God  is  infinitely  pure  and 
holy,  w^e  must  be  prepared  for  it  and  adapted  to  it, 
in  order  to  enter  into  the  joys  of  a  peaceful  immor- 


S6  MIND    AND    MATTER. 

tality.  3.  As  matter  belongs  to  'physical  science, 
we  now  close  this  part  of  our  inquiries,  and  refer 
the  reader  to  that  part  of  this  work  devoted  more 
exclusively  to  the  philosophy  of  mind,  where  the 
mental  powers  of  the  student  can  be  fully  tested  in 
examining  mental  elements.  He  should  study  to  de- 
fine as  clearly  as  possible  the  existence  and  ofiice  of 
the  various  properties  of  mind.  It  will  increase  his 
confidence  in  the  true  existence  of  immaterial  ele- 
ments, the  self-power  of  the  soul  to  act,  and  of  its 
immortality.  His  belief  will  be  established  as  to 
the  existence  and  limitless  power,  wisdom  and  good- 
ness of  the  great  first  Cause.  As  standing  midway 
the  ascending  and  descending  series  in  two  worlds 
of  existences,  he  should  rejoice  in  trying  to  contem- 
plate all  demonstrable  truths,  possessed  of  submis- 
sive composure  amid  the  infinite  mysteries  con- 
nected with  the  government  of  an  all- wise  Creator, 
knowing  that  duty  more  imperatively  requires  him 
ever  to  wonder  and  adore,  to  love  and  praise. 


^Itrntnts  at  ll^ntal  Btitntt, 


THE  ELEMENTS  OF  MIND 


WHICH 


LIS  AT  THB  POHNDATION  OP  MBNTAL  ACTION. 


,n«iiil^ 


ii 


iTA^^'s^f  ««f  f  A  au 


i>l 


giHsion  Jfirst. 

ELEMENTS  OF  MENTAL  SCIENCE. 

CHAPTER  I. 

PEELIMINARY  ARGUMENT. 
SECTION  I. 

1.  The  mind  of  man  is  truly  and  clearly  a  spir- 
itual existent,  immaterial  in  essence  or  nature,  and 
unending  in  its  duration.  2.  In  the  philosophy  of 
mind  there  are  elements  which  may  be  called  mental 
elements.  These  elements  lie  at  the  foundation  of 
the  philosophy  of  mind,  and  are  the  source  of  men- 
tal action,  and  without  their  existence  mental  action 
is  inane.  3.  If  moral  feelings  can  exist  in  the  mind, 
and  if  moral  action  can  proceed  from  it  as  an  entity, 
or  from  its  states  or  motion,  there  must  be  elements 
of  mind  connected  directly  with  the  origin  of  moral 
influences,  or  no  moral  feelings  could  ever  exist  as 
appertaining  to  or  as  a  part  of  self;  neither  could  we 
ever  be  capable  of  moral  action. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  Those  powers  which  lie  at  the  foundation  of 
moral  action^  or  are  connected  with  the  origin  of 
•the  moral  influences  of  the  soul,  may  be  called 
moral  elements  of  mind.  2.  If  there  is  neither 
mental  nor  moral  elements  in  the  mind,  there  can 

39 


40  PRELIMINARY    ARGUMENT. 

be  neither  mental  nor  moral  science^  which  can  be 
known  to  us  as  such.  But  mental  and  moral  science 
are  acknowledged  to  exist  and  to  be  true;  hence, 
there  must  exist  in  the  philosophy  of  mind  both 
mental  and  moral  powers,  when  we  compare  the 
nature  of  the  actions  which  proceed  from  them; 
otherwise  the  idea  of  the  power,  or  the  existence  of 
either  mental  or  moral  action,  is  absurd;  for  an 
effect  to  exist  without  a  foundation  or  cause  is  utterly 
impossible. 


INTELLECTTJAL    TOWERS.  41 


Wt^tl 


CHAPTER  II.      . 

INTELLECTUAL  OR  MENTAL  POWERS. 
SECTION  I. 

1.  There  are  varioics  orders  of  mind.  Finite 
minds,  from  the  lowest  up  to  the  highest  gradation 
of  intelligence,  are  justly  responsible  to  the  author- 
ity of  the  great  infinite  mind  and  sovereign  Kuler 
over  all,  to  whom  we  should  ever  be  wholly  submis- 
sive and  obedient  in  adoration,  service,  love,  and 
praise.  2.  The  inferior  orc?^*  of  animated  and  self- 
acting  beings  possess  something  of  the  phenomena 
of  mind.  These  properties,  if  they  be  only  called 
instinct,  are  properties  entirely  dissimilar  to  and 
differing  from  those  of  matter. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  Matter  has  neither  conscious  sensation  nor  sdf- 
motion^  but  it  has  inertness,  which  is  essential  to  its 
nature  and  existence,  and  without  which  it  ceases  to 
be  matter.  2.  That  which  is  analogous  to  the  states 
and  manifestations  of  mind  in  beasts,  birds,  and 
fish,  if  it  is  perceptible  at  all,  it  may  be  denomina- 
ted or  called  instinct;  yet  instinct  alone  may  be 
called  imperishable,  from  the  fact  that  it  is  distinct 
from  and  is  superior  to  matter;  and  we  have  no 
evidence  to  believe  that  any  properties  or  particles 
of  matter  will  ever  cease  to  be.     Hence,  the  intel- 

4* 


I  Mm 

f  &  INTELLECTUAL    POWERS. 

lectual  and  immortal  powers  of  the  human  mind  are 
now  prominently  before  us,  and  form  the  true  objects 
of  our  inquiries. 


tiiiH 


^«i¥^  'ff'rT  *^'^*^^?y»vp*^'  ^* 


EXISTENCE    AND    NATURE    OF    MIND.         4S 


CHAPTER  III. 

OUB  KNOWLEDGE  OF  THE   EXISTENCE  AND  NA- 
TURE OF  THE    HUMAN    MIND. 

SECTION  I. 

1.  Mind  is  immaterial  m  naiv/re^  and  exists  in 
essence,  or,  as  to  elements,  dissimilarly  to  that  of 
matter,  and  has  a  continued  being,  which  is  inde- 
pendent of  any  essential  loss  or  elementary  destruc- 
tion by  temporal  disease  or  death.  2.  It  is  not  con- 
stituted by  thought,  feeling,  or  any  emotion  or  act, 
but  it  is  that  which  feels,  thinks,  reasons,  and  acts. 
Though  we  examine  severally  the  elements  or  prop- 
erties of  mind,  it  can  not  be  regarded  as  divisible, 
but  it  is  one  in  essence  or  nature,  and  the  union  of 
properties  in  its  existence  is  forever  indivisible.  3. 
Our  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  mind  or  of  self, 
independently  of  demonstration,  falls  back  upon  in- 
tuition^ and  is  knowledge,  known  to  be  true,  in  an 
unerring  assurance  received  and  fully  tested  by  self- 
consciousness.  If  the  power  of  knowing  existing 
facts  be  not  referred  back  to  innate  elements  as 
truths  or  axioms,  which  lie  at  the  foundation  of  the 
philosophy  of  mind ;  and  if  they  be  not  the  primary 
source  of  the  knowledge  of  all  real  entities  to  us,  all 
our  knowledge  would  be  inane,  and  all  entities  non- 
existences. In  an  important  sense  we  know  that  we 
exist,  because  we  intuitively  feel  our  existence  to  be 
real,  and  the  knowledge  of  it  to  be  true.     4.  Our 


44        EXISTENCE    AND    NATURE    OF    MIND. 

knowledge  of  the  existence  of  mind  may  be  tested 
by  the  known  existence  of  certain  facts.  It  has 
power  to  think  and  will,  remember  and  reason.  It 
holds  intercourse  w^ith  external  things  by  med-ns  of 
the  corporeal  senses,  and  receives  impressions  from 
them.  These  operations  and  results  are  known  to 
us  as  facts,  which  facts  are  evidences  of  the  exist- 
ence of  a  power  capable  of  knowing  them  to  be 
such,  and  this  primary  power,  which  is  capable  of 
knowledge  within  itself,  is  mind. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  These  results^  which  are  of  the  operation  or 
motion  of  the  mind,  are  not  the  primary  knowledge 
of  its  existence,  else  the  whole  of  mind  would  exist 
in  motion,  and  motion  can  not  exist  where  there  is 
no  power  of  self-action,  or  cause  capable  of  moving. 
But  the  power  of  knowing  all  these  acts  and  results 
falls  back  upon  self-consciousness  and  intuition.  2. 
In  matter  such  essences  as  possess  solidity  and  ex- 
tension, or  that  which  is  essential  to  its  entity,  are 
called  primary  properties.  But  contact  with  a  smell 
or  odor  awakens  a  conviction  in  the  mind  that  there 
is  somewhere  an  unknown  cause  of  this  known  sen- 
sation. This,  with  color,  temperature,  and  taste, 
have  been  styled  as  Secondary  properties  of  matter. 
Yet  these  are  only  the  effects  or  results,  as  proof  of 
primary  elements.  3.  If  a  knowledge  of  mind,  as 
an  entity,  is  wholly  and  only  known  by  its  motion^ 
then  any  knowledge  of  it  is  an  accident;  for  motion 
or  action  may  or  may  not  exist;  and  if  there  be  no 
abiding,   primary  elements   capable  of  self-motion, 


EXISTENCE    AND    NATURE    OF    MIND.         45 

and  intuitively  the  origin  of  all  knowledge,  we  can 
not  have  certain  knowledge  of  any  existence.  4. 
Any  speculations  as  to  the  cav^e  of  mind  are  far 
beyond  philosophical  inquiries.  It  is  not  the  cause 
of  its  own  existence,  neither  can  entity  be  a  result  of 
non-existence.  These  things  go  beyond  the  reach  of 
the  human  understanding.  The  true  cause  can  only 
exist  in  the  wisdom,  goodness,  and  power  of  Deity, 
to  whom  we  should  bow  in  submissive  awe,  amid 
the  yet  unrevealed  mysteries  of  the  past,  the  present, 
and  the  future.  5.  The  nature  or  essence  of  mind  is 
unknown  to  us.  We  know  nothing  of  the  essence 
of  either  matter  or  mind ;  yet  we  are  certain  of  the 
reality  of  that  mysterious  principle  within  us,  which 
is  a  permanent  existent  of  various  phenomena  or 
properties.  If  that  principle  or  power  be  called  the 
essence  of  mind,  in  whole  or  in  part,  and  it  be 
unknown  to  us  as  to  its  nature,  yet  it  is  not  unknown 
to  us  as  an  existent. 


SECTION  III. 
1.  Philosophers  generally  agree  with  Mr.  Stewart, 
that  "we  are  not  immediately  conscious  of  mind's 
existence,  but  we  are  conscious  of  sensation,  thought, 
and  volition ;  operations  which  imply  the  existence 
of  something  which  feels,  thinks,  and  wills."  To 
what  extent  we  are  immediately  conscious  of  its  ex- 
istence, anterior  to  the  mind's  operations,  is  difficult 
to  define  with  words.  But  to  say  that  the  power  of 
self-consciousness  can  extend  no  further  back,  in  any 
way,  than  the  consciousness  of  sensation,  thou^it, 
and  volition,  and  they  admitted  to  be  mere  opera- 


46         EXISTENCE    AND    NATTJBE    OF    MIND. 

tions  of  mind,  is  absurd.  Operations  of  mind  are 
no  more  than  the  original  power  or  primary  ele- 
ments in  motion.  It  is  impossible  for  those  opera- 
tions, which  are  only  sequences  or  results,  to  derive 
no  power  from  the  primary  cause  and  supporter  of 
such  operations ;  otherwise  the  operations  or  acts  of 
the  mind  would  be  the  only  primary  principle  or 
elements  of  its  being.  Then,  whenever  the  mind 
was  wholly  inactive  it  would  be  annihilated,  or,  at 
least,  we  could  have  no  certain  knowledge  of  self, 
as  the  mere  operations  of  mind  may  or  may  not 
exist;  but  if  they  can  "imply  something  which 
feels,  thinks,  and  wills,"  they  imply  a  power  which 
is  capable  of  being  the  origin  of  the  conscious  knowl- 
edge of  all  the  acts  of  the  mind ;  otherwise  an  eifect 
must  be  the  origin  of  the  cause  of  itself.  2.  Axioms^ 
in  numerical  science,  may,  in  some  respects,  repre- 
sent axioms  in  the  philosophy  of  mind.  The  whole 
of  mathematical  demonstrations  or  calculations  can 
not  be  known  to  us  as  certainly  true  or  false,  w^ere  it 
not  for  the  fact  that  they  are  based  upon  self  evident 
facts  or  truths  called  axioms.  "We  are  compelled  to 
admit  that  things  w^hich  are  equal  to  the  same  thing, 
are  equal  to  one  another.  If  equals  be  added  to 
equals  the  wholes  are  equal.  All  right-angles  are 
equal  to  one  another.  A  square  block  is  a  square 
block.  Two  added  to  two  make  four.  We  know 
all  these  to  be  truths  or  facts;  but  it  is  an  absolute 
impossibility  for  us,  by  any  process  of  reasoning  or 
demonstration,  to  prove  them  to  be  either  true  or 
false.  And  without  axioms  there  can  be  neither 
mathematical  demonstrations  or  science.  3.  How 
can  we  Icnow  such  truths  to  be  self-evident  facts? 


EXISTENCE    AND    NATUEE    OF    MIND.        4:7 

Ko  power  can  receive  them  as  facts,  independently 
of  all  proof,  but  the  intuitive  selfevident  axioms 
which  are  the  foundation  of  the  philosophy  of  mind. 
The  innate  principles  of  the  soul  form  the  final  and 
conclusive  source  of  appeals,  and  are  the  primary- 
test  of  the  knowledge  of  facts  to  us.  Tlie  knowledge 
of  self-evident  facts,  as  such,  is  tested  by  an  intui- 
tive satisfaction  or  by  self-consciousness,  in  which  it 
is  impossible  for  us  to  doubt  them.  4.  Why  may 
not  these  selfevident  facts,  or  axioms  of  the  mind, 
have  a  knowledge  of  their  own  existence ;  and  can 
not  the  primary  power  of  the  perception  and  the 
understanding  of  external  facts  be  traced  back  to 
intuition?  The  origin  of  the  power  of  knowledge 
must  exist  in  and  arise  from  the  innate  elements  of 
mind,  or  otherwise  an  efi^ect  must  be  the  primary  or 
antecedent  cause  of  itself.  We  can  believe  facts  to 
exist,  and  to  be  self-evident  truths,  because  we  have 
within  an  intuitive  power  to  feel  and  know  them  to 
be  true  independently  of  either  proof  or  disproof. 


48         EXISTENCE    AND    NATURE    OF    MIND. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

EXISTENCE  AND  NATURE  OF  MIND. 

SECTION  I. 
1.  OuK  inquiries  as  to  the  phenomena  of  mind 
are  more  properly  confined  io  properties  or  elements. 
The  origin  and  nature  or  essence  of  mind  is  beyond 
the  limits  of  philosophical  demonstrations.  There 
is  not  so  much  mystery  connected  with  the  examina- 
tion of  the  elements  of  mind.  2.  The  mind  is  capa- 
ble of  a  tJireefold  division.  (1.)  Those  which  are 
clearly  mental  elements.  (2.)  Those  which  may  be 
called  moral  elements  of  mind.  (3.)  The  mani- 
festations or  acts  of  the  mind.  Mental  elements 
are  connected  with  all  mental  acts^  and  without  their 
existence  mental  motion  or  action  can  not  exist. 
They  are  the  foundation  or  origin  properly  of  such 
action  or  character  of  action.  Moral  elements  of 
mind  are  connected  with  the  origin  of  all  moral 
action,  and  without  such  for  a  foundation  no  moral 
action  can  exist.  3.  The  operations  or  acts  of  the 
mind  have  hitherto  been  regarded  as  involving,  (1.) 
Our  duties  to  God.  (2.)  The  duties  we  owe  to  our- 
selves. (3.)  Our  duties  to  one  another.  All  these 
have  been  claimed  as  the  principal  embodiment 
of  moral  philosophy. 


EXISTENCE    AND    NATURE    OF    MIND.         49 

SECTION  II. 
1.  To  every  philosopher  it  is  clear  that  the  present 
order  of  works  on  mental  and  moral  science  is  in- 
correct; for  the  natural  character  of  the  elements  of 
mind,  according  to  the  books,  without  any  suflSciently 
clear  distinction,  has  been  lost  sight  of  from  the  fact 
that  they  have  been  called  only  mental  elements. 
No  separate  work  has  been  arranged  exclusively 
upon  mental  action,  further  than  is  found  in  connec- 
tion with  the  examination  of  the  mental  elements; 
while,  on  the  other  hand,  the  action  of  the  mind 
has  been,  by  common  consent,  called  moral  action, 
connected  with  moral  duties  as  it  is  contained  in 
moral  philosophy.  But  we  should  bear  in  mind 
that  there  are  elements  of  mind  which  may  be  called 
moral  elements,  growing  out  of  their  relation  to  and 
influence  or  position  in  the  mind.  2.  This  work  is 
intended,  as  far  as  possible,  to  define,  in  the  first 
place,  mental  elements,  and,  secondly,  moral  ele- 
ments of  mind.  Then  there  should  be  a  work 
adapted  to  the  character,  power,  and  nature  of  the 
actions,  which  are  the  results  of  elementary  existen- 
ces which  are  truly  mental.  If  moral  philosophy 
can  apply  to  the  action  of  mind,  which  arises  in 
connection  with  and  from  moral  elements  of  mind, 
and  in  relation  to  moral  objects,  so  may  action, 
which  is  wholly  mental,  arising  only  from  mental 
elements,  be  defined  as  mental  action  in  nature  and 
character.  3.  From  the  position  of  many  writers 
we  would  be  led  to  suppose  that  moral  action,  or 
that  moral  philosophy  was  hosed  wholly  upon  men- 
tal elements,  while  the  works  on  mental  philosophy 

5 


50         EXISTENCE    AND    NATUKE    OF    MIND. 

do  not  contain  moral  elements  of  mind  properly  ac- 
knowledged and  sufficiently  defined.  But  they  will 
be  defined  hereafter  in  discriminating  the  difference 
in  the  nature  or  character  of  mental  and  moral  ele- 
ments of  mind.  4.  The  mind,  so  regularly  and  nat- 
urally arranged,  contains  within  itself  immediate 
power  to  hnow  and  to  extend  knowledge  by  examin- 
ing elements,  laws,  and  affinities  of  existences.  This 
is  the  comparison  of  phenomena,  and  the  discovery 
of  their  agreement  and  disagreement.  Though  we 
can  not  arrive  at  the  nature  of  the  essence  of  mind, 
yet  we  are  certain  of  something  existing  within, 
exhibiting  a  permanent  subject  of  certain  varying 
phenomena,  of  which  we  are  conscious,  and  to  doubt 
it  would  be  impossible. 


SENSATION.  51 


CHAPTER  V. 

SENSAT-ION. 
SECTION  I. 

1.  Sensation  is  the  mind's  reception  of  an  action 
felt  and  known  to  exist,  or  it  is  an  impression  made 
npon  it.  The  senses  form  the  medium  through 
which  such  an  effect  is  realized.  In  another  point 
of  light  it  may  be  regarded  as  a  simple  state  of  the 
mind,  in  a  peculiar  way,  and  connected  with  action. 
Abstractly  it  is  incapable  of  self  action,  and  must 
be,  to  a  certain  extent,  a  result  of  some  influence  or 
impingement,  which  may  arise  in  different  ways.  2. 
It  may  be  connected  with  the  change  or  influence  of 
some  one  or  more  of  the  organs  of  sense,  or  in  being 
closely  accessory  to  the  change  of  the  physical  pow- 
ers. A  change  in  the  internal  state  and  condition 
of  the  body  may  awaken  the  sensation  of  fatigue, 
pain,  or  heaviness.  3.  Sensation  can  not  he  sejparor 
ted  from  the  mind.  All  sensation  is  in  the  mind, 
and  is  nothing  more  nor  less  than  the  mind  itself  in 
a  certain  state.  Our  sensations  are  diversified  and 
are  almost  innumerable.  The  body  has  parts,  and 
can  exist  with  the  loss  of  some  of  its  members ;  but 
the  mind  and  sensation  are  forever  indivisible.  A 
sensation  must  be  the  mind  influenced,  and  is  the 
mind  in  a  certain  state.  But  sensation  is  not  wholly 
the  mind  itself.  By  the  term  mind  we  understand 
an  indefinable  essence,  of  which  only  the  elements 


can  come  under  philosophical  analysis;  but  sensa- 
tion can  be  the  mind  in  a  certain  way.  4.  Sensa- 
tion is  wholly  in  the  mind,  and  the  cause  of  sensa- 
tion may  exist  in  the  changes  or  condition  of  the 
body,  or  it  may  arise  from  objects  of  the  external 
world.  Hearing,  touch,  and  seeing  are  connected 
w^th  physical  organs ;  but  those  organs  have  no  self- 
power  to  hear,  feel,  and  see.  They  may  be  con- 
nected with  and  may  be  organs  of  sensation;  but 
sensation  within  itself  is  in  the  mind,  and  is  the 
mind  in  a  peculiar  state. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  In  another  shade  of  meaning  sensation  \&  feel- 
ing awakened  by  objects  of  the  external  world. 
The  knowledge  it  gives  of  external  objects  is  quite 
imperfect.  It  requires  a  combined  action  of  several 
faculties  in  conveying  to  us  a  general  idea  of  real 
existences.  The  various  senses,  acting  separately, 
can  give  us  no  correct  idea  of  existences,  nor  of  the 
properties  of  compounds.  Sensation  can  convey  to 
us  a  result  of  a  known  or  of  an  unknown  existence; 
but  of  itself  it  can  not  give  us  a  knowledge  of 
either  the  essence  or  of  the  properties  of  existences. 

2.  Sensation  may  be  a  state  of  internal  feelings^ 
which  is  capable  of  being  excited  by  spiritual  influ- 
ences, or  by  sensations  of  humility  and  awe  in  the 
presence  of  the  great  God.  It  can  be  realized  in 
the  bare  remembrance  of  startling  events  in  the  past. 

3.  In  receiving  impressions  from  external  objects, 
we  are  to  bear  in  mind  that  our  sensations  are  not 
the  a^jpearance  or  images  of  those  entities,  for  the 


SENSATION.  li 

true  place  of  sensation  is  in  the  mind,  l^o  external 
property  can  form  any  part  of  sensation,  neither 
can  it  be  added  to  it.  It  is  entirely  different  from 
all  material  properties  in  essence  or  in  nature.  And 
it  is  distinct  in  nature,  so  far  as  we  can  underetand, 
from  all  spiritual  influences  beyond  the  reality  of 
self.  4.  The  connection  between  sensation  and  the 
physical  organs  is  involved  in  mystery.  External 
objects  make  an  impression  or  they  affect  the  phys- 
ical organs,  and  through  the  medium  of  the  senses 
they  awake  sensations  in  the  mind.  To  explain  the 
change  effected  in  those  organs,  or  to  define  their 
connection  with  the  senses,  is  impossible.  5.  The 
awakening  of  sensation,  by  external  objects,  through 
the  medium  of  tlie  senses,  is  evidence  that  it  is,  to  a 
great  extent,  consequent  to  tJie  senses^  so  far  as  it 
relates  to  action  from  these  sources.  In  this  respect 
only  it  is  immediately  successive  to  the  action  of 
some  one  or  more  of  the  organs  of  sense ;  yet  the 
power  of  sensation  is  in  the  mind,  which  power  can 
and  will  act  independently  of  the  physical  organs 
connected  with  the  senses,  in  feelings  of  awe  in  the 
Divine  presence,  or  in  bare  remembrance  of  past 
emotions  of  the  soul,  which  existed  either  with  or 
without  a  known  cause.  6.  As  sensation  is  in  the 
mind,  and  is  the  mind,  in  a  certain  way,  we  are 
compelled  to  acknowledge  its  connection  witTi  the 
jprimary  elements  of  mental  science;  for  sensation 
can  not  exist  only  in  connection  with  the  existence 
of  mind. 

5* 


to 


54  SENSE. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

SENSE. 

SECTION  I. 
1.  Sense,  as  connected  with  the  human  mind,  is 
that  principle  or  faculty  which  has  power  to  ajppre- 
liend  the  existence,  and,  to  some  extent,  the  qualities 
of  external  objects.  2.  It  appears  to  hold  a  midway 
relation  between  the  existence  and  change  of  the 
physical  organs  and  the  existence  of  real  sensation, 
3.  In  this  position  only  it  is  immediately  succeeded 
by  sensation,  being  the  medium  through  which  im- 
pressions from  external  objects  wake  up  the  power 
of  sensation  in  the  mind. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  Sense,  at  least,  a^jpreJiends  some  of  the  quali- 
tiefe  of  the  substances  which  cause  sensations,  such 
as  possess  hardness,  extension,  and  weight,  which 
comes  in  contact  with  physical  organs.  2.  Its  sim- 
ple state  is  spontaneous^  and  its  action  may  be 
wholly  vohmtary,  as  well  as  a  result  of  either  volun- 
tary or  invoked  causes.  3.  It  may  be  regarded  as 
the  perception  of  the  senses,  or  is  that  influence  or 
motion  which  is  immediately  successive  to  impres- 
sions made  upon  physical  organs  toward  the  reality 
of  that  which  is  felt  ere  sensation  refers  it  to  the 


SENSE.  HP 

consideration  of  the  mind.  4.  It  may,  in  another 
point  of  light,  be  regarded  as  the  discernment  of  the 
senses,  which  takes  place  on  contact  with  an  object, 
and  in  relation  to  the  real  existence  of  such  an  ob- 
ject, almost  at  the  same  time  the  beginning  of  the 
impression  thus  made  is  realized. 


'H  lo  dotooa 


I         ^. 


W  .£ 


>i  9&  m  e^fl' 


1 


THE    SENSES. 


!>*k  w-  CHAPTER  VII. 

THE    SENSES. 


SECTION  I. 

1.  The  senses  connect,  in  one  respect,  the  sensa- 
tions of  the  mind  with  the  organs  of  sense  in  the 
body,  and  have  power  to  report  to  us  the  existence  of 
external  things  when  they  come  in  contact  with  the 
physical  organs,  and  can  convey  a  knowledge  of 
their  properties  in  connection  with  the  action  of 
other  powers  of  the  mind.  2.  The  connection  ex- 
isting between  the  senses  and  the  organs  of  sense  in 
the  body  can  not  be  defined.  3.  We  are  wholly 
dependent  upon  our  senses  as  the  medium  through 
which  we  have  knowledge  of  external  things.  While 
the  senses  apprehend  external  things,  and  are  a 
source  of  knowledge  to  us,  as  to  their  real  existence, 
yet  we  have  other  sources  of  knowledge ;  otherwise 
the  senses  would  be  the  embodiment  of  all  the  facul- 
ties of  the  mind. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  We  are  dependent  upon  the  senses  only  so  far 
as  it  relates  to  existences  in  the  external  worlds  as 
the  primary  medium  of  access  in  knowing  their  ex- 
istence to  be  real.  Abstractly  we  can  not  call  the 
senses  the  knowledge  of  external  things.  They  are 
only  the  knowledge  of  external  things  in  connection 


the;    8EN3ES. 


with  other  powers  of  the  mind.  2.  The  importance 
of  the  senses  as  a  source  of  knowledge  in  regard  to 
external  objects  is  indispensable.  If  we  were  de- 
prived of  smell,  taste,  hearing,  touch,  and  sight,  it 
would  be  utterly  impossible  for  us  to  know  any  thing 
of  external  physical  existences.  3.  Yet  the  loss  of 
all  these  could  not  annihilate  the  mind,  neither  could 
they  deprive  it  of  sensations  within  itself,  nor  from 
other  spiritual  influences  or  existences.  4.  We  are 
now  about  to  enter  upon  the  order  of  the  Jk)e  senses. 
In  examining  the  senses  as  they  occur  in  their  order, 
it  is  not  intended  that  we  should  define  the  power 
of  the  senses  as  they  exist  in  the  mind,  disconnected 
with  the  physical  organs  of  sense;  but  to  define,  as 
far  as  possible,  their  oflice  and  power  as  they  exist 
in  their  mysterious  connection  with  the  organs  of 
the  body. 


^VH^ 


56  THE    SENSE    OF    SMELL 


CHAPTER  YIII. 

THE  SENSE  OF  SMELL. 

SECTION  I. 
1.  The  organ  of  smell  is  said  to  consist  in  the  ex- 
tension of  nerves  to  every  part  of  the  delicate  mu- 
cous membrane,  with  which  the  cavities  of  the 
nostrils  are  lined.  These  are  connected  to  the  sin- 
ews and  extend  up  to  the  brain.  So  that  by  real 
physical  entities  the  organ  of  smell  is  delicately  and 
sensitively  connected  with  the  brain,  which  is  re- 
garded as  the  organ  of  the  mind.  2.  The  sense  of 
smell  is  clearly  connected  with  the  nerves^  and  it  is 
impossible  to  separate  it  from  them  only  in  the  de- 
struction of  the  physical  organs ;  then  that  power  of 
the  mind  may  remain  inactive,  so  far  as  it  relates  to 
the  power  of  apprehending  external  objects.  3.  The 
substance  of  the  nerves  contains  precisely  the  same 
properties  as  that  of  the  brain.  That  part  of  any 
nerve  which  has  been  severed  by  disease  or  by  vio- 
lence, loses  all  sensation,  and  is  doomed  to  perish. 
If  all  the  nerves  of  the  system  are  sensorial,  and  are 
connected  in  some  way  with  the  brain,  then  all  the 
physical  organs  of  sense  are  connected  with  the 
brain.  And  the  senses  are  inseparably  connected 
with  the  nervous  system.  4.  The  nasal  nerves^  or 
physical  organ  of  sense,  may  be  affected  by  the  odor 
of  a  rose,  and  simultaneously  is,  or  exists,  the  sense 


THE    SENSE    OF    SMELL.  0^ 

of  smell.  The  nerves  and  the  sense  of  smell  are 
not  one  and  the  same ;  yet  to  define  the  connection 
of  the  two  is  impossible.  Sensation  is  immediately 
successive  to  the  sense  of  smell,  and  conveys  to  the 
mind  the  impression  of  the  external  object,  which 
was  apprehended  by  the  organ  of  sense. 


SECTION  11. 
1.  The  sensations  of  smell  are  received  by  means 
of  the  organ,  which  is  the  mind's  primary,  yet  the 
most  remote  test  in  apprehending  the  existence  of 
external  things.  2.  The  nature  and  elements  of  that 
which  aftects  the  organ  may  elude  our  knowledge,  as 
to  a  correct  understanding  of  the  manner  of  the  op- 
eration ;  yet  there  is  a  state  of  mind  produced  by  it, 
varying,  in  a  great  measure,  voluntarily  with  the 
nature  and  elements  of  that  which  produced  the 
impression.  This  peculiar  mental  affection  is  inva- 
riably successive  to  the  organic  change.  And  the 
nature  of  the  connection  blending  the  two  in  one 
action  is  beyond  all  explanation.  3.  We  can  not 
classify,  but  to  a  limited  extent,  the  sensations  re- 
ceived by  the  sense  of  smell,  for  they  are  numerous 
and  diversified.  We  may  use  such  terms  as  sweet, 
sour,  and  musty;  but  as  a  general  rule  they  are 
classed,  being  distinguished  by  their  connection  with 
the  object  which  causes  the  sensation,  as  the  smell 
of  a  peach  or  an  apple.  The  sensations  received 
through  the  organ  of  smell  are  naturally  pleasant  or 
disagreeable.  Some  of  the  objects  which  produce 
them  throw  off  an  effluvia  which  is  delightfully  ex- 
hilarating, and  others  produce  death.    4.  The  sen- 


Mi  THE    SENSE    OF    SMELL. 

sation  of  smell,  through  the  means  of  the  organ,  has 
an  important  influence  upon  life  and  health.  It 
aids  in  the  right  use  of  medicines,  detecting  the 
,  harmless  from  the  poisonous.  It  detects  poisonous 
odors  emitted  from  objects,  or  that  which  is  destruct- 
ive in  vapors  in  the  air.  It  aids  in  the  selection  of 
the  right  kind  of  food,  as  well  as  to  impart  to  us  a 
knowledge  of  the  thousands  of  sweet  odors  which 
are  wafted  upon  the  winds  of  heaven.  6.  It  is  the 
jprojperties  of  external  bodies  which  produce  these 
sensations.  Odoriferous  effluvia,  or  small  particles, 
are  emitted  from  certain  substances,  and  are  diffused 

^  through  the  atmosphere.    The  air  which  is  drawn 

through  the  nostrils  is  impregnated  with  these  parti- 
cles, and  it  brings  them  in  contact  with  the  organ 

^  of  the  sense  of  smell. 


SECTION  III. 
1.  The  ^' jpercejptions  of  smeW'^  are  not  in  distinc- 
tion from  sensation;  for  perceptions  of  smell  can 
not  exist.  Smell,  within  and  of  itself,  is  incapable 
of  perception.  We  can  have  perceptions  of  tJiat 
which  is  the  object  of  the  sense  of  smell,  and  we 
may  have  certain  perceptions  of  or  in  relation  to  the 
condition  and  existence  of  the  organ  or  sense  within 
or  of  themselves,  but  not  as  many  writers  define 
perceptions  of  smell.  2.  The  argument  must  differ 
from  former  writers ;  for  there  can  be  no  sense  of 
smell  till  that  organ  has  been  affected.  The  action, 
then,  which  is  sensation,  conveys  the  impression  to 
the  mind.  Till  that  action  reaches  the  mind  there 
can  be  no  perception.    If  we  can  have  perception 


THE    SENSE    OF    SMELL.  61 

of  smell,  then  perception  must  precede  sensation, 
which  is  impossible.  There  can  be  no  smell,  known 
to  us  as  such,  till  the  organ  is  affected.  Then  if 
perception  precedes  sensation,  it  must  act  without 
direction  to  any  definite  object.  And  it  will  not  do 
to  say  that  sensation  within  itself  is  the  perception 
of  itself  or  of  the  cause  of  its  own  action.  3.  We 
can  have  perceptions  of  the  objects  which  are  the 
cause  of  the  action  of  the  sense  of  smell,  and  these 
perceptions  are  in  distinction  from  sensation. 

6 


THE    SENSE    OF    TASTE 


CHAPTER  IX. 

THE   SENSE    OF    TASTE. 

SECTION  I. 
1.  The  organs  of  taste  consist  of  nervous  papillae, 
covering  the  surface  of  the  tongue,  and  particularly 
that  of  the  apex  and  sides.  It  exists  also  in  the  mu- 
cous membrane,  which  lines  the  palate  and  the  cavity 
of  the  mouth.  The  entrance  of  the  alimentary  canal 
is  so  guarded  that  the  suitableness  of  every  thing 
which  enters  into  the  stomach  is  fully  tested  by  the  or- 
gan of  taste.  2.  The  sense  of  taste  is  realized  when 
the  organ  comes  in  contact  with  substances  of  differ- 
ent natures  or  qualities  of  properties.  These  effect  a 
change  in  the  organ,  which  is  immediately  followed 
b}''  a  corresponding  influence  of  mind.  3.  To  the 
sense  of  taste  is  connected  tJie  sensations  of  taste, 
conveying  to  the  mind,  to  some  extent,  something 
of  a  corresponding  impression  arising  from  the  qual- 
ities of  properties,  or  from  the  nature  of  the  external 
motive  cause.  This  position  has  been  denied ;  and 
it  has  been  maintained  that  sensation  can  not  con- 
vey any  thing  of  the  nature  or  condition  of  its  cause, 
but  that  it  is  reserved  for  some  other  power  or  fac- 
ulty to  have  perceptions  of  the  qualities  and  nature 
of  that  which  causes  sensation.  4.  If  any  faculty 
or  faculties  have  power  to  convey  to  the  mind  any 
thing  of  the  qualities  or  nature  of  objects  causing 
sensation,  why  may  not  sense  and  se7isation  influence 


THE    SENSE    OF    TASTE.  9P 

the  mind  in  regard  to  the  cause  of  sensations,  and 
favorably  to  the  apprehending  of  the  qualities  of 
the  same?  for  they  are  by  nature  adapted,  as  the 
inlet  to  the  mind,  to  the  reality  of  such  existences, 
and  are  designed  to  be  more  closely  connected  with 
such  objects  than  any  other  faculty  or  power  of  the 
mind.  5.  The  doctrine  that  sense  and  sensation, 
which  are  more  nearly  and  more  closely  connected 
with  the  causes  which  affect  them  than  any  other 
power,  can  not  affect  the  mind  favorably  to  the 
qualities  and  nature  of  such  causes,  is  too  absurd  to 
require  refuting  arguments,  and  especially  so,  when 
all  that  has  ever  been  said  to  the  reverse  consists 
wholly  in  assumptions.  6.  The  nature  of  the  sensa- 
tions of  taste  are  known,  and  are  items  of  experi- 
ence. The  mind  having  been  impressed  by  sensa- 
tion, the  affections  are  immediately  moved  in  search 
of  some  external  cause.  Sensation,  unaided  by 
other  affections  and  faculties  of  the  mind,  and  with- 
out any  assistance  from  experience,  can  not  convey 
to  the  mind  a  full  knowledge  of  the  various  quali- 
ties of  external  substances;  yet  there  is  a  natural 
adaptation  in  external  objects  to  produce  in  the 
mind  a  sensation,  to  some  extent,  corresponding  to 
their  nature,  which  may  be  called  the  sensation  of 
sweet,  sour,  or  bitter,  according  to  the  nature  or 
qualities  of  the  objects. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  The  modifications  of  taste  consist  in  its  power 
to  change,  or  in  the   inclination  of  the  organ  to 
adapt  itself,  or  to  be  adapted  to  the  nature  of  the 


M  THE    SENSE    OF    TASTE. 

various  qualities  of  sapid  objects.  There  is  hardly 
any  quality  of  the  objects  of  taste  so  disagreeable 
but  that  use  can  make  them  to  be  endured,  and,  per- 
haps, finally  agreeable.  And  on  the  other  hand  the 
pleasurable  may  lose  its  agreeableness  by  continued 
use.  2.  The  properties  of  bodies  which  give  rise  to 
the  sensations  of  taste  are  called  effluvia  or  flavors. 
The  nature  of  the  essence  of  these  flavors  is  un- 
known to  us ;  yet  we  know  that  such  flavors  exist. 
3.  Immediately  upon  the  sensations  of  taste  a  state 
of  mind  ensues  which  refers  them  to  the  external 
cause,  and,  in  part,  correspondingly  to  the  peculiar 
quality  of  some  sapid  object,  like  unto  those  which 
are  acrid,  sweet,  or  bitter. 


THE    SENSE     OF    HEARING. 


CHAPTER  X. 

THE  SENSE  OF  HEABING. 
SECTION  I. 

1.  The  ear  is  the  organ  of  sound  or  of  hearing. 
Its  location  is  convenient  and  wisely  arranged.  Its 
projection  forms  an  external  koilon,  which  is  suita- 
ble to  the  gathering  of  every  pulsation  of  the  air  as 
they  are  wafted  from  every  direction.  The  internal 
cavity  consists  of  circular  winding  passages.  These 
are  partitioned  or  divided  by  the  tympanum,  which 
is  a  delicate  membrane,  called  the  drum  of  the  ear, 
and  which  has  a  nerve  delicately  and  beautifully 
spread  out  upon  its  internal  surface.  This  is  called 
the  auditory  nerve,  and  is  connected  to  the  brain. 
2.  The  sense  of  hearing  consists  in  'Cii^  power  or  inr 
fluence  which  is  principally  and  mysteriously  con- 
nected with  the  union  of  the  tympanum  and  the 
auditory  nerve.  This  is  affected  by  the  action  of 
the  atmosphere.  The  undulations,  waves,  or  pulsa- 
tions of  the  air  move  upon  or  impress  the  tym- 
panum. 3.  The  sensations  of  hearing  are  realized 
when  the  vibrations  of  the  agitated  air  are  transmit- 
ted through  the  labyrinth,  impressing  the  transpar- 
ent membrane  or  drum  of  the  ear,  and  affecting  the 
auditory  nerve,  which  is  connected  with  the  brain. 
The  sensation  is  almost  simultaneously  conveyed 
from  the  organ,  when  affected,  to  the  mind,  which  is 

6* 


66  THE    SENSE    OF    HEARING. 

followed  by  a  new  state  of  mind,  in  which  we  have 
perception,  and  an  inquiry  as  to  the  external  cause. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  The  varieties  of  the  sensation  of  sound  are 
almost  innumerable.  It  has  been  said  that  the  ear 
is  capable  of  detecting  about  five  hundred  variations 
of  tone,  and  as  many  variations  in  strength.  We 
are  informed  that  when  these  are  combined  they 
number  about  twenty  thousand,  varying  in  simple 
sounds,  degrees  of  strength,  and  difference  of  tone. 
Many  human  voices  may  sound  the  tone  represented 
by  three  in  the  octave  or  stave,  and  each  one  will 
differ  from  all  the  rest,  though  sounding  the  same 
tone.  Fifty  different  instruments  may  sound  the 
same  note  and  the  ear  be  capable  to  distinguish  a  dif- 
ference in  all  of  them.  A  difference  can  be  detected 
which  may  arise  from  light  or  heavy  atmosphere, 
the  good  or  bad  repair  of  the  same  instrument,  and 
also  of  the  voice  in  sickness  contrasted  with  the 
same  in  health,  and  a  pleasant  with  an  angry  mode, 
or  age  with  youth.  2.  The  cause  of  these  sensations 
is  remotely  in  the  object  or  agent  which  produces  the 
vibratory  state  of  the  atmosphere,  as  the  air  has  not 
irregular  self-motion.  A  sonorous  body,  when  struck, 
agitates  the  atmosphere  around  it;  this  agitation 
recedes  from  it  in  all  directions  in  wave-like  undu- 
lations, resembling  the  concentric  encircling  waves 
on  the  surface  of  water  at  rest  when  ruptured  by  a 
falling  stone.  Yet  the  air  in  motion  may  be  re- 
garded as  the  operative  and  impressing  cause  of  the 
sensations   of  hearing.     3.  The   knowledge  which 


THE    SENSE    OF    HEARING.  69 

simple  sounds  convey  to  the  mind  is  not  i/ntuitive. 
The  power  of  the  sensations  of  sound  belongs  to 
intuition;  but  the  knowledge  we  receive  of  the  ex- 
istence and  properties  of  external  objects,  as  a  se- 
quence of  the  impressions  made  by  sensations,  is 
aided  by  other  faculties  in  connection  with  experi- 
ence. The  new  state  of  mind  consequent  upon  the 
action  of  these  sensations,  is  that  in  which  we  have 
perceptions  and  full  knowledge  of  the  existing  cause. 
4.  We  can  not  tell  the  direction  of  sound,  neither 
the  distance  it  is  from  us,  nor  the  qualities  of  the 
cause  wholly  unaided  by  other  faculties  and  experi- 
ence. But  in  gaining  a  knowledge  of  the  direction, 
distance,  and  existence  of  the  cause,  we  can  and 
must  depend,  to  a  considerable  extent,  upon  the 
sense  of  hearing.  As  to  direction  and  distance, 
more  depends  upon  the  sense  of  hearing  than  expe- 
rience. 


SECTION  III. 
1.  To  have  knowledge  of  sound  it  is  indispensable 
that  we  be  in  the  direction  and  under  the  influence 
of  the  waves  of  air  as  they  strike  the  ear.  The  nat- 
ural course  and  motion  of  sound  is  always  from  the 
cause.  There  can  be  no  sound  without  a  motion  of 
the  air,  and  if  fhere  is  motion  it  recedes  from  the  cause. 
If  we  depend  upon  experience  for  its  direction  and 
location,  we  can  arrive  at  them  amid  high  and  strong 
winds  as  though  all  were  calm.  But  this  is  absurd. 
2.  We  gain  our  knowledge  of  location  principally 
from  the  direction  of  the  motion  of  the  undulations 
or  pulsations  of  air  which  strike  the  ear,  producing 


68  THE    SENSE    OF    HEARING. 

a  corresponding  sensation;  and  also  of  distance  by 
the  peculiar  modifications  of  the  strength  or  force 
of  such  pulsations;  for  if  there  be  nothing  in  the 
sensation  corresponding  or  agreeing  in  any  way  with 
the  properties  or  nature  of  its  cause,  then  it  follows 
that  the  mind,  in  trying  to  determine  the  true  cause 
by  perception,  acts  without  a  guide,  and  the  result  is 
wholly  accidental;  for  no  faculty  is  calculated  by 
nature,  or  has  more  power  to  give  correct  direction 
to  the  perception  of  cause  than  sense  or  sensation, 
which  are  affected  or  are  created  by  it.  3.  Further 
proof  that  we  are  in  a  degree  dependent  upon  the 
peculiar  manner  and  way  in  which  sound  strikes  the 
ear  in  determining  the  cause  and  its  location^  is 
found  in  the  fact  that  when  we  have  a  confused  idea 
of  the  direction  of  sound  we  intuitively  turn  the 
head  in  different  directions  to  get  the  direction  of 
the  waves  of  air  on  the  tympanum,  in  order  to  know 
the  true  direction  of  the  cause,  and  from  the  pecu- 
liar modulations  and  force  of  the  sound  thus  con- 
veyed we  judge  of  the  distance  to  the  cause  or 
object.  4.  The  sense  of  hearing  is  of  great  import- 
ance. By  it  we  are  made  acquainted  with  the  music 
of  nature,  the  melody  in  the  concordant  sounds  of 
instruments  and  of  the  living  voice.  Music  has 
charms  which  are  exhilarating  and  sootjiing.  Yerbal 
language  is  wholly  dependent  upon  this  sense.  Ar- 
ticulated sounds  or  speech  in  the  reciprocal  expres- 
sion of  feelings,  fears,  and  hopes,  forms  one  of  the 
principal  mediums  and  sources  of  human  happiness. 
Eor  such  inestimable  gifts  praise  should  ever  re- 
dound to  the  great  Creator. 


THE    SENSE     OF    TOUCH 


CHAPTER  XI. 

THE  SENSE  OF  TOUCH. 
SECTION  I. 

1.  The  organ  of  touch  may  be  said  to  be  blended 
with  and  exists  in  the  muscles  or  papillae,  extending 
over  the  whole  surface  of  the  body.  The  hands  and 
fingers  have  been  regarded  as  the  principal  organ 
of  touch ;  but  it  is  not  clear  that  there  is  naturally 
much  more  minute  delicacy  or  acute  sensations  in 
the  tendons,  fibers,  nerves,  muscles,  or  skin  of  the 
hands  and  fingers,  than  exists  internally  and  over 
the  entire  surface  of  the  body.  Yery  much  depends 
upon  the  frequent  use  of  the  hands  and  the  concen- 
tration of  the  faculties  to  their  use  in  realizing  sen- 
sations of  touch.  2.  The  sense  of  touch  is  far  mare 
extensive  than  the  other  senses  which  we  have  just 
examined ;  for  in  one  sense  it  includes  them  all  in 
itself,  possessing  the  surface  of  the  whole  physical 
frame;  yet  a  distinction  can  be  made  and  does  natu- 
rally exist  in  the  senses.  3.  The  sense  of  touch  is 
not  the  essence  or  j/roperties  which  compose  the 
nervous  system ;  but  it  is  that  power  or  influence  of 
the  mind  which  is  mysteriously  and  inseparably  con- 
nected with  the  tendons,  fibers,  nerves,  and  muscles, 
extending  its  connection  with  them  to  the  very  apex 
of  the  papillae  spread  over  the  surface  of  the  body. 
Here  it  comes  in  contact  with  and  realizes  the  exist- 
ence of  external  objects.     4.  The  sensations  of  touch 


^  THE    SENSE    OP    TOUCH. 

constitute  that  which  conveys  to  the  mind  impres- 
sions of  objects  which  affect  the  physical  organs. 
Consequent  upon  the  action  of  these  sensations  is  a 
new  state  of  mind  which  has  perceptions  of  the 
cause.  But  to  define  the  mysterious  union  of  the 
power  of  the  sensations  of  touch  with  the  physical 
organ,  or  nerves,  is  utterly  impossible. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  The  extent  and  variations  of  the  sensations  of 
touch  differ  from  those  senses  which  we  have  no- 
ticed. By  the  sense  of  smell  we  acquire  a  knowl- 
edge of  the  effluvia  or  odors  of  external  objects. 
By  the  tongue  and  palate  we  gain  a  knowledge  of 
tastes;  and  by  the  ear  we  hear  sounds.  The  knowl- 
edge gained  by  these  senses  is  restricted  to  the  sin- 
gle medium  of  appropriate  operation  peculiar  to 
each  one.  But  by  the  sense  of  touch  we  acquire 
knowledge  of  various  objects  and  of  different  quali- 
ties, such  as  solidity,  softness,  hardness,  roughness,  and 
smoothness,  and  such  as  heat,  cold,  and  extension 
and  form.  2.  The  influence  of  the  qualities  of  ex- 
ternal bodies  upon  the  mind,  through  the  medium 
of  the  sense  of  touch,  may  and  does,  to  some  extent, 
impart  a  knowledge  of  those  properties  correspond- 
ing to  the  peculiar  nature  of  their  existence.  This 
can  be  tested  by  contact  wdth  hardness,  extension, 
and  form,  solidity,  softness,  roughness,  smoothness, 
and  motion.  3.  Whether  these  properties  be  of  pri- 
mary or  of  secondary  knowledge,  in  whole  or  in 
part,  does  not  prevent  them  from  producing,  when 
brought  in  contact  with  the  sense  of  touch,  an  in- 


THE    SENSE    OF    TOUCH.  71 

tenial  sensation  or  feeling  corresponding,  to  some 
extent,  with  the  peculiar  condition,  state,  or  nature 
of  the  cause.  4.  Knowledge  in  the  mind,  which 
arises  from  these  sources,  can  not  be  perfect,  received 
only  through  the  medium  of  any  one  of  the  senses 
without  the  aid  of  other  faculties.  All  sensations 
are  in  the  mind;  and  the  idea  that  the}'  have  no 
power,  when  produced  by  external  objects,  to  influ- 
ence the  mind  in  any  way  or  to  any  degree,  as  to 
the  nature  or  properties  of  the  affecting  cause,  is  con- 
trary to  true  analysis  and  our  conceptions  of  truth. 


SECTION  III. 
1.  All  sensation  is  in  the  mind,  and  can  not  exist 
either  with  or  without  external  causes.  Sensation 
is  known  to  be  true,  and  within  itself  is  nothing  else 
than  what  it  is  felt  to  be.  2.  The  nature  of  the  sen- 
sations of  touch  is  very  different  from  the  nature  or 
qualities  existing  in  the  external  causes  of  sensation. 
External  causes  can  exist  independently  of  the  sen- 
sation of  touch,  and  sensations  may  exist  without 
any  external  cause.  But  when  we  are  brought  in 
contact  with  external  objects,  sensation  reports  the 
existence  of  such  objects  to  the  mind.  And  in  con- 
nection with  the  sensation  thus  reporting  to  or  im- 
pressing the  mind,  is  the  origin  of  the  idea  of  the 
properties  of  such  external  cause  or  causes.  3.  Con- 
nected with  the  sense  of  touch  is  the  origin  of  the 
idea  of  extension,  hardness,  roughness,  and  smooth- 
ness, and  also  of  edges,  corners,  and  sharp  points. 
The  notion  of  such  qualities  must  first  arise  in  con- 
nection with  and  be  conveyed  to  the  mind  through 


73  THE    SENSE    OF    TOUCH. 

the  medium  of  the  sense  of  touch.  And  with  it  is 
connected  the  origin  of  the  idea  of  the  form  or  the 
figure  of  bodies.  4.  Connected  with  the  sense  and 
sensation  of  touch  is  the  origin  of  our  knowledge  of 
the  temperature  of  bodies.  When  heat  and  cold 
aifect  the  organs  of  the  sense  of  touch,  the  sensa- 
tion may  be  capable  of  a  corresponding  action  in 
the  peculiar  state,  nature,  or  modulations  within 
itself.  And  with  the  nature  of  its  action  upon  the 
mind  is  the  origin  of  the  idea  of  the  qualities  caus- 
ing action ;  for  without  the  medium  of  the  sense  of 
touch  we  can  have  no  knowledge  of  either  heat  or 
cold.  o.  The  sensation  is  not  within  itself  the  idea 
or  the  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  heat  or  cold ; 
but  connected  with  the  sensation  is  the  origin  of  the 
idea  of  such  existences;  for  if  the  origin  of  such 
ideas  be  not  connected  with  the  sense  of  touch,  then 
we  can  have  no  knowledge  of  either  heat  or  cold. 
This  position  is  not  affected,  whether  the  sensations 
arise  from  internal  or  external  causes.  It  is  easy  to 
determine  whether  the  sensation  arises  from  the 
remote  apex  of  the  organ  of  touch,  or  from  some 
influence  affecting  the  internal  tendons,  fibers,  or 
nerves  of  a  healthy  system. 


SECTION  IV. 
1.  A  sentient  being  may  know  that  heat  and  cold 
do  exist^  but  as  to  the  qualities  of  realities  which 
are  called  heat  and  cold  we  know  nothing.  There 
is  a  difference  between  a  sensation  and  an  idea.  A 
sensation  may  be  immediately  antecedent  to  an 
idea,  and  we  may  form  an  idea  of  the  cause  of  a 


THE    SENSE    OF    TOUCH.  78 

sensation  after  the  sensation  is  gone ;  yet  the  origin 
of  the  idea  may  be  connected  with  sensation,  though 
that  idea  or  notion  may  be  matured  after  the  sensa- 
tion is  gone.  2.  That  the  origin  of  the  idea  of  ex- 
ternal qualities  which  affect  the  sense  of  touch,  is 
connected  with  the  sensation  of  touch,  has  been  ac- 
knowledged by  all  the  leading  philosophers  of  past 
time;  but  many  of  them  contradict  their  assumed 
premises  in  the  conclusion  of  their  own  arguments, 
by  denying  the  origin  of  our  knowledge  of  any  ex- 
ternal substance  as  being  connected  in  any  way  with 
the  sensation  of  touch.  They  have  fallen  into  this 
error  by  trying  to  keep  up  a  logical  distinction  be- 
tween'the  elements  of  mind,  severing  the  affinity  of 
their  united  being  by  wild,  abstract  analysis.  3.  In 
essence  there  is  no  similarity  between  the  sensation 
and  the  external  cause.  How  this  dissimilar  sensa- 
tion can  carry  with  it  the  origin  of  the  idea  of  the 
external  cause  we  can  not  define,  but  we  can  not 
doubt  the  fact.  Sensations  are  not  the  knowledge 
of  external  things ;  but  what  can  we  know  of  exter- 
nal objects  without  the  medium  of  the  sense  of 
touch?  It  is  the  basis  of  the  mind's  action  in 
knowing  their  existence.  4.  This  sense  can  not, 
within  itself,  convey  to  us  a  matured  hiowledge  of 
external  existences;  yet  the  sensations  may  be  af- 
fected by  tjie  qualities  of  their  cause,  sending  them, 
with  various  modulations,  to  the  mind,  and  varying 
in  degrees  of  strength.  How  far  these  can  impress 
the  mind  in  regard  to  the  qualities  of  the  external 
causes  we  can  not  tell;  but  connected  with  the  sen- 
sations of  touch  is  the  origin  of  our  knowledge  of 
the  cause  of  such  sensations. 
■7 


n 


THE    SENSE    OF    SIGHT. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

THE  SENSE  OF  SIGHT. 

SECTION  I. 
1.  The  eye  is  the  organ  of  the  sense  of  sight.  Its 
location  is  wisely  arranged  for  convenience  and  use- 
fulness, and  where  it  can  be  most  readily  defended 
from  harm  or  danger.  It  consists  of  transparent 
substances;  The  humors  are  of  various  refractive 
powers.  They  are  called  the  aqueous,  crystalline, 
and  vitreous  humors.  The  first  refraction  of  the 
rays  of  light  takes  place  when  they  fall  upon  the 
convexed  surface  of  the  cornea  of  the  eye.  This 
exterior  surface  receives  the  rays  of  light  and  trans- 
mits them  to  the  aqueous  humor.  This  transparent 
fluid  exists  between  the  cornea  and  the-  crystalline 
humor.  The  jDupil  is  the  center  of  the  iris,  and  is  the 
avenue  to  admit,  and  is  for  the  transmission  of  the 
rays  of  light  passing  from  the  aqueous  humor  to  the 
crystalline  lens.  It  is  maintained  that  here  they  are 
rerefracted  and  transmitted  to  the  retina,  which  is 
surrounded  by  the  vitreous  humor.  '2.  The  retina 
is  a  delicate  membrane,  which  lies  at  the  bottom  of 
the  eye,  and  contains  upon  it  the  expansion  of  the 
sensitive  optic  nerve.  Rays  of  light  affect  the  sense 
of  vision  while  passing  through  the  eye,  and  are 
undergoing  several  refractions;  but  they  produce 
tipon  the  retina  or  optic  nerve  the  true  image  of  the 
object  which  reflects  the  light.     This  sensitive  organ 


THE    SENSE    OF    SIGHT.  ^  75 

receives  the  image  of  tlie  external  object  impressed 
upon  it,  and  this  impression  is  the  origin  of  vision. 
The  primary  power  of  vision  is  connected  with  the 
optic  nerve,  and  connected  with  this  nerve  is  the 
origin  of  the  sensations  of  sight  which  report  to  the 
mind.  3.  The  importance  of  the  sense  of  sight  to 
our  happiness  and  knowledge  is  self-evident.  We 
can  not  fully  estimate  the  true  value  of  sight  with- 
out supposing  ourselves  to  have  been  always  de- 
prived of  it.  Yet  in  that  case  we  could  depend 
upon  others ;  therefore  we  must  try  to  imagine  the 
condition  of  the  whole  world  without  the  power  of 
vision.  One  glance  of  vision  can  survey  hill  and 
valley,  mountain  and  lake,  the  verdant  plain  and 
rock-bound  coast,  flying  clouds  and  rolling  seas.  In 
an  instant  of  time  it  traverses  a  great  variety  in  ter- 
restrial existences — matches  the  flight  of  the  vast 
globe,  then  ranges  amid  the  revolving  orbs  of  the 
planetary  universe.  But  in  the  absence  of  vision 
these  might  exist  and  move,  yet  all  would  be  night — 
eternal  night  to  us. 


,  SECTION  II. 
1.  The  mysterious  arrangement  of  the  internal 
structure  of  the  eye,  in  adapting  it  to  the  eftects  pro- 
duced by  it,  displays  a  design,  skill,  and  wisdom 
infinitely  above  the  power  of  atheistic  arguments ; 
for  it  is  conclusive  evidence  of  an  omnipotent  Crea- 
tor, who  fashioned  it  according  to  his  infinite  wis- 
dom. The  rays  of  light  are  refracted  to  a  proper 
pojnt  by  the  difierent  coats  and  humors.  The  mus- 
cular tendons   command  the  action  of  the  ball  in 


^6  THE    SENSE    OF    SIGHT. 

turning  the  pupil  to  the  desired  object.  A  circular, 
prominent,  and  strong  orbit  is  set  for  its  defense. 
It  is  protected  by  lids,  lashes,  and  glands,  secreting 
tears  which  promote  its  lubricity,  supplying  moisture, 
and,  after  washing  the  eye,  the  fluid  passes  through 
the  outlet  into  the  nose.  This  exquisite,  mysterious, 
and  successful  arrangement  can  not  be  a  result  of 
accident  or  of  chance.  2.  The  sense  of  sight  must 
be  connected  with  the  retina  or  optic  nerve.  It  is 
not  the  nerve  within  itself,  neither  is  it  the  object  of 
vision;  but  it  is  connected  and  has  its  origin  with 
the  sensitiveness  of  the  optic  nerve.  3.  When  we 
consider  the  acute  sensitiveness  of  the  optic  nerve, 
if  rays  of  light  reflected  from  objects  paint  or  im- 
press the  optic  nerve  with  the  images  of  such  objects 
in  order  that  they  may  be  seen,  may  they  not,  in 
part,  be  felt  by  the  optic  nerve  when  seen?  4.  The 
sensations  of  sight  are  awakened  when  rays  of  light 
from  the  object  of  sight  afiect  the  retina  or  optic 
nerve.  These  sensations  impress  the  mind.  A  state 
of  mind  ensues  in  which  we  have  perception  of  the 
cause  of  such  sensations.  5.  What  modern  philoso- 
phers m6an  by  ^''tJie  jpercej^tions  of  sighV  we  can 
not  understand.  If  they  mean  that  sight  has  per- 
ceptions of  objects  within  and  of  itself,  we  beg  leave 
to  differ  from  them,  as  that  would  be  utterly  impos- 
sil)le.  And  if  they  mean  that  we  can  have  percep- 
tion of  the  origin  of  sight,  by  which  we  see  an 
object,  then  sight  would  be  a  sequence  of  percep- 
tion, and  is  dependent  upon  it  for  its  existence, 
which  is  not  true.  Therefore,  there  can  be  no  such 
thing  as  the  perceptions  of  sight,  but  we  can  have 
perceptions  of  the  objects  of  sight. 


THE    SENSE    OF    SIGHT.  71f 

.     SECTION  III. 

1.  Colors  have  been  regarded  as  the  principal 
canse  of  the  sensations  of  sight.  But  as  to  how 
colors  are  produced,  or  as  to  where  they  have  .their 
origin*  is  left  in  obscurity.  They  may  ai'ise  partly 
in  the  essence  or  qualities  of  the  objects  seen,  as 
well  as  from  the  various  refracted  rays  of  light  re- 
flected from  those  objects,  and  which  fall  on  the 
power  of  vision.  Some  bodies,  and  even  some  prop- 
erties, possess  power  to  reflect  some  rays  more 
abundantly  than  others.  That  light  within  and  of 
itself  consists  of  rays  of  diftereut  colors,  unaflected 
by  contact  with  other  existences,  is  very  doubtful. 
Light  passing  through  a  glass  prism  presents  difler- 
ent  colors ;  why  can  we  not  have  the  same  result 
when  it  passes  through  prisms  of  other  transparent 
subetances?  2.  We  find,  to  some  extent,  that  colors 
vary  with  the  essence  and  qualities  of  the  objects 
refracting  and  reflecting  the  rays  of  light.  They 
may  possess  naturally  a  difference  within  themselves, 
but  if  so  we  have  no  knowledge  of  the  fact.  It  is 
more  reasonable  to  believe  that  color  arises  from  the 
nature  of  the  objects  which  reflect  the  light  to  the 
eye,  or  that  it  results  from  a  modification  of  the 
principles  of  attraction,  adhesion,  density,  or  repul- 
sion of  such  objects.  3.  It  is  light  reflected  from 
external  objects  which  affects  the  fibrous  expansion 
of  the  sensitive  optic  nerve,  and  awakens  sensations 
which  extend  to  and  impress  the  mind  of  the  exist- 
ing action  of  the  reflected  light,  together  with  the 
images  of  the  objects  which  cause  such  sensations. 
The  modulations  or  ch^ge  imparted  to  the  rays  of 

7* 


?& 


THE    SENSE     OF    SIGHT. 


light  by  the  objects  which  reflect  and  refract  them 
is  carried  by  them  to  the  sense  of  sight,  and  a  cor- 
responding sensation  extends  to  the  mind.  This  is 
reasonable,  unless  we  deny  that  sensations  are  capa- 
ble of  change  or  modulations.  4.  If  we  can  not 
deny  the  degrees^  or  that  there  is  a  difference  in  the 
strength  of  the  sensations,  which  correspond  to  the 
variations  of  the  action  of  the  rays  of  light  reflected 
from  a  bright  object,  compared  with  those  from  an 
opaque  body,  may  we  not  conclude  that  sensations 
may  vary  with  modulations  of  light  in  other  re- 
spects? But  this  fact  we  do  not  know  to  be  true: 
yet  there  is  more  reason  in  support  of  it  than  can  be 
found  on  or  in  regard  to  a  thousand  other  points 
assumed  by  philosophers  when  they  have  been  una- 
ble to  render  one  argument  in  support  of  them. 
This  far  we  can  go,  that  the  origin  of  our  knowledge 
of  visual  objects  may  be  and  is  connected  with  j:he 
sensations  of  sight. 


SECTION  IV. 
1.  We  have  power  to  modify  or  change  the  rays 
of  light  which  come  from  visual  objects  by  interven- 
ing transparent  substances,  and  correspondingly  our 
notions  of  those  objects.  Though  light  is  the  pri- 
mary object  of  sight,  yet,  in  order  to  see  external 
things,  there  must  be  objects  from  which  light  is 
reflected,  and  the  change  and  modulations  of  the 
reflected  rays  carrying  with  them  the  image  of  such 
objects  to  the  power  of  vision,  or  the  eye  of  coats, 
humors,  and  retina,  or  optic  nerve.  To  define  the 
precise  office,  nature,  and  ppwers  of  any  or  of  all 


THE    SENSE    OF    SIGHT.  W 

thesd  is  beyond  human  wisdom  or  philosophical 
analysis.  2.  The  knowledge  we  receive  through  the 
sense  of  sight.  This  sense  can  be  affected  by  gradu- 
ated rays  of  light  and  shade  coming  from  an  innu- 
merable variety  of  objects  and  qualities.  At  once 
we  see  the  relative  position  of  bodies,  with  their 
magnitude,  figure,  distance,  and  color,  aided  by  per- 
ception, suggestion,  association,  and  experience.  To 
say  that  the  sense  of  sight,  within  itself,  has  power, 
to  impart  to  us  a  full  knowledge  of  visual  objects  is 
absurd.  And  to  say  that  within  itself  it  has  no 
power  to  aid  in  arriving  at  a  knowledge  of  such 
objects  is  false;  for  our  knowledge  of  visual  ob- 
jects, as  such,  has  its  origin  with  the  sensations  of 
sight.  3.  Philosophers  have  erred  in  defining  the 
senses  so  as  to  abstract  them  from  their  affinity  to 
the  other  faculties  of  the  mind,  thereby  rendering 
them  powerless  in  aiding  to  the  real  knowledge  of 
existences,  whereas  we  should  bear  in  mind  that  the 
elements  are  forever  indivisible.  4.  Our  knowledge 
of  color  is  derived  from  the  sense  of  sight,  and  the 
origin  of  this  knowledge  is  original  with  the  power 
of  vision.  Ko  one  of  the  other  senses  can  be  in- 
volved in  the  primary  detection  of^  color.  Colcy 
may  be  a  property  inherent  in  light,  consisting  in  a 
difference  or  condition  in  the  rays  of  light  and 
shades,  refracted  and  reflected,  or  are  so  changed, 
which  is  a  result  from  contact  with  the  bodies  the 
appearance  of  which  they  present  or  impress  upon 
the  optic  nerve.  If  white  is  not  to  be  called  a  color, 
yet  it  may  be  regarded  as  the  primary  quality  from 
which  colors  gradate,  as  red,  orange,  yellow,  green, 
blue,  indigo,  and  violet.    These  are  imparted  to  the 


80  THE    SENSE    OF    SIGHT. 

mind  by  the  sensations  of  sight  only.  And  if  the 
origin  of  our  knowledge  of  color  is  conveyed  to  the 
mind  by  the  sensations  of  ^ sight,  may  not  the  pecu- 
liar manner  or  way  in  which  the  sense  of  sight  is 
affected,  produce  corresponding  sensations  in  their 
modulations  or  nature  in  regard  to  the  knowledge 
of  other  existences?  And  may  not  the  same  be  true 
of  the  other  senses?  We  know  that  philosophers 
have  taught  differently,  and  the  substance  of  their 
reasons  are  that  it  is  not  so  because  it  is  not  so,  and 
no  higher  reason  has  been  rendered  by  them. 


SECTION  V. 
1.  The  idea  of  extension  as  visual  is  not  wholly 
original  from  Sight,  but  it  is  depentlent  upon  -it  for 
self-correctness.  Light  is  the  primary  object  of  vi- 
sion, but  it  is  not  the  only  object  of  vision.  The 
modulations  and  inherent  nature  of  its  refracted  and 
reflected  rays  present  the  appearance  of  objects  to 
the  sense  of  sight.  If  the  power  of  vision  extends 
no  further  than  the  retina  of  the  eye,  and  that  vision 
consists  in  the  first  contact  of  light  with  it,  then 
when  the  image  of  an  object  was  impressed  upon 
the  optic  nerve,  it  would  continue  to  be  seen,  though 
the  object  .should  be  intercepted  with  a  cloud  or 
darkness.  May  we  not  have  power,  in  some  way, 
to  see  the  extension  of  the.  surface  of  real  bodies? 
If  there  was  one  clear  reason  to  the  reverse  we 
would  gladly  adopt  it,  and  we  will  do  so  when  such 
reason  or  reasons  are  to  be  found.  2.  If  a  solid 
body  can  present  to  the  eye  nothing  but  colors  and 
light^  will  that  prove  that  there  is  no  connection 


THE    SENSE    OF    SIGHT.  81 

existing  in  any  way  between  those  colors  and  light, 
and  the  object  which  causes  them  to  fall  on  the 
power  of  vision  ?  We  can  see  the  effect  of  a  strong 
wind,  but  we  can  not  see  the  element  itself.  But  it 
is  different  with  a  solid  body;  it  is  the  cause  of  a 
peculiar  light  and  color  as  the  effect  upon  the  eye; 
these  are  continuously  supported  there  by  the  object; 
hence,  the  light  and  color  either  see  for  us  the  cause 
which  continues  their  stay,  or  the  eye  can  see,  first, 
the  primary  objects,  light  and  color,  and,  secondly, 
by  means  of  these  the  real  objects.  If  the  optic 
nerve  has  power  to  feel  the  action  of  the  rays 
of  light  and  the  image  impressed  upon  it,  may 
it  not  have  power  by  means  of  them  to  feel  the 
object  which  causes  their  action  upon  the  nerve,  and 
continues  it  as  long  as  the  eye  is  directed  to  such 
objects?  3.  The  origin  of  our  knowledge  of  the 
extension,  figure,  and  magnitude  of  bodies,  is  prop- 
erly connected  with  the  sense  of  touch,  and  is 
strengthened  and  greatly  increased  by  the  sense  of 
sight.  Beginning  with  the  sense  of  touch  and  sight 
we  arrive  at  a  knowledge  of  the  extension  of  bodies 
by  association  and  comparison.  4.  Our  knowledge 
of  objects,  through  the  sense  of  sight  only^  is  lim- 
ited and  confused.  It  has  been  ascertained  by  re- 
moving the  cataract  from  the  eyes  of  adult  persons, 
that  at  first  visual  objects  appeared  to  be  touching 
the  eye;  and  it  requires  the  aid  of  some  of  the  other 
senses,  and  of  the  action  of  the  mind,  to  correct 
these  appearances.  But  as  all  our  senses  and  facul- 
ties are  improved  by  action  or  use,  so  is  sight,  and 
it  tends  to  correct  itself  in  regard  to  visual  objects. 


S£  THE    SENSE    OF    SIGHT. 

SECTION  YI. 
1.  If  the  sense  of  sight  has  no  power,  in  any  way, 
or  to  any  degree,  of  receiving  visible  extension, 
length,  and  breadth,  we  can  not  tell  how  we  are  to 
judge  of  the  real  size  of  objects,  as  we  can  do  but 
very  little  in  association  and  in  comparing  distant 
objects  by  the  sense  of  touch  only  2.  In  judging 
of  the  magnitude  of  msual  objects,  we  are  much 
influenced  by  the  peculiar  nature  and  way  the  mod- 
ulations of  light  strike  the  organ  of  sight,  and  in 
comparing  such  objects  with  other  objects,  the  size 
of  which  is  known.  Objects,  in  a  murky  atmos- 
phere, often  appear  larger  and  nearer  to  us  than 
they  would  in  clear  air.  This  may  be  caused  by 
their  dim  appearance,  and  the  refraction  of  the  rays 
of  light  passing  through  a  denser  atmosphere.  The 
sun  and  moon  appear  larger  in  the  horizon  than  they 
do  in  the  zenith.  The  principal  cause  of  this  is,  that 
the  rays  of  light  coming  from  them  strike  the  atmos- 
phere obliquely,  and  the  oblique  portion  of  the  at- 
mosphere, which  refracts  the  rays,  occupies  an  en- 
larged space  in  the  field  of  vision  and  subtends  a 
greater  angle  at  the  eye.  The  refraction  makes  the 
appearance  of  the  sun  and  moon  greater  than  they 
really  are,  and  this  difference  increases  in  proportion 
as  the  rays  pass  parallel  with  the  earth's  surface  in 
the  denser  part  of  the  air.  3.  ^\\q purer  the  atmos- 
phere the  more  accurate  is  our  estimation  of  the 
distance  to  objects.  And  an  object  upon  a  smooth 
plain  or  a  ship  at  sea,  where  there  are  no  interme- 
diate objects,  always  appear  to  be  nearer  to  us  than 
tliey  really  are.      4.  Our  perceptions  of  distance. 


THE    SENSE    OF    BIGHT.  $8 

throTigli  tb©  medium  of  sight,  are  principally  ao- 
quired.  This  is  clear  from  the  testimony  of  persons 
born  blind  that  have  been  suddenly  restored  to  sight. 
At  first  all  objects  appeared  to  touch  the  eye,  and 
there  was  confusion  in  locating  them ;  yet  experience 
in  associating  and  in  comparing  them  aided  in  cor- 
recting the  false  appearance.  5.  Though  the  above 
position  is  correct,  yet  we  find,  by  correct  analysis, 
that  the  primary  power  of  our  perception  of  visual 
objects  and  of  distance  is  original  or  intuitive.  Take 
a  child,  before  it  can  reason,  when  it  first  begins  to 
notice,  and  place  a  candle  near  its  face,  and  its  hand 
will  be  but  partially  extended  in  order  to  grasp  it. 
But  turn  its  face  to  the  moon  or  some  distant  object, 
and  intuitively  the  arm  will  be  extended  at  full 
length. 


84  SOUKCES     OF    KNOWLEDGE. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

PRIMARY  AND  SECONDARY  SOURCES  OF 
KNOWLEDGE. 

SECTION  I. 

1.  The  senses  may  be  regarded  as  a  secondary 
source  of  knowledge,  when  compared  with  knowl- 
edge which  is  direct,  or  is  imparted  to  the  mind  or 
spirit  as  the  result  of  the  mind's  own  internal  action, 
or  is  received  by  a  superhuman  spiritual  influence 
without  the  medium  of  physical  organs.  2.  If  mat- 
ter has  no  self-power  to  impress  or  to  move  material 
entities,  only  when  it  is  connected  with  spirit,  then 
it  follows  that  self-motion  belongs  to  spirit,  and  that 
spirit  can  impress  or  move  spirit  or  mind  independ- 
ently of  material  organs.  Therefore,  the  internal 
feelings,  influences,  and  impressions,  imparted  by 
the  infinite  Spirit  to  the  mind,  may  be  regarded  as 
knowledge  direct,  or  that  which  comes  to  us  inde- 
pendently of  any  feeble,  diseased,  and  perishable  ma- 
terial organs,  which,  from  their  nature  and  condition, 
are  liable  to  deceive  us.  Then  that  which  we  expe- 
rience from  imperishable  sources  is  not  only  knowl- 
edge direct,  but  such  sources  are  primary  sources  of 
knowledge  to  us,  and  are  worthy  of  far  more  confi- 
dence and  belief  than  any  fact  or  knowledge  we 
receive  through  the  medium  of  the  senses,  which 
are  connected  with  diseased,  deceptions,  and  perish- 
ing physical  organs.     3.  According  to  the  preceding 


S0UBCE8    OF    KNOWLEDGE.  86 

argument  the  senses  may  be  regarded  as  a  secondary 
source  of  knowledge.  And  the  order  of  this  world 
is  to  rely  upon  the  senses  in  testing  the  reality  and 
nature  of  external  things  with  the  highest  degree  of 
confidence  or  belief,  while  knowledge  of  direct  evi- 
dence to  the  mind  is  often  disregarded  and  rejected 
as  worthless.  4.  The  senses  can  not,  in  connection 
or  otherwise,  give  us  a  perfect  knowledge  of  external 
things;  otherwise  each  power  of  the  senses  would 
be  a  perfect  mind  within  itself.  But  they  are  lim- 
ited in  conveying  a  knowledge  of  external  objects, 
which,  however,  is  perfected  when  brought  under 
the  inspection  of  the  mind.  The  deception  exists 
wholly  in  the  nature  and  condition  of  the  physical 
organs. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  Spirit  being  imperishable,  is  incapable  of  dis- 
ease destroying  its  action  or  of  decay ;  but  the  phys- 
ical organs  are  subject  to  be  enfeebled  or  rendered 
inactive  by  disease,  or  they  may  be  entirely  de- 
stroyed. While  under  the  influence  of  disease  we 
can  not  depend  upon  them  with  much  certainty. 
The  correctness  of  their  reports  is  accidental,  and 
the  mind  often  has  great  difficulty  in  correcting 
wrong  impressions  which  have  been  made  by  them. 
2.  Our  reliance  upon  the  senses,  and  our  power  to 
believe  in  the  correctness  of  their  reports,  does  not 
arise  in  the  existence  and  nature  of  the  senses,  but 
has  its  origin  in  connection  with  an  internal  convic- 
tion or  consciousness  that  what  they  report  is  true. 
But  as  no  one  is  disposed  to  doubt  the  testimony  of 

8 


86  SOFKCES     OF    KNOWLEDGE. 

the  senses  when  they  are  free  from  the  power  of 
disease,  we  will  not  spend  time  in  proving  the  neces- 
sity of  greater  confidence  in  them.  3.  The  skeptic 
professes  the  most  positive  helief  in  the  existence 
and  nature  of  facts  tested  by  the  senses,  while  he 
rejects  internal  convictions  and  moral  demonstra- 
tions. A  correct  knowledge  of  external  facts  re- 
ported to  the  mind  depends  upon  intuitive  power. 
We  can  have  no  knowledge  of  external  facts,  as 
such,  but  for  the  presence  of  intuition,  to  which  all 
facts  may  be  referred  in  order  to  be  fully  known  and 
the  mind  satisfied.  If  internal  afiirmations  and  con- 
victions of  truth  are  to  be  wholly  rejected,  then  it  is 
utterly  impossible  for  us  to  have  knowledge  of  any 
existent  in  the  external  world. 


SECTION  III. 
1.  It  will  be  seen  by  the  preceding  argument  that 
i\iQ  primary  source  of  knowledge  is  contained  in  the 
internal  powers  and  nature  constituting  the  soul  or 
mind  which  possesses  self-action  and  an  immortality 
of  being.  2.  By  the  sense  of  sight  I  test  the  ap- 
pearance of  a  proposition  in  mathematics,  and  sa}'' 
that  it  is  correct,  because  the  calculation  is  based 
upon  certain  self-evident  axioms  upon  which  the 
whole  science  stands.  He  who  rejects  internal  intu- 
itions and  moral  demonstrations,  believes  all  this 
with  unwavering  confidence;  but  ask  him  how  he 
knows  such  truths  or  axioms  to  be  self  evident,  by 
which  we  understand  that  they  are  incapable  of 
either  proof  or  disproof,  and  he  will  not  refer  to  any 
one  or  all  of  the  senses  as  the  source  or  power  by 


SOURCES    OF    KNOWLEDGE.  87 

which  he  knows  them  to  be  self-evident  truths,  but 
he  has  to  refer  to  the  intuitive  principle  within  which 
only  has  power  to  receive  any  fact  as  such,  or  any 
self-evident  reality  as  such,  without  any  possibility 
of  proof.  3.  So  if  we  reject  internal  convictions, 
feelings,  and  intuitive  affirmations,  we  are  compelled 
to  reject  all  knowledge.  Then,  to  be  consistent,  wo 
must  declare  that  we  are  incapable  of  any  knowl- 
edge, and  that  our  own  existence  is  non-existence. 
4.  Then  it  follows  that  all  knowledge  of  direct  evi- 
dence to  the  mind^  and  of  which  the  mind  is  sus- 
ceptible, independently  of  the  organs  of  the  decay- 
ing earthly  tabernacle,  is  less  liable  to  deceive  us 
than  that  which  comes  through  the  medium  of  the 
senses.  Therefore  we  should  watch  to  be  directed 
by  this  internal  source  of  knowledge,  as  it  can  not 
lead  us  to  deception  or  disappointment,  either  in 
this  life  or  the  life  to  come,  if  we  strictly  adhere  to 
the  voice  and  dictates  of  conscience. 


CHAPTER  I. 

PERCEPTION. 


SECTION  I. 

1.  Perception  is  that  faculty  of  the  mind  which 
has  power  of  perceiving  internal  and  external 
changes  and  existences.  And  in  action  it  has  power 
of  perceiving  and  of  receiving  a  knowledge  of  ex- 
ternal objects  by  means  of  the  impressions  they 
make  on  the  senses,  or  it  leads  to  the  full  action  of 
the  mind  in  arriving  at  a  knowledge  of  real  exist- 
ences. 2.  Sensation  and  perception  are  regarded  as 
the  properties  of  mind,  \>y  which  we  arrive  at  a 
knowledge  of  external  things.  Sensation  refers  to 
the  physical  organs  and  their  mysterious  union  with 
the  immaterial  sensibilities,  and  perception  refers  to 
the  power  and  action  of  mental  influences  and  ele- 
ments. Perception  has  been  regarded  as  an  asso- 
ciation formed  between  the  impressions  made  upon 
the  organs  of  the  senses  and  the  external  substan- 
ces which  are  the  cause  of  such  impressions.  But 
the  acting  power  of  this  association  is  connected 
with  the  primary  elements  of  mind.  3.  Perception 
is  immediately  successive  to  the  action  of  sensation, 
or  it  arises  with  the  new  state  of  mind  which  fol- 
88 


PERCEPTION.  S$ 

lows  the  impressions  made  by  sensations.  Sensa- 
tion within  itself  can  have  no  perception  of  its  own 
existence,  nor  of  the  cause  of  such  an  existence; 
but  impressions  made  through  the  medium  of  sensa- 
tion upon  the  mind  are  followed  by  a  peculiar  state 
of  mind,  in  which  we  have  immediate  perception  of 
the  affecting  cause.  4.  Whether  perception  is  a 
seqicent  of  impressions  conveyed  by  sensations  to  the 
brain  we  know  not.  The  inlets  of  the  mind,  for 
comprehending  external  things,  appear  to  be  myste- 
riously connected  with  the  entire  nervous  system. 
The  nerves  are  connected  with  the  brain,  and  thence 
receive  their  influence.  But  this  great  medium  of 
sensation  may  not  require  sensations  to  go  from  the 
extremities  to  the  brain  before  there  can  be  any 
action  of  perception.  The  mind  may  have  power  to 
perceive  the  affecting  cause  upon  its  action  upon  the- 
organs  of  senses ;  but  to  determine  the  precise  mode 
of  operation  is  impossible. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  Perception  may  be  regarded  as  a  voluntary  act 
of  the  mind.  That  aggressive  influence  or  power 
which  strikes  out  in  maturing  a  knowledge  of  exter- 
nal objects,  requires  an  effort  of  the  mind  in  order 
to  a  full  degree  of  perception  which  can  be  retained. 
2.  Sensation  is  not  necessarily  followed  by  percep- 
tion. The  mind  may  be  employed  in  thought  or  in 
conversation,  while  a  numerous  variety  of  objects 
may  pass  through  the  field  of  vision  and  none  of 
them  be  retained  in  the  mind.  This  results  from  a 
want  of  the  perception  of  those  objects.     We  may 

8* 


f^  PEECEPTION.' 

have  experienced  the  sensations  of  them,  but  no  effort 
of  the  mind  was  made  in  retaining  the  impressions 
of  them ;  for  the  mind  must  attend  to  what  is  passing 
in  order  to  a  real  perception  of  external  objects.  3. 
To  a  limited  extent  perception  may  be  regarded  as 
involuntary.  We  may  open  our  eyes  upon  a  beau- 
tiful forest ;  the  first  tree  seen  may  claim  our  atten- 
tion till  we  suddenly  turn  away;  yet  we  may  have 
faint  perceptions  of  other  trees  in  that  forest  which 
are  still  retained  in  the  mind,  and  they  were  not 
voluntary  objects  of  either  sight  or  perception.  If 
we  cast  our  eyes  upon  a  canvas  of  pictures  and  fix 
our  mind  upon  one  of  them,  so  that  all  the  rest  are 
almost  as  though  they  did  not  exist,  yet  they  are 
unintentionally  seen,  and  our  perception  of  them  is 
involuntary.  In  leaving  our  room  in  eager  quest  of 
some  object,  we  pass  two  men  in  descending  the 
stairway,  one  small  and  the  other  large — the  percep- 
tion of  the  difierence  in  their  size  is  wholly  involun- 
tary. 4.  But  voluntary  perception  involves  an  act 
of  the  mind  in  attending  to  the  cause  of  sensations ; 
and  connected  with  this  act  or  action  of  the  mind  is 
our  perception  of  external  substances  and  qualities. 


SECTION  III. 
1.  Perception  makes  us  acquainted  with  external 
things,  and  has  its  origin  in  a  peculiar  mental  state, 
in  which  the  influence  or  action  refers  to  internal 
afi^ections  of  the  mind,  and  also  to  external  causa- 
tion. It  carries  the  mind  out  of  or  beyond  the  ex- 
istence of  self,  and  introduces  us  to  the  external 
world.     It  has  power  to  cause  external  things  to  pass 


PEECEPTION.  iS 

in  review  before  the  inspection  of  the  mind.  Per- 
ception is  not  the  only  medium  through  which  we 
are  made  acquainted  with  external  things.  Our 
knowledge  of  external  things  commences  with  sen- 
sation, and  sensation  is  a  sequence  of  the  impinge- 
ment or  of  contact  with  external  things ;  and  per- 
ception following  sensation  fully  presents  to  the 
inspection  of  the  mind  the  cause  of  such  sensations. 
2.  If  perception  should  only  be  regarded  as  an 
affection  or  influence  of  the  mind,  and  as  consequent 
upon  the  action  of  sensation  in  apprehending  exter- 
nal existences,  yet  in  reality  it  must  be  regarded  as 
more  than  a  secondary  appendage  of  psychology  or 
of  the  mind  when  we  contemplate  its  power  to  act 
in  perceiving  the  intenial  changes,  action,  and  pow- 
ers of  the  mind.  3.  If  it  could  be  separated  from 
the  primary"  elements  of  mind  and  still  retain  its 
identity  and  power  to  act  in  whole  or  in  part,  then 
we  might  reject  its  connection  in  every  way  with  the 
original  elements  of  mind.  But  its  existence  is 
either  with  or  is  dependent  on  its  connection  with 
the  existence  of  the  elements  of  mind ;  for  an  aiFec- 
tion  or  influence  of  the  mind  is  no  more  than  an 
original  element  or  elements  in  action;  otherwise 
such  an  affection  or  influence  would  be  a  divisible 
entity,  and  an  independent  active  being  within  itself 
and  superadded  to  the  mind,  which  is  absurd. 


SECTION  IT. 
1.  Out  perception  of  primary  properties  of  matter 
differs  from  that  of  sensation.     Primary  properties 
are  essential  to  the  existence  of  all  material  substan- 


92  PEECEPTION. 

ces,  and  are  known  to  be  such  as  solidity,  extension, 
figure,  and  density,  with  divisibility.  These  quali- 
ties belong  to  all  real  material  bodies;  but  as  to 
their  essence  we  know  nothing.  2.  Sensation  is  a 
result  of  contact^  in  some  w^ay,  with  external  sub- 
stances, and  implies  their  existence  as  the  cause  of 
such  sensation  or  sensations.  Perception  ref&rs  or 
leads  the  mind  to  a  knowledge  of  the  cause  of  a 
known  sensation.  3.  We  have  perception  of  the 
difference  between  ^r^'ma/y  and  secondary  ^vo'^QviiQ^ 
of  matter.  The  latter  are  such  as  hardness,  soft- 
ness, roughness,  and  smoothness,  smell,  taste,  heat, 
and  cold,  sound,  and  color.  These  may  cause  cer- 
tain effects  in  the  mind,  or  awaken  sensations  which 
are  immediately  followed  by  perception,  bringing 
the  affecting  cause  under  mental  inspection. 


FALSE    PERCEPTION.  9$ 

.HI     I  . 


CHAPTER  II. 

FALSE  PERCEPTION. 
SECTION  I. 

1.  False  perceptions  take  place  when  there  are 
no  external  objects  corresponding  with  them,  and 
which  are  the  cause  of  them.  When  there  are  no 
external  causes,  as  real  existences,  we  are  left  to 
conclude  that  false  perceptions  exist  within  ourselves 
and  in  the  mistake  which  the  mind  makes  of  its 
own  perceptions.  2.  False  perceptions  can  arise 
Jirst  in  the  organs  of  sense.  The  organs  of  sense 
can  be  affected  in  various  ways,  and  the  succeeding 
sensations  are  followed  by  perception,  as  to  the  act 
of  the  mind,  when  there  are  no  external  substances 
as  cause  of  such  sensations,  or  as  objects  of  percep- 
tion. These  organs  can  be  changed  or  affected  so 
as  to  produce  the  appearance  of  realities  by  disease 
or  by  excitement,  fear,  or  grief.  And  they  change 
within  themselves,  being  affected  by  age.  3.  Again : 
false  perceptions  may  exist  in  connection  with  the 
cTumges  in  the  states  of  the  mind.  The  mind  is 
capable  of  an  internal  error  or  delusion  in  believing 
in  the  existence  of  objects  as  real  when  they  are  not. 
It  can  be  deceived  in  its  own  conceptions  of  real 
existences.  4.  False  perceptions,  which  arise  in 
connection  with  the  organs  of  sense,  are  caused  gen- 
erally by  bodily  disorders.    These  perceptions  may 


$4:  FALSE    PEKCEPTION. 

be  corrected,  as  we  shall  notice  in  the  order  of  the 
following  section. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  By  the  concentrated  action  of  the  mind,  as  af- 
fected through  the  medium  of  the  other  senses. 
Corresponding  sensations,  resulting  from  affecting 
causes  upon  the  organs  of  sense,  contribute,  in  their 
united  appeals  to  the  mind,  toward  correcting  false 
perceptions.  2.  False  perceptions  can  be  corrected 
by  comparing  our  perceptions  of  objects  we  suppose 
to  exist  or  of  objects  which  exist  in  a  different  way 
from  their  appearance,  with  the  perceptions  of  oth- 
ers in  regard  to  them.  The  deliberate  decision  of 
several  persons,  by  means  of  the  same  organs  of 
sense,  while  in  health,  and  at  the  same  time,  will 
not  mislead.  3.  A  correction  can  be  made  by  a 
proper  exercise  of  judgment  in  comparing  with  some 
known  object.  4.  If  we  have  perception  of  two  or 
rnm^e  objects  of  the  same  or  differing  in  kind,  we 
can  turn  to  some  one  that  we  know  to  be  single,  and 
if  there  appears  to  be  more  than  one,  we  know  our 
perception  in  that  respect  to  be  false.  But  in  cor- 
recting all  false  perceptions  we  are  dependent  upon 
a  correct  exercise  of  the  judgment. 


PEBGEPTION    AND    SMELL.  95 


CHAPTER  III. 

PERCEPTION  AND  SMELL.  i 

SECTION  I. 
1.  We  will  now  turn  attention  to  our  perceptions 
of  objects  which  affect  the  mind  through  the  medium 
of  the  sense  of  smell.  The  oflSce  and  the  powers  of 
the  sense  of  smell  have  been  already  defined.  Our 
perceptions  of  the  objects  of  smell  are  successive  to 
the  sensations  of  smell.  And  these  sensations  are  a 
result  of  the  action  of  odors  or  of  effluvia  upon  the 
organs  of  smell.  Sensation  reports  its  cause,  and 
perception  brings  that  cause  under  the  inspection  of 
the  mind  in  order  that  our  knowledge  of  it  may  be 
matured.  2.  Habit,  in  relation  to  smell  and  in  de- 
tecting qualities,  tends  to  higher  maturity  by  re- 
peated and  continuous  effort  in  discriminating  differ- 
ences. If  there  are  habits  of  smell,  and  if  this 
sense  can  be  cultivated,  it  follows  that  there  must  be 
something  capable  of  being  cultivated.  This  culti- 
vation is  not  acquired  by  the  physical  organs  ab- 
stractly, but  is  conferred  upon  them  by  the  action 
of  the  immaterial  influence  or  powder  connected  with 
them,  and  the  direction  of  the  mind  to  them.  3. 
The  origin  of  our  knowledge  of  the  existence  and  of 
the  difference  in  odors  commences  with  the  sensa- 
tions of  smell.  May  not  the  modulations  and  nature 
of  the  sensations  of  smell  impress  the  mind  favora- 
bly to  the  knowledge  of  the  affecting  cause,  and  the 


06  PERCEPTION    AND    SMELL. 

qualities  of  that  cause?  We  know  that  our  knowl- 
edge of  the  degrees  or  difference  in  the  strength  of 
odors  commences  with  and  is  conveyed  to  the  mind 
by  sensation.  And  why  may  not  sensations  affect 
the  mind  in  some  way,  and  to  a  limited  degree,  as  to 
the  qualities  of  the  cause  of  such  sensations?  To 
say  they  do  not  is  more  absurd  than  to  say  they  do. 
But  to  say  and  to  prove  either  position  to  be  clearly 
true  is  impossible. 

SECTION  II. 
1.  If  it  is  impossible  for  sensations  to  affect  the  mind 
in  any  way  corresponding  \q>  the  object  and  qualities 
of  its  cause,  then  there  is  no  connection  between 
the  action  of  sensation  and  that  of  perception.  Then 
when  we  receive  sensations  from  the  smell  of  a  rose 
or  jasmin,  we  would  be  as  apt  to  have  percep- 
tion of  a  rock  or  mountain  as  the  cause  as  any  other 
existent;  and  our  perception  as  to  the  true  cause 
being  wholly  unguided,  would  be  accidental  in  its 
results.  2.  If  there  is  no  connection  between  sensa- 
tion, and  perception  it  would  be  true  that  when  we 
have  sensation  we  may  or  may  not  have  perception ; 
and  if,  in  any  case,  perception  is  immediately  suc- 
cessive to  sensation,  it  could  only  be  regarded  as  an 
accident.  Hence,  it  is  reasonable  to  believe  that 
sensation,  in  some  way,  impresses  the  mind  to  a 
limited  degree  as  to  the  nature  or  properties  of  its 
cause,  and  that  perception  brings  that  cause  under 
the  inspection  of  the  mind.  3.  It  requires  all  the 
elements  of  mind  to  constitute  a  sentient  being,  and 
each  one  contributes  in  its  ofBce  and  action  to  our 


PEBOEPTION    AND    SMELL.  W 

knowledge.  Dr.  Abercrombie  mentions  a  blind  phi- 
losopher who  could  distinguish  a  black  dress  by  the 
smell  of  it.  The  origin  of  this  knowledge  did  not 
commence  with  perception,  but  with  sensation.  And 
the  sensation  of  smell,  in  this  case,  appears  to  have 
impressed  the  mind  with  a  knowledge  of  the  object 
and  some  of  its  qualities  unaided  by  the  other 
senses.  Mr.  Stewart  speaks  of  James  Mitch  el,  who 
was  deaf,  speechless,  and  blind,  yet  by  smell  he 
could  detect  the  presence  of  a  stranger  and  give  the 
direction  to  him.  This  knowledge  of  the  stranger 
and  of  the  direction  to  him  commenced  with  the 
sensations  of  smell,  and  that  without  the  aid  of  the 
other  senses.  In  this  case  the  mind  must  have  been 
influenced  to  correct  decisions,  in  some  way,  by  the 
peculiar  nature  or  character  of  the  sensations  of 
smell.  4.  Sensation  reports  the  cause  of  its  exist- 
ence to  the  mind,  and  perception  hrings  that  cause 
under  the  full  inspection  of  the  mind,  the  result  of 
which  is  real  knowledge. 

9 


\   .1 

XL 


fi  PERCEPTION    AND    TASTE. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

PERCEPTION  AND  TASTE. 

SECTION  I. 
1.  Our  perception  of  objects  which  affect  the 
mind,  through  the  medium  of  the  sense  of  taste^ 
should  be  carefully  examined.  It  has  been  said 
that  sixteen  different  simple  tastes  exist.  In  the 
different  combinations  there  are  almost  innumerable 
modifications,  as  in  the  degrees  of  strength,  intens- 
ity, and  weakness,  quickness,  and  slowness.  The 
properties  of  external  substances  which  affect  the 
organs  of  taste,  awakening  sensations,  are  called 
flavors.  Our  perceptions  of  these  flavors  or  proper- 
ties properly  follow  the  sensations  of  taste.  2.  Habit^ 
in  relation  to  taste,  enables  us  to  distinguish  differ- 
ences by  repeated  or  continuous  efforts.  In  this  way 
the  epicurean  distinguishes  the  flavor  and  qualities 
of  the  luxuries  of  the  table  to  a  degree  which  would 
pass  unnoticed  by  others.  And  in  the  same  way 
the  physician  can  tell  the  difference  in  drugs  which 
are  similar  in  appearance,  and  also  in  taste,  to  one 
not  accustomed  to  them. 


SECTION  II. 
1.    Tinder  the  law  of  Tidbit  some  wine-dealers,  by 
the  repeated  exercise  of  this  sense,  are  said  to  have 
increased  its  strength  and  power  of  discrimination 


PEECEPTION    AND    TA8TB.  96 

till  they  could  distinguish  the  flavor  of  one  wine 
from  that  of  another,  and  tell  where  each  or  all  were 
made.  2.  The  proper  direction  of  the  action  of  per- 
ception toward  the  true  cause  which  affects  the  sense 
of  taste,  must  be,  to  a  limited  extent,  connected  with 
and  dependent  on  the  nature  or  modulations  of  the 
sensation  received ;  for  if  there  is  no  connection  in 
this  respect,  or  in  any  way,  our  perception  as  to 
being  immediately  successive  to  sensation,  and  in 
bringing  the  true  cause  of  such  sensation  to  the 
attention  and  inspection  of  the  mind,  would  be 
wholly  an  accident. 


100  PERCEPTION    AND    HEARING, 


CHAPTER  V. 

PERCEPTION  AND  HEARING. 

SECTION  I. 
1.  The  perception  we  have  of  objects  which  affect 
the    mind    through    the   medium   of  the   sense  of 
hearing  is  worthy  a  passing  notice.     The  sense  of 
hearing  is  more  acute  in  some  persons  than  in  oth- 
ers, yet  the  power  of  discriminating  sounds  and  the 
difference  in  tones  or  modulations  of  sound  may  be 
cultivated.     2.  The  sense  of  hearing  has  not  within 
and  of  itself  the  jpower  of  perceimng  the  affecting 
cause,  neither  can  we  have  simultaneous  perception 
of  the  action  of  external  things  or  of  sounds  upon 
the  organs  of  hearing.     All  we  can  have  is  sensa- 
tion, and  sensation  may  be  strong  or  weak,  corre- 
sponding to  the  cause.    3.  The  sound  of  a  cannon  pro- 
duces a  stronger  sensation  than  that  of  a  rifle.     Who 
can  say  that  perception  receives  no  influence  as  to 
the  cause  of  sensations,  from  the  peculiar  way  they 
affect  the  mind?     If  mind  was  divisible,  then  this 
might  be  impossible.     But  the  elements  of  mind 
can  not  be  abstracted,  like  blocks  of  marble,  from 
the  same  mountain,  and  examined  by  the  rules  of 
superfices  and  solids  and  the  laws  governing  inert 
elements.     All  the  elements  of  mind  are  operative, 
and  are  connected  together  in  constituting  the  living 
soul,  and  they  can  and  do  influence  each  other,  and 
also  each  one  of  them  the  whole  mind. 


PEECEPTION    AND    HEARING.  101 

SECTION  II. 

1.  The  application  of  Ticibit  to  the  sense  of  hear- 
ing renders  the  power  of  hearing  more  acnte  as 
repeated  efforts  are  made.  There  are  instances  of 
blind  persons  who  can  call  the  names  of  persons 
from  the  sound  of  their  voices,  though  they  may  not 
have  heard  them  for  several  years.  Others  can  tell 
when  they  are  approaching  a  precipice  or  a  wall,  by 
the  peculiar  sound  of  their  feet  upon  the  ground. 
2.  If  there  is  no  connection  in  any  way  between  sen- 
sations produced  by  sound  and  our  perception  of 
the  cause  of  such  sensations,  then  our  perception  of 
the  true  cause  may  be  accidental.  3.  Our  knowl- 
edge of  the  existence  of  sonorous  bodies  commences 
with  the  sensations  of  hearing.  Sensation  and  per- 
ception hold  a  peculiar  relationship  to  each  other, 
from  the  fact  that  they  may  and  do  belong  to  one 
and  the  same  mind. 

9* 


\b 


102  PERCEPTION    AND    TOUCH 


CHAPTER  VI. 

PERCEPTION   AND   TOUCH.  feci  M 


SECTION  I. 

1.  We  eayperience  perceptions  of  objects  which 
affect  the  mind  through  the  medium  of  the  sense  of 
touch.  The  sense  of  touch  is  more  extensive  than 
any  other  one  of  the  senses,  from  the  fact  that  in 
one  sense  it  includes  all  the  other  senses.  2.  It  in- 
creases in  proportion  to  repeated  efforts  in  appre- 
hending external  bodies.  And  our  perception  of 
external  existences  is  clear  in  proportion  to  the 
acuteness  of  touch  through  which  such  existences 
are  reported  to  the  mind.  3.  Habit  in  regard  to 
touch  increases  its  strength  as  we  rely  on  and  attend 
to  its  repeated  action,  .  And  in  proportion  to  the 
increase  of  the  exquisite  acuteness  in  detecting  and 
rep'jrtitjg  ^>;terijal  substances  to  the  mind,  is  the 
clearness  and  proper  action  of  our  perception  in 
bringing  such  substances  before  the  mind. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  Blind  persons  can,  with  greater  safety,  pass  all 
through  a  house  in  a  dark  night  than  any  one  who 
has  the  power  of  vision.  Some  of  them  can  tell  the 
distance  to  a  burning  fire  by  the  action  and  degree 
of  heat,  and  also  of  approaching  contact  with  exter- 
nal bodies  by  the  peculiar  action  of  the  air.     And 


PERCEPTION    AND    TOUCH.  103 

by  the  sense  of  tonch  they  can  be  taught  to  read  by 
means  of  large  raised  letters,  which  are  made  by 
heavy  type.  The  sense  of  touch  can  be  so  cultiva- 
ted that  they  can  have  perception  of  the  different 
letters,  and  read  correctly  when  as  many  as  four 
thicknesses  of  a  silk  handkerchief  intercepts  be- 
tween their  fingers  and  the  letters.  2.  Our  knowl- 
edge of  that  which  affects  the  sense  of  touch  com- 
mences with  the  sensations  of  touch,  and  k  more 
fully  developed  to  the  mind  by  the  action  and  power 
of  perception. 


104:  PERCEPTION    AND    SIGHT. 


CHAPTER,VII. 

PBKCEPTION  AND  SIGHT. 

SECTION  I. 
1.  OvR perception  of  objects  which  affect  the  mind 
through  the  medium  of  the  sense  of  sight  is  worthy 
of  attention.  Expansion  of  surface  and  color  have 
been  regarded  as  primary  objects  of  vision,  but  that 
of  distance  and  magnitude  have  been  rejected.  Yet 
it  is  maintained  that  we  can  judge  of  limited  distan- 
ces by  sight  alone.  If  we  can  judge  of  small  distan- 
ces by  sight  alone,  why  not,  to  some  extent,  judge  of 
greater  distances  aided  by  the  same  power?  2.  The 
inclination  of  the  axis  of  vision^  which  directs  both 
eyes  to  the  same  object,  and  the  peculiar  way  in  which 
the  reflected  rays  of  light  fall  on  the  eyes,  appears 
to  give  rise  to  an  influence  which  affects  the  mind 
in  deciding  upon  the  true  distance  of  such  an  object. 
To  touch  any  object  immediately  before  us  with  one 
eye  closed  is  accidental,  but  certain  with  the  aid  of 
both.  3.  A  child,  before  it  can  reason  or  compare, 
shows  an  intuitive  knowledge  of  distance  ly  sight^ 
in  extending  its  hand  no  farther  than  the  desired 
object  when  it  is  near,  and  at  full  length  when  the 
object  is  distant.  Our  knowledge  of  the  distance 
and  magnitude  of  visual  objects  commences  with 
the  sensations  of  sight.  In  some  way  sensations 
appear  to  be  conveyed  to  the  brain  and  nervous  sys- 
tem, which  are  followed  by  perception ;  but  to  define 


PEBCEPTION    AND    SIGHT.  "405 

this  process,  or  to  tell  how  the  mind  is  connected  with 
and  is  affected  by  the  nervous  system,  is  impossible. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  Hdhit^  in  relation  to  the  power  of  vision,  ren- 
ders it  acute  in  detecting  the  existence  of  objects. 
And  in  proportion  as  we  try  to  discriminate  visual 
objects  will  we  have  clear  perception  of  the  objects 
which  affect  the  organs  of  sight.  By  continued 
effort  the  mariner  can  discover  a  ship  as  it  nears  in 
the  distance,  when  it  can  not  be  seen  by  a  person 
not  accustomed  to  maritime  observations;  and  he 
can  call  its  name  when  nothing  more  than  a  blur 
can  be  seen  by  the  untrained  eye  upon  the  surface 
of  the  ocean.  Under  the  law  of  habit  there  is  a 
quick  and  vigorous  action  of  the  power  of  vision, 
and  in  proportion  to  its  improvement  is  the  clear- 
ness and  power  of  our  perception  of  visual  objects. 
2.  A  man  existing  without  the  power  of  hearing 
may  supply  the  defect,  to  a  limited  extent,  by  the 
Tidbits  of  sight.  We  know  a  man  who  has  not  heard 
the  sound  of  speech  for  al>out  twenty  years ;  yet  he 
can  converse  with  us  without  much  difficulty,  by 
watching  the  expression  of  the  countenance  and  the 
motion  of  the  lips.  3.  The  keen  discrimination  of 
visual  objects  and  qualities,  which  is  possessed  by 
the  deaf  and  dumb,  gives  evidence  that  the  senses 
can  be  cultivated,  and  that  in  the  absence  of  some 
of  them  others  can  be  so  cultivated  as  to  supply  the 
loss  sustained  to  a  considerable  extent.  4.  If  the 
mind  could  exist  without  having  access  to  external 
things,  through  the  medium  of  the  senses,  how  could 


lOd  PERCEPTION     AND    SIGHT. 

we  have  perception  of  ex.smal  things  f  It  is  evi- 
dent that  the  action  of  perception,  in  one  respect, 
has  its  origin  in  connection  with  the  states  of  mind 
caused  by  sensations;  and  if  these  states  of  mind 
are  not  influenced  in  any  way  by  the  modulations 
and  nature  of  the  sensations  received,  and  if  these 
sensations  do  not  correspond  in  any  way  with  the 
nature  and  qualities  of  their  cause,  then  there  is  no 
connection  between  sensation  and  perception ;  hence, 
any  action  of  perception  in  perceiving  and  in  bring- 
ing under  the  inspection  of  the  mind  the  true  cause 
of  a  certain  sensation,  is  wholly  accidental.  But 
this  is  not  true,  for  a  connection  does  exist,  from  the 
fact  that  they  may  and  do  belong  to  one  and  the 
same  mind. 


HABIT    IN    RELATION    TO    PERCEPTION.  107 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

HABIT  IN  RELATION  TO  PERCEPTION. 
SECTION  I. 

1.  Habit,  in  relation  to  perception,  should  not 
pass  unnoticed.  It  has  been  said  that  men,  chil- 
dren, idiots,  and  brutes  acquire  perceptions  by  habit  j 
that  they  are  not  original  with  them.  Our  remem- 
brance of  past  events  or  existences  may  be  regarded 
as  weak  or  strong  in  proportion  to  the  interest  we 
had  in  them.  2.  "We  have  many  perceptions  wliich 
are  not  remembered  for  the  want  of  attention  and 
interest  in  them,  and  by  them  our  knowledge  is  not 
increased;  yet  when  a  necessity  awakens  mental 
exercise  in  attending  to  them,  they  can  be  called  up 
as  auxiliaries  in  forming  correct  decisions.  3.  There 
is  a  law  of  hdbit^  in  relation  to  perception,  under 
which  we  may  delineate  the  natural  method  or  proc- 
ess of  its  action.  Perception  is  connected  with  the 
existence  and  action  of  the  powers  of  the  mind ;  yet 
its  action  in  perceiving  is  at  first  weak  and  confused. 
That  it  depends  upon  habit  for  the  origin  of  its  ex- 
istence is  impossible. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  By  rejpeated  efforts  perception  is  increased  in 
power  and  its  action  is  made  rapid,  easy,  and  is 


108  HABIT    IN    RELATION    TO    PERCEPTION. 

matured.  Its  maturity  depends  upon  distinct  and 
successive  acts.  2.  Though  objects  of  many  forms 
and  of  diflPerent  elements  may  be  simultaneously 
presented  to  the  eye,  yet  our  perception  of  them  all 
can  only  be  regarded  as  concentrated  mto  one  act. 
And  if  there  is  naturally  a  distinct  difference,  the 
true  order  can  not  be  clearly  defined.  3.  The  acts 
of  perception,  in  perceiving  the  different  forms  of  an 
object,  are  so  rapid  that  the  effect  upon  us,  in  regard 
to  all  of  them,  may  be  said  to  be  instantaneous. 
The  power  of  perceiving  is  connected  with  the  states 
and  elements  of  mind. 


■m 


giHsion  CJirb 


CHAPTER  I. 

OUR  KNOWLEDGE  OF  THE   DEFINITE  AND  CONTIN- 
GENT   PHENOMENA  OF   THOUGHT. 

SECTION  I. 

1.  It  has  been  said  that  the  phenomena  of  mind 
consists  of  certain  thoughts  and  feelings^  and  that 
the  true  inquiry  is  as  to  the  order  in  wiiich  they 
arise,  and  of  what  these  elements  are  constituted? 
Though  they  are  of  great  importance,  yet  we  can 
not  imagine  that  within  themselves  they  constitute 
all  of  mind.  2.  Thought  exists  in  the  mind,  or  it  is 
that  which  is  formed  in  the  mind  as  an  idea  or  con- 
ception. Thought  may  be  formed  by  the  united  ac- 
tion of  mental  elements.  It  can  arise  in  connection 
with  internal  spontaneous  affirmations,  or  from  the 
affecting  influence  of  imagination,  or  from  con- 
science. At  certain  states  of  the  mind  thoughts 
appear  to  arise  in  one  connected  chain,  and  at  other 
times  and  under  different  circumstances,  they  have 
a  more  abstracted  existence.  3.  We  can  not  doubt 
the  real  existence  of  thought  in  connection  with  the 
mind's  states.  Of  the  existence  and  action  of 
thought  we  can  ibrm  some  idea  and  have  a  satisfac- 
tory knowledge.  The  nature  of  elements,  which 
have  been  called  the  original  elements  of  thought, 
10  109 


110        PHENOMENA  OF  THOUGHT. 

can  not  be  clearly  defined,  though  they  must  have 
their  origin  in  connection  with  the  existence  and 
action  of  the  primary  elements  of  the  mind.  4. 
Thought  is  that  which  the  mind  thinks,  and  it  may 
be  said  to  be  tliat^  in  part,  which  acts  in  thinking. 
And  it  is  that  which  is  prominent  and  leads  in  cogi- 
tation, reflection,  contemplation,  and  meditation. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  Thought  is  not  only  real  within  and  of  itself, 
but  it  expresses  acticm,^  as  in  thinking.  It  is  the  act 
or  operation  of  the  mind  when  attending  to  any  par- 
ticular subject  or  existent,  and  in  another  sense  it 
may  be  regarded  as  the  idea  consequent  on  that  ope- 
ration. 2.  The  mind  may  act,  in  pursuing  any  sub- 
ject, by  a  succession  of  thoughts.  One  thought 
introduces  another  thought,  in  accordance  with  a 
certain  order  which  is  preserved  in  the  succession 
of  thoughts.  Some  thoughts  seem  to  be  a  result  of 
other  thoughts,  by  which  some  persons  have  sup- 
posed the  latter  could  have  been  predicted  by  a 
strict  observance  of  the  nature  of  the  former;  but 
the  idea  of  their  inseparable  union  is  only  a  mere 
sequence  of  their  near,  yet  distinct  relationship. 
Though  any  train  of  thoughts  may  be  said  to  be 
invariably  found  together,  yet  the  mind  is  only  capa- 
ble of  a  peculiar  order  of  divisible  succession  of 
thoughts.  All  that  we  can  know  of  the  phenomena 
of  thought  is  the  result  of  observation  aided  by 
experience.  3.  Thought  can  not  exist  as  a  part  of 
the  mind  if  separated  from  it.  Hence,  our  thoughts 
are  nothing  more  than  the  mind  itself  in  a  peculiar 


■>■ 


mpi^wi^^p^wp 


PHENOMENA    OF    THOUGHT. 


Ill 


way  or  in  different  states ;  yet  the  proper  office  of 
thought  has  been  defined.  4.  The  importance  of 
thought  to  our  heing^  knowledge^  and  happiness  is 
forever  beyond  all  power  of  description.  By  con- 
tinued thought  the  student  ever  expands  the  powers 
of  his  mind  with  useful  knowledge.  Think,  think, 
always  thinking,  is  the  motto  of  true  greatness.  It 
will  lead  to  the  possession  of  that  true  eminence 
where  the  mind,  with  triumphant  composure,  scorns 
the  perishable  glory  of  earthly  fame. 


,^1 


lis  IDEAS. 


CHAPTER  II. 

IDEAS. 

SECTION  I. 
1.  The  term  idea,  as  that  of  notion,  applies  to 
that  which  perceives  or  observes  in  the  mind ;  hence 
the  form  or  image  of  any  thing  in  the  mind  pos- 
sessed by  it  for  contemplation  or  inspection.  It  ex- 
ists in  the  mind,  and  can  be  a  result  of  mental 
action.  2.  Our  ideas  may  be  said  to  vary  with  or 
to  correspond  to  their  objects  in  regard  to  their 
nature  and  mode  or  condition  of  existence.  3.  Our 
idea  of  physical  existences  may  be  regarded  as  con- 
tingent^ from  the  fact  that  it  is  natural  for  us  to  have 
conceptions  of  them  as  mutable,  and  that  it  is  pos- 
sible for  the  power  that  made  them  to  cause  tliem  to 
cease  to  be.  4.  Our  idea  of  physical  entities  may 
be  said  to  be  relative^  as  the  very  notion  of  that 
which  has  bounds  or  finity  will  suggest  the  oppo- 
site, which  is  infinity  or  non-limitation.  5.  Our  idea 
of  duration  may  be  regarded  as  absolute.  We  know 
that  duration  is  and  must  continue,  and  that  its  an- 
nihilation is  impossible. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  Our  idea  of  space  has  been  said  to  be  necessary 
or  absolute.    To  conceive  of  the  annihilation  of  all 
physical  entities  is  possible,  but  to  conceive  of  the 


IDEAS.  113 

annihilation  of  unbounded  space  is  utterly  impossi- 
ble. Hence,  the  idea  of  space  is  necessary ;  for  we 
can  have  conception  of  the  real  existence  of  the 
object  of  such  an  idea,  and  to  try  to  conceive  of  the 
non-existence  of  space  is  beyond  our  power.  2. 
Our  idea  of  apace  is  absolute^  which  arises  from  the 
condition  of  its  existence.  We  are  immediately 
impressed  of  the  fact;  and  our  belief  is  unwavering 
that  space  must  be,  and  that  it  can  not  cease  to  be. 
Though  we  can  conceive  of  the  non-existence  of  all 
physical  elements,  yet  to  doubt  the  existence  of 
space  is  impossible.  3.  The  idea  of  space  implies 
the  absence  of  limitMion.  We  can  not  conceive  of 
it  only  as  real  and  infinite.  Our  ideas  of  material 
elements,  or  of  the  finite,  are  contingent  and  rela- 
tive; and  those  of  space,  or  of  the  infinite,  are 
necessary  and  absolute.  These  exist  in  the  mind, 
and  are  distinct  in  their  orders.  4.  If  the  idea  of 
space  and  of  the  infinite  is  necessary  and  absolute^ 
60  may  we  regard  the  idea  of  cause.  Therefore,  it 
is  reasonable  for  the  Atheist,  when  looking  on  the 
works  of  nature,  which  are  sequences,  to  intuitively 
infer  a  cause  of  their  existence,  and  to  believe  that 
Buch  a.  cause  is  all-powerful  and  all- wise,  from  the 
vastness  and  skill  evidenced  in  visual  and  tangible 
existences. 

SECTION  III. 

1.  If  effects  or  events  are  contingent  and  rdati/ve^ 

their  very  existence  infers  and  even  demonstrates 

the  existence  of  a  cause ;  for  they  could  not  create 

themselves  and  arrange  themselves  with  such  infi- 

10* 


114  IDEAS. 

nite  wisdom.  2.  But  though  we  are  finite,  yet  the 
idea  of  personal  identity,  or  of  self,  is  necessary. 
The  knowledge  we  have  of  our  own  existence  is  real, 
and  to  doubt  it  is  utterly  impossible.  3.  Hence,  the 
Atheist  is  compelled  to  acknowledge  the  existence 
of  self^  and  that  God  is  necessarily  the  author  of 
such  existence,  and  to  whom  he  is  reasonably  and 
lawfully  amenable. 


SECTION  lY. 
1.  Though  our  idea  of  self  is  necessary,  yet  our 
idea  of  the  phenomena  of  mind  may  be  regarded  as 
contingent.  We  have  intuitive  knowledge  of  self; 
but  the  mind  is  composed  of  many  faculties,  and 
each  faculty,  in  existence  and  action,  holds  a  certain 
relation  to  the  other  faculties.  2.  ^j primary  ele- 
ments of  mind,  we  are  to  understand  the  original 
elements,  first  in  order  of  time.  The  appropriate 
position  and  action  of  the  primary  powers  relatively 
to  each  other  will  be  defined  in  analyzing  those  pow- 
ers. It  will  be  seen  that  some  faculties  which  have 
been  defined  as  primary  by  some  philosophers,  are 
dependent  for  their  existence  upon  other  faculties. 
And  the  idea  that  there  are  only  two  or  three  pri- 
mary elements  in  mind  is  absurd.  3.  Intuitive  ele- 
ments, which  have  been  denominated  primary  ele- 
ments, apprehend  their  objects,  the  action  arising 
from  intuition.  Each  one  unites  in  testing  and  re- 
ceiving truths  as  knowledge  by  a  simple  intuitive 
inspection,  and  independently  of  argument  or  tes- 
timony. 


KNOWLEDGE    WITHOUT    TESTIMONY.      115 


CHAPTER  III. 

POWER  OF  KNOWLEDGE   WITHOUT  TESTIMONY. 

SECTION  I. 
1.  The  primary  elements  of  mind  may  be  regarded 
as  the  axioms,  or  self-evident  truths,  within  them- 
selves, which  are  the  foundation  of  the  philosophy 
of  mind.  Tliat  they  have  a  real  existence,  and  that 
such  existences  are  true  within  themselves,  is  knowl- 
edge which  we  have  no  power  to  doubt;  and  the 
primary  elements  are  truths,  the  reality  and  correct- 
ness of  which  are  incapable  of  either  proof  or  dis- 
proof. 2.  There  is  no  possible  way  of  proving  the 
axioms  or  self-evident  truths,  which  are  the  founda- 
tion of  mathematical  science,  to  be  either  true  or 
false,  yet  we  receive  them  as  truths.  The  power  to 
do  this  is  not  contained  in  those  axioms  or  truths, 
but  it  lies  back  of  all  these,  and  can  only  exist  in 
the  intuitive  powers  of  mind.  Therefore,  it  is  more 
reasonable  for  us  to  regard  the  primary  elements  of 
mind  as  self-evident  truths;  for  our  knowledge  of 
them,  and  of  all  other  facts  or  objects,  turns  upon 
their  intuitive  power  to  know  them  to  be  true,  and 
to  reject  that  which  is  false.  3.  The  primary  ele- 
ments of  mind  are  truths  known  to  be  true  only 
from  the  fact  that  we  know  them  to  be  such ;  and 
all  the  power  we  have  of  knowing  any  thing  of  their 
existence,  nature,  action,  or  of  ^ny  other  truth  or 
fact  in  the  vast  universe,  arises  in  connection  with 


^mmii^^F^''mmi^!^^^^^m^9^l^^^mmm'mmmmmmm^ 


116      KNOWLEDGE    WITHOUT    TESTIMONY. 

and  from  the  existence,  nature,  and  action  of  these 
original  elements.  ^^ 


SECTION  II. 
1.  We  can  not  arrive  at  a  knowledge  of  their  ex- 
istence by  any  form  of  argument  or  from  any  exter- 
nal testimony.  They  are  their  own  witnesses,  testi- 
fying within,  of,  and  to  themselves,  of  their  own 
existence,  which  is  knowledge.  2.  With  them  is  the 
origin  of  the  power  to  receive  within  and  of  them- 
selves the  knowledge  of  their  own  existence.  3. 
With  them  is  the  origin  of  the  power  to  arrive  at 
and  to  know  truth  in  regard  to  external  things,  either 
without  or  from  testimony. 


m 


HP 

W^'  KNOWLEDGE    FBOM    TESTIMONY.  IIT 


'       CHAPTER  IV. 

KNOWLEDGE    FROM    TESTIMONY. 
SECTION  I. 

1.  We  have  intuitive  power  to  arrive  at  a  knowl- 
edge of  facts  and  of  truth  from  testimony.  The  im- 
mediate self-knowledge  we  have  of  external  tilings 
is  tested  by  and  received  through  the  medium  of  the 
senses;  but  the  greater  part  of  our  knowledge,  in 
regard  to  such  existences,  is  obtained  from  other 
persons  upon  the  evidence  of  testimony.  2.  Testi- 
mony is  a  solemn  declaration  or  attestation  made  for 
the  purpose  of  establishing  or  making  known  some 
fact.  Testimony  is  the  declaration  of  a  fact,  and 
evidence  is  the  eifect  of  that  declaration  on  the 
mind,  or  the  degree  of  light  imparted  by  it.  Facts 
are  received  by  us  from  personal  observation  far 
more  readily  than  from  the  declaration  of  others. 
We  must  first  have  confidence  in  the  ability  and 
veracity  of  the  narrator  in  order  to  give  full  cre- 
dence to  the  facts  revealed.  If  what  he  says  comes 
true,  we  believe  him  more  readily  at  another  time ; 
but  if  once  deceived,  his  future  testimony  is  apt  to 
be  rejected.  We  can  believe  the  statements  of  a 
tried  friend  more  readily  than  we  can  those  of  a 
stranger.  3.  Our  intuitive  power^  which  is  referred 
to  in  the  reception  and  belief  of  external  facts,  is 
influenced  by  the  corresponding  agreement  of  such 
facts  with  those  already  known.     We  should  look 


*  ■■# 


118  KNOWLEDGE    FEOM    TESTIMONY. 

well  to  the  evidence  upon  which  we  receive  facts, 
and  to  the  capacity  of  the  narrator.  A  weak  mind 
is  apt  to  have  boundless  credulity,  and  seldom  ever 
thinks  or  reasons  for  itself.  The  contracted  mind  is 
generally  captious,  skeptical,  and  always  inclined  to 
reason  from  imperfect  premises,  and  arrives  at 
false  conclusions.  An  ignorant  mind  or  person  re- 
jects the  testimony  of  all  philosophers.  He  believes 
the  earth  to  be  flat  and  its  position  fixed  immovably. 
He  gives  only  one  foot  diameter  to  the  sun,  and 
drives  him  through  the  heavens.  4.  When  we  are 
limited  in  our  views  and  acquirements,  there  is  a 
tendency  to  rely  on  our  experience,  and  to  reject  all 
knowledge  for  which  we  have  not  the  evidence  of 
our  senses.  A  proper  und'erstanding  of  self,  and  of 
the  true  method  of  arriving  at  a  knowledge  of  ex- 
ternal facts,  will  remedy  false  perceptions  and  con- 
clusions. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  In  judging  of  the  credibility  of  any  fact  from 
testimony,  we  are  not  to  rely  wholly  upon  our  expe- 
rience of  similar  events,  but  we  must  proceed  upon 
the  knowledge  which  we  have  received  by  other 
means  of  the  nature  or  properties  of  that  which  is 
presented  for  our  inspection.  2.  We  can  receive 
facts  upon  the  authority  of  testimony,  and  the  power 
we  have  to  receive  them  must  have  its  origin  in 
intuition.  The  conclusive  action  of  this  constitu- 
tional power  turns  upon  the  fact  that  the  witness  is 
honest.  3.  T\iq princijpal  ground  of  our  credence  is, 
that  the  witness   had   a  suflicient  opportunity  of 


w 


KNOWLEDGE    FROM    TESTIMONY.  119 

knowing  the  facts  set  forth  in  his  testimony,  that  he 
was  capable  of  judging  correctly,  and  that  he  was 
not  improperly  influenced  in  testifying.  4.  Our 
confidence  is  increased  in  proportion  to  the  number 
of  tried  witnesses  who  unite  in  the  same  testimony. 
This  kind  of  testimony  the  whole  world  of  intelli- 
gences are  in  the  habit  of  receiving  and  of  believ- 
ing. The  principal  foundation  of  incredulity  is  ig- 
norance. The  enlightened  mind,  in  forming  correct 
conclusions,  is  influenced  by  a  thousand  contingen- 
cies, which  pass  wholly  unnoticed  by  the  thought, 
less  or  inactive  mind. 


SECTION  III. 

1.  A  well-regulated  mind  is  influenced  by  the 
recollection  of  facts,  which  appeared  at  first  to  be 
deceptions  or  even  false,  but  subsequently  they 
prove  and  are  known  to  be  true.  Hence  the  con- 
clusion that  there  may  be  and  that  there  does  exist 
many  elements  and  facts,  though  they  may  be  de- 
cidedly marvelous  or  appalling  to  us  at  first.  "We 
have  power  to  know  from  experience  alone,  that 
facts  may  and  do  exist,  both  in  accordance  with  or 
independent  of  our  experience.  2.  The  mind  is 
greatly  influenced  in  deciding  upon  the  truthfulness 
of  that  which  is  presented  for  consideration  if  we 
perceive  known  principles  connected  with  it,  if  it 
contains  some  element  of  probability,  or  if  it  is  in 
any  way  allied  to  facts  or  a  chain  of  known  entities, 
either  as  an  antecedent  or  sequence.  We  have 
power  to  believe  in  the  existence  of  realities  pre- 
sented to  the  mind  from  the  fact  that  other  truths, 


P  J^- 


120  KNOWLEDGE    FKOM    TESTIMONY. 

at  one  time,  were  marvelous,  which  are  now  known 
to  be  true.  And  we  can  go  still  further  and  believe, 
by  reason  of  facts  already  known,  that  other  facts 
unknown  to  us  may  exist.  3.  We  have  power  to 
arrive  at  a  correct  knowledge  of  facts  from  testi- 
mony. And  we  have  power  to  discriminate  credi- 
ble testimony  from  that  which  is  not,  by  contrasting 
the  manner,  the  arrangement  of  parts,  or  the  condi- 
tion. When  a  sufficient  amount  of  the  right  kind 
of  testimony  has  been  received,  we  feel  an  internal 
satisfaction  in  relying  upon  it  without  doubt.  4. 
Infidelity  assumes  that  we  can  not  believe  testimony 
which  differs  from  our  uniform  experience  and  the 
uniform  course  of  nature ;  but  we  have  seen  already 
that  this  position  is  false.  The  influence  or  power 
sustaining  and  containing  the  elements  of  our  belief 
in  regard  to  testimony,  has  its  origin  in  intuition. 
To  receive  proper  testimony  is  natural,  but  to  con- 
scientiously doubt  it  is  unnatural  and  impossible. 


SECTION  lY. 
1.  To  arrive  at  a  distinct  belief  of  a  miraculous  in- 
terposition or  act,  requires  something  more  than  to 
give  credence  to  facts  which  are  in  accordance  with 
the  uniform  laws  or  course  of  nature.  2.  Miracle 
we  understand  to  be  that  which  takes  place  in  vio- 
lation to,  or  deviating  from,  the  established  course 
of  nature,  and  that  which  is  contrary  to  our  uniform 
experience.  If  miracles  exist  in  violation  of  or  de- 
viating from  the  regular  course  of  nature,  their 
existence  can  not  be  a  result  of  this  uniform  course 
of  nature,  nor  of  the  laws  governing  the  material 


KNOWLEDGE    FKOM    TESTIMONY.  121 

universe.  Then,  if  miracles  exist,  the  cause  of  their  -^ 
existence  must  be  distinct  from  and  superior  to  the 
course  of  nature.  Therefore,  they  exist  by  a  direct 
interposition  or  act  of  Divine  power.  Their  nature 
and  relation  to  the  course  of  nature  forever  pre- 
cludes the  idea  of  their  origin  with,  from,  or  by  such 
a  uniformity  of  action.  Miracles,  as  results,  and 
considered  as  they  are,  within  themselves,  clearly 
demonstrate  that  their  cause  must  be  distinct  from 
and  infinitely  superior  to  any  uniform  course  of 
nature.  3.  Divine  revelation  is  regarded  as  a  mi- 
raculmis  gift  of  Heaven,  and,  as  a  result,  clearly 
demonstrates  or  proves  an  adequate  cause  of  its  own 
existence.  All  the  miracles  recorded  in  the  Bible 
aid  in  proving  the  existence  of  Deity  and  his  power 
to  establish  laws  and  suspend  them  at  pleasure.  If 
he  has  power  to  order  and  arrange  common  events, 
which  are  called  natural,  he  has  power  and  does 
order  uncommon  events,  which  are  called  miracles. 


SECTION  V. 
1.  Infidels  assume  that  events  Tiajppening  coni/rary 
to  the  course  of  nature  and  our  experience  should 
be  rejected,  and  that  it  is  more  reasonable  for  men 
to  lie,  and  that  several  concur  in  propagating  the 
same  lie,  than  that  a  miracle  should  take  place,  ac- 
cording to  their  testimony,  which  would  be  a  result 
contrary  to  the  course  of  nature  and  experience. 
The  rejecters  of  the  Christian  system  hold  and  teach 
that  the  uniform  course  of  nature  is  true,  and  that  it 
is  the  unerring  truth  of  the  universe.  2.  Mr.  Hume 
says,  in   regard   to  the   res^^rrection  of  Christ,  "I 

11 


122  KNOWLEDGE    FEOM    TESTIMONY. 

must  admit  one  of  two  things — either  that  twelve 
men  agreed  to  tell  a  lie,  or  that  a  man  arose  from 
the  dead.  It  is  more  probable  that  men  should  lie 
than  that  one  should  return  to  life  again."  That  is, 
if  Christ  rose  it  w^ould  be  contrary  to  the  uniform 
course  of  nature,  which  course  of  nature  he  regarded 
as  infallible  truth.  He  then  asserts  that  it  is  more 
reasonable  for  men  to  lie  than  that  Christ  should 
arise  from  the  dead.  According  to  his  own  premi- 
ses, arguments,  and  belief,  such  a  lie  could  not  be  a 
part  of  the  course  of  nature,  which  is  truth,  neither 
can  it  be  a  result  of  it  in  any  possible  way.  Hence, 
such  a  lie  being  contrary  to  truth,  is  contrary  to  the 
uniform  course  of  nature,  which  is  truth.  Then, 
according  to  his  own  creed  and  belief,  this  lie  would 
be  a  miracle;  yet  he  regards  it  as  that  which  is  the 
most  reasonable,  and  adopts  it  as  the  foundation  of 
his  faith  and  future  hope.  He  then  tries  to  disprove 
the  miracle  of  Christ's  resurrection  by  assuming,  in 
lieu  thereof,  the  existence  of  another  miracle,  ac- 
cording to  his  own  faith  and  teachings,  which  mira- 
cle, he  says,  is  more  reasonable,  though  he  acknowl- 
edges it  to  be  a  lie.  And,  of  course,  if  in  this 
respect  the  foundation  of  his  faith  or  belief  be  a  lie, 
all  the  arguments  and  conclusions  drawn  from  it 
must  be  wholly  and  forever  untrue.  3.  And  as  this 
is  the  only  argument  which  has  ever  been  referred 
to,  which  can  have  any  claims  to  be  an  argument 
against  the  resurrection  of  Christ,  it  is,  therefore, 
true,  that  Christ  rose  from  the  dead,  and  the  truth- 
fulness of  our  holy  Christianity  is  forever  incontro- 
vertible, notwithstanding  the  great  and  celebrated 
argument  of  Mr.  Hume. 


«  m 


^ihxBun  Jf0Hrt|. 


CHAPTER  I. 

CONCEPTION. 

SECTION  I. 
1.  Conceptions  exist  in  connection  with  peculiar 
states  and  operations  of  the  mind,  by  and  in  which 
they  appear  to  arise.  2.  Conception  of  and  within 
itself  is  th^power^  and  acting  is  the  act  of  conceiv- 
ing and  of  receiving,  or  of  admitting  facts  to  the 
inspection  of  the  mind.  It  is  closely  connected  with 
our  sensations  and  perceptions.  When  we  have  con- 
ceptions they  are  revived  and  followed  by  certain 
mental  states,  in  which  present  or  past  ideas,  sensa- 
tions, or  impressions  can  be  and  are  examined.  3. 
In  a  certain  sense  we  may  have  conceptions  of  ideas, 
images,  sentiments,  and  thoughts.  And  in  another 
sense  it  may  apply  to  re-occurring  facts  and  to  re- 
existing  emotions  and  sensations,  which  we,  at  one 
time,  had  realized.  The  mind,  in  the  peculiar  states 
with  which  they  are  connected,  is  moved  and  influ- 
enced in  reference  to  both  external  facts  and  internal 
feelings  and  sensations  of  the  soul. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  Conceptions   in  nature  and  action  appear  to 
differ  from  sensations  and  perceptions.     Perception 

123 


124  CONCEPTION. 

is  characterized  by  an  egressive  action,  or  by  its 
striking  out  in  apprehending  objects,  while  concep- 
tion is  more  passive,  with  internal  power  to  be  re- 
vived or  awakened  as  an  inlet  to  the  mind  of  exist- 
ing facts,  and  of  the  re-occurring  of  facts,  feelings, 
and  ideas  which  had  been  real  in  the  experience  of 
the  past.  2.  Conception  differs  from  memory  and 
from  the  action  and  objects  of  remembrance.  The 
causes  and  objects  of  conceptions  are  absent,  which 
is  not  true  with  sensations  and  perceptions.  Sensa- 
tion and  perception  act  from  and  in  reference  to 
their  causes  and  objects;  but  we  have  conceptions 
of  truths  in  the  remembrance  of  past  feelings  and 
ideas,  when  the  causes  and  objects  are  not  taken  into 
the  account.  In  this  way  we  may  have  conceptions 
of  any  thing  within  the  control  of  memory,  inde- 
pendently of  time,  condition,  or  place.  Our  con- 
ceptions of  past  occurrences  take  no  account  of  the 
time  when  their  causes  were  present;  and  the  regu- 
lation of  our  conceptions  are  influenced  by  the  power 
and  laws  of  association,  and  can  arise  under  the 
action  and  controlling  powder  of  volition.  3.  Con- 
ception is  not  confined  to  our  impressions  of  past 
time,  but  can  be  connected  with  our  feelings  in  re- 
gard to  present  existences.  We  can  not  only  have 
conceptions  of  present  and  real  existences,  but  we 
can  have  them  in  connection  with  peculiar  mental 
states  or  conditions,  upon  which  depends  the  pecu- 
liarities of  illusions,  dreaming,  and  partial  insanity, 
though  such  conceptions  may  be  misguided  or  be 
entirely  false. 


* 


CONCEPTION     AND    THE    SENSES.  125 


CHAPTER  II. 

CONCEPTION  AND  THE  SENSES. 
SECTION  I. 

1.  Our  conceptions  of  facts  or  influences  con- 
nected with  the  objects  of  the  sense  and  sensations 
of  smell  may  be  explained  in  few  words.  When 
any  odoriferous  body,  as  the  rose  or  jasmin,  is  pre- 
sented to  us,  the  effect  experienced  is  a  sensation ; 
this,  in  the  course  of  time,  may  appear  to  be  erased 
from  memory — the  power  which  replaces  memory 
and  perception,  in  recalling  it,  and  revives  in  the 
mind  any  thing  of  the  nature,  kind,  or  qualities  of 
that  which  is  brought  to  remembrance,  is  concep- 
tion. And  in  this  way  we  may  have  conceptions  of 
other  qualities  of  the  objects  of  smell  once  known, 
which  are  detected  and  revived  in  memory  by 
reason  of  corresponding  qualities  or  resemblances. 
And  when  we  have  conceptions  of  any  thing  for- 
merly perceived,  it  becomes  an  object  of  thought.  2. 
Our  conceptions  in  regard  to  ohjects  of  taste  may  be 
clear  or  confused,  in  proportion  to  the  ratio  of  differ- 
ence as  to  qualities.  He  who  has  ever  tasted  the 
bituminous  water  of  Lake  Asphallities,  or  of  the 
mineral  water  of  some  celebrated  spring,  will  be  at 
no  loss  in  forming  proper  conceptions  of  them. 
And  the  same  is  true  in  tasting  that  which  is  sweet 
or  sour.  Our  taste  can  be  followed  by  vivid  con- 
ceptions of  any  thing  pleasant  or  unpleasant.    The 

11* 


126  CONCEPTION    AND    THE    SENSES. 

qualities  we  taste  in  one  object  may  affect  the  mind 
in  recalling  and  in  replacing  our  conceptions  of  sim- 
ilar qualities  in  some  other  object.  3.  In  regard  to 
Tiearing^  we  may  have  cor '^.eptions  of  sound  or 
sounds,  as  to  their  existence,  the  difference  of  tones, 
degrees  of  strength,  and  of  their  harmony  or  dis- 
cord. Any  peculiarity  connected  with  sound  or 
sounds  that  we  have  ever  heard  may  be  recalled  and 
our  conceptions  of  them  be  vivid,  having  been  ex- 
perienced ;  and  we  can  have  brilliant  conceptions  of 
the  nature  or  character  of  such  sounds.  4.  "We  can 
have  conceptions  of  the  objects  of  the  sense  or  sen- 
sations of  touch.  Having  once  experienced  severe 
heat  or  cold,  we  are  at  no  loss  in  having  proper  con- 
ceptions in  relation  to  them  at  any  subsequent 
period.  Some  philosophers  say  they  have  knowl- 
edge of  men  having  been  blind  through  life,  who 
had  true  conceptions  of  the  forms  of  letters  and  of 
figures  once  known,  and  that  they  could  even  de- 
tect colors,  and  have  true  conceptions  in  relation  to 
them. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  Conceptions  of  objects  of  sigJit  revive  and  are 
replaced  in  recalling  visual  objects,  especially  great 
objects,  or  those  pervading  the  field  of  vision  with 
that  which  is  wild  or  is  filled  with  terrific  grandeur. 
The  conceptions  of  visual  objects  are,  perhaps,  more 
easily  recalled,  and  appear  to  be  more  vividly  con- 
nected with  the  mental  states,  than  those  immedi- 
ately connected  with  that  which  affects  the  other 
senses.     This  may  arise  from  the  fact  that  there  are 


CONCEPTION    AND    THE    SENSES.  12Y 

a  great  variety  of  particles  in  each  object  of  sight, 
which  taxes  the  power  of  attention,  association,  and 
comparison.  The  conceptions  of  objects  once  seen 
are  apt  to  be  very  clear  ever  afterward.  There  are 
examples  of  persons  having  been  blind  for  years,  yet 
their  conceptions  were  strong,  and,  aided  by  them, 
they  could  give  lucid  and  correct  descriptions  of 
that  which  had  been  seen.  A  descriptive  writer  or 
speaker  must  necessarily  have  vivid  conceptions  of 
truths  or  facts  in  order  to  present  them  full  of  inter* 
est.  2.  The  power  of  conception  and  of  correctly 
conceiving  facts  is  essentially  important  in  consti- 
tuting a  well-regulated  mind.  We  are  greatly  de- 
pendent upon  it  in  distinctly  delineating  objects  and 
influences  once  experienced,  their  synchronizing 
properties,  differences,  and  their  resemblance.  3. 
The  power  of  conception  or  of  conceiving  facts  has 
its  origin  in  connection  with  the  original  powers  of 
the  mind,  and  from  its  nature  and  oflice  it  is  worthy 
of  higher  claims  than  to  be  regarded  as  a  mere  acci- 
dental and  indefinable  halo,  wandering  amid  ele- 
ments called  primary  lights  or  entities  constituting 
the  soul. 

J09nr/J>  3d 

SECTION  III. 
1.  The  power  of  conceimng  facts  can  be  cultiva- 
ted by  repeated  efibrts  to  paint  and  repaint,  dis- 
tinctly to  the  mind,  the  scenes  and  facts  described 
by  some  other  mind.  2.  It  can  be  cultivated  by 
carefully  and  repeatedly  painting  to  the  mind  the 
scenes  of  the  landscape,  mountain,  or  ocean,  or  by 
impressing  the  mind  with  the  features  and  traces  of 


128  CONCEPTION    AND    THE    SENSES. 

beauty  and  grandeur  as  exhibited  in  the  scenery  of 
nature.  3.  Different  minds  manifest  different  de- 
grees of  vividness  and  of  power  in  conceiving  facts. 
A  mind  of  vigorous  and  clear  conception  is  apt  to 
be  gifted  in  lively  descriptions.  Some  artists  can 
paint  the  likeness  of  a  friend  from  recollection,  but 
it  is  necessary  for  them  to  have  vivid  conceptions  of 
their  features  in  order  to  give  a  correct  expression 
of  the  countenance.  It  has  been  stated  that  some 
artists  have  such  brilliant  conceptions  of  paintings 
once  seen,  that  in  their  absence  they  can  paint  a  fac 
simile,  so  that  when  they  are  compared  no  difference 
can  be  detected.  4.  When  we  are  brought  in  unex- 
pected contact  with  objects  which  suddenly  arrest 
our  attention,  we  rely  on  our  conceptions  of  them  as 
true  till  they  are  corrected.  Either  from  education  or 
from  debilitation  we  may  be  led  to  believe  in  noctur- 
nal apparitions  or  ghosts,  and  when  involved  in  the 
gloom  of  night,  in  some  lonely  place,  our  concep- 
tions of  the  features  and  countenances  of  dead  per- 
sons whom  we  have  seen  in  time  past  become 
quick,  vivid,  and  extravagant.  Such  conceptions 
can  be  corrected  when  tested  by  reason  and  experi- 
ence ;  yet  it  can  be  done  only  with  great  labor  and 
care.  t 


SECTION  IV. 
1.  When  the  attention  is  given  to  fictitious  or 
tragical  scenes,  though  we  know  them  to  be  untrue, 
yet  at  some  exciting  appearance  or  incident,  our  con- 
ceptions are  attended  with  a  lelief  that  what  we 
witness  is  true ;  yet  this  is  soon  corrected  when  we 


CONCEPTION    AND    THE    SENSES.  129 

appeal  to  .reason,  unless  the  mind  is  verging  to  a 
state  of  derangement.  2.  If  we  are  suddenly  af- 
flicted by  contact  with  some  object,  the  cause  is  nat- 
urally the  subject  of  revenge,  from  the  fact  that  for 
the  moment  we  conceive  it  to  be  capable  of  suffer- 
ing, though,  in  fact,  it  be  really  inanimate.  And 
our  vivid  conceptions  as  to  how  much  greater  the 
injury  might  have  been  is  attended  with  a  moment- 
ary belief  that  a  greater  injury  has  been  really 
received.  Some  persons  in  turning  unexpectedly  to 
the  likeness  of  an  absent  friend,  have  had  such  vivid 
and  strong  conceptions  of  them  as  to  involve  a  mo- 
mentary belief  that  the  person  was  really  before 
their  eyes.  3.  The  influence  of  Tiabit  on  our  con- 
ceptions aids  in  correcting  those  which  are  incorrect 
or  confused,  and  in  strengthening,  with  distinctive 
clearness,  those  which  are  true.  Further  we  will 
not  speak  of  the  influence  of  habit  upon  our  concep- 
tions of  objects,  and  influences  afiecting  the  mind 
through  the  medium  of  the  senses.  The  influence 
of  habit  upon  our  conceptions  of  internal  and  moral 
truths  and  feelings  will  arise  and  be  defined  in  the 
moral  department  of  this  work. 


IS#  MEMOEY 


CHAPTER  III. 

MEMORY. 

SECTION  I. 
1.  Memory  is  that  faculty  of  the  mind  by  which 
we  retain  the  knowledge  of  past  events,  or  ideas 
which  are  past.  It  is  the  power  of  retaining  im- 
pressions, facts,  or  events;  and  remembrance,  or  rec- 
ollection, is  the  act  of  recalling  them,  and  of  pre- 
senting them,  by  a  voluntarj^  effort,  to  the  mind  for 
inspection.  By  conception  we  recall  perceptions  or 
the  impressions  of  scenes  or  events  without  reference 
to  time,  causes,  or  objects,  but  memory  retains  past 
ideas  or  events  with  but  little  effort  in  connection 
with  time,  causes,  and  objects.  Ideas,  facts,  and 
events  seem  to  be  spontaneous  or  abiding  realities 
in  the  existence  of  memory:  but  remembrance,  or 
the  act  of  recalling  past  events  or  ideas,  is  controlled 
by  an  effort  of  the  will.  2.  Memory  is  that  power 
or  susceptibility  of  the  mind  which  contains  and  re- 
tains ideas  or  events  without  any  special,  voluntary, 
or  involuntary  action.  "Within  itself  its  capacity  or 
power  contains  facts  in  connection  with  either  active 
or  inactive  states  of  mind.  It  is  the  retentive  power 
of  events  or  realities  which  become  the  objects  of 
thought  and  of  knowledge.  This  power,  in  vigorous 
and  voluntary  action,  calling  up  past  events  or 
truths,  is  remembrance,  or  recollection.  Memory  is 
not  the  origin  of  knowledge,  but  it  is  a  source  of 


MEMOKT.  131 

knowledge,  in  connection  with  other  mental  powers, 
and  it  is  essential  in  forming  ideas  of  realities.  3. 
The  existence,  nature,  and  power  of  memory  are 
closely  connected  with  those  of  conception,  percep- 
tion, suggestion,  association,  and  imagination.  4. 
When  we  speak  of  an  object  of  memory,  we  have 
immediate  concejotions  of  its  appearance  and  quali- 
ties. 5.  In  T&memhering  objects  which  afflicted  us 
in  the  past  there  is  an  immediate  recalling  oi percep- 
tions or  impressions,  in  regard  to  which  we  have 
perceptions  of  the  relation  of  past  time.  6.  It  is 
common  for  us  to  say,  when  we  think  of  a  fact 
within  the  compass  of  memory,  that  it  suggests  to  us 
another  fact,  perhaps  from  the  similarity  or  their 
nearness  in  the  order  of  time.  Y.  Memory  has  been 
called  a  department  of  association^  or,  under  and 
within  the  extent  of  its  power,  there  is  an  affinity  of 
ideas  or  events,  forming  a  chain  or  association,  in 
which  they  naturally  recall  each  other.  8.  Imagin- 
ation is  dependent  on  memory  in  forming  new  com- 
binations of  ideas  from  materials  stored  up  in  the 
memory. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  There  appears  to  be  original  differences  in  the 
power  of  memory.  Some  persons  have  remarkably 
strong  and  retentive  memories,  which  are  essential 
to  a  rapid  and  extensive  acquisition  of  knowledge ; 
but  when  memory  is  very  prominent  or  predominant, 
it  is  seldom  connected  with  a  properly-balanced  and 
well-regulated  mind.  The  strength  of  the  endow- 
ment of  such  minds  depends  principally  upon  what 


im 


MEMOKT. 


has  been  seen  and  heard,  as  they  are  apt  to  be  very 
much  limited  in  originality,  yet  quick  and  untiring 
in  the  pursuit  of  an  object,  with  but  little  caution  or 
judgment.  Some  have  been  known  to  repeat  almost 
any  number  of  words  which  they  had  heard  with- 
out any  connection  or  meaning.  One  writer  speaks 
of  a  man  who  could  repeat  the  entire  contents  of  a 
newspaper,  and  of  another  who  could  retain  words 
spoken  to  him  to  the  number  of  six  thousand,  w^hile 
their  other  intellectual  powers  were  of  an  inferior 
order,  though  this  is  not  universally  true  with  per- 
sons of  such  remarkable  memories.  2.  Memory 
fo%mded  upon  and  embracing  real  analogies  is  an 
element  of  mind  more  important  to  true  mental  cul- 
tivation and  the  acquisition  of  knowledge,  than  that 
which  remembers  facts  only  in  the  order  in  which 
they  occurred.  The  former  is  an  important  auxil- 
iary in  forming  and  arriving  at  intellectual  attain- 
ments and  character,  while  the  latter  is  connected 
wdtli  but  little  judgment;  yet  it  appears  to  be  more 
sprightly,  attended  with  show,  and  embraces  that 
class  of  facts  in  common  demand.  3.  We  have  em- 
hraced  and  implied^  in  the  nature  and  power  of 
memory,  in  its  peculiar  connection  with  the  action 
of  the  intellectual  principle,  (1.)  A  sensitive  im- 
jpression^  or  a  certain  mental  state,  resulting  from 
contact  with  some  previous  existent,  and  synchro- 
nizing with  the  perception  of  the  cause  recalled. 
(2.)  The  involuntary  recurring  of  internal  impres- 
sions and  feelings,  or  of  those  which  may  arise  from 
their  similarity  to  some  existent  of  present  knowl- 
edge. (3.)  An  involuntary  recurrence  in  the  mind 
of  some  previous  existent  related  to  the  object  or 


IIBMOSY.  133 

cause  apprehended  in  close  affinity  or  order  of  time. 
(4.)  It  not  only  implies  suggestion,  but  conception 
of  past  events  with  ihQ  perceptions  of  epochs  in  past 
time. 


SECTION  III. 
1.  Local  memory,  which  refers  to  and  has  power 
over  local  entities  or  facts  once  known,  existing 
either  in  matter  or  mind,  is  generally  combined  with 
but  little  caution  and  judgment.  It  merely  remem- 
bers facts  or  events  in  the  order  of  their  occurrence, 
resting  upon  local  or  incidental  relations,  especially 
in  regard  to  place,  order  of  priority,  and  aposteri- 
ority.  It  is  not  founded  upon  general  principles, 
clearly  known  or  understood,  nor  upon  real  analo- 
gies, but  upon  facts  more  abstracted  or  disconnected 
in  existence  and  relationship.  2.  Memory  contrib- 
utes to  true  knowledge  and  the  belief  of  truth.  If 
the  power  of  memory  to  retain  and  remember  facts 
be  removed,  our  knowledge  of  past  events  is  swept 
away.  Then  knowledge  would  principally  depend 
upon  our  consciousness  of  present  existences  and 
our  perceptions  of  those  things  which  are  the  objects 
of  research.  Events  of  the  past  could  not  suggest 
any  thing  in  regard  to  the  present  or  future;  but 
having  knowledge  of  past  events,  through  and  by 
the  power  of  memory,  we  believe  in  and  know  them 
to  have  been  real  existences.  3.  There  are  degrees 
in  the  power  of  memory  in  different  persons.  There 
are  some  who  can  not  retain  facts  in  the  mind  for 
any  length  of  time  when  compared  with  others. 
Some  recollect  that  which  they  have  seen,  but  soon 

12 


19^  MEMORY. 

forget  that  which  they  have  heard.  Others  recollect 
that  which  they  have  read  or  heard,  but  can  not 
remember  objects  of  sight.  Some  of  the  greatest 
and  most  affecting  orators  known  in  history  could 
write  in  two  hours  more  than  they  could  memorize 
in  a  week.  It  is  true  that  some  persons  can  give  a 
long  chain  of  facts  narrated  by  an  author,  only  in 
the  author's  words;  while  others  can  give  all  the 
facts,  only  in  their  own  language.  4.  PMlosoj)liiG 
memory  embraces  general  principles  and  universal 
truths.  General  principles  are  of  more  importance 
than  minor  items,  and  also  the  facts  appertaining  to 
and  which  are  explanatory  of  such  principles.  This 
description  of  memory  is  sustained  principally  by 
the  relations  of  cause  and  effect,  resemblance  and 
contrast.  Thus,  our  inquiries  extend  to  the  nature 
and  origin  of  existences,  scanning  their  analogies 
and  oppositions,  causes  and  results.  5.  This  species 
of  memory  is  more  clearly  distinguishable  in  some 
minds  than  others.  The  mind  naturally  possessing 
philosophic  perceptions  and  remembrances  corre- 
sponding, is  often  more  tardy  in  the  acquisition  of 
general  knowledge  than  one  of  lively  local  or  cir- 
cumstantial memory.  The  former  is  best  adapted 
to  the  theoretical  department,  or  principles  of  sci- 
ence, and  the  latter  to  the  practical  department,  or 
facts  of  relevance  and  rules  of  proceeding.  These 
facts  and  rules  form  mediums  of  rapid  progress  in 
circumstantial  memory.  Philosophic  memory  is 
connected  with  minds  which  look  into  principles, 
analogies,  classifications,  and  deductions.  Circum- 
stantial memor^^  may  lose  its  interest  and  power 
over  facts  and  rules,  while  the  other,  commencing 


MEMORY.  135 

with  principles,  traces  out  the  analogies  and  tenden- 
cies, bursting  through  or  rending  in  sunder  all  op- 
posing diflBculties. 


SECTION  IV. 
1.  A  ready  memory  embraces  qualities,  resem- 
blances, and  rules  of  progression  with  ease,  and  with- 
out any  special  process  of  exploring  and  of  under- 
standing the  truths  or  facts  illustrative  of  general 
principles.  Local  or  circumstantial  memory  is  brill- 
iant and  ready  in  common  composition  or  hasty 
and  desultory  conversation.  2.  A  retentive  memory 
is  connected  with  that  species  of  memory  called  phi- 
losophic. It  is  supported  by  facts  and  realities,  con- 
nected with  general  principles,  and  in  remembering 
any  fact  the  action  is  apt  to  be  prolonged  by  recall- 
ing the  general  principles  with  which  it  is  connected. 
Though  it  may  be  slow,  yet  it  is  generally  progress- 
ive and  irresistible  in  conquest.  3.  Artificial  mem- 
ory is  cultivated  and  attained  by  connecting  things 
easily  remembered  with  those  not  so  readily  recalled. 
This  operation  is  connected  with  and  is  dependent, 
to  some  extent,  upon  suggestion  in  a  modified  form. 
The  whole  system  of  mnemonics,  principally  depends 
upon  suggestion,  as  when  in  recalling  two  synchro 
nizing  objects,  with  one  and  the  same  state  of  mind, 
the  object  of  easiest  recollection  •  exciting  the  mind 
in  recalling  the  other  of  more  difficult  remembrance. 
This  system  may  be  useful  to  a  limited  extent ;  but 
much  effort  in  carrying  out  the  system  is  injurious 
to  the  mind,  by  burdening  or  overloading  the  mem- 
ory with  many  useless  and  foolish  items  and  influ- 


186  MEMORY. 

ences,  in  order  to  the  suggesting  and  remembrance 
of  other  things  difficult  to  recall  synchronizing  with 
elementary  agreement  or  disagreement.  4.  An  effi- 
cie7it  memory  has  power  to  retain  facts,  with  vivid-" 
ness  of  action  in  recalling  them.  There  is  an  acute- 
ness  and  peculiar  quickness  of  retentive  power 
connected  with  the  memory  of  some  persons  which 
is  not  exercised  by  others.  A  good  memory  is  not 
only  tenacious  and  quick  in  the  reception  of  facts  or 
existences,  but  it  retains  impressions  or  ideas  with  a 
great  degree  of  freshness  and  vividness  amid  the 
crumbling  of  mutable  elements  and  the  blight  of 
time.  5.  Another  feature  of  an  efficient  memory  is 
the  readiness  and  ease  with  which  it  recalls  and  pre- 
sents to  the  mind  facts  or  impressions.  6.  The  ab- 
sence of  these  good  qualities  may  arise,  (1.)  From 
weakness  or  incapability  of  the  tenacious  reception 
of  facts  or  impressions.  (2.)  It  may  result  from  the 
inefficiency  of  the  retentive  power.  3.  It  may  be 
attributed  to  a  habit  of  inattention  or  carelessness. 


SECTION  V. 
1.  The  memory  of  persons  at  advanced  age  is  not 
efficient  as  in  earlier  life.  There  is  an  apparent 
weakness  in  the  retentive  power  of  memory,  and  an 
inability  to  recall  ideas  and  facts.  The  loss  of  the 
power  and  activity  of  memory  can  not  be  regarded 
as  wholly  arising  within  and  of  itself,  but  is  princi- 
pally attributable  to  the  state  or  condition  of  the 
medium  through  which  it  acts,  though  it  has  been 
accounted  for  in  different  ways.  2.  This  feebleness 
can  not  arise  from  an  im'paired  state  of  the  organs 


MEMOSY.:  liflT 

of  perception  bo  much  as  it  does  from  a  defect  of 
the  organs  or  medium  of  its  own  immediate  action. 
The  organs  of  perception  are  no  more  liable  to  de- 
rangement than  the  organs  or  medium  through 
which  memory  acts.  Therefore,  memory  is  not  de- 
pendent upon  the  organs  of  perception  further  than 
it  is  dependent  upon  perception  itself.  3.  Memory 
is  dependent  upon  pereejptien  for  facts  with  which  it 
is  stored,  only  so  far  as  perception  aids  in  the  be- 
stowment  of  such  facts.  But  it  can  not  be  regarded 
as  dependent  upon  it  for  its  retentive  power,  nor  for 
its  action  in  the  recalling  of  ideas  or  facts.  4.  Mem- 
ory may  be  weakened  by  defects  in  attention  from 
its  close  connection  with  it;  for  with  attention  there 
is  an  emotion  of  interest  which  is  not  so  acute  and 
tenacious  in  old  persons ;  yet  it  is  necessary  to  im- 
plant facts  upon  the  mind  so  as  to  be  readily  remem- 
bered. 6.  The  faculty  or  power  of  memorj^,  in  aged 
persons,  is  not  capable'  of  any  diimnuiion  or  loss 
within  and  of  itself.  Tha  defect  is  attributable  to- 
the  change  and  enfeebledness  of  the  organs  or  me-' 
dium  through  which  its  manifestations  are  realized. 
Otherwise  the  mind  of  an  aged  person  would  be  an- 
nihilated in  proportion  as  it  ceases  to  be  developed. 
But  this  is  contrary  to  experience  and  knowledge. 
The  memory  of  the  aged  can  retain  the  events  of 
early  life  so  that  they  can  be  correctly  rehearsed, 
while  present  events  or  truths  are  forgotten  by 
them  in  an  hour.  This  shows  that  the  original 
power  within  itself  has  suffered  no  elementary  loss, 
and  that  it  is  free  from  any  annihilating  power. 

12*  . 


138  MEMOET. 

SECTION  VI. 

1.  The  im^ovement  of  memory  depends  upon  the 
tenacious  manner  which  attends  it  in  the  perception 
of  facts.  Many  facts  or  truths  may  come  within  the 
compass  of  a  careless  or  inattentive  memory  and  not 
become  the  objects  of  its  retentive  power.  By  strict 
attention  we  may  cultivate  acuteness  in  the  manner 
of  receiving  facts,  which  are  to  be  the  objects  of  the 
retentive  power  of  memory.  2.  The  retentive  power 
of  memory  can  be  cultivated  by  repeated  efforts  to 
impress  upon  it  the  facts  we  wish  to  recollect:  and 
by  often  pausing  in  order  to  impress  that  which  is  to 
be  remembered  upon  the  mind  by  associating  it 
with  objects  known,  easily  retained,  and  readily 
recalled.  3.  In  order  to  imjprove  memory^  the  effort 
should  be  to  deeply  and  distinctly  impress  the  mind 
with  those  things  which  are  to  be  the  objects  of 
memory.  Hence,  our  attention  should  be  turned  to 
the  distinct  differences  of  objects,  and  we  should 
form  distinct  conceptions  of  all  facts  and  objects 
which  we  wish  to  remember.  In  this  way  memory 
can  be  cultivated. 


SECTION  YII. 
1.  Memory  may  be  aided  by  carefully  considering 
the  condition  and  relationship  of  that  which  is  to  be 
remembered,  together  with  the  time  and  circum- 
stances of,  and  in  connection  with,  the  objects  of 
memory.  2.  The  memory  will  often  retain  facts 
better  by  writing  them  down^  and  also  by  classify- 
ing them,  or  by  tracing  them  back  to  first  principles. 


MEMORY.  13fl 

3.  He  who  fears  to  tniat  memory  will  always  feel 
embarrassed  in  delivering  what  he  knows  on  any 
subject.  In  order  to  conquer  and  to  feel  at  home  on 
any  or  all  subjects,  we  must  make  memory  responsi- 
ble, and  freely  throw  ourselves  upon  it.  4.  Memory 
should  be  constantly  exercised  and  burdened  only 
with  the  most  important  facts.  5.  We  should  receive 
the  impressions  of  things  to  be  remembered  in  their 
nat'fcral  order — from  premises  to  relations  and  re- 
sults, from  elements  to  manifestations  and  from 
causes  to  effects. 


liCt.  DURATION    OF    MEMOKT 


CHAPTER  IV. 

EEMEMBRANCE,    RECOLLECTION,   AND   THE   DURA- 
TION OF  MEMORY. 

SECTION  I. 

1.  Remembrance  is  the  retainina  or  the  continu- 
ing in  the  mind  ideas  or  facts  which  have  been  pres- 
ent at  previous  mental  states,  or  it  is  an  idea  or 
impression  previously  received  from  some  object 
recurring  to  the  mind  at  a  subsequent  period  without 
the  presence  of  its  cause.  2.  Remembrance  implies 
the  occurring  of  ideas  or  facts  to  the  mind  spontane- 
ously, or  with  but  little  mental  effort.  3.  The  ease, 
distinctness,  and  readiness  with  which  we  remember 
an  impression  or  fact,  is  proportionably  to  the  tenac- 
ity with  which  they  are  received.  Deep  impressions 
are  lasting,  and  are  continued  as  property  of  the 
mind  without  any  special  voluntary  mental  effort. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  Recollection  is  the  act  of  recalling  impressions 
or  facts  which  have  been  the  objects  of  memory  at 
some  former  time.  2.  Remembrance  differs  from 
recollection.  The  former  implies  that  an  idea  or 
impression  occurs  to  the  mind  spontaneously  or  with 
but  little  voluntary  exertion.  The  latter  implies  not 
only  the  power,  but  it  is  the  act  of  recalling  ideas  or 
facts  which  do  not  spontaneously  recur  to  the  mind, 


DURATION    OF    MEMORY.  141 

and  with  seemiDgly  voluntary  efforts.  3.  Recollec- 
tion, in  one  sense,  is  voluntary^  and  in  another  sense 
it  is  not.  We  can  not  remember  because  we  merely 
choose  to  remember.  To  will  to  remember  any  fact 
or  facts,  implies  that  such  facts  were  once  the  objects 
of  memory,  and  that  they  are  still  in  the  reach  and 
subject  to  the  power  and  the  act  which  recalls  them. 
4.  Memory  may  be  said  to  be  the  power  which 
receives  and  retains  ideas  or  facts.  Remembrance 
appears  to  preserve  facts  once  known  from  passing 
away  from  the  mind  so  as  to  be  utterly  beyond 
recovery.  Recollection  is  the  act  of  recalling  facts, 
once  the  objects  of  memory,  for  the  inspection  and 
use  of  the  mind. 


SECTION  III. 
1.  The  duration  of  memory  is  clearly  evidenced 
in  its  power  to  recall  and  present  to  the  mind  the 
events  of  its  past  experience.  Memory,  within  it- 
self, is  absolutely  imperishable,  and  thoughts  which 
are  the  objects  of  memory  are  indestructible.  If 
the  impression  is  revived  with  which  any  thought  in 
time  past  was  connected,  the  thought  itself  can  be 
reproduced.  The  reviving  of  any  impression  once 
realized  necessarily  involves  the  presence  and  the 
action  of  a  power  which  can  affect  the  recalling  of 
thoughts  coexisting  with  it.  2.  Thoughts  and  feel- 
ings, which  have  been  forgotten  for  years,  often  re(mr 
unexpectedly.  It  is  believed  by  some  that  the  mind 
possesses  within  itself  power  in  its  different  states, 
and  while  affected  alternately  by  innumerable  exist- 
ences and  influences,  to  recall,  at  different  periods, 


142  DURATION    OF    MEMORY. 

all  the  events  and  feelings  which  have  ever  been  the 
objects  of  memory.  3.  The  different  conditions  and 
states  of  the  physical  system  exert  an  influence  over 
the  power  of  memory.  But  no  influence  of  this 
kind  has  absolute  control  over  memory  itself,  or  any 
object  of  memory,  so  as  to  annihilate  any  thing 
which  is  essential  to  them.  4.  If  all  that  is  essential 
to  memory  can  not  be  in  whole  or  in  part  annihila- 
ted by  physical  elements,  what  must  be  the  power 
of  memory  when  freed  from  all  entanglements  in 
the  future  world?  This  is  no  more  than  memory  as 
an  abstract  entity.  Its  present  indestructible  exist- 
ence is  only  the  beginning  of  its  immortality.  The 
memory  is  said  to  become  weak  and  to  lose  its  re- 
tentive power,  and  also  its  vividness  of  action  in 
recalling  past  events;  yet  we  have  no  proof  that 
memory  within  itself  has  sufiered  any  elementary 
loss.  So  that  this  defect  in  the  memory  of  aged 
persons  must  be  attributed  to  the  change,  enfeebled- 
ness,  and  inactivity  of  the  physical  organs  or  me- 
dium through  which  it  acts. 


SECTION  lY. 
1.  Memory  can  be  and  is  affected  by  the  physical 
organs,  when  those  organs  are  under  the  power  and 
influence  of  disease.  There  is  a  connection  between 
the  mind  and  the  physical  organs,  in  which  each 
exercises  a  reciprocal  influence.  The  action  of  the 
mind  may  be  increased  or  diminished  in  proportion 
to  the  manner  and  intensity  of  the  influence  of  dis- 
ease upon  the  body.  Accordingly  as  the  body  is 
affected  the  mind  may  be  retarded  or  quickened  in 


DURATION    OF    MEMORY.  143 

action.  2.  Memory  may  be  impaired  from  inguries 
of  the  head  or  affections  of  the  brain.  An  English- 
man has  been  mentioned  who  was  in  a  state  of  stu- 
pt)r,  the  result  of  an  injury  of  the  head,  who,  when 
reviving,  spoke  only  in  Welsh.  He  had  been  thirty 
years  from  his  native  country,  and  previous  to  the 
injury  he  had  forgotten  his  native  language,  and 
when  restored  to  health  he  recovered  the  English 
language  again  and  could  not  recollect  the  Welsh. 
This  was  evidence  that  the  power  of  memory  had 
not  been  destroyed,  and  that  its  inactivity  in  recall- 
ing facts  can  not  be  attributed  to  any  defect  within 
and  of  itself.  A  Frenchman  on  going  to  England 
when  quite  young,  finally  lost  the  power  of  speak- 
ing French ;  but  while  suffering  from  an  injury  of 
the  head  he  spoke  only  French.  3.  When  the  body 
is  affected  in  different  ways  the  effect  upon  memory 
differs.  A  boy  has  been  mentioned  who  seemed  to 
be  insensible  under  the  operation  of  trepan  for  a 
fracture  of  the  skull,  and  when  he  was  restored  to 
health  he  had  no  recollection  of  it ;  but  during  the 
delirium  of  a  fever  eleven  years  after  he  gave  a  cor- 
rect description  of  the  operation,  and  of  the  persons 
present.  An  Italian  gentleman,  when  fi[rst  attacked 
with  disease  of  the  brain,  spoke  English ;  as  the  dis- 
ease progressed  he  spoke  French,  and  for  some  time 
before  his  death  he  spoke  only  Italian.  These  facts, 
with  many  others,  show  that  diseased  organs  have 
an  influence  over  memory,  and  also  that  memory 
must  be  imperishable. 


144  DURATION    OF    MEMORY. 

SECTION  y. 
1.  Often  when  the  mind  appears  to  be  in  an  inact- 
ive state  of  coma^  the  result  of  violent  fever,  the 
powers  and  action  of  memory  are  not  wholly  sus- 
pended. There  are  instances  of  persons  thus  af- 
fected, and  supposed  to  be  perfectly  unconscious, 
who,  on  recovery,  have  had  a  perfect  recollection  of 
the  events  and  conversation  which  took  place.  And 
on  the  other  hand,  an  attack  of  disease  often  sus- 
pends the  action  of  memory,  so  that  all  anterior 
knowledge,  for  some  length  of  time,  is  lost.  Some 
recover  correctly  the  ideas  of  things,  but  can  not 
recollect  their  names.  These  facts  go  to  show  that 
the  most  intense  disease  can  not  destroy  the  element- 
ary 230wer  of  memory.  Hence,  we  can  but  come 
to  the  conclusion  that  temporal  death  has  no  power 
to  annihilate  the  elements  of  mind.  2.  States  of 
stupor  or  coma  are  often  the  result  of  intemperance, 
or  other  habits  of  dissipation.  In  the  case  of  some 
memory  is  suspended,  but  with  others  there  is  a 
brilliant  recollection  of  impressions  and  facts.  3. 
When  the  subject  of  intemi^erance  is  under  the 
injhoence  of  delirium  tremens^  it  would  appear  im- 
possible for  him  to  retain  any  thing  of  what  was 
passing;  yet  there  is  a  vivid  and  horrible  recollec- 
tion of  real  feelings  and  of  facts  which  are  regarded 
as  true.  When  the  drunkard  revives  from  this  state 
of  mental  torture,  he  can  recall  and  give  appalling 
descriptions  of  snakes,  hooks,  pincers,  and  devils. 
With  tremors  of  horror  he  can  describe  the  wailings 
of  the  lost  and  the  undying  flames  of  an  intermina- 
ble hell.     That  which   was  true  to  him,  and  that 


DTTBATION    OF    MEMORY.  145 

which  appeared  to  be  true,  were  of  tenacious  recol- 
lection, showing  the  power  of  memory.  Though  he 
may  try  to  drown  his  sorrows  and  forget  his  sins  in 
the  lethean  poison  of  earth,  yet  faithful  memory,  in 
the  future  world,  will  gather  them  all  around  him 
with  more  than  scorpion  sting  of  unrelenting  re- 
morse. If  this  be  the  real  condition  of  the  mind, 
what  will  be  the  future  hope  Of  the  soul  while  de- 
scending amid  the  melting  bowlders  of  the  flame- 
encircled  walls  of  woe,  as  though  it  were  seeking  a 
deeper  electricity  of  more  fervent  wrath  eternal ! 


SECTION  VI. 
1.  Truths,  which  are  the  first  objects  of  memory 
in  the  minds  of  the  young,  are  those  which  are  of 
most  importance.  Though  they  are  the  first  re- 
ceived, yet  they  are  the  last  to  be  forgotten.  Those 
things  which  we  learn  first  are  generally  closely  con- 
nected with  our  education,  and  they  greatly  influence 
our  couree  in  life,  and  aid  in  forming  our  characters 
for  eternity.  Therefore,  there  can  not  be  too  much 
care  in  selecting  proper  truths  for  the  mind  in  the 
beginning  of  its  education.  2.  In  view  of  the  judg- 
ment of  the  great  day,  what  manner  of  persons 
ought  we  to  be?  Memory  will  then  and  there  pre- 
sent to  the  mind  all  the  impressions,  ideas,  feelings, 
and  acts  of  our  whole  lives.  All,  all  will  be  remem- 
bered. From  the  very  nature  and  duration  of 
memory  we  should  be  guilty  of  no  act  that  we  will 
dread  remembering  in  that  day,  or  to  have  revealed 
before  the  countless  millions  of  the  vast  universe. 

13 


146  ATTENTION, 


CHAPTER  V. 

ATTENTION. 

SECTION  I. 
1.  Attention  is  that  faculty  of  the  mind  which 
has  power  to  attend  to  or  Jieed  any  object  or  fact. 

2.  By  general  consent  it  has  been  defined  to  be  the 
action  in,  or  the  act  of  attending  to,  objects  or  facts. 

3.  If  it  has  power  to  act,  or  if  it  can  be  axited  wpon^ 
then  it  is  a  real  entity.  And  if  it  is  a  real  entity, 
it  must  be  capable  of  being  called  an  element  of  the 
mind.  4.  If  it  is  an  element  of  mind,  it  can  not 
be  a  result  of  any  other  element  or  elements.  5. 
The  strong  efforts  made  by  some  to  prove  that  it  is 
not  an  original  power  of  mind,  has  convinced  us  that 
the  reverse  is  true,  from  the  fact  that  their  conclu- 
sions failed  for  the  want  of  correct  arguments.  6. 
Attention  expresses  not  only  the  state  of  mind,  but 
the  act  by  which  it  is  directed  to  any  object  or  fact, 
to  the  exclusion,  for  the  time,  of  all  other  considera- 
tions. Though  it  is  closely  connected  with  percep- 
tion, yet  we  may  have  perceptions  of  objects,  to 
some  extent,  before  the  attention  is  directed  to  them. 
The  musician  can  perceive  the  order  of  the  bass  of 
a  piece  of  music  which  he  is  playing  on  an  instru- 
ment, while  his  attention  is  at  the  same  time  upon 
the  air  he  is  singing.  When  our  attention  is  stead- 
ily fixed  upon  an  object,  other  objects  may  pass 
within  the  field  of  vision  unheeded  till  our  attention 
is  withdrawn ;  then,  without  difficulty,  the  mind  can 


ATTENTION.  147 

be  directed  to  the  object  which  had  received  no  pre- 
vious attention.  While  the  attention  is  intensely 
fixed  upon  some  object,  a  friend  may  ask  a  question 
which  may  seem,  for  some  time,  to  be  lost;  but 
when  the  attention  is  diverted  and  turned  to  the 
question,  it  can  be  answered  with  ease. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  Attention  is  said  to  be  voluntary  when  it  is 
under  the  power  and  action  of  the  will.  An  object 
may  have  our  attention  so  as  to  lead  us  to  a  general 
examination  of  its  appearance ;  but  we  can  detenn- 
ine  to  attend  to  the  nature  or  elements  of  such  object 
or  objects,  upon  which  a  penetrating  investigation 
takes  place.  2.  Attention  is  said  to  be  involuntary 
when  it  is  suddenly  attested  and  turned  to  an  unex- 
pected object  before  the  consent  of  the  will  is  ob- 
tained to  forsake  an  object  of  previous  pursuit  or 
investigation.  3.  The  degrees  of  attention  differ 
from  small  to  great.  The  mind  may  be  but  slightly 
and  momentarily  arrested  by  an  object,  and  the 
attention  may  not  be  quickened  by  any  voluntary 
action  or  powerful  emotion;  therefore  its  action  is 
feeble.  But  attention  is  tenacious  and  intense  when 
it  acts  under  the  continuous  earnestness  and  power 
of  volition.  4.  Intense  and  successful  attention  de- 
pends upon  our  determination  to  tJvoroughly  investi- 
gate and  understand  the  objects  or  facts  to  which 
the  mind  is  directed.  This  determined  persever- 
ance is,  or  soon  will  be,  accompanied  with  a 
desire  to  conquer,  and  a  love  for  the  investigation 
of  truth. 


148  ATTENTION. 

SECTION  III. 
1.  Much  depends  upon  2,  jproper  exercise  of  atten- 
tion in  listening  to  the  truths  and  arguments  of  a 
discourse.  K  we  listen  with  seemingly  an  involun- 
tary indifference  or  carelessness,  that  which  is 
learned,  cogent,  and  beautiful  is  to  us  almost  if  not 
entirely  lost.  And  if  we  give  attention  in  a  hurried 
and  confused  manner,  our  remembrance  of  that 
which  was  heard  will  be  confused  and  defective.  2. 
In  attending  to  truths  we  read  in  the  perusal  of 
books,  the  mind  should  be  concentrated  upon  that 
which  we  read  with  earnestness  of  thought  and  with 
calm  and  mature  deliberation.  If  we  are  apt  to 
become  weary  and  inattentive,  it  is  better  to  read 
less  at  any  one  time;  and  we  should  read  but  few 
books,  and  they  should  be  of  the  best  selection.  3. 
Memory  is  dependent  upon  attention.  In  proportion 
as  our  attention  to  facts  is  intense  or  slight,  so  is  our 
remembrance  vivid  and  of  long  continuance,  or  brief 
and  imperfect.  That  which  receives  our  undivided 
attention  becomes  the  object  of  remembrance.  If 
the  peculiarities  of  a  tree  in  the  midst  of  the  grove 
receives  our  undivided  attention,  it  will  be  remem- 
bered, while  all  those  which  surround  it,  with  equal 
peculiarities  and  within  the  field  of  vision,  if  remem- 
bered at  all  they  will  be  remembered  as  almost 
indistinct  entities.  Any  object  of  which  we  can 
have  knowledge  through  the  medium  of  the  senses, 
if  it  does  not  become  the  object  of  attention,  our 
remembrance  of  it  will  be  imperfect,  if  not  entirely 
lost. 


ATTENTION.  14» 

SECTION  IV. 
1.  Attention  is  easily  influenced  by  disease.  Many 
persons  under  only  a  slight  inflnence  of  febrile  aftec- 
tion,  are  often  discovered  to  be  incapable  of  fixing 
their  attention  upon  any  thing  with  any  degree  of 
certainty.  2.  Bodily  diseases,  in  most  cases,  seem 
to  affect  this  faculty  of  the  mind  first.  And  as  dis- 
ease advances  its  victim  becomes  so  far  incapable 
of  exercising  attention  that  present  occuiTences,  with 
him,  can  not  be  remembered.  When  the  mind  is  so 
much  affected  by  disease  that  we  are  incapable  of 
receiving  correct  impressions  from  external  objects, 
and  we  begin  to  regard  the  objects  of  our  thoughts 
as  real  existences,  we  are  ia  the  first  degree  or  state 
of  delirium.  3.  Fever,  intemperance,  and  old  age 
80  affect  the  body,  that  in  the  majority  of  cases  the 
attention  can  not  be  concentrated  upon  a  long  chain 
of  arguments,  neither  can  it  be  fixed  for  a  long  time 
upon  any  one  object.  Though  diseased  physical 
organs  may  exert  a  great  influence  over  attention, 
yet  the  power  of  attending  to  facts  is  in  the  mind, 
and  is  incapable  of  any  essential  destruction  or  an- 
nihilation within  and  of  itself. 

13* 


150  ASSOCIATION. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

ASSOCIATION. 

SECTION  I. 
1.  Tub  power  of  association  is  in  the  mind.  This 
power  has  its  origin  in  connection  with  conscious- 
ness, original  and  relative  suggestion,  and  by  it  the 
objects  of  thfeir  action  seem  to  be  blended  for  the 
inspection  and  use  of  the  mind.  Its  action  is  the 
associating  of  ideas  where  two  or  more  ideas  con- 
stantly or  naturally  follow  each  other  in  the  mind, 
so  that  one  almost  infallibly  produces  the  other.  2. 
The  act  of  associating  is  sustained  by  a  remarkable 
tendency,  in  which  facts  or  conceptions,  having  been 
contemplated  together  or  in  immediate  succession, 
become  so  connected  in  the  different  mental  states, 
that  one  of  them,  at  a  subsequent  period,  recalls  the 
others,  or  introduces  a  train  of  thoughts  which  suc- 
ceed each  other  in  the  order  of  their  original  asso- 
ciation. 3.  Association  may  be  regarded  as  volun- 
tary^ to  a  certain  extent.  There  can  be  a  mental 
effort  made  in  calling  up  ideas  or  facts  which  have 
been  associated  with  those  which  are  clearly  the 
objects  of  volitive  action.  4.  But  we  are  led  to 
regard  association  principally  as  involuntary.  It  is 
spontaneous  when  any  fact  present  to  the  mind  sug- 
gests another  resembling  or  having  some  kind  of 
affinity  to  itself;  this  may  suggest  a  third  and  so  on 
till  many  arise.  This  may  take  place  with  but  little 
or  no  mental  effort,  and  without  attention,  so  that 


ASSOCIATION.  161 

the  facts  can  not  be  remembered  till  something  oc- 
curs to  arouse  the  attention;  then,  by  a  mental  effort, 
we  are  confident  that  facts  have  intervened  since  the 
attention  was  withdrawn  from  some  fact  far  back, 
which  is  the  object  of  remembrance. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  If  association  consists  only  in  the  adhering, 
natural  affinity  and  the  blending  of  our  ideas,  or 
thoughts,  or  feelings,  then  philosophers  have  argued 
cogently  and  effectually.  But  if  "resemblance,  con- 
trast, contiguity,  in  time  and  place,  and  cause  and 
effect"  are  primary  laws  of  association,  we  can  not 
understand  their  undefined  definition  of  the  primary 
power  of  association.  If  there  is  a  power  in  the 
mind  capable  of  associating  ideas,  that  power  lies 
back  of  the  act  of  associating  them;  and  if  the  act 
is  acknowledged,  the  cause  of  that  act  belongs  to 
and  is  in  the  mind.  It  is  impossible  for  the  original 
power  of  association  to  be  a  result  of  the  action  of 
one  or  more  of  the  elements  of  mind.  No  primary 
element  of  mind  has  power  to  form  itself,  and  conse- 
quently it  can  not,  by  mere  action,  form  a  power 
which  fills  the  office  of  a  mental  faculty.  2.  It  is 
not  contended  that  the  associating  of  ideas  or  facts, 
as  a  result,  is  an  original  element  of  mind,  nor  that 
it  is  any  thing  more  than  an  ultimate  existent  in 
mental  phenomena,  but  that  the  power  which  acts 
is  in  the  mind.  3.  Association  is  fumisTied  with 
materials  in  the  occurrences  and  facts  which  are 
connected  with  the  laws  of  cause  and  effect,  resem- 
blance, contrast,  and  contiguity  in  time  and  place. 


153  ASSOCIATION. 

%{f^m,  EJECTION  III. 

1.  Objects  which  are  connected,  or  those  which 
sustain  to  each  other  the  relation,  to  any  degree,  of 
canse  and  effect,  do  suggest  each  other  as  objects  of 
the  power  of  association.  2.  Resemhlance^  in  the 
form  or  qualities  of  objects,  will  mutually  suggest 
each  other  to  the  mind,  and  the  objects  or  facts  thus 
presented  are  the  property  of  the  power  of  associa- 
tion. 3.  Contrast  appears  to  contribute  to  associa- 
tion. A  very  large  man  seems  to  suggest  to  the 
mind  of  the  beholder  the  idea  of  a  dwarf,  the  rivu- 
let a  river,  and  a  lake  the  ocean.  4.  Association  is 
aided  by  facts  connected  with  the  law  of  contiguity 
of  time  and  place.  The  nearness  of  time  in  which" 
facts  occurred  or  feelings  existed,  and  the  close  con- 
nection of  localities  or  places  aids  the  power  of  sug- 
gestion and  contributes  to  association.  Some  par- 
ents can  always  tell  the  ages  of  their  neighbors' 
children  by  recalling  to  the  mind  the  birthdays  of 
their  own  children,  which  correspond  to  or  are  near, 
in  time,  to  the  birthdays  of  their  neighbors'  chil- 
dren. When  we  think  of  the  cities  of  London  and 
Paris,  we  immediately  think  of  the  countries  where 
they  are  located. 


SECTION  IV. 
1.  Natural  association  takes  place  when  any  fact, 
which  is  the  object  of  attention,  is  by  the  mind  as- 
sociated with  some  fact  of  previous  knowledge  to 
which  it  has  a  resemblance  or  a  relation.  In  this 
way  associations  may  be  formed.     The  referring  of 


ASSOCIATION.  153 

facts  to  some  principle  or  subject,  which  they  are 
calculated  to  illustrate,  fixes  them  iu  the  mind,  and 
the  association  is  easy  and  natural.  If  a  question 
arises  which  we  can  not  at  the  time  decide,  any  sub- 
sequent information  deciding  the  question  will  be 
referred  by  tlie  mind  to  such  question;  whereas, 
such  information  might  have  passed  unnoticed  or 
have  been  forgotten  but  for  the  original  question. 
2.  Association  can  arise  out  of  thQ'natural  and  real 
relations  of  facts  to  each  other,  or  to  objects  of 
thought  which  have  long  existed  in  the  mind.  The 
remembrance  of  facts  or  truths  does  not  wholly  de- 
pend upon  the  acuteness  of  attention,  but  it  depends, 
in  some  degree,  upon  the  previous  existence  of  truths 
or  facts  in  the  mind,  with  which  new  ones  can  be 
and  are  readily  associated.  And  to  these  subse- 
quent facts  or  truths  which  may  arise  can  be  added, 
extending  the  power  and  increasing  the  energy  and 
activity  of  the  mind.  Thus,  every  new  thought  or 
truths  received  by  the  mind  are  valuable  within 
themselves,  and  each  one  forms  a  new  basis  for  a 
new  and  extended  association  of  facts  by  which  we 
progress  in  knowledge.  The  same  facts,  associated 
in  the  minds  of  different  persons,  may  vary  with 
their  intellectual  habits  and  be  associated  in  various 
ways.  Many  truths  thus  associated  in  the  mind  are 
so  related  to  each  other  in  their  aflSnitating  tendency 
as  to  readily  recall  each  other  in  the  various  mental 
states. 

SECTION  V. 
1.  The  calling  up  of  facts  is  voluntary  when  we 
direct  the  mind  to  a  particular  train  of  truths  or 


164:  ASSOCIATION. 

thoughts  best  calculated  to  lead  to  those  we  wish  to 
command.  We  may  have  an  impression  of  some 
item  of  knowledge  which  we  have  been  in  the  pos- 
session of,  and  from  the  present  knowledge  of  a  por- 
tion of  facts  belonging  to  a  certain  class  or  associa- 
tion be  enabled  to  recall  all  others  of  the  same 
association.  We  can  turn  the  mind  to  the  examina- 
tion of  the  known  truths  till  they  lead  to  the  recall- 
ing of  those  we  desire  to  have  at  our  command.  In 
remembering  a  part  of  associated  facts  we  can  com- 
mand and  direct  our  attention  to  them  till  all  of  the 
same  connection  are  revived  and  recalled.  2.  Asso- 
ciations recur  involuntarily  when  the  mind  is  turned 
to  some  subject  which  is  calculated,  in  its  nature,  or 
by  its  elementary  existence  or  tendency,  to  lead  to 
them.  The  mind  can  pursue  trains  of  thought  with- 
out any  volitive  effort,  and  often  without  any  con- 
sciousness of  its  action,  till  some  object  arrests  the 
attention.  The  process  which  leads  to  such  an  object 
of  thought  appears  to  be  lost  till  we  trace  the  asso- 
ciations of  thought  back  to  some  existent  of  previous 
and  intentional  examination.  In  this  way  ideas, 
truths,  and  occurrences  which  had  not  been  the  sub- 
jects of  thought  for  years  are  revived  and  recalled. 
Thus  they  may  recur  spontaneously,  being  associated, 
according  to  their  natural  and  real  relation,  to  each 
other.  3.  Casual  associations  are  formed  only  in 
connection  with  persons,  incidents,  or  place.  An 
idea  or  thought  is  associated  with  the  source  it  was 
received  from — the  person,  the  book,  or  the  place, 
of  whom,  or  of  which,  or  where  we  came  in  pos- 
session of  any  truth  or  fact.  Such  truths  or  facts 
are  recalled  in  the  mind  whenever  the  source  is 


ASSOCIATION.  165 

thought  of,  seen,  or  mentioned.  If  we  think  of  a 
certain  city  where  we  have  been,  the  mind  is  imme- 
diately presented  with  direct  facts,  incidents,  or 
occurrences  in  connection  with  it  to  almost  an  innu- 
merable extent. 


SECTION  VI.  ,,. 

1.  Facts  or  occuiTences  associated  with  places  or 
localities  are  revived  vihen  we  think  of  or  visit  them. 
The  Christian  loves  to  revisit  the  place  where  his 
manner  of  life  was  changed,  and  to  think  of  and 
review  the  associations  connected  with  it.  And 
even  on  the  othel*  hand,  the  murderer  dreads  to 
think  of  or  to  revisit  the  places  of  his  dark  criminal 
deeds,  and  he  shudders  in  dwelling  upon  the  asso- 
ciations which  there  arise  as  portentous  of  wretch- 
edness and  woe.  2.  Associations  formed  in  connec- 
tion with  localities  seem  to  impress  the  mind  with 
fiictB' almost  independent  of  memory.  In  some  in- 
stances occurrences,  which  have  been  experienced 
in  connection  with  certain  locations,  have  been  en- 
tirely forgotten  till  the  place  or  places  were  revisited, 
when  the  facts  associated  with  them  were  revived 
and  recalled.  3.  If  we  meet  with  a  person  or  per- 
sons who  know  us,  but  of  whom  we  have  no  recol- 
lection, and  being  unwilling  to  ask  their  names,  we 
continue  to  converse  with  them  till  we  learn  the 
location  of  their  homes,  or  the  places  where  we  met 
with  them,  from  some  fact  connected  with  the  former 
associations,  and  even  their  names  revive  and  are  at 
our  command.  If  we  wish  to  call  the  attention  of  a 
friend  to  any  item  or  truth  he  has  forgotten,  we 


156  ASSOCIATION. 

speak  of  the  circumstances  which  were  associated 
with  it  till  some  one  which  he  remembers  recalls  the 
fact,  and  probably  all  that  was  connected  with  it. 


SECTION  VII. 
1.  Intentional  association  involves  a  volitive  men- 
tal action.  The  truths  associated  are  not  connected 
so  much  by  the  external  relation  they  sustain  to  each 
other  as  that  existing  in  the  states  and  action  of  the 
mind.  We  can  establish  a  connection  between  the 
thing  we  wish  to  remember  and  some  other  known 
object,  which  may  have  no  relation  to  that  which  is 
to  be  remembered.  2,  Often,  when  persons  go  in 
the  pursuit  of  two  or  more  objects,  and  fearing  that 
some  one  wdll  be  forgotten,  they  will  select  some 
familiar  phrase,  carry  something  in  their  hand  or  in 
their  pocket,  only  as  realities,  to  prevent  them  from 
forgetting  the  object  desired.  3.  We  can  associate 
any  thing  we  wish  to  remember  with  some  hiown 
existent,  which  does  not  resemble  that  which  we 
wish  to  remember,  so  that  it  can  be  recalled.  Mer- 
chants can  tell  the  prices  of  their  goods  from  marks, 
which  can  have  no  resemblance  to  prices  in  any 
way.  The  order  of  successive  periods,  or  the  observ- 
ance of  the  commemorative  rites  in  the  Christian 
system,  must  be  regarded  as  intentional.  4.  Differ- 
ent objects  can  produce  impressions  which  excite 
similar  feelings  in  the  mind,  and  they  mutually  sug- 
gest or  recall  each  other.  This  arises  from  the  natu- 
ral resemblance  in  their  mutual  relation.  Thus  ob- 
jects of  natural  resemblance  can  not  but  excite 
similar  feelings.     Similar  feelings  are  the  result  of 


ASSOCIATION.  157 

entities,  which  have  any  thing  in  common  assimila- 
ted to  the  original  principles  or  nature  of  our  being. 
And  any  thing  of  sucli  resemblances  or  relationship 
may  suggest  or  recall  another  object  which  will  pro- 
duce a  similar  result  upon  the  mind. 


SECTION  VIII. 
1.  The  principle  of  intentional  association  is  fur- 
ther illustrated  by  the  way  in  which  the  mind  is 
affected  in  regard  to  the  real  existence  of  the  Chris- 
tian system  and  the  truths  connected  with  it.  Infi- 
dels who  have  urged  that  the  common  course  of 
nature  is  the  only  truth  that  is  universal  and  infalli- 
ble, have,  on  the  other  hand,  denied  that  human 
testimony  is  sufficient  to  establish  the  events  con- 
nected with  our  lioly  religion.  Though  this  is  a 
sophism,  yet  it  should  be  met.  If  we  had  no  means 
or  way  of  judging  of  the  lapse  of  time,  or  of  the 
remote  ages  of  the  world,  than  the  testimony  of  inert 
elements  as  contained  on  the  face  of  the  globe,  or 
those  which  are  now  regarded  as  being  contained  in 
the  stratified  archives  of  its  own  periods  and  ages, 
we  would  as  readily  infer  that  the  existence  of  the 
earth  was  an  accident  of  recent  occurrence  as  to 
have  any  other  supposition.  2.  A  proper  belief  in 
the  arrangements  and  occurrences  of  such  facts  de- 
pends upon  human  testimony  and  experience  in  rela- 
tion to  the  chain  of  associated  truths  in  the  past. 
By  means  of  traditional  and  written  testimony  we 
are  led  to  the  belief  that  the  earth  is  more  than  five 
thousand  years  old;  but  without  this  testimony  it 
would  all  be  in  the  confusion  of  uncertainty,  and  in 

14 


158  ASSOCIATION. 

darkness.  3.  The  commemorative  rites  or  periodical 
observances,  can  be  transmitted  from  age  to  age  by 
traditional  testimony^  or  that  which  has  been  written 
by  many  individuals,  and  at  different  times,  during 
the  lapse  of  thousands  of  years;  yet  there  is  the 
regular  return  of  the  fact,  the  occasion  and  the  day 
associated  with  them,  the  unbroken  series  which 
carry  us  back  to  the  time  of  the  original  events,  and 
the  persons  who  witnessed  them.  Hence,  we  have 
as  much  faith  or  belief  in  the  real  existence  of  such 
facts  as  we  have  in  the  series  of  years  which  have 
marked  the  course  of  time  and  the  existence  of  the 
globe.  4.  By  the  association  of  the  events  and  facts 
connected  with  these  observances  we  are  freed  from 
every  impression  of  false  testimony,  from  the  fact 
that  we  are  conducted  back  by  regular  steps  and 
periods  to  the  time  of  the  original  events.  An  im- 
postor can  not  fabricate  a  system  of  theology  which 
can  be  even  the  object  of  investigation  till  it  is 
marked  with  rites,  periods,  and  events;  then  the 
harmony  and  regular  occurrence  of  them  would  be 
of  the  utmost  importance.  Bat  such  a  system  as 
this,  bearing  a  sufficient  resemblance  to  the  Bible 
to  be  believed,  has  never  been  known ;  while  the 
Bible  has  them  in  the  series  of  facts  extending 
through  the  past  and  described  as  pending  in  the 
unbounded  future  to  a  degree  and  extent  infinitely 
beyond  all  other  books,  systems,  or  facts  ever  known. 


ASSOCIATION.  159 


CHAPTER  YII. 

ASSOCIATION  CONTINUED. 
SECTION  I. 

1.  The  true  analysis  of  language  will  not  allow 
the  terms  law  or  laws  to  be  applied  to  the  principle 
of  association,  nor  to  those  principles  or  existences 
closely  connected  with  it,  only  as  such  connected 
entities  are  clearly  contingent  in  nature  or  relation- 
ship. 2.  Truths  may  sustain  such  relations  to  one 
another  as  to  mutually  suggest  each  other;  this  rela- 
tionship can  not  reveal  the  law  or  laws  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  association ;  but  it  is  that  by  which  objects 
suggest  each  other  upon  the  ground  of  a  common 
influence  or  impression  made  by  them  upon  the 
mind.  Objects  which  have  no  known  relation  to 
each  other  are  often  associated  from  the  fact  that 
the  effect  of  them  upon  the  mind  is  similar.  3.  A 
variation  of  the  associating  principle  may  be  fouiid 
in,  and  in  connection  with,  the  original  difference  in 
mental  powers.  It  may  arise  from  the  difference  in 
primary  elements  and  their  action,  all  of  which  may 
affect  the  associating  principle.  One  mind  may 
differ  from  another  by  possessing  one  or  more  facul- 
ties of  a  higher  order  than  those  corresponding  to 
them  in  the  other  mind ;  yet  when  all  the  faculties 
of  both  minds  are  examined  they  are  found  to  con- 
stitute them  equal  in  strength,  yet  the  associating 
principle  varies,  being  affected  by  them.     The  ac- 


160  ASSOCIATION. 

tion  of  many  minds  differ,  and  these  differences 
influence  the  associating  principle.  Three  men  of 
equal  minds  in  strength  journey  together;  one  of 
them  is  naturally  inclined  to  notice  the  face  of  the 
country,  a  second  the  road  and  internal  improve- 
ments, and  a  third  the  manners  and  customs  of  the 
people.  All  these  different  objects  give  rise  to  cor- 
responding associations.  4.  The  associating  princi- 
ple varies  with  the  energy  and  strength  of  the  emo- 
tions. Objects  vrhich  cause  or  have  in  connection 
with  them  realities,  giving  rise  to  intense  feelings  of 
sorrow,  are  readily  recalled ;  as  permanent  columns, 
amid  ruins,  they  stand  out,  the  enduring  objects  of 
memory,  while  facts  connected  with  slight  emotions 
are  soon  numbered  with  things  that  were.  And  in 
like  manner  those  things  which  excite  feelings  of 
joy,  becoming  the  objects,  not  only  of  feeling,  but 
of  attention  and  thought,  will  be  readily  at  our  com- 
mand, together  with  all  the  associated  facts. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  The  influence  of  the  lapse  of  time  affects  the 
existence  and  action  of  the  associating  principle. 
Facts  occurring  last  evening  can,  at  the  present 
time,  be  recalled  with  clearness  and  far  more  readily 
than  those  of  many  years'  standing,  from  the  fact 
that  there  is  no  perceptible  loss  in  the  strength  of 
the  connection  by  which  the  facts  thus  associated 
revive  and  restore  each  other.  This  view  of  the 
subject  is  in  accordance  with  the  common  experi- 
ence of  mankind.  But  however  far  the  associating 
principle  can  or  may  be  affected  by  the  lapse  of 


ASSOCIATION.  Wk 

time,  its  original  power  must  be  imperishable,  and 
all  facts  thus  becoming  a  part  of  knowledge  will  live 
and  be  known  beyond  the  bounds  of  change.  2. 
The  lapse  of  five  years  may  erase  many  truths  from 
the  memory  of  aged  persons,  while  the  associated 
facts  of  early  life  readily  recall  each  other.  This 
shows  that  the  original  power  is  not  lost,  but  that  it 
still  lives;  and  when  death  is  shaking  down  this 
clay  tenement,  the  interaal  animating  flame,  long 
compressed,  will  burst  forth  from  amid  the  ruins 
with  imperishable  powers,  and  with  all  its  resources 
of  knowledge.  3.  The  associating  principle  is  influ- 
enced by  the  original  differences  in  the  natural  incli- 
nations or  disposition.  Some  persons  naturally  love 
that  which  is  grave  or  solemn,  and  associations  of 
facts  are  formed  corresponding  to  their  natural  dis- 
position or  feelings;  others  have  only  lively  feelings; 
and  a  difi*erent  class  are  attracted  with  the  romantic, 
or  that  which  possesses  natural  sublimity  or  beauty. 
So  that  facts  become  prominently  associated  corre- 
sponding to  all  the  different  inclinations  or  disposi- 
tions, together  with  even  the  times  and  circumstances. 

SECTION  III. 
1.  Associations  can  be  revived  and  recalled  when 
present  objects  are  reported  to  the  mind,  through 
the  medium  of  the  senses,  being  the  immediate  ob- 
jects of  perception.  There "^may  be  something  in  or 
connected  with  such  objects  which  causes  the  recall- 
ing of  truths  and  trains  of  facts  which  had  not  been 
thought  of  for  many  years.  Often  there  is  some- 
thing in  the  sound,  the  taste,  the  odor,  the  appear- 

14* 


1^''  ASSOCIATION. 

ance,  or  touch,  which  revives  some  occurrence  or 
fact  of  early  life.  2.  The  vividness  and  duration 
in  the  reception  and  retention  of  realities  which 
have  been  the  objects  of  the  senses  and  of  percep- 
tion, depends  upon  the  strength  or  force  and  charac- 
ter of  the  action  thus  received.  When  an  object 
aifects  directly  and  forcibly  the  organs  of  the  senses, 
and  is  fully  the  object  of  perception  and  thought, 
accompanied  with  appropriate  emotions,  it  can  not 
be  readily  classed  with  fleeting  objects  of  memory. 
It  appears  to  have  been  impressed  upon  the  mind  in 
a  durable  way.  3.  Mental  associations  may  be 
under  a  direct  volitive  power  and  action.  By  vol- 
untary action  we  can  not  create  associations  nor  the 
facts  entering  into  such  combinations.  And  we  can 
not  will  the  existence  of  truths  to  be  associated  with- 
out first  having  some  idea  or  perception  of  those 
things  we  wish  to  have  exist;  but  we  can  will  that 
facts  or  trains  of  thought  may  be  present  with  and 
under  the  full  inspection  of  the  mind ;  and  we  have 
volitive  power  to  retain  them  as  objects  of  such  in- 
spection. And  on  the  sudden  perception  of  some 
unpleasant  reality  we  can  instantly  divert  the  atten- 
tion and  refuse  to  contemplate  it,  or  the  facts  which 
may  be  associated  with  it.  4.  Associations  can  be 
and  often  are  under  indirect  voluntary  power.  A 
volitive  power  may  be  regarded  as  incapable  of  cre- 
ating, by  direct  action,  either  mental  associations  or 
the  facts  thus  connected.  But  when  we  have  per- 
ception of  some  truths,  which  appear  to  be  of  an 
association  or  chain  of  events,  we  can  will  to  use 
them  and  contingent  facts  in  arriving  at,  and  in 
being  able  finally  to  contemplate  and  comprehend 


ASSOCIATION.  16S 

other  existences  which  are  at  the  time  unknown. 
When  we  stop  such  succession  of  mental  states  or 
action,  or  check  the  regular  tendency  or  course  of 
our  thoughts,  there  will  arise  associations  under  the 
control  of  indirect  voluntary  action.  In  pursuing  a 
train  of  thought  or  events  we  often  arrive  at  some- 
thing rema'rkable  within  itself;  here  the  regular  ac- 
tion of  the  mind  is  arrested,  when,  from  the  peculiar 
qualities  or  resemblance  of  such  an  existent,  remote 
facts  arise  and  new  associations  are  formed.  5.  In 
noticing  the  skill  and  design  interwoven  and  con- 
nected with  the  works  of  nature  they  lead  us  to  think 
of  the  great  first  Cause.  Here  we  pause  as  though 
we  would  wish  to  comprehend  the  infinity  of  such  a 
power  or  Being;  yet  the  regular  course  of  such 
thought  is  no  sooner  checked  than  the  silvery  trains 
of  innumerable  rolling  worlds  or  orbs,  which  he  has 
made,  fly  through  the  field  of  mental  action  and 
contemplation,  ever  burning  with  the  glow  of  imper- 
ishable light. 


SECTION  lY. 
1.  The  influence  of  association  upon  our  ideas  of 
correct  taste  is  worthy  of  notice.  Great  care  should 
be  observed  in  receiving  truths  according  to  the  rules 
of  correct  taste.  Oratoi-s  famed  for  wisdom,  a  ready 
and  forcible  delivery,  often  indulge  in  imperfections 
as  to  language,  gestures,  or  manner  of  delivery, 
which  would  be  regarded  as  revolting  and  disgust- 
ing but  for  the  influence  associated  with  the  speaker. 
Though  such  defects  are  noticed  at  first  without 
pleasure  upon  the  part  of  admirers,  yet  in  the  course 


164  ASSOCIATION. 

of  time  such  defects,  being  associated  wi'li  the  man 
and  his  zeal,  are  regarded  as  marks  of  great  dis- 
tinction. Hence,  such  defects  are  copied  and  imita- 
ted, while  traits  of  true  excellence  pass  unnoticed. 
2.  Our  ideas  oi.  fashion  vary  with  the  influence  of 
association.  The  odd  insignia  or  the  peculiarity  of 
the  escutcheon  upon  which  is  emblazoned  the  glory 
of  some  great  warrior,  however  ludicrous  they  may 
appear  within  themselves,  yet  they  are  soon  regarded 
as  tasteful  and  glorious  from  their  connection  with 
such  a  personage.  This  is  true,  to  some  extent,  in 
regard  to  almost  every  extravagance  in  dress.  3. 
That  which  would  be  abhorred^  if  introduced  by 
common  persons,  can  be  introduced  by  others,  and 
be  extolled  by  almost  universal  consent,  only  from 
its  association  with  such  persons.  When  the  multi- 
tude lay  aside  any  extravagance,  should  any  one 
perpetuate  it  they  are  regarded  as  being  destitute  of 
refinement.  It  would  appear  that  any  person  ever 
conforming  to  the  niles  of  a  correct  taste  and  fash- 
ion, independently  of  the  varying  influence  of  asso- 
ciation, would  be  regarded  as  a  wonder  in  the  earth, 
being  unworthy  of  imitation.  4.  Habit  gives  effi- 
ciency to  the  power  we  have  over  our  associations. 
It  is  constituted  by  the  repetition  of  efibrts  in  at- 
tending to  associating  operations,  till  we  gain  a 
facility  and  readiness  in  them  and  in  regard  to  them. 
Trains  of  thought  or  associations,  which  have  been 
long  familiar  to  us,  are  attended  to  with  ease  and 
precision.  The  mind  has  a  natural  tendency  to  re- 
turn or  recur  to  the  states  of  previous  experience,  in 
T'hich  associated  truths  or  events  receive  and  re- 
call each  other.     The  formation  of  habit  is  volun- 


ASSOCIATION.  IW 

tary  when  we  determine  to  repeat  the  efforts  of  at- 
tending to  such  mental  operations.  And  it  may  be 
the  result  of  indirect  volitive  power. 


SECTION  Y. 
1.  The  tendency  and  the  effects  of  irriproper^  slsso- 
ciations  are  worthy  of  notice.  Associations  may 
descend  in  degrees  from  those  of  simple  error  to 
those  of  vicious  and  malicious  tendencies  and  re- 
sults. Many  descriptive  writers  associate  with 
wicked  tendencies,  deeds,  and  events  language  full 
of  imagery,  exciting  the  feelings  with  sublimity, 
beauty,  grandeur,  and  delight,  till  that  which  is  sin- 
ful can  be  contemplated  without  any  feelings  of  ab- 
horrence, and  the  mind  becomes  inclined  to  crime. 
This  course  once  entered,  without  almost  a  miracu- 
lous interposition  of  Divine  power,  the  immortal 
soul  is  soon  entangled  and  black  with  crimes,  at- 
tracting the  electricity  of  unending  wrath  under  the 
just  claims  of  infinite  law.  2.  We  here  close  with 
the  tendency  and  results  of  correct  associations. 
That  which  is  pure  within  itself  becomes  the  object 
of  pure  mental  action.  A  pure  mind  appears  to  be 
naturally  so  corelated  to  objects  that  if  some  of 
them  were  not  of  a  high  order  of  purity,  yet  the 
associations,  if  permitted  to  be  formed,  would  be 
pure  and  harmless.  3.  He  who  wishes  to  succeed  in 
any  branch  of  science  must  know  that  he  has  first 
correctly  fixed  the  primary  principles,  and  then  asso- 
ciate with  them  those  truths  which  are  naturally 
adapted  to  and  are  connected  with  their  existence, 
in  order  to  arrive  at,  and  to  clearly  comprehend  cor- 


166  ASSOCIATION. 

rect  results.  We  can  not  speak  of  all  the  endlessly- 
diversified  applications  of  the  associating  principle, 
yet  their  existence  is  indispensable  in  the  acquisition 
of  knowledge. 


giHsion  Jfiftfe- 


CHAPTER  I. 

MENTAL   STATES. 
SECTION  I. 

1.  A  SIMPLE  mental  state  may  be  regarded  as  only 
expressing  the  presence  of  one  thought  or  object, 
which  appears  to  be  disconnected  and  indivisible. 
Such  a  state  of  mind  seems  to  be  natural ;  for  a  sim- 
ple notion,  feeling,  or  idea  is  indivisible;  yet  they 
can  be  the  object  or  objects  of  mental  states.  2.  If 
two  or  more  elements  or  existences,  collected  or  con- 
nected together,  enter  into  mental  states,  such  states 
are  not  simple,  but  complex.  3.  Though  simple 
mental  states  can  not  be  defined,  yet,  like  axioms, 
they  may  be  regarded  as  self-evident  truths,  always 
to  be  known  as  real  entities  within  themselves.  4. 
Our  helief  in  and  reliance  upon  simple  mental  states 
as  real  may  be  with  boundless  confidence;  for  there 
can  be  no  imaginary  existent  in  a  single  idea,  feel- 
ing, or  fact  abstracted  and  indivisible.  Here  is  nat- 
ural truth,  in  which  we  can  trust  without  the  fear  of 
deception.  6.  Simple  mental  states  may  be  re- 
garded as  preceding  those  which  are  complex.  A 
simple  idea,  feeling,  or  fact  must  first  enter  into 
mental  states  and  be  known,  in  order  to  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  relationship  of  many  truths  in  the  ex- 
istence of  complex  states.    If  compounds  are  made 

167 


^« 


168  MENTAL    STATES. 

up  of  simple  elements  or  facts,  so  many  complex 
states  of  mind  exist,  being  affected  with  the  presence 
of  a  plurality  of  realities  capable  of  being  discon- 
nected or  reduced  to  simple  indivisible  entities. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  The  existence  of  complex  mental  states  may  be 
regarded  as  being  affected  with  the  presence  of  a 
collection,  assemblage,  or  a  complication  of  ideas, 
feelings,  or  realities.  If  we  think  of  any  external 
existence,  as  a  tree,  mountain,  lake,  or  river,  there 
are  properties  and  qualities  embraced  in  the  action 
of  the  mind  in  relation  to  each  or  all  of  them.  But 
inert  elements  have  no  self-power  of  uniting  by  pen- 
etration, and  remain  only  in  juxtaposition.  There  is 
a  higher  degree  of  blending  and  in  the  union  of  the 
elements  and  the  inclinations  or  influences  of  the 
mind.  2.  Our  thoughts  and  feelings  may  arise  from 
many  objects  or  causes,  but  all  unite  in  the  soul 
under  the  immediate  inspection  of  the  mind,  which 
can  take  into  the  account  the  oneness  severally  in 
their  origin.  3.  Our  mental  states  are  complex  in 
contemplating  external  objects.  We  form  an  idea 
of  the  existence  of  ice  from  its  properties,  and  we 
describe  it  only  by  giving  those  properties,  w^eight, 
friability,  color,  and  hardness.  Similar  complexness 
exists  in  regard  to  any  other  combination  of  pro23er- 
ties.  4.  Complex  mental  states  may  exist  in  rela- 
tion to  tJiat  which  is  connected  with  external  objects, 
differing  from  abstract  elements.  In  connection  with 
qualities  there  may  be  presented  to  the  mind  tend- 
encies, appearances,  and  influences.     And  we  may 


MENTAL    STATES.  169 

be  ready  to  acknowledge  an  essence  or  foundation 
without  being  able  to  define  it.  The  only  way  that 
we  can  study  the  existence  and  nature  or  essence  of 
material  compounds,  is  by  their  elements  and  inert- 
ness. And  the  only  way  that  we  can  study  the 
nature  or  essence  of  mind,  is  by  its  elements  and  ac- 
tion. From  the  peculiar  impression  existing  ele- 
ments often  make  upon  the  mind,  it  is  natural  for  us 
to  receive  the  idea  of  the  existence  of  something, 
though  its  nature  can  not  be  defined.  5.  Complex 
states  of  mind  are  often  the  result  of  internal  influ- 
ences or  realities.  As  a  lake  receives  from  tributary 
streams,  on  every  hand,  so  the  mind  may  be  re- 
garded as  the  receptacle  of  knowledge,  being  affected 
by  almost  innumerable  influences  and  impressions. 
We  can  judge  of  these  as  correctly  as  we  can  of 
those  arising  from  external  existences. 

15 


ItO  ABSTBAOTION, 


CHAPTER  II. 

ABSTRACTION. 

SECTION  I. 
1.  Abstkaction  is  the  act  or  operation  by  which 
elements  are  separated  from  each  other  and  are  ex- 
amined individually.  The  original  power  of  such 
action,  and  by  which  it  is  known  to  exist,  is  in  the 
mind.  It  may  take  place  when  the  mind  is  occupied 
with  separated  facts,  or  when  we  contemplate  some 
particular  part  or  property  of  a  compound,  or  of  a 
complex  object,  as  disconnected  from  other  existen- 
ces of  such  combinations.  2.  By  the  mental  exercise 
or  the  acting  power  of  abstraction,  we  can  examine 
many  objects,  selecting  definite  properties  in  which 
they  agree  and  can  be  classified.  And  it  can  be 
still  more  comprehensive  in  selecting  a  property  or 
fact  which  is  common  to  an  extensive  collection  of 
adhering  or  complex  entities.  3.  An  abstract  notion 
or  thought  may  arise  upon  the  ground  of  detected 
resemblance  and  difference  in  objects  or  properties, 
and  in  the  special  notice  or  attention  given  to  them 
individually.  In  the  presence  of  compounds  we  can 
have  conceptions  of  density,  form,  or  friability  with- 
out the  introduction  of  other  properties.  Proper- 
ties may  be  so  separated  from  the  combination  as  to 
be  the  objects  of  abstract  thought,  and  any  element 
may  be  so  contemplated  in  its  separation  as  to  be 
the   object  of  special   observation.     If  I  say  this 


ABSTKACTION .  iTl 

apple  is  red,  the  color  only  may  be  the  object  of 
abstract  thought. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  Mental  operations  in  separating  facts,  or  in  ab- 
stracting certain  ideas,  is  worthy  of  a  passing  notice. 
The  power  of  abstraction  is  in  the  mind.     If  the 
mind  has  the  power  of  motion,  and  if  it  does  act, 
we  must  admit  that  notions  or  ideas  arise  in  connec- 
tion with  or  in  such  action.     In  the  origin  of  our 
ideas  they  may  be  simple,  or    may  exist  separated 
from  each  other.     Tliere   appears  to  be  a  natural 
tendency  uniting  them,  giving  rise  to  complex  men- 
tal states.     If  this  union  is  formed  of  many  simple 
ideas  or  truths,  the  power  in  the  mind,  or  that  is 
connected  with  mental  operations,  which  is  capable 
of  separating  these  united  facts,  in  whole  or  in  part, 
may   be   called    abstraction.     The  union   of   ideas 
forming  complex  mental  states  may  be  either  inten- 
tional or  involuntary ;  but  the  separating  or  abstract- 
ing of  them  appears  to  be  voluntary.     There  must 
be  an  intentional  action  in  the  examination  of  any 
individual  thought  or  idea  in  the  mind  by  which  it 
is  separated  or  abstracted.     2.  Abstraction  can  not 
be  implied  in  the  examination  of  simple  elements  or 
ideas  unless  tliey  could  be  capable,  in  some  way,  of 
being  decomposed,  or  are  divisible  within  and  of 
themselves.     But  abstraction  will  apply  in  the  sepa- 
rating of  the  oneness  of  their  existence  from  all 
other  facts  or  realities  existing  in  the  mind.     3.  Ab- 
straction is  implied  in  the  examination  of  complex 
notions  or  ideas,  when  every  simple  element  or  idea 
involved  in  the  compound  or  collection  are  analyzed 


m. 


172  ABSTRACTION. 

individually  or  separately.  The  act  of  distinctly 
separating  the  elementary  parts  of  a  compound  or 
certain  entities  of  a  collection  from  each  other  is 
called  abstraction,  and  this  work  caYi  only  be  effected 
by  abstraction.  4.  'We  msij  he  said  to  have  particu- 
lar abstract  ideas  on  the  presentation  of  an  object  to 
us  having  color,  fragrance,  form,  density,  and  exten- 
sion, when  the  mind  is  so  entirely  occupied  with 
some  one  of  these  qualities  as  to  be  almost  insensi- 
ble to  the  existence  of  the  others.  The  particular 
abstraction  takes  place  when  the  action  of  the  mind 
is  limited  to  one  quality.  When  any  object  or  qual- 
ity existing  in  a  state  of  combination  is  separated 
by  a  mental  process  for  inspection,  the  idea  we  form 
of  it  may  be  said  to  be  of  particular  abstraction. 
This  may  take  place  in  the  mind  either  with  or  with- 
out a  real  separation  of  the  combined  entities. 


SECTION  III. 
1.  The  power  of  abstraction  and  the  right  exercise 
of  it  is  of  essential  importance  in  the  acquisition  of 
true  knowledge.  It  is  indispensable  to  a  correct 
knowledge  of  material  existences  in  analyzing  the 
constituent  elements  or  component  parts,  bringing 
them  separately  and  consecutively  under  the  test  of 
the  senses  and  the  power  of  perception.  It  enters 
into  the  process  of  correct  deductive  and  demonstra- 
tive argumentation  or  reasoning.  It  is  involved  in 
the  mental  operations  of  the  exciting  orator,  the 
descriptive  writer,  and  the  efficient  architectnralist 
in  abstracting  each  form  of  beauty,  elements  of 
taste,  and  superior  excellence,  contributing  to  that 


ABSTRACTION.  lit 

which  is  to  be  accomplislied  in  true  interest,  sublim- 
ity, or  grandeur.  2.  Abstract  notions  or  ideas  may 
be  said  to  be  simple,  complex,  or  general.  Onr 
ideas  of  objects  which  have  many  elements,  parts, 
or  qualities  may  be  said  to  be  complex;  bat  general 
abstract  ideas  may  exist  in  relation  to  classes  of  ob- 
jects when  they  are  contemplated  separately — dis- 
tinct from,  or  are  abstractedly  from  those  of  other 
classes.  The  term  man  may  be  used  to  convey  the 
idea  of  the  existence  of  our  race,  while  the  term  iish 
may  apply  to  the  existence  of  all  in  that  department 
of  creation.  These  classes  can  be  contemplated  by 
separating  them  from  each  other,  or  from  any  other 
class  of  existences,  under  the  law  of  general  abstrac- 
tion. 3.  Primary  truths  or  principles  may  be  classi- 
fied and  examined  under  the  law  of  general  abstrac- 
tion. Such  truths  or  facts  may  be  combined  in 
classes  entering  into  trains  of  thought  or  reasoning 
in  arriving  at  permanent  conclusions  or  results  in 
the  general  divisions  or  departments  of  knowledge. 
4.  General  abstraction  may  apply  to  numerical  sci- 
ence. General  abstract  propositions,  though  brief, 
may  involve  almost  a  world  of  meaning  or  reality. 
Though  a  series  may  arise,  extending  to  innumerable 
powers,  yet  it  can  be  represented  by  a  general  no- 
tion or  term,  which,  in  reality  and  effect,  is  the  work 
of  abstraction.  General  reasoning  depends  upon 
classification  as  a  result  of  abstraction. 


SECTION  lY. 
1.  General  abstraction  may  apply  to  classification 
when  we  examine  one  class  of  objects  separate  and 

16*  w^      . 


m 


m 


If4  ABSTRACTION. 

apart  from  other  classes.  Objects  classified  under 
the  terms  of  genera  and  species,  may  be  contempla- 
ted or  examined  under  the  law  of  general  abstrac- 
tion. When  a  variety  of  objects  are  before  us,  it 
is  easy  and  almost  natural  for  the  properties  or 
qualities  of  agreement  and  disagreement  to  be  pre- 
sented to  the  mind,  giving  rise  to  associations 
or  classes.  These  classes  of  many  objects  may  be 
represented  by  a  single  term,  and  any  one  of  them 
become  the  object  of  mental  action  separate  or  ab- 
stracted from  the  others.  2.  General  abstract  ideas 
will  apply  to  almost  innumerable  classes  of  objects — 
the  different  orders  or  classes  in  zoology,  ornithol- 
ogy, vegetation,  and  crystallization.  3.  The  process 
of  abstraction  is  essential  to  a  well-regulated  mind. 
Without  it  we  can  not  proceed  correctly  in  analyzing 
the  qualities  or  elements  of  objects;  and  we  could 
not  control  the  attention,  concentrating  the  action  of 
the  mental  powers  in  the  examination  of  any  one 
object  separated  from  the  thousands  bestudding  the 
field  of  vision,  or  that  are  present  with  and  are  con- 
tained in  the  mind.  4.  It  is  influenced  and  affected 
by  the  power  of  disease,  and  can  be  so  impaired  or 
weakened,  as  disease  increases,  that  all  objects  are 
in  a  state  of  confusion  to  the  mind,  and  it  naturally 
varies  as  to  degrees  of  acuteness  and  power  in  dif- 
ferent minds. 


« 


IMAGINATION.  175 


CHAPTER  in. 

IMAGINATION. 

SECTION  I. 
1.  Imagination  is  that  power  or  faculty  of  the 
mind  by  the  action  or  exercise  of  which  we  form 
new  combinations  within  the  mind,  gathered  from 
real  elements,  scenes,  or  facts.  It  is  that  which 
forms  new  associations  of  ideas  from  the  truths  which 
are  the  property  of  memory,  being  subject  to  its 
power.  From  the  materials  stored  up  in  the  mem- 
ory it  produces  new  combinations,  on  the  one  hand, 
more  pleasing,  more  brilliant,  or  more  sublime,  or, 
on  the  other,  more  awful,  more  terrible,  or  more  hor- 
rible. 2.  Imagination  has  been  regarded  as  an  idte- 
rior  element  of  mind,  or  that  it  is  a  result  of  certain 
primary  elements  when  in  action.  If  its  origin  and 
existence  wholly  depends  upon  the  action  of  certain 
primary  elements,  then  when  those  elements  are 
inactive  the  power  and  action  of  imagination  would 
be  annihilated ;  and  if  ever  its  being  and  action  are 
recalled  they  would  exist  by  the  creative  action  of 
those  primary  elements.  That  any  primary  ele- 
ments of  mind  have  such  creative  power  is  absurd. 
The  power  and  the  action  of  imagination  is  wholly  in 
the  mind.  Though  it  may  be  called  an  ulterior  fac- 
ulty, yet  to  define  it  to  be  an  imaginary  nothing  is 
incorrect;  if  it  is  a  real  existence  it  is  capable  of 
being  so   defined.     3.  Imagination   is  closely  con- 

I 


IW  IMAGINATION. 

nected  with  the  power  of  the  understanding  and  our 
conceptions  and  perceiDtions  of  objects  and  facts. 
Under  its  influence  and  action  we  are  enabled  to 
combine  objects  and  qualities  of  which  we  have 
conceptions,  and  extend  our  thoughts  to  the  contem- 
plation of  similar  ones,  or  of  other  facts  as  real, 
though  unknown  to  us  before,  and  w^e  can  imagine 
such  existences  as  being  more  pleasing  or  awful  than 
tkiiy  fact  of  real  existence  in  nature.  In  some  in- 
stances we  can  pursue  and  describe  them  to  a  greater 
degree  of  clearness,  beauty,  and  grandeur  than  is 
contained  in  any  similar  fact  or  object  of  material- 
ity. 4.  Imagination  may  extend  to  the  operations 
of  apprehending  and  contemplating  the  arrange- 
ments, qualities,  resemblances,  or  influences  con- 
nected with  objects  of  mental  action,  and  the  exten- 
sion of  our  thoughts  in  the  formation  of  new  ideas 
beyond  those  which  may  be  regarded  as  primary 
ones,  together  with  the  relative  position  and  influ- 
ence of  the  same  to  and  upon  each  other,  and  to  the 
original  ideas.  It  recombines  our  ideas  of  the  rela- 
tive condition  of  things,  and  influences  mental  states 
in  relation  to  the  beautiful,  grand,  and  sublime, 
which  transcends  the  original  ideas  as  our  thoughts 
pass  beyond  them  and  ascend  higher. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  Imagination  influences  mental  states,  in  and  by 
which  the  mind  conceives  and  forms  ideas  within 
itself,  and  of  real  and  imaginary  external  objects. 
It  assembles  images  and  paints  them  upon  our  minds 
and  on  the  minds  of  othei-s.     By  it  we  can  go  be- 

I 


IMAGINATION.  ITT 

yond  all  these  in  adding  ideas  and  thoughts  to  those 
already  in  the  mind,  and  in  adding  any  image  or 
reality  necessary  to  fill  or  complete  the  scene  or  proc- 
ess of  apprehending  till  the  mind  is  satisfied,  or 
there  is  a  suspension  of  further  action.  Thus  tfcere 
is  a  pleasure  realized  as  we  advance  to  new  facts 
and  in  the  reception  of  every  new  idea.  2.  Imag- 
ination is  incapable  of  being  resolved  into  any  other 
element  or  combination  of  mental  faculties,  from  the 
fact  that  no  element  of  mind  has  self  power  to  cre- 
ate or  aid  in  creating  any  other  faculty,  the  ofiicc 
and  action  of  which  can  be  defined,  and  upon  which 
other  faculties  are  dependent.  The  origin,  power, 
and  action  of  imagination  belongs  to  and  is  in  the 
mind.  Therefore,  it  is  a  power  or  faculty  of  the 
mind,  though  the  ulterior  process  of  its  action  may 
be  regarded  as  of  secondary  relationship.  The  idea 
that  this  faculty  is  wholly  created  by  some  other  fac- 
ulty or  faculties  is  absurd.  3.  Imagination  leads  in 
Mending  elements  of  diverse  existences.  Those 
which  belong  to  widely  diversified  scenes  can  be 
combined  into  one  beautiful  conception.  It  blends 
the  ideas  or  the  elements  of  thought  in  harmony, 
either  with  some  real  conception  or  the  elements  of 
it.  And  it  blends  diversified  elements,  presenting 
to  the  mind  that  which  is  beautiful,  grand,  or  par- 
takes of  true  sublimity. 


SECTION  III. 
1.  The  operations  or  exercise  of  imagination  may 
be  said  to  be  involuntary^  when  there  is  action  with- 
out  any  volitive   effort   of  the   mind.      And   such 


t 


^ 


178  IMAGINATION. 

action  can  take  place  when  we  are  not  immediately 
conscions  of  the  fact  till  some  object  oi  fact  arrests 
our  attention,  and  we  recall  beautiful  combinations 
which  have  been  the  work  of  imagination.  2.  In- 
tentional imagination  involves  artificial  combina- 
tions, by  means  of  which  the  mind  acting  passes  on, 
while  extended  thoughts  and  facts  arise,  forming 
new  objects  of  contemplation.  3.  Fictitious  deline- 
ations are  dependent  upon  imagination  for  transac- 
tions, scenes,  and  imaginary  facts.  Aided  by  this 
faculty  the  narrator  or  actor  paints  images  and  char- 
acters with  any  appropriate  qualities  or  influences. 
4.  Productions  of  the  imagination  are  chaste  and 
of  a  high  moral  character  in  proportion  to  the  moral 
principles,  taste,  and  habits  of  the  author.  5.  The 
comhinations  of  images,  elements,  or  facts  which  are 
produced  by  the  imagination  being  vile,  demoraliz- 
ing, and  destructive  in  their  nature  and  tendency, 
correspond  with  the  bad  motives,  the  corrupt  princi- 
ples, and  the  perverted  habit  of  the  author. 


SECTION  IV. 
1.  Imagination  differs  from  fancy  in  forming  new 
combinations  from  the  materials  stored  up  in  the 
memory,  graduating  them  from  the  beautiful  to  the 
sublime,  or  from  the  awful  to  the  more  terrible. 
Fancy  is  that  by  which  the  mind  forms  images  or 
representations  of  facts  or  existences,  while  imagina- 
tion is  the  power  of  combining  and  increasing,  or  oi 
diminishing  the  interest  of  mental  states.  2.  Im- 
agination differs  from  admiration;  for  the  latter  is 
no  more  than  wonder  mingled  with  emotions  of  love 


IMAGINATION.  1T9 

or  veneration,  or  of  that  which  is  novel  or  great.  3. 
It  differs  from  fictions  in  the  results  of  its  action. 
Fictions  can  only  be  regarded  as  fictions;  but  im- 
agination blends  elements  of  beauty,  grandeur,  and 
sublimity  into  one  grand  conception,  the  elements 
of  which  can  not  be  abstracted  from  true  existences. 
The  creations  of  the  imagination  are  true  to  thought, 
and  are  objects  of  mental  action.  4.  There  is  a  dif- 
ference between  the  imagination  and  bombast.  The 
former  may  command,  combine,  and  blend  elements 
into  forms  of  beauty,  grandeur,  and  sublimity,  while 
the  latter  consists  in  high-sounding  words  in  an  in- 
flated style.  In  this  way  persons  often  use  high- 
sounding  terms,  but  without  any  connection  of  ideas 
or  cogency  of  thought,  and  without  a  proper  concep- 
tion of  that  which  they  wish  to  express.  A  speaker, 
while  enforcing  the  truthfulness  and  claims  of  his 
theme,  had  moved  his  audience  with  a  general  feel- 
ing of  excitement  under  his  thrilling  eloquence,  and 
closed  with  great  applause  and  triumph  in  the  fol- 
lowing manner:  '^Now,  my  audience,  if  I  had  power 
I  would  plant  one  foot  upon  the  Andes  and  the  other 
upon  the  Rocky  Mountains;  thrusting  my  tongue 
into  the  thunder's  mouth,  I  would  proclaim  these 
truths  to  the  ends  of  the  world."  Subsequently  a 
young  speaker  attempted  to  use  the  same  while 
delivering  a  discourse  in  a  loud  tone  of  voice  and 
with  great  confidence:  "Now,  my  audience,  if  I 
had  power  I  would  plant  one  foot  upon  the  Andes 
and  the  other  upon  the  Eocky  Mountains,  and  I 
would  thrust  my  tongue  into  the  thunder's  mouth, 
and  Pd,  I'd,  I'd  howl  like  a  wolf."  Here  is  evidence 
that  the  action  of  the  imagination  was  imperfect, 


i> 


180  IMAGINATION. 

and  that  at  first  he  had  but  a  meager  conception  of 
what  he  wished  to  say.  Bombast  is  without  a  cor- 
rect blending  of  the  beautiful,  and  without  the  proper 
presence  and  arrangement  of  ideas  and  of  thoughts, 
jM-'m  ^^^  ^^  ^^  without  a  maturity  of  conception,  all  of 
-^^^"'^^  which  belong  to  or  are  connected  with  a  vigorous 
and  active  imagination. 


SECTION  V. 
1.  Imagination  differs  very  much  in  nature  and 
action  from  that  of  hurlesque.  The  solemn  thought- 
fulness  or  real  nature  of  the  latter  is  only  feigned  for 
the  purpose  of  exciting  amusement  or  laughter  by 
ludicrous  images  or  representations.  It  is  the  pecu- 
liar influence  manifested  in  a  contrast  between  the 
subject  and  the  way  in  which  it  is  treated,  tending 
to  excite  laughter  or  ridicule,  while  the  active  im- 
agination carries  with  it  real  interests,  thrilling  the 
soul  with  the  liveliest  emotions  of  the  beautiful  and 
sublime.  2.  Imagination  differs  from  sarcasm.  The 
latter  may  abound  with  imagery  or  beautiful  lan- 
guage, but  at  the  same  time  there  is  an  ironical  sig- 
nification or  expression.  Though  there  is  a  granting 
of  the  claims  of  any  person  or  people,  yet  there  may 
be  a  keen,  reproachful  expression  or  satirical  re- 
mark, with  an  influence,  expression,  or  feeling  of 
scorn,  while  imagination  must  be  regarded  as  free 
from  such  peculiarities.  3.  Feelings  of  syTnjpatliy 
are  not  wholly  dependent  upon  imagination,  though 
they  may  be  aided  by  it.  Though  sympathy  can 
and  does  not  originate  with  or  from  imagination,  yet 
a  quick,  active,  and  powerful  imagination  can  and 


IMAGINATION.  ^Sl 

does  combine  images  of  suffering,  gloom,  and  de- 
spair. A  man  whose  moral  sensibilities  are  still 
alive  to  action  always  has  sympathy  intuitively  on 
the  presentation  of  any  object  of  suffering,  if  his 
attention  is  arrested  by  it.  But  his  feelings  are 
much  increased  when  he  begins  to  imagine  himself 
in  like  condition.  4.  The  imagination  can  be  exer- 
cised in  works  of  fiction  without  injury  ordy  when 
such  fiction  is  immediately  connected  with  truths  or 
facts  in  nature^  and  possessing  the  high  moral  char- 
acter which  infinite  Wisdom  has  connected  with  all 
that  he  has  made.  6.  Tlie  influence  of  fictitious 
writings  upon  an  active  imagination  and  upon  the 
mind  is  decidedly  injui-ious.  It  weakens  mental  ac- 
tion in  the  examination  of  real  and  important  truths, 
tends  to  fickleness  and  whimsicalnxiss  of  mind,  insta- 
bility of  character,  and  often  leads  to  certain  min. 
The  divine  Being  has  filled  an  infinite  space  with  an 
eternal  range  of  existences  or  facts,  so  that  the  im- 
moi-tal  mind  of  man  can  dwell  on  real  facts  or  truths 
without  number,  and  to  endless  ages  increasing  in 
majesty  and  glory.  When  all  these  truths  have 
been  scanned  till  they  have  become  dim  with  age 
and  their  glory  exhausted,  then,  and  only  then,  has 
an  undying  spirit  time  to  breathe  its  energies  out 
upon  puffs  of  empty  air,  or  excite  its  restless  powers 
over  the  dreams  of  some  drunken  lord  which  were 
kindled  by  the  exhalations  of  rum ;  or  they  may  be 
the  result  of  a  perverted  and  vicious  purpose  of 
heart.  6.  The  imjproveraent  of  the  imagination,  or 
the  injury  it  receives  from  popular  works  of  fiction, 
depends  principally  upon  the  purity  of  the  author's 
motives  and  the  manner  in  which  the  elements  of 

16 


183  IMAGINATIOif, 

thought  are  combined.  A  chaste  and  spirited  nar- 
ration of  facts,  as  they  are  mapped  or  arranged  in  the 
universe  around  us,  tends  to  enliven  the  imagination 
in  advancing  and  combining  or  blending  of  new 
forms  of  beauty  or  grandeur.  A  chain  of  real  enti- 
ties present  tliat  which  can  give  rise  to  the  creation^ 
of  imagination  and  its  rapid  improvements 


SECTION  YI. 
1.  The  utility  and  importance  of  the  imagination 
must  be  regarded  as  of  no  ordinarj^  character.  In 
neglecting  the  cultivation  of  this  noble  and  import- 
ant faculty  of  the  mind,  is  to  impede  the  power  and 
action  of  the  whole  mind.  2.  A  vigorous  and  active 
imagination,  in  conveying  our  thoughts  or  in  de- 
scribing facts  in  writing,  is  of  great  importance. 
To  present  imagery,  or  to  correctly  delineate  scenes, 
facts,  or  transactions,  or  to  paint  them  in  their  com- 
binations and  qualities,  is  effected  principally  under 
the  control  and  action  of  the  imagination.  3.  An 
active  imagination  is  essential  to  true  oratory.  To 
conceive  of  a  speaker's  power  to  excite,  move,  and 
thrill  an  audience  without  the  aid  of  imagination  to 
assist  him  is  utterly  impossible.  True,  affecting,  and 
exciting  eloquence  can  never  exist  in  connection 
with  that  mind  which  is  destitute  of  an  active  im- 
agination. Under  its  combinations  and  blendings, 
derived  from  the  language  of  trope  and  metaphor, 
the  orator  may  launch  thunder-peals,  startling  the 
feelings  or  emotions  of  all  around  him.  The  elec- 
trifying power,  drawn  from  imagery,  illustrations, 
atid  resemblances,  will  ever  stir  with  life  and  thrill 


IMAGINATION 


ISI 


with  joy  or  awe.  4.  The  combinations,  blendings, 
descriptions,  and  painting  of  the  poet  are  without 
2J\y  pleasing  interest  unless  the  action  of  the  mind 
is  pervaded  by  an  active  imagination.  5.  The  sculp- 
tor's chisel  can  not  trace  upon  the  marble  the  living 
and  desired  expression  or  features  of  a  friend  if  he 
is  destitute  of  the  power  or  influence  of  imagination. 
It  is  this  which  enables  him  to  render  every  form 
graceful  and  beautiful.  And  it  is  this  faculty  which 
causes  others  to  admire  the  work  when  it  is  com- 
pleted. 6.  The  simple  tones  or  rounds  in  music,  if 
abstracted,  are  monotonotis  if  they  do  not  cause  con- 
fusion; but  the  relation  of  those  sounds,  when  prop- 
erly blended  or  harmonized,  thrills  the  soul  with  the 
most  pleasing  emotions. 


SECTION  VII. 
1.  The  development  or  improvement  of  the  imag- 
ination can  be  secured  by  attending  to  the  manner 
of  its  exercise  or  action,  by  continued  or  repeated 
efforts  to  extend  its  power  and  influence.  It  should 
not  be  exercised  out  of  its  proper  sphere,  but  in  the 
most  natural  way  and  upon  its  appropriate  objects. 
2.  The  influence  of  disease  may  aftect  the  imagina- 
tion ;  its  action  may  be  directed  to  an  improper  ob- 
ject or  in  a  wrong  channel.  3.  It  can  lead  us  to 
m^isconceptions  and  improper  action  unless  it  is  con- 
trolled by  reason,  motive,  and  virtue.  We  are  apt 
to  imagine  that  great  warriors  or  statesmen,  who 
have  left  the  world,  have  died  happy  and  are  gone 
to  heaven,  when  they  have  not,  at  any  time,  given 
one  clear  and  conclusive  evidence  of  such  a  result,  as 


184  IMAGINATION. 

is  required  by  the  Gospel  law.  4.  Imagination  will 
lead  to  deception^  if  it  is  allowed  to  wander  nncon- 
trolled  amid  myriads  of  imaginary  beings,  or  scenes 
of  wealth  and  pleasure.  It  soon  tends  to  abstract 
the  mind  from  real  existences,  and  causes  it  to  dwell 
on  the  beautiful  forms  of  imagination,  which  are 
false,  and  upon  the  most  whimsical  speculations.  It 
ceases  to  contemplate  real  existences  at  hand  as 
worthy  attention.  It  soon  withdraws  from  all  ob- 
jects of  worth  and  dwells  in  a  world  of  imagination. 
When  the  mind  advances  to  this  point  it  is  midway 
from  a  rational  state  to  that  of  insanity.  5.  A  con- 
tinued love  of  and  an  untiring  pursuit  oi  fiction 
often  diseases  and  sends  out  the  entire  desires  of  the 
mind  upon  the  wing  of  imagination — feasting  such 
desires  with  inaccessible  enjoyments  and  perishable 
glory.  Finally,  the  mind  becomes  wearied  with  the 
staleness  of  all  demonstrable  truths,  and  fictions  ap- 
pear as  realities.  The  sympathies  and  affections  of 
the  heart  become  cold  and  die  for  the  want  of  real 
accessible  objects  upon  which  they  can  act.  Often 
false  opinions  and  lies  become  the  dreams  of  life,  an 
additional  gloom  in  death,  and  the  bitterness  of  eter- 
nal remorse.  It  would  be  far  better  to  suffer,  if  pos- 
sible, a  thousand  temporal  deaths,  than  for  the  im- 
mortal soul  to  perish  with  invoked  madness,  l^ever 
let  the  mind  dwell  too  long  upon  only  one  and  the 
same  idea  if  you  would  be  sane  on  all  points. 


9fi' .lit-^mmm '.      CHAPTEB  I. 
Intellectual  states  of  exteenal  obigin 

AND  intellectual  STATES  OF 
INTERNAL  ORIGIN. 


SECTION  I. 
1.  The  powers  of  mind  arranged  under  the  pre- 
ceding divisions  of  this  work,  or  the  greater  number 
of  them,  have,  by  the  common  consent  of  many 
writers  in  time  past,  been  arranged  under  the  gen- 
eral heading  of  intellectual  states  of  external  origin, 
and  the  faculties,  the  defining  of  which  we  are  now 
commencing,  have  been  arranged  under  the  heading 
of  intellectual  states  of  internal  origin.  In  this  ar- 
rangement there  appears  to  be  a  distinction  without 
a  philosophical  difference.  There  is  a  difference, 
but  it  is  contrary  to  the  meaning  conveyed  by  the 
first  heading  referred  to.  2.  We  object  to  the  doc- 
trine of  intellectual  states  of  external  origin.  Intel- 
lectual'states  may  exist  as  results  of  external  causes; 
but  for  intellectual  states  to  arise  iu  the  external 
world,  or  out  of  or  beyond  the  limits  of  the  mind 
itself,  is  clearly  incorrect,  and  this  is  a  philosophical 
deduction  from  the  heading  referred  to.  3.  If  it  is 
impossible  for  intellectical  ^states  to  have  external 
origin,  then  it  is  more  absurd  to  regard  the  faculties 

16*  185 


186      ORIGIN     OF    INTELLECTUAL    STATES. 

or  powers  of  tlie  mind  couched  under  such  a  head- 
ing, as  having  their  origin  externally  or  in  the  exter- 
nal world.  There  are  external  causes  of  mental 
states;  but  mental  states  and  faculties  can  not  have 
external  origin  till  they  arise  out  of  the  mind,  which 
is  impossible.  4.  It  is  utterly  impossible  for  us  to 
conceive  that  mind  is  matter^  or  that  matter  can  be 
mind.  All  the  faculties  of  the  mind  belong  to  and 
exist  in  the  mind.  All  the  mental  states  of  which 
"we  are  capable  have  their  origin  and  existence  in 
the  mind.  Therefore,  no  state  or  faculty  of  the 
mind  can  have  an  external  existence  or  origin  unless 
such  existence  or  origin  takes  place  beyond  the  self- 
limits  of  mind,  and,  consequently,  in  the  external 
world. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  If  we  should  say  that  any  element  or  power  of 
mind  was  of  external  origin^  as  to  either  its  exist- 
ence or  action,  would  it  not  convey  the  idea  that  the 
origin,  or  that  the  commencement  of  its  being  was 
in  connection  with  some  inert  element  or  existences 
of  the  external  world  ?  But  if  we  refer  to  the  origin 
of  its  action,  would  it  not  imply  that  such  action 
might  commence  with  distant  objects  of  matter, 
thence  advance  to  the  mind  in  order  to  be  known  ? 
2.  If  we  say  that  any  mental  state  is  of  external  ori- 
gin, would  it  not  convey  the  idea  that  external  phys- 
ical elements  have  self-action,  which  action  must  first 
ta*ke  place  in  order  to  affect  the  mind,  which  is  at 
rest,  creating  new  mental  states?  This  would  seem 
to  indicate,  that  while  the  mind  was  at  rest  mental 


OEIGIN    OF    INTELLECTUAL    STATES.      187 

action  of  the  same  mind  could  take  place  in  connec- 
tion with  inert,  distant  objects,  which  finally  afiects 
the  mind  in  creating  new  mental  states.  If  such 
conclusions  be  true,  we  are  not  capable  of  so  under- 
standing them.  3.  The  action  of  some  faculties  of 
the  mind  may  be  regarded  as  more  closely  related 
to  and  connected  with  external  objects  than  that  of 
others,  and  their  position  and  claims  must  be  de- 
fined accordingly,  which  can  not  be  done  to  any 
great  extent  by  any  general  heading. 


SECTION  III. 
1.  There  can  be  no  impropriety  in  saying  that 
there  are  intellectual  states  of  internal  oAgin;  io\\ 
although  external  objects  may  afiect  the  mind 
through  the  medium  of  the  senses,  yet  the  mental 
state  which  follows  must  be  wholly  of  and  within 
the  mind.  And  this  state,  though  it  follows  an  ex- 
ternal cause,  can  not  of  itself  be  said  to  be  of  exter- 
nal origin.  While  the  cause  may  be  external,  yet 
the  origin  of  the  mental  state,  as  such,  is  not  the 
inert  cause,  nor  the  sensation  received  by  contact 
with  it,  but  is  wholly  of  and  within  the  mind.  2. 
The  origin  of  all  knowledge  known  to  us,  as  such, 
is  in  the  mind.  The  true  study  of  psychology  is  of 
boundless  importance.  The  undying  soul  may  be 
said  to  contain  within  itself  an  eternity  of  meaning, 
being,  and  destiny.  Through  the  medium  of  the 
senses  we  become  acquainted  with  the  realities, 
beauty,  and  grandeur  of  the  external  world ;  but  by 
means  of  internal  powers  we  can  and  do  have  knowl- 
edge  independent  of  material   entities,  or  of  the 


188       ORIGIN     OF     INTELLECTUAL    STATES. 

power  and  action  of  the  senses.  3.  The  most  ulte- 
rior origin  of  knowledge,  in  regard  to  external 
things,  must  begin  with  sensation.  This  knowledge 
can  only  embrace  the  fact  that  a  sensation  has  been 
received,  and  that  we  have  the  presence  of  such  an 
existent.  This  sensation  in  and  of  itself  can  never 
generate  or  impart  to  the  mind  thoughts  and  ideas, 
which  are  the  true  beginning  of  intellectual  or 
rational  knowledge.  4.  The  action  of  sensation  af- 
fecting the  mind  is  immediately  followed  by  a  new 
mental  state,  which  is  the  result  of  a  reviving  influ- 
ence or  action  of  the  internal  power  of  the  soul. 
By  and  in  the  action  of  this  internal  power,  modi- 
fied into  certain  mental  states,  arises  the  formation 
and  existence  of  thought;  and  with  the  formation 
of  thought  commences  intellectual  or  rational  knowl- 
edge. 5.  The  existence  of  simple  thoughts  and  ideas 
must  arise  by  and  within  the  action  of  the  internal 
power  of  the  soul.  The  advancing  of  these  from 
simple  to  complex,  and  the  blending  of  them  into 
combinations,  is  real  knowledge.  Thinking,  believ- 
ing, hoping,  and  doubting  have  their  origin  wholly 
and  only  in  the  active  internal  power  of  the  soul. 
They  are  not  objects  of  the  senses,  nor  of  sensa- 
tions, caused  by  external  things.  So  we  are  forced 
to  the  conclusion  that  knowledge  is  of  internal  ori- 
gin, and  the  power  we  have  in  knowing  all  truths  or 
facts,  whether  they  exist  in  the  external  world  or 
within  the  imperishable  soul,  is  an  internal  power, 
the  test  of  all  facts. 


SUGGESTION.  189 


CHAPTER  II. 

SUGGESTION. 
SECTION  I. 

1 .  Suggestion  appears  to  be  the  jpresentation  of 
an  idea  to  the  iniud  without  the  immediate  aid  of 
the  senses.  It  has  power  within  and  bj  its  own  ac- 
tion to  give  rise  to  thoughts.  We  have  notions, 
thoughts,  and  ideas  which  appear  to  be  inspired,  and 
arise  from  the  internal  action  of  the  immaterial  con- 
stitution, without  the  aid  of  combining  and  compar- 
ing ideas  or  facts.  There  are  certain  thoughts  and 
ideas  which  arise  and  can  be  called  natural  sugges- 
tions. 2.  Simple  suggestions  may  be  regarded  as 
primary  and  natural.  They  have  been  regarded  as 
a  spontaneous  result  of  intuitive  power,  or  that  they 
arise  in  the  action  of  internal  emotions  or  sensations. 
The  action  of  these  may  suggest  the  idea  of  real 
existences  which  may  become  the  objects  of  mental 
action.  3.  The  internal  action  of  the  mind,  in  and 
by  which  suggestions  arise,  may  be  regarded  as  the 
real  or  clearly-deiinable  origin  of  their  knowledge 
or  known  existence.  In  connection  with  these  we 
have  power  to  believe  in  their  real  existence.  4. 
From  this  internal  action  or  states  of  the  mind  is 
suggested  the  notion  of  self^  or  of  the  mind  as  real, 
and  the  cause  and  reality  of  change.  That  which 
suggests  the  idea  of  our  being,  or  the  notion  of  du- 
ration, is  independent  of  the  power  and  action  of 


f#0  SUGGESTION. 

the  senses  or  of  sensation  as  to  its  origin.  Such 
suggestions  appear  to  arise  from  intuitive  power  and 
become  the  objects  of  consciousness,  and  such  inti- 
mations appear  to  be  essential  to  the  nature  of  mind, 
and  its  power  of  primary  action,  which  is  the  origin 
of  all  knowledge  to  us,  capable  of  demonstration. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  The  idea  of  self-existence  can  not  be  tested  by 
the  senses.  We  can  not  see,  hear,  taste,  or  smell 
such  an  idea  or  fact,  neither  can  we  feel  to  originate 
the  same,  but  it  arises  from  the  mind  itself.  It  is 
suggested  spontaneously,  from  the  very  nature  of 
the  mind,  as  it  is  constituted  by  its  sovereign  Crea- 
tor. It  is  so  closely  connected  with  the  nature  and 
existence  of  mind  that  it  is  impossible  for  us  to 
define  the  time  or  the  beginning  of  its  origin.  2. 
The  origin  of  the  idea  of  mind,  as  an  existent,  can 
not  commence  with  the  senses;  for  the  senses  are 
properly  affected  by  external  things,  and  no  idea  of 
mind  can  result  abstractly  from  the  existence  of  ma- 
teriality. The  origin  of  the  notion  is  suggested  by 
and  from  the  nature  of  the  mind  within  itself  The 
beginning  of  our  ideas  of  the  primary  elements  of 
mind  is  suggested  by  the  mind,  though  they  may  be 
matured  by  the  feelings  and  action  of  the  mind  in 
various  ways.  3.  The  origin  of  the  notion  or  idea 
of  personal  identity  is  with  the  internal  power  of  the 
mind.  It  can  not  arise  from  inert  elements  of  the 
external  world,  neither  can  it  arise  from  the  same- 
ness in  qualities  or  nature  of  any  mental  existence 
beyond  and  distinct  from  self;  but  the  beginning  of 


SUGGESTION*  §0^ 

its  being  is  suggested  by  the  interDal  and  intuitive 
power  and  nature  of  the  mind.  4.  The  idea  of  our 
7'eal  existence  must  arise  from  the  natural  existence 
of  the  mind.  We  can  not  exist  without  having  an 
idea  of  our  existence.  The  beginning  of  such  an 
idea  is  connected  with  the  power  of  suggestion,  and 
may  be  regarded  as  a  simple  idea,  forever  undefina- 
ble.  But  an  idea  or  thought  implies  and  is  action; 
therefore,  the  self-acting  power  is  of  and  within  the 
mind  itself. 


SECTION  III. 
1.  Simple  suggestion  may  embrace  certain  states 
of  mind  which  arise  out  of  states  previously  experi- 
enced, when  the  relationship  is  not  an  object  of 
memory  or  of  present  mental  action.  2.  Simple 
ideas  arise  from  the  internal  power  of  the  soul,  and 
from  the  nature  and  origin  of  some  of  them  we  may 
come  to  the  conclusion  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as 
natural  suggestion.  Connected  with  such  ideas  is  a 
belief  that  their  existence  is  true.  3.  Simple  sug- 
gestion can  apply  to  pctst  thmigJit  07'  events.  If  we 
visit  a  natural  curiosity,  which  we  have  formerly 
visited,  in  company  with  a  friend,  the  different  ob- 
jects of  former  attraction  and  conversation  will 
revive  the  thoughts  and  even  the  words  used  by  i>s 
on  that  occasion.  In  passing  the  different  objects 
of  former  conversation  they  often  cause  the  former 
language  and  words  to  be  revived  by  the  power  of 
suggestion.  4.  This  kind  of  suggestion  extends  not 
only  to  the  action  of  the  mind  in  regard  to  past 
tlwuglits  or  facts ^  but  will  apply  to  mental  action  in 


» 


192  SUGGESTION. 

regard  to  that  which  may  become  the  object  of  men- 
tal action,  though  it  may  have  never  before  been 
the  object  of  any  mental  action.  One  idea  often 
introduces  another  into  the  mind.  The  sight  of  a 
peculiar  object  may  suggest  others  of  the  same  class, 
but  differing  in  certain  facts  or  features,  or  may,  and 
often  does,  give  rise  to  certain  trains  of  thought 
never  before  experienced. 


SECTION  lY. 
1.  Suggestion  is  involuntary  when  thoughts  arise 
in  connection  with  other  thoughts  which  are  not  at 
the  time  the  special  objects  of  the  attention  or  of 
mental  action.  And  it  is  clearly  involuntary  when 
the  thought  or  idea  appears  to  arise  in  connection 
with  or  from  the  intuitive  power  of  mental  and 
moral  action.  2.  This  power  may  be  said  to  be  vol- 
vmtary  when  we,  by  intentional  cogitation,  use  cer- 
tain thoughts,  feelings,  or  bearings  of  facts  in  order 
to  trace  out  other  or  similar  things  of  which  we  have 
had  no  clear  perception  before.  The  discovery  of 
each  new  fact  suggests  the  idea  of  something  as  real 
still  beyond.  3.  The  importance  of  this  faculty  is 
incalculable.  It  is  a  revealer  to  us  of  the  past;  it 
enables  us  to  contemplate  the  future,  and  upon  it 
memory  is  dependent  for  much  of  its  power  in  call- 
ing up  past  thoughts  or  facts.  It  is  an  original  tend- 
ency of  the  mind  to  exist  in  certain  states  after 
certain  other  states.  4.  In  suggestion  there  is  a 
tendency  to  relative  conceptions:  All  ideas  or  ob- 
jects so  affinitated  as  to  sustain  a  relation  to  each 
other  may  and  often  do  suggest  one  another.     These 


SUGGESTION.  193 

relations  are  experienced,  or  are  so  perceived  by  the 
mental  faculties,  that  in  trying  to  comprehend  them 
the  power  and  majesty  of  the  mind  augments  our 
conceptions  of  its  limitless  reality.  5.  In  suggestion 
there  is  also  a  tendency  to  relative  perceptions,  in 
which  all  facts  or  truths,  sustaining  a  relation  to 
each  other,  suggest  similar  facts  or  truths,  which, 
without  their  presence  with  the  mind,  would  have 
never  been  the  objects  of  perception. 


SECTION  V. 
1.  The  origin  of  the  idea  of  material  existences 
may  be  imparted  to  us  through  the  medium  of  the 
senses,  but  we  could  not,  from  sight  or  touch  alone, 
judge  of  the  qualities  or  properties  of  a  compound 
beyond  the  surface  which  is  seen  or  felt.  But  that 
which  is  tested  by  contact  with  the  senses  can  and 
does  suggest  an  idea  of  those  properties  which  exist 
within  or  beyond  the  outer  surface.  2.  Suggestion 
involves  our  experience  in  noticing  successive  mental 
states.  This  chain  of  successive  events  suggest  other 
chains,  and  all  the  individual  facts  serve  to  suggest 
corresponding  facts  or  truths.  3.  We  are  princi- 
pally dependent  upon  suggestion  as  to  the  origin  of 
our  idea  of  motion.  We  can  test  the  abstract  ex- 
istence and  qualities  of  objects  which  are  in  motion, 
but  there  is  a  difference  between  that  which  moves 
and  motion  itself  Our  idea  of  that  which  changes 
the  relative  position  or  order  of  things  must  be  sug- 
gested; for  motion  can  not  be  regarded  as  a  real 
object  of  the  sense;  hence  the  idea  or  notion  of  it 
can  not  arise  from  the  power  of  the  senses,  but  is 

17 


^ 


Id^  SUGGESTION. 

suggested  in  the  change  and  relative  position  of 
things.  4.  "We  are  dependent,  in  an  important 
sense,  upon  suggestive  ^ower  for  our  notion  or  idea 
of  the  relation  of  effect  to  its  cause.  The  character 
of  an  effect  may  suggest  the  cause,  guided  in  part 
by  the  presence  and  action  of  the  senses :  but  the 
origin  of  the  idea  of  the  cause  is  wholly  of  sugges- 
tion. If  it  requires  strength  to  raise  a  small  stone 
from  the  earth,  the  thought  of  lifting  a  larger  one 
naturally  suggests  the  idea  of  additional  power; 
hence,  the  presence  of  the  vast  globe  naturally  sug- 
gests a  first  Cause,  or  the  omnipotent  power  which 
caused  the  being  or  real  existence  of  the  globe  or  of 
the  vast  universe. 


SECTION  VI. 
1.  The  origin  of  the  idea  of  time  is  connected 
with  the  suggestive  power.  Time  is  duration  meas- 
ured by  the  revolutions  of  the  heavenly  bodies.  We 
can  not  have  clear  conceptions  of  duration  existing 
in  succession,  though  we  can  have  of  duration  which 
can  be  measured.  The  events  which  take  place  in 
time,  and  the  relative  positions  in  the  flight  of  the 
orbs  which  measure  it,  can  not  give  us  a  satisfactoi*y 
idea  of  time;  hence,  such  an  idea  arises  from  an 
internal  suggestive  power.  2.  If  duration  measured 
can  be  called  time,  then  it  would  appear  that  dura- 
tion without  being  measured,  or  being  unfinished, 
may  be  called  eternity.  The  succession  of  events, 
lander  the  law  of  measurement,  has  a  natural  tend- 
ency to  the  suggestion  of  the  idea  of  the  permanency 
of  duration  unchecked  by  a  succession  of  periods  or 


SUGGESTION.  195 

the  flying  returns  of  revolving  worlds.  3.  We  can 
not  recall  the  time  when  we  first  received  an  idea 
of  space.  It  appears  to  have  arisen  spontaneously, 
or  that  it  is  a  result  of  an  intuitive  suggestive  power. 
There  is  no  way  to  represent  space  to  the  senses;  it 
is  without  form,  figure,  or  bounds.  It  is  not  depend- 
ent upon  the  existence  of  any  thing  else,  so  far  as 
we  are  capable  of  judging,  and  when  we  have  con- 
ceptions of  any  existent,  it  is  impossible  for  us  to 
think  of  it  out  of  or  beyond  the  bounds  of  space. 
4.  Resemblance  may  be  regarded  as  an  ulterior 
law  of  suggestion.  The  primary  power  of  sugges- 
tion is  connected  with  the  intuitive  powers  of  the 
mind,  as  the  previous  argument  will  show.  The 
mutual  or ■  reciprocal  resemblance  of  objects  often 
suggest  each  other,  and  is  the  occasion  of  recalling 
past  existences  by  means  of  the  suggestive  power 
and  its  action.  The  house  of  a  stranger  may  replace 
in  the  mind  clear  or  vivid  conceptions  of  the  old 
homestead.  The  appearance  of  yonder  grove,  or 
the  banks  of  that  rolling  river  instantly  revives  the 
place  of  my  childhood  sports,  and  where  my  little 
brother  and  sister  sleep  peacefully  waiting  the  sound 
of  the  last  trump.  The  peculiar  voice  of  a  stranger 
may  recall  to  my  mind,  as  from  the  grave,  that  of 
my  father.  The  peculiar  state  of  mind  aflfected  by 
one  object  has  a  tendency  to  suggest  other  states  or 
objects. 


SECTION  YII. 
1.  The  internal  action  of  the  suggestive  power  is 
aided  by  the  contrast  involved  in  the  nature  and 


196  SUGGESTION. 

existence  of  objects.  The  presence  of  the  dead 
body  of  a  celebrated  warrior,  statesman,  or  divine 
is  almost  instantly  followed  by  their  appearance 
when  living  and  in  their  glory.  2.  The  extremes  of 
conditions^  in  existences,  suggest  their  opposites. 
In  connection  with  the  idea  of  a  suffering  beggar  by 
the  wayside  is  suggested  the  thought  of  prosperity 
and  happiness.  The  prairie  which  has  smiled  under 
the  rays  of  a  thousand  summer's  suns  only  affects 
the  mind  by  the  introduction  of  the  thought  or  idea 
of  dark,  silent  groves,  or  of  majestic  forests  waving 
in  the  living  emerald  of  beauty  and  grandeur.  The 
action  of  the  mind  in  passing  from  one  object  to  an- 
other is  a  wise  arrangement  of  Deity,  else  all  of 
earth  would  become  monotonous  and  uninteresting. 
3.  In  thinking  of  some  one  of  cotemjporaneous  ex- 
istences often  others  of  the  same  epoch  are  suggested 
to  us.  If  objects  distinct  from  each  other,  yet  united 
by  an  invariable  connection,  as  the  batteries  at  the 
extremities  of  a  telegraphic  wire,  the  thought  of  the 
one  often  suggests  the  other.  4.  Without  lively  sug- 
gestive powers  mental  action  would  be  confused.  It 
appears  to  be  indispensable  in  furnishing  new  materi- 
als, amplifying  the  thoughts  of  the  writer  or  of  the 
speaker;  and  in  proportion  to  the  activity  of  the 
suggestive  power  will  be  the  readiness  of  language, 
cogency  of  thought  and  sentiment,  and  the  force  of 
appeal.  5.  Beat  entities  are  the  objects  of  sugges- 
tion, and  when  thus  presented  to  the  mind  they  be- 
come the  objects  of  notice  and  reason.  The  great 
truths  which  lie  at  the  foundation  of  that  process  of 
reasoning  by  which  we  are  compelled  to  acknowl- 
edge the  existence  of  God,  together  with  our  own 


SUGGESTION.  19f 

being  and  our  obligations  to  him  as  the  Father  and 
donor  of  all  good — thej  are  the  direct  intimations 
and  objects  of  the  suggestive  power  of  the  mind. 

SECTION  YIII. 
1.  The  suggestive  intellect  is  capable  of  being 
strengthened  and  rendered  lively  and  efficient  by 
attentively  directing  the  mind  to  those  thoughts  and 
feelings  of  our  choice,  and  which  will  be  most  likely 
to  suggest  each  other  and  in  trying  to  retain  them 
as  distinctly  and  as  long  as  we  possibly  can.  Facts 
thus  collected  become  as  encamped  or  collected 
materials  for  the  egressive  action  of  the  mind.  2. 
Thm  power  can  be  rendered  more  vigorous  by  attend- 
ing to  those  truths  which  are  most  naturally  affinita- 
ted,  or  are  blended  in  a  state  of  union.  3.  It  can 
he  aided  in  attending  to  those  facts  which  differ  most 
abstractly  from  others,  and  produce  sensations  and 
feelings  peculiar,  or  that  differ  in  kind  and  nature 
so  as  to  attract  the  greater  attention.  4.  This  power 
can  he  increased  by  attending  to  that  temperance, 
care,  and  economy  necessary  to  secure  the  health  of 
the  bodily  powers,  contributing  thereby  to  the  natu- 
ral capability  and  readiness  of  mental  development, 
BO  far  as  mind  is  dependent  upon  physical  organs. 
The  mind  can  not  be  perfectly  developed  through 
either  a  diseased  skull  or  brain.  5.  The  activity  of 
the  suggestive  power  of  the  mind  depends  much 
upon  the  hdhit  or  manner  in  which  it  is  exercised. 
It  should  be  tested  and  exerted  with  care  and  with 
repeated  egressive  efforts  in  presenting  the  mind 
with  new  and  delightful  truths  or  facts.     In  the  con- 

17* 


198  SUGGESTION. 

templating  of  these  natural  truths  the  mind  rises, 
admiring  the  power  and  goodness  of  Him  who 
reared  the  forest,  commands  the  storm,  rolls  the 
ocean,  and  eliminated,  as  from  the  uncreated  light  of 
Lights,  the  planetary  lamps  which  ever  move  in 
boundless  space  around  us,  outnumbering,  if  possi- 
ble, an  infinite  flight  of  years. 


BELATIVB    SUGGESTION. 


CHAPTER  III. 

RELATIVE  SUGGESTION. 

SECTION  I. 
1.  In  contemplating  objects  the  mind  is  capable  of 
receiving  impressions,  or  of  being  influenced  in  re- 
gard to  certain  relations  which  such  objects  mutually 
sustain  to  each  other.  Thai  which  awakens  a  feel- 
ing or  a  mental  state  in  regard  to  the  natural  rela- 
tionship of  objects  is  called  relative  suggestion. 
Without  doubt  the  mind  is  capable  of  such  an  influ- 
ence, but  it  is  difficult  to  clearly  define  its  office,  as 
it  appears  to  be  midway  between  the  nature  or  char- 
acter of  simple  suggestion  and  that  of  the  judg- 
ment. Yet  a  suggestive  power,  in  any  way  or  to 
any  degree  of  strength,  is  clearly  distinct  from  that 
of  the  judgment.  2.  The  mind  is  capable  of  expe- 
riencing certain  influences^  which  are  aff*ected  by  a 
peculiar  relationship  of  objects  of  similar  or  dissim- 
ilar co-ordinate  properties  or  qualities,  which  give 
rise  to  a  new  class  of  feelings  and  mental  states. 
The  presence  of  such  objects  appears  to  affect  in  the 
mind  the  process  of  comparing,  so  as  to  give  rise  to 
the  cognizance  of  the  first  intimations  or  ideas  in 
relation  to  them,  in  which  we  realize  their  relation 
in  a  certain  way  or  respects.  This  is  an  original 
susceptibility  of  the  mind,  and  is  connected  with 
the  action  of  intuitive  principles.  The  mind  is  not 
only  capable  of  realizing  or  experiencing  the  pres- 


200  RELATIVE    SUGGESTION. 

ence  and  relations  of  objects,  but  of  being  affected 
by  the  condition  or  character  of  those  things  which 
are  like  or  unlike,  agreeing  or  disagreeing  as  to 
equality,  time,  or  place.  3.  Influences  of  relation 
may  arise  and  be  suggested,  or  experienced  by  the 
mind,  in  the  notice  or  contemplation  of  a  great  va- 
riety of  realities  or  facts.  The  degrees  of  difference 
which  glow  in  the  emerald  hues  of  a  summer  forest, 
are  the  occasions  of  giving  rise  to  the  first  appre- 
hensions, or  perceptions,  of  the  different  kinds  of 
trees  composing  that  forest  and  other  relative  facts. 
In  the  sound  of  the  national  band,  one  instrument  is 
loud,  and  another  soft;  in  the  touching  of  frozen 
mercury  and  cotton,  or  in  the  tasting  different  kinds 
of  fruit,  there  are  natural  differences,  the  relations 
of  which  affect  or  influence  the  mind  in  regard  to 
them.  The  relation  of  any  class  of  objects  is  dif- 
ferent from  the  objects  of,  and  within  themselves. 
That  w^hich  is  involved  in  such  relationship  affects 
the  mind  in  regard  to  the  objects  themselves,  and 
also  in  respect  to  the  degrees  of  the  mutual  contrast 
in  the  properties  related.  4.  Terms  of  correlative 
character  may  involve  and  express  that  which  is 
intended  to  be  explained.  The  mere  mention  of 
them  involves  the  relation  they  sustain  to  other 
objects,  which  relation  is  the  immediate  occasion 
giving  rise  to  mental  influences,  or  states ;  while  the 
object  expressed  by  the  use  of  the  term  was  lost 
sight  of.  In  the  use  of  the  terms  father,  mother, 
governor,  or  commander,  the  relations  are  the  more 
direct  causes  of  a  full  mental  action  * 

,    .j     . ....  :.'.      ..■  -f  J    .1..     .. 


RELATIVE    SUGGESTION. 

SECTION  II. 
1.  Relative  auggestion  does  not  depend  upon  the 
power  of  the  senses  for  its  existence,  else  brutes  and 
birds  would  have  it  as  fully  developed  as  man;  for 
they  can  see  and  hear  as  well  as  we  can ;  but  as  to 
their  power  of  suggestion,  or  their  perception  of 
relations  being  well  developed  is  very  doubtful. 
The  idea  of  the  tallness  of  a  tree  could  not  be  con- 
veyed to  us  by  sight  only;  for  if  no  tree  of  any 
kind  existed  save  that  one,  it  would,  doubtless,  ap- 
pear to  us  neither  tall  nor  short;  but  if  we  know 
that  tall  and  short  trees  are  before  us,  it  is  evidence 
that  their  relation  has  been  suggested  to  the  mind, 
and  has  been  an  object  of  mental  action.  2.  Wo 
are  not  dependent  upon  the  action  of  the  senses  in 
recognizing,  and  in  realizing  the  mutual  relation- 
ship of  hope  and  expectation,  love  and  jo}^,  or  that 
joy  and  grief  are  opposites  ;  yet  these  relations  give 
rise  to  mental  influences  and  new  states  of  mind. 
The  number  of  relations  which  affect  or  cause  the 
action  of  the  suggestive  power,  in  consequence  of 
which  new  mental  states  are  experienced,  or  take 
place,  are  almost  as  the  stars  of  heaven  for  number. 
"What  a  limitless  variety  of  objects  and  facts  con- 
tribute to  the  action  and  resources  of  the  mind ! 
What  must  mind  be  contemplated  in  the  perfection 
of  its  powers  I  What  an  eternity  of  duration,  and 
infinity  of  feeling,  memory,  knowledge,  action,  and 
being  within  and  of  itself!  Imperishable  gem,  as- 
sert the  power  of  thy  immortal  faculties ;  for  living 
thou  shalt  never  cease  to  be.  3.  The  extent  of  this 
power,  and  the  number  of  objects  and  facts  involved 


202  RELATIVE    SUGGESTION. 

in  its  action,  can  not  readily  be  defined.  Its  action 
is  connected  with  relations  of  coexistence,  resem- 
blance, diversity,  degree,  and  position.  It  may 
extend  to  the  relation  of  cause  and  eflfect.  But 
it  is  useless  to  dwell  longer  upon  this  subject^ 
We  will  pass  to  the  examination  of  the  next 
topic,  with  increased  humility,  gratitude,  and  awe 
in  contemplating  the  powers  and  the  being  of 
mind,  and  the  goodness  of  that  Creator  who  con- 
stituted it  progressive  to  endless  ages.  With  more 
than  lightning  speed  it  sends  forth  its  pioneer 
thoughts  upon  the  road  of  interminable  duration, 
without  ever  arriving  at  the  ulterior  bounds  of  its 
dominion.  4.  Who  can  define  and  contemplate 
the  soul  ^perfected  in  its  departure  from  earth? 
Progressive  flight!  when  millions  of  rising  series 
in  knowledge  have  been  numbered,  comprehended, 
and  passed,  still  onward  in  its  towering  flight,  know- 
ing more,  and  still  more,  of  the  incomprehensible 
fullness,  love,  and  goodness  of  that  Being  to  whom 
it  owes  its  existence  I 


THE    JUDGMENT.  -fidS 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THB  JUDGMENT. 
SECTION  I. 

1.  The  faculty  of  the  human  mind  that  is  called 
judgment  has  often  been  acknowledged,  while  some- 
thing else  has  been  defined  in  lieu  of  it.  Its  exist- 
ence can  not  but  be  acknowledged,  for  it  is  a  real 
faculty,  and  as  such  it  should  be  defined.  2.  It  is 
that  faculty  of  the  mind  by  which  we  are  enabled 
to  compare  ideas  or  thoughts,  and  to  determine  upon 
the  evidences  as  to  preferences,  or  that  which  is 
right  or  wrong.  By  it  we  not  only  compare  ideas 
and  thoughts,  but  we  advance  to  compare  the  rela- 
tions of  terms,  of  propositions,  and  of  arguments ; 
also  to  determine  upon  that  which  is  correct.  3. 
It  is  that  which  may  be  called  the  determination  of 
the  mind,  in  which  we  become  satisfied  from  the 
evidence  and  influence  received  in  comparing  the 
relations  of  ideas,  thoughts,  propositions,  and  argu- 
ments. 4.  It  is  not  only  the  act  of  judging,  but  it 
is  the  power  by  which  such  a  process  or  action  is 
concluded.  And  if  it  has  power  to  examine  the 
agreement  or  disagreement  of  things  in  order  to 
arrive  at  the  truth,  it  has  power  to  determine  or  to 
decide  upon  that  truth  after  it  is  found  or  defined. 
It  not  only  has  power  to  examine  and  to  determine 
upon  relations,  and  the  correct  stages  of  argumenta- 
tion, but  it  is  the  concluding  action  of  the  mind  in 


204:  THE  jtjdgmj:nt. 

regard  to  the  determining  of  the  truthfulness  of  ob- 
jects or  entities,  and  of  determining  the  mind  favor- 
ably to  truths,  whether  casual  or  substantial,  5. 
The  faculty  of  judgment  is  a  particular  jpower 
within  itself  'y  it  is  not  to  be  taught  in  order  to 
have  being,  and  the  power  of  its  origin  is  connected 
with  the  existence  and  action  of  the  primary  ele- 
ments of  mind.  It  is  not  originated  by  education, 
but  exists  only  to  be  exercised.  If  it  is  naturally 
deficient — and  this  appears  to  be  true  in  some 
minds — there  is  no  process  of  instruction  that  can 
supply  the  defect.  The  understanding  may  be  nat- 
urally^ perfect,  and  the  same  may  be  true  of  sugges- 
tion, or  other  powers ;  but  if  the  judgment  is  defi- 
cient, the  mind  generally  acts  hastily,  and  at  the 
first  intention.  6.  The  judgment  has  not  only  power 
to  determine  an  action,  or  of  concluding,  or  of 
finishing  that  which  may  be  called  a  mental  process 
satisfactorily,  but  it  can  analyze^  abstract^  classify^ 
and  generalize.  By  it  we  can  class  an  individual 
existent  under  a  general  notion  in  the  afiirmation,  as 
that  is  an  animal  of  a  certain  kind,  or  that  is  a  tree 
of  a  special  kind,  or  from  a  certain  mountain.  The 
powers^' of  the  mind  are  in  motion,  uneasy,  or  rest- 
less till  the  object  of  its  action  is  decided  by  the 
judgment.  This  decision  once  made,  rest  generally 
pervades  the  whole  of  the  mental  faculties. 


SECTION  II. 
1.    A  naturally-defective  faculty  of  judgment — • 
and  many  there  are  who  appear  to  be  almost  totally 
wanting  in  regard  to   a  well-developed  power   of 


THE    JUDGMENT.  205 

judgment — is  attended  with  great  uncertainty,  and 
much  confusion,  as  to  a  proper  discrimination  and 
action  in  regard  to  what  is  right  or  wrong.  Such 
minds  may  desire  to  do  right,  and  to  act  conscien- 
tiously in  all  things,  but  there  is  plainly  a  want  of 
proper  and  safe  decisions.  They  should  share  of 
the  charity  of  others  rather  than  suffer  severe  pen- 
alties in  case  of  wrong  acts.  An  allowance  should 
be  made  for  their  imprudence,  while  the  purity  or 
impurity  of  their  motive,  at  the  time  of  their  error, 
should  be  the  object  of  the  judgment  of  others  in 
acquitting  or  in  condemning  them.  2.  The  judg- 
ment jpresujpposes  the  understanding.  The  latter 
may  exist  without  the  former,  but  the  judgment  can 
not  exist  with  any  special  manifestation  without  the 
understanding.  The  latter  furnishes  the  materials, 
or  facts,  upon  which  the  former  acts.  It  furnishes 
to  the  judgment  that  which  is  capable  of  being  an- 
alyzed, abstracted,  classified,  or  generalzied.  With 
a  well-developed  understanding,  we  may  have  dis- 
tinct and  vivid  conceptions  of  objects  presented  to 
the  mind;  but  if  the  judgment  is  deficient,  we  can 
not  properly  discriminate  between  them  in  marking 
the  features  of  difference,  and  in  bringing  such  dif- 
ference, or  differences,  into  the  decision,  each  one 
contributing  to  the  final  decision  or  conclusion.  3. 
The  understanding  only  knows  objects  as  they  really 
exist,  and  as  they  are  presented  to  the  mind ;  but 
the  judgment  must  discriminate  by  arranging  them 
together,  and  by  evolving  those  things  which  agree 
or  disagree;  and  it  depends  upon  this  power  to  give 
a  decision  accordingly  and  correctly.  4.  The  judg- 
ment, then,  must  be  that  which  has  power  to  determ- 

18 


#S#  ^  THE    JUDGMENT. 

ine,  or  of  decision ;  but,  in  another  point  of  light, 
its  action,  in  connection  with  a  mental  apparition,  is 
the  recognition  of  facts,  feelings,  and  differences  in 
the  relations  of  things  presented  to  the  mind,  which 
are  the  objects  of  conception,  or  are  made  known  to 
the  understanding.  Bj  its  action  we  are  impressed 
with  the  relations  of  resemblance,  and  of  dissimi- 
larities which  may,  or  does,  exist  between  two  ob- 
jects, and  can  arrive  at  a  conclusion  in  regard  to 
them.  5.  Judgment,  properly  exercised,  is  con- 
nected with  the  various  mental  operations  guiding 
them  to  the  discovery  and  knowledge  of  truth.  It 
enables  us  to  compare  facts  with  facts,  feelings  with 
feelings,  and  truths  with  truths,  weighing  their  bear- 
ings, relations,  tendencies,  and  differences,  and  to 
give  to  each  its  proper  importance,  or  influence,  in 
the  final  conclusion :  hence  the  importance  of  a 
fully-developed  and  well-regulated  judgment.  By 
it  we  can  be  rendered  safe  in  life,  can  judge  prop- 
erly of  men  and  things,  and  pass  above  and  beyond 
the  sorrow  which  so  often  rafters  the  moral  condition 
of  earth  with  prison  environs,  and  vails  the  spiritual 
sky  with  augmenting  darkness,  closing  out  true  hap- 
piness from  perishing  thousands.  -    -^^^ 

SECTION  III. 
1.  The  action  of  the  faculty  of  judgment  is  so 
closely  connected  with  reason,  that  a  reference  to 
the  one  may  aid  in  explaining  the  other.  Reason 
embraces  the  ground  of  an  opinion,  or  the  premises 
of  an  argument  npon,  and  from  which  the  argument 
is  based,  and  carefully  carried  through   to  the  con- 


THE    JUDGMENT.  207 

elusion.  The  judgment  appears  to  inspect  this  proc- 
ess, and  weighs  the  facts  presented  in  the  different 
objects  so  as  to  decide  upon  them,  or  the  correctness 
of  the  conclusion  of  an  argument,  by  deciding  upon 
all  the  facts  involved  in  the  argument,  even  to  the 
correctness  of  the  premises,  unless  such  premises  be 
free  from  confusion  or  doubt,  and  then  the  judgment 
must  approve  of  the  same.  That  the  judgment  is 
really  and  only  reason  is  absurd.  Keason,  unaided 
by  judgment,  does  not  appear  to  know  any  thing 
but  the  premises  and  conclusion,  with  the  regular 
argument,  or  successive  steps  in  going  from  the  one 
to  the  other,  while  the  judgment  appears  to  decide 
upon  the  truthfulness  and  the  amount  of  weight  that 
should  be  attached  to  all  the  facts,  together  with  the 
justness  of  the  conclusion.  2.  Under  the  active 
power  of  the  judgment  may  be  comprehended  the 
relations  of  properties  or  qualities  of  entities  by 
which  they  are  distinguished  and  recognized.  The 
geologist  marks  the  differences  of  the  earth's  strata, 
containing  the  archives  of  its  own  periods  and  ages. 
In  this  way  the  lapidarian  detects  the  agreement  or 
disagreement  of  the  properties  and  particles  which 
are  consolidated  in  the  mountain  cliffs  and  crags, 
which  defy  the  wastings  of  time  or  the  violence  of 
storms.  This  is  also  true  of  the  zoologist  and  orni- 
thologist, in  regard  to  certain  characteristics  of  the 
different  tribes,  or  divisions  of  those  vast  families  of 
existences.  3.  A  correct  development  of  the  rela- 
lations  of  resemblances,  and  a  satisfactory  knowl- 
edge of  the  same,  depends  very  much  on  a  vivid 
judgment.  Here  is  the  power  of  arranging  the 
relations  of  resemblances,  and  of  classifying  prop- 


SO^  THE    JUDGMENT. 

erlj,  by  discriminating  the  certain  number  of  sub- 
Btances  or  properties  necessary  to  class  them  to- 
gether as  one  species.  The  correctness  of  all  such 
arrangements,  of  individuals  forming  the  genus  or 
properties  of  the  compound,  or  existences  of  classes, 
with  the  elements  of  differences,  relations  of  resem- 
blances, and  analogy,  embracing  the  points  or  de- 
grees in  which  there  is  a  difference,  depends  upon 
a  well-developed  and  active  judgment. 


SECTION  IV. 
1.  We  may  readily  decompose  a  compound,  but 
it  requires  the  presence  of  the  judgment  in  attend- 
ing to  the  agreement  or  disagreement  of  the  proper- 
ties and  the  relations  of  resemblances — the  natural 
adaptation  and  agreement  of  the  parts  to  each 
other  and  to  the  whole.  It  is  the  work  of  the  judg- 
ment to  clearly  discriminate  these  facts,  and  to  so 
satisfy  the  mind  in  regard  to  them.  Keason  may 
connect  or  follow  a  chain  of  truths  in  arriving  at 
conclusions,  but  it  requires  the  exercise  of  judg- 
ment in  satisfying  the  mind  in  relation  to  them,  so 
as  to  produce  uniformity  of  our  belief,  purpose,  and 
action.  2.  The  character  and  relations  involved  in 
regard  to  cause  and  effect  can  only  fully  be  recog- 
nized through  the  medium  of  the  judgment.  If  the 
nature  or  qualities  of  a  cause  are  known,  then  it 
requires  the  exercise,  or  an  act  of  judgment  in  form- 
ing an  opinion  of  the  nature  or  character  of  the 
approaching  effect  or  pending  result.  The  exercise 
of  this  faculty  is  especially  necessary  to  prevent 
confusion,  in  case  of  joint  causes,  followed   by   a 


THE    JUDGMENT.  000 

common  effect,  or,  if  there  be  joint  effects,  of  a  com- 
mon cause.  There  may  be  sequences  introduced  to 
our  notice,  wliich  will  require  us,  from  their  charac- 
ter, or  nature,  or  relations,  to  look  for,  and  judge  of, 
the  true  antecedents  or  causes,  as  well  as  the  form- 
ing of  an  opinion  of  the  character  of  the  results.  3, 
The  truthfulness  of  axioms,  and  the  relations  of 
angles  and  propositions,  are  objects  of  the  judgment. 
If  we  say  that  all  axioms  which  lie  at  the  founda- 
tion of  mathematical  science  are  self  evident  truths, 
and  are  incapable  of  either  proof  or  disproof,  it 
requires  the  exercise  of  the  judgment  in  order  to 
receive  them  as  such  free  from  doubt.  Otherwise, 
doubt  and  confusion  would  pervade  all  our  efforts  in 
acquiring  knowledge,  and  in  relying  on  them  as 
true.  4.  The  skill  and  success  of  a  physician 
greatly  depends  upon  this  faculty^  or  mental  power. 
He  must  be  able  to  judge  of  the  symptoms  by  which 
a  disease  may  be  known,  though  they  may  resemble 
those  of  other  diseases,  as  well  as  the  effect  of  cer- 
tain remedies  upon  disease,  and  upon  different  phys- 
ical constitutions.  Without  judgment  we  can  not 
foretell  the  probable  result  of  an  action  under  par- 
ticular circumstances,  and  on  different  kinds  of 
objects ;  but  in  this  way  we  are  enabled  to  arrive  at 
truth,  and  know  it  to  be  such  from  a  careful  discrim- 
ination of  the  facts  which  are  evolved,  and  the  ap- 
proval of  conscience. 


SECTION  V. 
1.  The   action  of  the  judgment  is   essential   in 
regard  to  our  knowledge  of  intellectual  science.     It 

18* 


210  THE    JUDGMENT. 

is  the  process  or  method  of  judging  correctly  of  the 
facts  evolved  in  argumentation,  or  events  and  rela- 
tions, giving  due  weight  to  each  one  in  the  final 
result.  The  power  of  memory  may  call  up  an  ex- 
tensive array  of  facts,  but  judgment  must  form  tliem 
into  classes,  genus,  or  combinations,  or  it  must  ab- 
stract them  according  to  the  various  elements  or 
points  of  difference  connected  with  each  or  all  of 
them.  2.  Decisions  may  be  true  or  false,  in  propor- 
tion to  the  clearness  and  distinctness  jwith  which  we 
judge  in  weighing  all  the  facts  and  influences  con- 
nected with  the  premises,  argument,  and  conclusion. 
He  who  arrives  at  conclusions  upon  slight,  partial, 
or  imperfect  evidence,  and  is  unwilling  to  admit  of 
corrective  facts,  will  be  almost  invariably  wrong  in 
his  decisions.  If,  with  pure  motive,  he  attempts  to 
regulate  his  own  conduct,  and  is  not  guided  by  a 
proper  judgment,  he  is  liable  to  be  led  by  the  most 
hasty  impressions  or  feelings,  which  will  lead  him 
to  quick  and  rash  conclusions,  too  often  only  to  la- 
ment the  want  of  proper  and  timely  consideration; 
or,  having  formed  his  opinions,  he  is  more  tenacious 
and  arbitrary  in  regard  to  them  than  the  man  of 
sound  judgment;  therefore,  we  should  be  careful  to 
form  our  opinions  with  care,  properly  judging  of  all 
the  facts  which  would  naturally  lead  to  sound  re- 
sults. 3.  This  jprincijple^  or  power ^  appears  to  be  of 
universal  adaptation,  whether  it  be  applied  to  the 
investigation  of  scientific  truths,  or  the  afi'airs  con- 
nected with  every  day's  occurrences  or  events.  It 
pre-eminently  aids  in  deriving  from  all  sources  of 
facts  that  which  is  essential  to  correct  motives,  acts, 
and  conclusions  connected  with  our  belief,  and  the 


THE    JUDGMENT.  211 

rule  of  right.  When  our  conclusions  are  thus 
formed  with  care  and  deliberation,  we  should  al- 
ways be  free  to  be  influenced  by  new  facts  as  cor- 
rectives, yet  we  should  first  know  them  to  be  true 
within  themselves. 


SECTION  VI. 

1.  A  great  natural  defect  in  the  judging  power  is 
incurable.  There  are  some  minds  which  are  want- 
ing in  the  power  of  reason,  and  are  unskilled  in  the 
strict  exercise  of  attention.  Such  minds  are  easily 
shaken  in  their  conclusions;  whenever  new  facts  are 
urged,  whether  they  are  legitimately  connected  with 
the  subject  or  not,  they  are  ever  changing.  But  by 
care  and  repeated  efforts  the  want  of  attention  may, 
in  a  great  measure,  be  corrected,  and  the  power  of 
judging  become  more  perfect.  There  are  others 
whose  judgment  is  so  deficient  that  they  hastily 
form  an  opinion  from  the  first  evidence,  however 
imperfect  or  deceptious  it  may  be,  with  a  stubborn 
firmness:  and  then,  with  such,  all  arguments  or 
facts,  which  may  be  brought  as  correctives,  are  to 
them  not  only  worthless,  but  aggravating.  If  their 
motive  be  pure,  they  may  escape,  while  their  work 
is  lost;  but  if  their  motive  be  uniformly  impure, 
there  is  but  little  or  no  hope ;  for  it  is  impossible  to 
remedy  a  radical  defect  of  judgment  by  any  kind 
of  training  or  education.  2.  In  order  to  judge  cor- 
rectly^ all  selfish  motives  and  feelings  should  be 
buried  a  million  of  feet  under  ground ;  then  all  the 
facts  connected  with  the  case  should  be  carefully 
and  impartially  considered,  and  due  weight  of  each 


212  THE    JUDGMENT. 

and  all  should  contribute  to  the  final  decision.  De- 
cisions made  in  this  way  are  worthy  of  confidence. 
3.  Connected  with  the  power  of  judging  is  the^/'c>6'- 
ess  of  classification^  which  embodies  an  idea  not 
only  of  the  power,  but  of  the  act  of  forming  into 
classes,  or  of  distributing  into  sets  of  classes.  4. 
This  may  take  place  in  the  mind,  to  some  extent, 
involuntarily.  When  no  special  mental  effort  is 
put  forth,  the  qualities  of  some  contingent  existent, 
under  the  law  of  resemblances,  may  give  rise  to  a 
state  of  mind  embracing  realities  as  such. 


SECTION  VII. 
1.  In  certain  respects  classification  may  be  re- 
garded as  necessary,  when  it  arises  in  connection 
with  our  conceptions  of  primary  facts  or  self-evident 
truths ;  and  if  our  attention  is  attracted  by  a  tree, 
it  exists  in  common  with  all  trees :  hence  it  requires 
the  exercise  of  a  special  power  to  discriminate  the 
differences,  and  to  classify  so  that  it  may  be  dis- 
tinctly an  object  of  clear  perception  and  thought, 
and  that  power  is  the  judgment.  Then  qualities  or 
properties  may  be  the  immediate  work  of  classifica- 
tion, which  can  not  be  correctly  arranged  without 
the  special  discriminating  action  of  the  judgment. 
2.  In  certain  respects  the  work  of  abstraction  is 
connected  with  the  power  of  judging.  The  mind 
takes  cognizance  of  the  character  of  the  qualities 
or  elements  of  objects  through  the  medium  of  the 
judgment,  by  which  the  properties  are  abstracted 
and  arranged  under  the  clear  conceptions  of  their 
natural    differences.     Henceforth    an    abstract    ele- 


THE    JUDGMENT.  M0 

ment  can  be  a  special  object  of  thought  without 
involving  the  obscurity  of  the  compound,  or  mass, 
whence  it  was  evolved  or  eliminated.  3.  General- 
ization is,  in  part,  connected  with  the  power  and 
action  of  the  judgment;  for  the  power  of  correctly 
reducing  particulars  to  generals,  or  to  their  genera, 
must  be  exercised  with  a  due  reference  to  those 
features,  or  qualities,  which  would  designate  them 
as  naturally  belonging-  to  a  certain  class  or  combi- 
nation. Such  properties  of  differences,  or  of  agree- 
ment, must  be  determined  by  the  judgment.  In 
this  way  we  determine  that  a  fact  is  general  by 
finding  it  in  each  member  of  a  certain  class  of 
existences,  and  we  determine,  in  a  similar  way, 
that  facts  are  not  general  when  they  are  found  only 
in  certain  members  of  different  classes.  4.  The  act 
of  judging  may  be  preceded  by  perception.  We 
may  have  perception  of  a  variety  or  a  mass  of 
objects  which,  at  first,  are  apprehended  in  a  con- 
fused way,  but  by  comparing  the  appearance,  or 
qualities  of  properties,  we  are  enabled  to  decide 
upon  them  without  doubt :  hence  we  arrive  at  gen- 
eral conclusions  from  their  applicability  to  each  and 
all  of  the  entities  of  any  one,  or  of  each  particular 
class,  which  are  the  immediate  objects  of  mental 
action. 


SECTION  VIII. 

1.  The  faculty  or  power  of  judging  differs  from 

tJiat    of    the    understanding.     The    understanding 

seems  to  know  notions  or  objects  as  they  appear, 

but  it  requires  the  exercise  of  judgment  to  abstract 


214  THE    JUDGMENT. 

or  classify  according  to  natural  principles  and  dif- 
ferences, so  we  can  have  a  clear  and  real  knowledge 
of  their  existence.  That  which  is  the  object  of  the 
understanding  is  that  which  is  decided  upon  by  a 
well-developed  judgment.  If  the  power  of  the  un- 
derstanding be  vigorous  and  well  developed,  and 
that  of  the  judgment  radically  deficient,  the  mind 
will  have  experienced  the  presence  of  many  facts 
without  the  power  of  combining  them,  so  as  to  have 
distinct  and  decisive  use  of  them :  hence  the  knowl- 
edge of  many  things,  but  the  control  of  almost  none 
of  them  to  advantage.  2.  The  jpower  of  judging  is 
closely  connected  with  that  of  suggestion.  The  lat- 
ter consists  in  the  first  intimation,  or  presentation, 
of  a  fact  or  ideas  to  the  mind,  but  the  former  has 
decisive  power  in  regard  to  them,  which  proceeds 
upon  the  notice  of,  and  the  influence  or  weight  of 
all  the  differences  compared  and  balanced.  The 
action  of  the  powder  of  judging  is  clearly  different 
and  distinct  from  that  of  suggestion.  3.  The  power 
and  action  of  relative  suggestion  is  not  one  and  the 
same  with  tTiat  of  judgment.  The  former  takes 
place  when  the  mind  experiences  the  first  effects,  or 
influences,  which  arise  out  of  the  certain  relations 
that  different  objects  mutually  sustain  to  each 
other.  The  making  known  to  the  mind,  merely,  the 
first  intimations  of  mutual  relationship  may  be 
called  relative  suggestion,  but  it  requires  an  act  of 
judgment  to  decide  upon  the  causes  of  these  rela- 
tions, and  the  importance  that  should  be  attached 
to  each,  or  all  the  facts  connected  with  them ;  and 
we  can  not  have  clear  conceptions  of  them,  and  a 
distinctive  command  over  them,  only  as  it  is  given 


THE    JUDGMENT.  215 

by  the  correct  exercise  of  judgment.  That  the 
judgment  only  acts  under  the  controlling  influence 
of  suggestion,  or  that  of  relative  suggestion,  is  ab- 
surd ;  but  it  has  the  natural  right,  and  does  act 
upon  and  in  regard  to  all  the  facts  or  influences 
which  are  the  objects  of  mental  action,  being  em- 
braced in  the  power  of  suggestion,  or  of  relative 
suggestion.  And  it  is  clearly  and  unquestionably 
true  that  it  difiers  from  them  both  as  to  its  nature 
and  oflice  in  the  mind.  4.  The  importance  of  a 
well-developed  and  active  judgment  is  incalculable. 
The  acquisition  of  knowledge,  and  a  right  use  of  it, 
in  adding  to  our  own  happiness  and  to  the  happi- 
ness of  others,  depends  upon  it.  If  we  are  deficient 
in  regard  to  the  power  of  this  faculty,  we  never  can 
act  with  that  degree  of  prudence  and  discretion  that 
the  laws  of  propriety  and  right  require ;  but  with  a 
mature  and  well-regulated  judgment  we  are  fur- 
nished with  facts  from  all  sources,  together  with  an 
unshaken  belief  in,  and  command  of  them,  upon 
which  we  can  depend  with  the  utmost  confidence, 
and  can  arrange  either  to  hide  from  the  dangers 
and  storms  of  earth,  or  to  triumph  over  and  beyond 
their  power.  • 


§xhhxan  Bthtni\. 


CHAPTER  I. 

REASON. 

SECTION  I. 

1.  Reason  is  a  faculty  of  the  mind,  having  power 
to  act,  or  of  remaining  at  rest.  It  is  connected 
with  the  intuitive  elements  of  our  being,  and  can  be 
cultivated  so  as  to  increase  its  power  of  vividness  in 
action,  but  it  is  impossible  for  its  origin  to  be  the 
result  of  education.  It  is  that  principle  of  the  mind 
by  which  it  distinguishes  truth  from  error,  and  good 
from  evil.  In  the  exercise  of  this  function  of  the 
mind  other  faculties  appear  to  harmonize,  and  can 
be  called  into  action  as  auxiliaries  in  the  investiga- 
tion of  truth,  and  in  distinguishing  between  that 
which  is  correct  and  that  which  is  false.  With  the 
power,  and  the  correct  exercise  of  reason,  the  mind 
is  capable  of  deducing  inferences  or  results  from 
facts  or  from  propositions.  2.  This  principle  ena- 
bles us  to  allege  or  assert,  with  confidence,  the 
ground  or  cause  of  opinion  upon  which  is  to  be 
built  the  elements  of  argumentation,  or  facts  lead- 
ing from  the  cause  to  the  conclusion.  It  aids  in  the 
selection  and  use  of  that  kind  of  facts  and  positions 
in  the  argument  which  naturally  support  and  jus- 
tify the  final  conclusion  or  result.  3.  Hatiocination 
216 


REASON.  '217 

can  not  exist  without  a  power  competent  to  be  the 
foundation  of  such  action,  or  exercise  of  reason.  It 
is  this  power  which  enables  us  to  arrive  at  a  knowl- 
edge of  the  process  of  demonstration,  both  as  to  the 
facts  involved  and  the  correctness  of  the  process. 
The  reception  of,  and  our  confidence  in  the  facts  as 
ti-ue  within  themselves,  together  with  the  results,  de- 
pends upon  the  power  and  correct  action  of  reason. 
4.  Reason  appears  to  be  the  foundation  upon,  or 
in  the  power  of  which  rests  ideas  or  facta  for  the 
purpose  of  correct  arrangements,  and  the  right  use 
of  thoughts  and  arguments.  It  leads  to  the  devel- 
opment of  primary  principles  in  nature,  and  the 
exploring  of  hidden  fields  of  truth.  It  invests  the 
mind  with  power  to  define,  to  some  extent,  the  pow- 
ers of  our  being,  and  rises  by  and  through  con- 
nected chains  of  facts,  from  nature  up  to  a  real 
belief  in  the  existence  and  power  of  a  sovereign 
Creator  and  Ruler  of  the  universe. 


L 


,  SECTION  II. 
1.  Reason  is  not  only  a  power  existing  in  the 
mind,  but  it  is  a  power  capable  of  action.  It  is  a 
faculty  capable  of  acting,  and  such  action  is  reason- 
ing when  appropriate  facts  are  involved  as  materials 
of  argumentation,  and  influences  and  results  are 
correctly  deducted  from  the  premises.  Eeason,  as 
to  its  natural  and  real  existence  in  the  mind,  is 
correct,  and  so  we  may  regard  it  when  in  action ; 
for  we  can  not  have  conceptions  of  incorrect  reason- 
ing. The  judgment  will  admit  of  degrees,  but  the 
moment  reason  is  incorrect  it  ceases  to  be  reason. 

19 


218  EEASON. 

The  chain  of  facts  is  broken,  or  the  relation  of  effect 
to  cause,  or  of  cause  to  efffect,  is  unjointed,  and  the 
action  of  reason  being  intercepted,  ceases  to  be 
either  reason  or  reasonable.  2.  Reason,  in  another 
sense,  is  to  exa'iuine^  discuss^  or  suj^ort  hy  facts ^ 
connected  in  argumentation.  E'othing  can  be  re- 
ceived by  us  as  true  which  opposes  the  dictates  of 
reason.  It  is  utterly  impossible  for  us,  at  one  and 
the  same  time,  to  receive  truth  and  error,  or  that  of 
correct  and  false  propositions  ;  but  certain  truths 
and  correct  propositions,  at  first,  may  appear  decep- 
tions or  false ;  yet  often,  when  they  are  traced  out  in 
their  proper  connection,  or  chain  of  facts,  in  argu- 
mentative form,  we  become  satisfied  that  they  are 
correct.  3.  Reason  differs  from  the  understanding. 
The  latter  is  that  which  apprehends  and  embraces 
things  presented  to  it,  but  reason  proceeds,  in  the 
investigation,  to  the  certain  knowledge  of  their  real 
existence  and  character.  Notions  may  arise  with, 
or  be  given  by  the  understanding,  but  reason  ena- 
bles the  mind  to  investigate  the  truthfulness  of 
them,  or  to  know  that  which  is  true  and  that  which 
is  false.  The  understanding  can  not  blend  those 
things  which  are  presented,  involving  such  things, 
or  truths,  in  a  certain  connected  train,  in  order  to 
give  a  knowledge  of  the  real  results,  as  well  as  the 
correctness  of  the  steps  taken  in  arriving  at  such  a 
conclusion ;  but  reason  can  bring  all  into  the  ac- 
count, and  arrive  at  certain  conclusions  and  a 
knowledge  of  them.  4.  Our  ideas  of  riglit  and 
wrong  are  tested  by  reason,  with  the  exception  of  ax- 
ioms or  self-evident  truths,  both  in  matter  and  mind. 
They  are  received  by  us  as  truths  without  reasons 


REASON.  21^ 

either  for  or  against  them  ;  for  we  are  incapable  of 
reasoning  in  regard  to  them ;  yet  the  intuitive,  self- 
evident  truths,  which  are  the  foundation  of  mind, 
receive  self-evident  truths  as  such,  independent  of 
proof  in  any  way.  All  our  ideas  of  other  facts,  or 
existences,  are,  or  can  be,  tested  by  reason,  and, 
by  the  same  process,  our  knowledge  of  them  be 
matured. 


SECTION  III. 
1.  The  power  of  reason  exists  in  the  mind^  and  is 
connected  with  its  intuitive  faculties.  Its  origin  is 
neither  the  result  of  habit  nor  of  education,  and  the 
objects  of  its  action  can  not  be  numbered.  2.  There 
are  certain  intuitive  facts ^  and  self-evident  truths, 
which  can  not  be  tested  by  reason.  Such  self-evi- 
dent existences  are  in  the  mind,  and  lie  at  the 
foundation  of  reason;  but  their  truthfulness  can  not 
be  tested  by  reason.  Reason  in  action  advances 
from  one  fact,  or  degree,  to  another,  founding  the 
one  upon  the  other,  till  we  reach  the  conclusion. 
And  in  tracing  the  chain  of  connected  facts  from 
the  conclusion  backward,  we  will  arrive  at  primary 
facts,  or  self-evident  truths,  both  in  the  existence  of 
mind  and  matter.  All  such  truths  can  not  be  made 
known  to  us  by  any  kind  of  reasoning  or  proof,  for 
they  are  incapable  of  either.  3.  Self-evident  truths 
may  be  divided  into  two  classes:  (1.)  Those  truths 
which  lie  at  the  foundation  of  the  philosophy  of 
mind;  and,  (2.)  Those  truths  which  belong  to,  and 
are  connected  with,  the  science  which  appertains  to 
external  things.    The  axioms,  or  self-evident  truths, 


230  KEASON. 

upon    which   the   whole    of  mathematical    science 
stands,  or  is  based,  are  incapable  of  either  proof 
or  disproof;  yet  we  are  compelled  to  receive  them, 
and  to  receive  them  as  facts,  independently  of  any 
power  of  reason;  therefore,  what  power  is  capable 
of  receiving  the  primary,  self-evident  facts  which  lie 
at  the  foundation  of  all  external  science  or  knowl- 
edge, but  the  intuitive,  self-evident  elements  which 
lie  at  the  foundation  of  the  philosophy  of  mind? 
4.    These. intuitive  principles   are  the  foundation 
and  origin  of  all  knowledge  to  us :  hence  intuitive 
internal  facts,  or  elements,  with  our  feelings  and 
experience,  are  to  be  depended  upon  as  true  with 
more  absolute  certainty  than  the  knowledge  of  all 
external  things ;   for  the  latter  are  tested  by  and 
through   the   medium    of    the   senses,   which    may 
deceive   us  by  reason   of  their  connection,  often, 
with  diseased  physical  nerves,  while  internal  feel- 
ings, or  facts,  are  objects  of  direct  knowledge,  with- 
out the  interception  of   physical   elements,  which 
may  be  imperfect  or  diseased  so  as  to  deceive  us. 
6.  All  self-evident  facts  are  not,  and  they  are  inca- 
pable of  being,  the  results  of  reason  in  any  way. 
They  are  received  by  us  with  a  conviction  of  infal- 
lible certainty.     Though  incapable  of  either  proof 
or  disproof,  yet  they  are  received  by  us,  and  are 
known  to  be  true.     It  is  utterly  impossible  for  an}^ 
one  to  doubt  their  existence,  or  their  truthfulness, 
and  all  men  are  guided  by  them  in  the  acts  of  life. 
Such  facts,  or  truths,  are  received  as  such  by  the 
intuitive  powers  of  our  existence,  independently  of 
all  proof. 


REASON.  221 

SECTION  IV. 
1.  A  knowledge  of  our  own  existence  arises  in 
connection  with  the  power  and  action  of  the  pri- 
mary elements  of  the  mind.  Self  evident  truths, 
which  are  the  foundation  of  the  philosophy  of  mind, 
have  power  to  affirm  and  know  our  own  existence; 
and  in  their  existence  and  power  we  have  knowl- 
edge of  all  other  facts  within  the  bounds  of  mental 
action.  With  them  arises  the  conviction  of  our  own 
existence ;  and  being  identified  with  their  being  and 
nature,  it  is  utterly  impossible  for  us  to  avoid  the 
knowledge  of  our  real  entity.  With  the  same  pow- 
ei*s  arises  the  conviction  as  to  the  distinct  nature  of 
the  mind  from  the  body,  and  that  the  mind  is  capa- 
ble of  thinking  and  acting  without  the  aid  of  the 
material  organs.  Knowledge  implies  a  power  capa- 
ble of  knowing,  and  objects  capable  of  being 
known.  Those  elements  which  are  capable  of  ex- 
periencing a  conviction  of  their  own  existence,  and 
that  of  other  existences,  may  be  regarded  as  pri- 
mary, self-evident  principles.  2.  These  truths  are 
unchanging  in  their  essence  and  nature  of  action 
within  themselves.  Our  physical  powers  are  con- 
tinually changing,  and  the  same  may  be  said  to 
be  true,  to  some  extent,  of  elements  tested  by  the 
senses ;  but  a  knowledge  of  all  these  changes  is 
realized  by  the  unchanging  intuitive  powers  of  the 
mind.  Facts  tested  in  this  way  are  of  direct  knowl- 
edge, and  can  not  admit  of  either  sophistry  or 
doubt ;  therefore  our  knowledge  of  the  existence  of 
our  own  minds  as  certain,  is  more  absolute  in  nature 
than  the  knowledge  we  can  have  of  our  material 

19* 


222  KEASON. 

being,  or  of  any  thing  beyond  that  of  self.  3.  In 
these  self  evident,  primary  elements  of  the  mind  is 
contained  the  power  of  receiving  and  of  'knowing 
self  evident  truths,  or  axioms,  in  external  things,  or 
that  lie  at  the  foundation  of  all  scientiiic  demonstra- 
tions and  knowledge  beyond  that  of  self.  If  we 
can  not  depend  upon  the  internal  being,  convictions, 
feelings,  and  processes  of  the  mind,  it  is  utterly  im- 
possible for  us  to  have  real  knowledge  of  any  fact 
or  existent  beyond  the  self-bounds  of  the  mind.  4. 
In  the  intuitive  being  and  power  of  the  mind  arises 
the  conviction  and  belief  of  our  personal  identity. 
Present  mental  states,  or  internal  affections  and 
feelings,  are  the  occasion  of  the  calling  up  of  past 
mental  states,  or  feelings,  each  or  all  existing  in  the 
same  mind,  and  at  the  same  time,  imparting  the 
idea  of  duration  to  the  same  sentient  being,  and  the 
certainty  of  the  sameness  of  that  which  was  pres- 
ent, or  was  capable  of  commanding  and  retaining 
such  knowledge.  Change  belongs  to  all  physical 
entities,  and  the  various  acts  of  the  mind ;  but  amid 
every  and  all  possible  abbreviations,  or  changes,  the 
sentient  being  experiences  and  retains  a  certain 
conviction  that  spiritual  self  does  not,  and  can  not 
change,  but  must  ever  be  the  same  in  essence ;  and, 
with  this  conviction  and  knowledge,  all  our  notions 
of  external  things  are  regulated.  5.  Connected 
with  the  power  of  reason  arises  the  notion  tJiat  every 
result  must  liave  a  cause.  It  is  natural  for  us  to  ex- 
perience a  conviction  of  cause  from  effect,  and  to 
have  an  idea  of  the  character  of  the  cause  from  the 
magnitude  or  nature  of  the  result.  The  uniform 
and  natural  tendency  is,  that  the  same  cause  under 


BBASON.  223 

the  same  laws  will  have  a  similar  or  the  same  effect. 
If  there  were  no  uniformity  in  these  things,  we 
could  have  no  confidence  in  the  laws  regulating  ex- 
ternal things ;  therefore,  accident  would  be  the  only 
law  regulating  all  objects  of  external  knowledge. 
We  have  intuitively  a  conviction,  confidence,  and 
belief  in  the  uniformity  existing  as  to  degrees,  na- 
ture, and  character  involved  in  the  relations  of  ante- 
cedents and  sequences,  of  causes  and  effects ;  and 
to  doubt  these  is  contrary  to  nature  and  all  experi- 
ence, and  is  utterly  impossible. 


224  REASON. 


CHAPTER  II. 

f  REASON,    CONTINUED. 

SECTION  I. 
'  1.  In  connection  with  the  power  of  reason  is  our 
confidence  in  the  uniformity  of  the  laws  of  nature. 
The  cognizance  of  the  exactness,  or  uniform  manner 
in  the  succession  of  phenomena,  evolving  the  rela- 
tions of  sequences  and  antecedents,  of  effect  and 
cause,  gives  rise  to  a  conviction  and  notion  of  their 
order  and  obedience  to  law,  all  of  which  enters  into 
our  experience  and  knowledge.  The  origin  of  such 
a  conviction  is  connected  with  intuitive  power.  Ex- 
perience, guided  by  reason,  enables  us  to  apply  it  to 
the  proper  objects,  or  process,  in  successive  events. 
2.  Our  immediate  confidence  in  the  uniformity  of 
phenomena  gives  origin  to  the  notion  of  causation. 
The  regular  tendency  of  one  event  to  follow  another, 
becoming  or  affecting  an  abiding  experience,  gives 
rise  to  the  conviction  that  the  former  is  that  of 
cause,  and  the  latter  is  the  result  or  effect.  We 
then  regard  the  cause  as  adequate  to  the  effect.  The 
next  item  is,  to  notice  the  character  or  nature  of 
both  cause  and  effect,  and  if  these  uniformly  har- 
monize, we  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  same 
cause,  under  the  same  laws,  will  invariably  produce 
the  same  effect.  This  uniformity  must  be  thor- 
oughly tested  by  experience,  so  as  to  prevent  decep- 
tion in  regard  to  the  various  phenomena.     3.  Redson 


JBEASON. 

miist  he  present  in  forming  correct  conclusions  in  re- 
gard to  complicated,  or  complex  and  extensive  natu- 
ral tendencies,  or  operations.  The  first  effort  to 
contemplate  such  a  mass  of  realities  may  be  at- 
tended with  confusion;  but  by  extending  the  effort 
so  as  to  embrace  the  entire  mass,  we  are  impressed 
with  a  uniform  tendency.  Yonder  waves  a  beau- 
tiful forest.  The  different  kinds  and  sizes  of  the 
trees,  at  first  sight,  present  a  confused  scene  of 
grandeur.  Some  individual  trees  will  soon  be  taken 
away ;  but  the  idea  of  the  forest  growing  contina- 
ally,  and  that  it  can  continue  to  exist  in  the  future, 
can  not  be  doubted,  for  this  accords  with  reason  and 
experience.  The  seasons,  for  some  length  of  time, 
may  vary,  but  our  observation  in  relation  to  these 
changes,  for  several  years,  gives  rise  to  the  belief 
that,  in  the  lapse  of  a  still  greater  number  of  years, 
there  will  be  conformity  to  a  general  law  and  a  re- 
markable uniformity.  It  has  been  observed,  with 
some  degree  of  certainty,  that  from  two  to  three  cold 
wintei*s  succeed  each  other,  then  there  will  be  about 
as  many  of  milder  temperature.  The  same  has  been 
thought  to  be  true  in  regard  to  y^ry  hot  or  cool  sum- 
mers. Another  opinion  has  been  partially  settled 
in  regard  to  wet  and  dry  years,  that  the  weather 
graduates  to  the  two  extremes  about  every  four 
years.  Amid  all  these  changes,  there  appears  to  be 
a  conformity  to  something  like  general  laws,  a 
knowledge  of  which  seems  to  have  been  based  upon 
experience,  and  guided  by  reason.  4.  When  the 
miiformity  of  natural  entities  exist  and  conform  to 
general  laws,  and  a  conviction  of  such  facts  enters 
into  our  experience,  we  are  then  enabled  to  detect 


226  KEASON. 

results  which  are  contrary  to  regular  laws.  Such 
deviations  can  easily  be  made  the  objects  of  mental 
action,  and  such  incidental  or  contingent  causes, 
diminishing  or  interrupting  the  results,  can  be  as- 
certained, and  a  reoccurrence  prevented.  In  this 
way  dangers  can  be  detected,  and  even  foreseen, 
reasoning  from  natural  relations  and  tendencies ;  and 
often  life,  safety,  and  happiness  are  preserved  in  lieu 
of  such  dangers,  or  even  temporal  death.  5.  There 
are  laws  regulating  mind,  but  our  knowledge  of  its 
conformity  and  uniformity  thereto  is  attended  with 
greater  uncertainty  than  is  our  knowledge  of  the 
conformity  and  uniformity  of  matter  to  the  laws  by 
.which  it  is  regulated.  Physical  elements,  existing 
without  self-motive  and  self  action,  can  not  evade  or 
deprecate  the  force  and  authority  of  the  laws  by 
which  they  are  governed;  and,  under  all  circum- 
stances, such  elements  are  subject  to  the  investiga- 
ting action  of  the  mind.  But  sentient  beings  can 
evade  and  deceive,  so  as  to  render  the  true  analysis 
of  mental  phenomena  more  obscure ;  yet  mind  and 
the  laws  under  which  it  acts,  are  as  true  within 
themselves,  and  can  be  depended  upon  as  such  with 
as  much  certainty  as  any  thing  that  appertains  to 
the  material  world. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  Self-evident  truths^  either  in  mind  or  matter, 
which  are  the  objects  of  belief  and  confidence,  with- 
out being  capable  of  either  proof  or  disproof,  are 
necessarily  involved  in  all  mental  processes  in  guid- 
ing to  correct  conclusions;  for  it  is  impossible  not  to 


SEASON.  fi9f 

believe  them ;  and  an  appeal  to  consciousness  is  all 
that  is  necessary  in  order  to  know  that  they  are  re- 
ceived by  us  as  true.  2.  The  power  of  reason 
within  itself  can  contain  and  command  a  certain 
number  of  truths,  and  as  to  their  truthfulness  no 
reason  or  evidence  can  be  given,  and  none  is  re- 
quired. And  unless  we  admit  that  the  intuitive 
elements  of  the  mind  contain  power  to  receive  self- 
evident  truths  as  such,  without  proof,  either  in 
regard  to  mind  or  matter,  it  is  utterly  impossible  for 
there  to  be  any  such  thing  as  reason,  reasoning,  or 
knowledge  in  an^^  or  all  created  intelligences ;  for  if 
all  truths  could  only  be  known,  or  made  known  to 
D8  by  proof,  then  all  knowledge  would  begin  with 
proof;  and  then  proof  would  have  to  extend  to 
infinity,  which  is  impossible,  as  they  are  numerous, 
and,  therefore,  can  not  be  infinities  within  them- 
selves ;  and  the  mind,  being  finite,  could  not  use 
them  in  proof  of  ulterior  facts.  3.  The  conduct  of 
all  persons  shows  their  helief  in  the  existence  of 
primary  truths,  whether  they  acknowledge  or  deny 
such  existences.  No  skeptical  philosopher  can  pro- 
ceed in  the  investigation  of  any  fact  without  involv- 
ing a  reference,  and  clear  evidence  of  his  belief 
in  their  existence,  though  he  may  deny  the  same  at 
every  step  or  degree  of  his  argument.  If  he  is  in 
quest  of  some  primary  truth,  the  absence  of  which 
would  soon  involve  him  in  sufierings  or  death,  it 
would  be  revolting  to  all  his  feelings  to  be  informed 
that  there  was  no  such  thing  in  existence ;  and  his 
dismay  would  be  augmented  if  he  should  be  re- 
minded that  to  prove  such  an  existent,  is  that  he 
own    his   own   existence  to  be  utterly  impossible. 


^ 


S9t  EEASON. 


How  can  he  prove  origin  to  self-knowledge,  or  the 
beginning  in  which  he  knows  his  own  existence  to 
be  real  ?  "Without  confidence  in  such  settled  facts, 
how  could  he  contemplate  that  which,  from  the 
regular  chain  of  such  truths,  will  affect  his  interest 
or  happiness  in  the  future,  or  be  certain  that  the 
pain  he  had  received,  in  time  past,  was  experienced 
by  the  same  person,  called  by  his  name,  and  which 
he  now  thinks  to  be  himself?  4.  If  he  looks  upon 
a  beautifully-finished  tower,  it  is  natural  for  the 
mind  to  run  back  to  the  'beginning^  at  the  founda- 
tion, and  to  inquire  as  to  the  process  of  building, 
and  also  as  to  who  the  builder  was.  IS^otwithstand- 
ing  he  is  assured  by  thousands  that  it  exists  without 
a  cause,  builder,  or  beginning,  which  would  accord 
with  his  avowed  faith,  yet  an  internal,  intuitive  con- 
viction would  appeal  to  his  understanding,  and 
thunder  the  perpetual  lie  to  such  defective  assertions. 
In  all  cases,  those  who  labor  to  deny  first  truths  are 
wholly  dependent  upon  them  for  facts  by  which  they 
are  rendered  capable  of  doubting  or  of  denying  the 
very  truths  which  are  the  foundation  of  all  the 
knowledge  their  minds  are  capable  of. 


SECTION  III. 
1.  There  is  a  difference  between  the  process  of 
argumentation  and  the  mere  action  of  the  reasoning 
power,  in  arriving  at  primary  truths.  The  mind, 
which  is  capable  of  correct  argumentation,  has 
power  to  evolve  facts  by  basing  one  upon  another, 
or  by  connecting  them  in  a  correct  chain  from  the 
first  to  the  final  result.    This  requires  natural  ac- 


I 


REASON. 

tivity  and  cogent  habits  of  mental  discipline.  These 
gifts  and  acquirements  are  possessed  only  by  few 
persons ;  but  the  action  of  reason,  in  connection 
with  our  reception  and  belief  of  first  truths,  is  nat- 
uraj,  and  common  to  all  rational  minds ;  and  it  is 
impossible  for  them  to  doubt  their  intuitive  convic- 
tions in  regard  to  them.  It  is  natural  and  easy  for 
us  to  believe  that  an  effect  must  have  an  adequate 
cause.  When  we  look  on  the  trembling  fires  of 
yonder  heavens,  we  believe  in  a  great  First  Cause, 
and  see  the  power  and  design  of  Deity  as  written 
in  the  existing  flower,  rustling  leaf,  burning  sun,  or 
flying  orbs.  2.  Reason  differs  from  conscicnisness^ 
the  latter  being  the  knowledge  of  mental  opera- 
tions and  of  sensations,  or  that  act  of  the  mind 
which  makes  known  internal  objects  or  feelings. 
The  former  evolves  and  connects  facts  in  arriving 
at  results,  and  apprehends  truths  necessary,  abso- 
lute, and  univei'sal.  3.  Its  power  differs  from  that 
of  the  senses.  The  latter  may  be  regarded  as  the 
medium  through  which  sensations  make  their  appeal 
to  the  mind  ;  but  the  former  commands  the  energies 
of  the  mind  in  amplifying  its  research,  and  in  ex- 
tending its  knowledge.  4.  It  differs  from  the  judg- 
ment. It  appertains  to  the  latter  to  discriminate, 
combine,  and  decide  upon  the  truthfulness  of  that 
which  is  used  in  argumentation,  and  also  the  rela- 
tions of  facts  and  the  correctness  of  that  state,  and 
each  position  of  the  argument;  but  it  requires  the 
presence  and  action  of  reason  to  properly  connect 
this  chain,  and  in  forming  a  correct  process  and 
conclusion.  The  origin  of  such  action  is  found  in 
intuition.  5.  Reason  diff'ers^  also,  from  the  under- 
20 


k. 


230  REASON. 

standing.  The  latter  apprehends  the  real  state  of 
that  which  is  presented  to  it,  or  is  the  power  of 
believing;  while  the  former  leads  to  a  satisfactory 
result,  or  a  certain  knowledge. 


SECTION  IV. 
1.  In  connection  with  the  power  of  reason  arises 
convictions  in  relation  to  right  and  wrong.  Tlie 
mind  is  capable  of  being  influenced,  and  has  intu- 
itive power  to  act  in  reference  to,  and  in  distinguish- 
ing between  good  or  bad,  right  or  wrong.  An  intu- 
itive influence  affects  the  mind  favorably  in  regard 
to  right,  and  deters  it  in  relation  to  evil.  It  has 
power,  also,  not  only  to  be  influenced,  but  to  act  in 
exploring  or  in  demonstrating  that  which  is  right  or 
wrong.  This  introduces  us  into  the  process  of  rea- 
soning. 2.  We  soon  know,  from  experiences  that 
when  we  perform  certain  acts,  we  have  the  approval 
of  conscience,  and  are  entitled  to  a  peaceful  reward ; 
and  in  the  performance  of  other  acts,  our  con- 
sciences are  disturbed,  and  we  can  only  expect  pun- 
ishment. When  that  which  is  good  is  involved  in 
the  action  of  reason,  there  will  be  a  corresponding 
result ;  and  when  that  which  is  bad  or  impure  fills 
the  steps  or  degrees  of  argumentation,  there  will  be 
a  corresponding  bad  result.  3.  This  intuitive  con- 
viction,  influence,  and  self-afiirming  power  of  the 
mind,  in  regard  to  right  and  wrong,  is  universal. 
All  rational  intelligences  are  endowed  with  it, 
whether  they  are  under  the  light  of  Christianity,  or 
are  under  the  cloud  of  heathenism.  In  every  soul 
conscience  exists,  and  intuitions  arise  and  act  in 


REASON.  im^ 

reference  to  that  which  is  good  and  evil.  Such  is 
our  nature  as  ordered  and  wisely  arranged  by  the 
great  First  Cause.  All  men  are  endowed  with 
power  to  adhere  to  this  light,  and,  through  the 
assistance  of  Divine  grace,  to  be  saved  in  heaven; 
and  none  are  under  an  absolute  necessity  of  being 
doomed  to  irresistible  and  irretrievable  sorrow.  4. 
In  connection  with  the  power  of  reason,  we  may 
experience,  or  have,  to  some  extent,  ideas  of  that 
which  is  heautifid  or  svhlime.  Many  objects  of  the 
same -class  may  differ  in  degree  of  beauty:  that  in 
each  one  which  approaches  nearest  the  most  perfect 
one,  or  to  our  conceptions  of  a  perfect  model,  re- 
quires the  presence  and  action  of  reason,  in  arriving 
to  a  correct  equilibrium,  or  balancing  of  them,  and 
to  just  conclusions.  The  descriptions  of  an  orator 
may  surpass  the  perfections  of  that  which  forms 
the  object  of  his  descriptions.  The  painter  may 
surpass  the  natural  beauties  of  the  landscape,  or  the 
graphic  sublimity  of  some  occurrence  or  reality. 
The  arrangement  and  regularity  of  these  must  re- 
quire the  presence  and  action  of  reason.  When 
defects  exist  with  the  beautiful  in  any  object,  or  that 
which  agrees  or  disagrees  with  a  perfect  model,  we 
must  be  aided  with  the  power  of  reason  in  giving 
each  its  legitimate  place  and  weight,  or  the  whole 
would  be  contemplated  with  confusion. 


282  REASONING. 


CHAPTER  III. 

REASONING. 
SECTION  I. 

1.  Keasoning  is  the  power  of  reason  in  action. 
It  is,  then,  the  act  or  process  of  exercising  the  faculty 
of  reason,  in  and  by  which  new  or  unknown  propo- 
sitions or  facts  are  deduced  from  previous  ones,  and 
previous  facts  are  established  from  the  relation  and 
character  of  their  results  or  effects.  2.  The  correct 
exercise  of  reason  is  destructive  to  atheism^  or  the 
foundation  of  infidelity.  We  know  that  an  effect 
can  not  exist  without  a  cause,  and  we  can  not  be- 
lieve in  a  cause  that  is  inadequate  to  the  effect 
which  follows  it.  Universal  existences  all  around 
us  confirm  our  belief  in  the  existence  of  a  great  First 
Cause;  and  the  idea  of  such  a  cause,  or  Being,  is  a 
first  truth  of  reason.  3.  Two  modes  of  argumenta- 
tion will  settle  and  confirm  our  belief.  The  first 
evidence  or  proofs  are  drawn  from  the  necessity  that 
such  a  being  must  exist  independently  of  the  evi- 
dences which  are  every-where  written  upon  his 
works.  The  second  embraces  proofs  or  evidences 
of  his  being  and  perfections  as  given  in  his  works. 
We  now  proceed  to  examine  these  two  modes  of 
argumentation. 


REASONING. 

SECTION  II. 
1.  If  there  be  no  oiie  being  in  infinite  space  but 
such  as  might  possibly  not  have  had  a  being,  it 
would  follow  that  there  might  possibly  have  never 
been  any  existent:  hence  the  possibility  that  such 
an  entity  might  have  arisen  from  nonentity.  Thiq 
is  impossible.  Then  it  is  impossible  that  there 
might  have  been  no  existence  in  any  way ;  there- 
fore, an  impossibility  of  not  existing  must  be  true, 
and  there  must  have  been  a  being  whose  non-exist- 
ence is  impossible,  otherwise  the  truthfulness  of  all 
reason  and  knowledge  would  be  reversed.  2,  All 
the  essence  and  attributes  of  an  unoriginated  being 
must  be  unoriginated,  and  necessarily  self-existent. 
Such  an  essence,  or  being,  can  not  give  origin  to  its 
own  attributes,  unless  it  had  power  to  act  before  it 
existed,  which  would  be  impossible.  Such  a  being 
must  be  real,  absolute,  self-existing,  and  eternal ; 
for  any  thing  finite,  or  contingent,  must  have  a 
cause  which  would  be  anterior,  and  show  that  such 
a  finity,  or  contingent,  could  not  be  causation  nor 
eternal.  3.  The  attributes  of  an  unoriginated  be- 
ing must  be  absolute  and  limitless,  otherwise  they 
would  be  imperfect  or  limited,  and  that  would  in- 
volve a  modifying  cause;  but  no  such  cause  can  be 
acknowledged,  as  such  a  cause  would  be  imperfect. 
But  the  cause  of  which  we  speak,  being  perfect,  lies 
back  of  all  things,  and  may  be  styled  the  cause  of 
causes,  being  infinite  or  eternal.  No  modifying 
cause  can  be  allowed,  as  such  a  one  could  not  be 
absolute  in  perfection,  and  could  not  be  eternal;'' 
and  all  imperfect  attributes,  or  any  attribute  which 

20* 


234  REASONING. 

is  not  infinitely  perfect  within  itself,  is  finite  to  some 
degree,  and  must  be  capable  of  greater  perfection 
by  improvement,  exercise,  and  experience.  This 
would  prove  imperfection  in  an  unoriginated  being, 
and  that  he  was  perfecting  his  attributes  and  exist- 
ence by  self-action,  experience,  and  a  farther  ac- 
quaintance with  his  own  works.  His  being,  and 
each  attribute,  must  be  perfect  and  unoriginated. 
4.  Such  an  unoriginated  and  infinite  being  must 
exist  every-wTiere^  in  the  same  way  and  manner  he 
does  any  where,  otherwise  there  must  be  a  cause  by 
which  his  existence  and  presence  is  limited.  But 
there  is  and  can  be  no  cause  limiting  the  existence, 
action,  or  presence  of  Deity;  for  there  can  not  be 
but  one  first  cause,  which  cause,  from  necessity, 
must  be  unoriginated,  self-existent,  infinite,  and 
eternal.  It  is  utterly  impossible  for  us  to  have  con- 
ception of  more  than  one  infinite  space,  and  beyond 
this  thought  can  not  travel ;  neither  can  we  have  any 
idea  of  any  out  border,  or  limitation  to  the  innu- 
merable worlds  which  are  the  result  of  a  cause 
lying  still  back  of  their  origin  and  motion.  Then 
if  there  is  only  one  infinite  space,  it  can  contain 
only  one  infinite  series  of  points  in  that  limitless 
space;  therefore,  that  reality  which  is  capable  of 
filling  each  point  in  infinite  space  must  be  indivisi- 
ble, one,  and  infinite.  As  two  or  more  infinite  be- 
ings can  not  occupy  one  and  the  same  infinite  space, 
filled  with  only  one  series  of  infinite  points,  without 
being  one  and  the  same  being,  therefore  there  is 
one,  and  only  one  unoriginated,  self-existent,  infi- 
nite, and  eternal  cause  and  Governor  of  the  universe. 


REASONING.  235 

SECTION  III. 
1.  This  tmorigmated  being  must  be  a  reality, 
precisely  the  same  in  every  place,  not  consisting 
of  parts,  as  they  would  naturally  exist  independ- 
ently;  nor  of  whole,  for  that  would  imply  a  com- 
bination of  parts;  nor  of  degree,  as  that  would 
signify  imperfection  and  quantity  with  comparison ; 
therefore,  this  being  is  one  and  omnipresent,  with- 
out any  thing  like  degrees,  comparison,  or  limita- 
tion. He  exists,  and  can  be,  and  is  to  every  one  an 
object  of  belief  and  knowledge,  naturally  resulting 
from  an  intuitive  conviction  within  us  so  effectually, 
and  ever  making  it^  internal  appeals  to  conscience, 
reason,  and  judgment,  that  it  is  naturally  impossi- 
ble to  indulge  a  conscientious  doubt.  2.  Such  a 
being  can  not  be  ?riaieriality,  for  this  would  come 
under  the  laws  which  govern  it,  and  would  have 
density,  divisibility,  form  with  limitation.  !N^on- 
entity  can  not  give  origin  to  matter;  and  matter 
which  is  limited  can  not  give  origin  to  matter,  for 
it  contains  no  power  of  self-action;  much  less  could 
it  produce  an  existent  with  self-cogitative  power, 
being  within  and  of  itself  unthinking.  That  which 
is  naturally  inert,  and  utterly  incapable  of  self- 
action,  can  not  produce  itself  or  any  other  inert  ele- 
ment; and  if  a  portion  of  matter  was  eternal,  it 
could  not  originate  other  inert  elements,  much  less 
give  origin  to  self-acting  and  cogitative  intelligences. 
3.  If  matter  and  motion  were  both  eternal,  and 
could  be  connected  together,  yet  they  never  could 
produce  a  cogitative  mind.  Matter  and  motion, 
though   changed  or  varied  in  any  possible  way,  yet 


236  REASONING. 

the  particles  could  only  meet,  impel,  and  resist  each 
other ;  and  they  have  no  power  to  do  more.  It  is 
impossible  for  matter  to  originate  any  thing,  being 
inert.  Then,  if  nothing  were  eternal,  matter  could 
never  have  had  origin,  as  it  could  not  result  from 
nothing.  If  matter  without  motion  were  eternal, 
then  motion  could  never  have  a  beginning ;  for  mat- 
ter has  no  self-motion,  and  inertness  is  essential  to 
its  nature  and  being.  If  only  matter  and  motion 
are  eternal,  then  thought  or  intellectual  action  could 
never  have  a  being ;  for  matter,  either  at  rest  or  in 
motion,  can  not  originate,  within  and  of  itself,  self- 
action,  cogitation,  and  knowledge ;  neither  is  it  capa- 
ble, abstractly,  within  and  of  itself,  to  act  and  feel 
joy,  pleasure,  or  grief.  These  differ  from  any  prop- 
erties or  qualities  of  matter,  and  are  superior  to 
them.  Then  the  first  being  must  be  infinite,  and 
must  have  self-power  to  act,  think,  foresee,  and  ar- 
range the  beginning  and  real  existence  of  all  finite 
things;  and  that  which  is  first  of  all  things  must 
really  possess,  of  necessity,  absolute  perfections,  as 
nothing  which  is  essential  to  such  an  existent  could 
ever  be  added  ;  for  that  which  was  added  would  t)e 
finite,  and  in  this  respect  imperfect,  and  would  be 
created.  4.  Such  a  being  must  possess  wisdom  and 
power  without  limitation,  and  all  other  attributes 
must  be,  within  themselves,  absolutely  perfect. 
Real  or  natural  attributes  are  considered  as  belong- 
ing to  the  essence  or  nature  of  a  being,  and  are 
essential  to  the  nature  of  such  an  existent.  There 
are  no  attributes  of  Deity  ideal,  casual,  or  contin- 
gent. All  his  attributes  are  unlimited  and  eternal: 
hence  nothing  can  exist  without  his  knowledge,  or 


REASONING.  281F 

be  sustained  without  his  omnipotent  power.  For  an 
atheist  to  have  ever  lived  without  conscious  misgiv- 
ings as  to  the  soundness  of  his  doctrine,  is  utterly 
impossible. 


SECTION  ly. 
1.  The  existence  of  more  them  one  uuoriginated 
being  in  the  universe,  or  the  same  infinite  space,  is 
utterly  impossible.  Such  a  being  is  possessed  of  in 
finite  attributes,  and  must,  of  necessity,  be  present 
in  every  point  in  infinity.  A  second  unoriginated 
being  must  be  equal  to  the  first  in  every  respect,  as 
both  must,  necessarily,  be  eternal,  from  the  fact  that 
they  are  unoriginated ;  therefore,  as  there  can  be 
only  one  infinity  to  be  occupied  or  filled  by  them, 
that  infinity  can  be  no  more  than  perfectly  filled ; 
and  those  two  unoriginated  and  infinite  beings  must, 
necessarily,  be  the  same  in  essence  or  nature,  every- 
where present,  incapable  of  any  distinction  or  dis- 
similarity, and,  of  absolute  necessity,  they  would 
have  to  be  one  and  the  same.  To  suppose  the  ex- 
istence of  any  but  one  such  infinite  and  eternal 
Being  is  absurd,  and  to  try  to  contemplate  a  second 
or  third,  is  only  contemplating,  as  far  as  is  possible 
for  us,  the  existence  and  attributes  of  one  and  the 
same  being.  2.  AU  inferior  or  subordinate  exist- 
ences^ in  any  respect,  or  degree,  have  their  existence 
curtailed  by  finity,  and  their  origin  must,  necessa- 
rily, take  place  within  the  compass  of  duration ; 
and,  as  such,  they  are  all  wholly  dependent  upon 
the  great  First  Cause  for  their  existence.  There 
can  only  be  one  unoriginated  essence  or  being  in 


238  REASONING. 

the  universe,  or  in  infinite  space.  3.  All  finite  ex- 
isf'ejioes,  becoming  entities  within  the  bounds  of 
duration,  or  aside  and  apart  from  that  which  is  eter- 
nal, implies  a  cause  of  their  existence.  It  is  impos- 
sible for  them  to  originate  themselves,  not  being 
self-existent ;  and  that  which  is  self-existent  is  eter- 
nal, and  that  which  is  eternal  is  unoriginated,  one 
and  the  same.  All  finite  existences  owe  their  being 
to  the  great  First  Cause,  which  Cause,  so  far  as  we 
can  understand,  was  under  no  possible  obligations 
to  constitute  them  real  entities.  4.  The  absolute,  or 
omnipotent  power  of  Deity,  does  not  make  his  acts 
either  arhitrary  or  of  necessity.  They  are  free  in 
their  nature  and  power,  and  are  with  efibrt,  other- 
wise such  acts  would  be  of  necessity,  which  neces- 
sity w^ould  be  the  cause,  and  not  the  free  power  of 
absolute  perfections  in  unison.  What  he  willeth  he 
can  do,  yet  nothing  is  done  by  him  only  that  which 
is  right.  He  is  too  wise  to  err,  and  too  good  to  be 
unkind. 


SECTION  V. 
1.  His  omnipotence  does  not  necessitate  his  knowl- 
edge ;  yet  he  knows  all  things,  and  there  is  nothing 
hid  from  him.  Necessity  would  imply  something 
that  was,  or  is  yet  to  be  explored  by  him ;  whereas, 
if  there  is  any  thing  which  he  would  not  choose  to 
know,  as  contingent  or  otherwise,  it  would  imply 
that  he  must  first  know  what  that  is  before  he  would 
choose  not  to  know  it.  2.  He  has  power  to  act,  and 
Buch  action  must  be  according  to  liberty  or  ^perfect 
freedom.     As  all  his  perfections  are  infinite,  none 


BBA&ONING. 

of  his  acts  can  be  originated  by  contingent  or  out- 
ward causes :  hence,  the  oneness  in  the  harmony  of 
his  limitless  attributes,  and  the  infinity  of  his  good- 
ness and  absolute  holiness,  can  not  be  connected 
with  action  contrary  to  his  infinite  power,  wisdom, 
purity,  and  truth.  3.  He  has  infinite  wisdom  in 
the  exercise  of  his  knowledge  and  power,  and  infi- 
nite goodness  in  the  perfection  of  all  his  acts.  4. 
From  reason  we  may  infer  that  the  object  of  man's 
existence  was  to  share  of  the  endless  goodness  of 
God;  his  duty  was  to  glorify  his  Creator;  and  that 
the  performance  of  this  duty  wholly  depends  upon 
volition  ;  therefore,  he  must  be  created  free  to  serve 
and  glorify  God.  If  such  service  was  of  necessity, 
or  by  requisition,  then  such  requisition  would  be 
the  agent  in  rendering  glory,  while  man  would  be 
passive :  hence,  the  object  of  our  being  would  have 
been  cut  off  by  law,  and,  of  course,  our  existence 
would  have  been  impossible.  Then,  if  we  are  at 
liberty  to  hold  a  merciful  relation  to  our  Creator,  a 
perversion  of  the  same  liberty  will  deprive  us  of 
happiness. 


24:0  KEASONINO. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

REASONING,   CONTINUED. 

SECTION  I. 
1.  We  now  proceed  to  the  second  mode  of  rea- 
soning^ which  is  to  establish  or  to  prove  the  exist- 
ence of  Deity,  by  arguing  from  effect  to  cause.  This 
process  exemplifies  the  power  and  action  of  reason, 
and  tends  to  strengthen  our  confidence  in  the  cor- 
rectness of  argumentation,  and  also  leads  us  to  a 
confirmed  belief  in  the  conclusions  made,  and  in 
the  facts  established,  from  incontestable  evidences 
or  proof.  2.  Our  conceptions  of  a  being  of  infinite 
^ower,  and  wisdom  would  naturally  lead  us  to  sup- 
pose such  power  and  wisdom  would  be  evidenced  in 
the  variety,  multiplicity,  agreement,  dependence, 
mystery,  and  design  which  exist  in,  and  in  connec- 
tion with  all  his  works.  That  which  we  can  com- 
prehend, and  those  things  which  we  can  not  compre- 
hend, are  alike  characteristic  of  his  power  and 
wisdom,  and  are  evidences  of  his  being.  3.  If  the 
divine  Being  is  an  unoriginated  and  infinite  Spirit^ 
he  can  not  be  made  known  to  us  as  such  through 
the  medium  of  the  senses  only,  and  that  abstractly, 
or  without  any  aid  or  evidence  from  material  exist- 
ences. Spirit  may  be  manifested  to  spirit,  but  spirit 
can  not  be  manifested  to  spirit  through  the  medium 
of  our  senses,  and  without  any  aid  or  evidence  con- 
tained in  materiality.     The  great  unoriginated  Sj^irit 


BEAB0NIKO1. 

manifests  himself  to  us  through  the  medium  of  our 
senses  by  material  existences.  Spirit  and  matter 
might  exist  independently  of  each  other,  so  far  as 
we  can  determine ;  but  material  elements,  or  exist- 
ences, the  objects  of  our  senses,  may  be  used  as 
evidences  proving  the  existence  of  spirit.  The  ex- 
istence of  inert  matter  as  a  result  is  evidence  of  a 
competent  self-acting  cause.  4.  There  is  evidence 
of  the  wisdom  and  power  of  Deity  in  the  different 
systems  of  innumerable  orbs  which  glow  in  the 
heavens.  The  order,  distances,  velocity,  gravitation, 
and  centripetal  forces;  the  diurnal  and  orbicular 
motions,  all  of  these  are  conclusive  evidences  of  the 
wisdom,  power,  and  existence  of  God  ;  for  these 
things  are  neither  of  self-origin  nor  accidental.  6. 
Ths  earth  contains,  in  its  own  structure,  evidences 
of  the  presence  and  power  of  an  infinite  Creator. 
Its  internal  structure  contains  the  archives  of  its 
own  periods  and  ages.  Vegetation  upon  its  surface 
is  mysteriously  promoted  by  the  circulation  of  nutri- 
tious properties  elevated  by  capillary  influences, 
forming  ligenous  fibers,  or  is  consolidated  in  trunks, 
boughs,  and  leaves.  The  delicate  fibers  and  glow- 
ing tints  of  almost  an  endless  variety  of  flowers,  can 
only  be  regarded  as  so  many  evidences  of  the  wis- 
dom and  goodness  of  the  great  Creator.  6.  The 
laws  of  inert  matter^  or  elements,  could  never  ar- 
range and  preserve  the  orders  of  genera  and  spe- 
cies, without  which  the  world  would  be  confusion. 
All  these  are  so  many  marks  of  infinite  skill,  wis- 
dom, and  goodness. 

21 


242  REASONING. 

SECTION  II. 
1.  There  is  evidence  of  the  existence  of  Deity  in 
the  order  of  providence^  which  meets  the  demands 
of  all  animated  or  self-moving  beings — the  regular 
return  of  the  seasons,  the  descending  rain,  and 
warming  sun,  each  year  yielding  a  sufficiency,  and 
not  too  much.  These  things  are  out  of  the  common 
onward  course  of  nature,  and,  to  a  certain  extent, 
they  are  miraculous,  as  there  is  no  law  contained  in 
matter  that  can  originate  them  or  govern  them  with- 
out settled  uniformity.  2.  Life^  sleep^  vision^  and 
muscular  action  are  evidences,  and  furnish  positive 
proof  of  the  existence  of  Deity.  It  is  utterly  impos- 
sible for  any  finite  existence  or  influence  to  originate, 
and  keep  in  regular  action,  the  expansion  and  con- 
traction of  the  intercostal  nerves,  by  which,  in  part, 
the  lungs  are  enabled  to  inhale  the  atmospheric  air, 
receive  the  oxygen,  and  throw  off  the  carbon  from 
the  blood.  We  have  no  self-power  to  keep  up  this 
process,  yet  it  goejs  on  whether  we  sleep  or  wake. 
Reason,  together  with  the  facts  in  the  case,  teaches  us 
to  know  this  truth,  that  this  process  is  arranged  and 
continued  by  the  wisdom  and  constant  presence  of 
a  merciful  Creator,  and  the  very  moment  the  influ- 
ence of  his  presence  is  withdrawn  from  these  nerves 
our  breath  is  paused  forever.  3.  Another  source  of 
evidence  may  be  found  in  connection  with  the  circu- 
lation of  the  hlood.  It  is  stated  that  in  health  the 
heart,  in  one  minute  of  time,  makes  eighty  pulsa- 
tions, and  a  little  over  two  ounces  of  blood  are  ex- 
pelled into  the  aorta  at  each  pulsation — about  nine 
thousand  six  hundred  ounces  every  hour,  and  about 


0 


m! 


SEASONING. 

one  thousand  four  hundred  and  forty  pounds  per 
day !  It  is  also  stated,  by  those  who  have  exper- 
imented in,  and  have  tested  these  things,  that  each 
pulsation  of  the  heart  propels  the  blood  eight  inches, 
making  fifty  feet  in  one  minute  I  The  average  quan- 
tity of  blood  in  each  human  body  is  about  thirty 
pounds,  and  it  is  said  to  pass  through  the  heart 
twenty-three  times  in  one  hour.  In  calculating  the 
velocity,  and  the  force  necessary  to  effect  action  to 
the  remotest  extremities  of  the  arteries,  or  where 
their  anastomosis  with  the  veins  take  place,  and  the 
mysterious  counteraction  of  the  blood  in  the  veins 
to  the  heart  again,  would  require  the  heart,  in  its 
legitimate  office  and  action,  to  possess  the  astonish- 
ing power  of  four  hundred  pounds.  Who  is  pre- 
pared to  acknowledge  that  these  realities  and  proc- 
esses of  action  are  the  result  of  inert  materiality, 
or  of  chance  or  accident  ?  They  are  conclusive  evi- 
dence that  the  cause  by  which  they  are  arranged  is 
possessed  of  infinite  wisdom,  power,  and  goodness. 


■  SECTION  III. 
1.  But  how  are  we  to  account  for  the  irregular, 
yet  continuous,  eoiypansion  and  contraction  of  the 
muscles  and  cords  of  the  heart,  which  gives  motion 
to  the  blood,  upon  which  depends  the  perpetuity  of 
life  ?  These  muscles  and  cords,  being  matter,  have 
no  self-power  to  move  or  act,  and  the  suspension  of 
such  action  is  death.  Human  knowledge  has  never 
attempted  to  solve  the  mystery,  and  account  for  it, 
but  in  one  way  that  had  the  least  appearance  of 
reason  ;  that  is,  that  the  pulsations  of  the  heart  are 


9M  BEASONIKG. 

caused  by  the  stimulating  nature  of  the  blood.  2. 
This  has  been  disproved  by  the  following  experi- 
ments: (1.)  If  we  apply  a  stimulus  to  the  muscles 
of  the  heart  of  an  animal  after  it  is  emptied,  it  will 
dilate  and  contract  as  if  it  were  full.  (2.)  If  all 
the  large  vessels  of  the  heart  be  entirely  emptied, 
the  dilations  and  contractions  will  continue  for  some 
time,  in  the  entire  absence  of  the  blood,  and  it  will 
be  discovered  that  the  dilations  are  as  forcible  as 
are  the  contractions.  3,  The  continued  and  un- 
wearied action  of  the  heart  is  evidence  of  the  infi- 
nite wisdom  and  presence  of  its  Creator.  That 
which  exhausts  all  the  other  muscles  of  the  body 
increases  the  power  and  action  of  the  heart.  This 
action  is  wholly  involuntary,  and  the  muscles  and 
delicate  cords  of  the  heart,  unlike  any  other  phys- 
ical powers,  may  act  incessantly^,  and  without  weari- 
ness^ for  a  hundred  years.  Natural  laws  can  never 
explain  this.  4.  The  existence  and  action  of  the 
heart  is  created  and  arranged  by  an  all-wise  Being, 
and  its  action  is  given,  sustained,  and  perpetuated 
by  the  power  and  continued  presence  of  the  same. 
Matter  has  no  self-power  to  either  originate  or  con- 
tinue action ;  but  the  heart  continues  its  motion  in 
our  waking  hours,  and  in  the  deep  slumbers  of  the 
night.  Having  no  self-power  in  either  state  to  con- 
tinue its  motion,  should  we  lie  down  in  slumber 
with  enmity  toward  God,  how  easily,  in  our  uncon- 
scious state,  could  he  withdraw  from  those  tender 
muscles  and  cords  of  the  heart,  and  their  action 
would  be  suspended,  the  wheels  of  life  paused,  and 
the  spirit  fled  forever !  As  such  action  is  irregular, 
and  contradictory  to  the  nature  and  principles  of  all 


REASONING.  245 

self-power  of  action  and  material  laws,  it  is  only 

sustained  by  an  abiding  presence  of  the  great  Cre- 
ator. 


SECTION  IV. 
1.  Keason  may  be  regarded,  in  a  certain  sense,  to 
be  the  jpower^  and  reasoning  the  action^  or  process^ 
of  deducing  conclusions  from  premises.  This  proc- 
ess adds  a  second  step  to  that  which  has  been  used, 
and  a  third  to  the  second,  and  so  on  to  the  last,  or 
the  conclusion.  In  other  words,  it  may  be  regarded 
as  that  process  of  action  which  connects  a  chain  of 
facts,  or  a  train  of  reasoning,  involving  them  as  a 
whole,  and,  in  their  legitimate  order,  or  appropriate 
fitness,  as  parts  most  naturally  adapted  to  the  nature 
of  the  premises  or  proposition.  Keasoning  is  the 
continued  exercise  of  reason,  in  the  demonstration 
or  investigation  of  subjects,  or  series  of  facts,  trac- 
ing their  relations,  arriving  at  and  establishing  legit- 
imate conclusions.  2.  Reasoning  applies  to  the 
investigation  of  propositions  in  science,  or  existing 
wholly  in  the  mind.  We  reason  in  regard  to  ex- 
ternal things  through  the  medium  qf  the  senses, 
but  mental  or  moral  reasoning  may  take  place  in 
the  mind.  3.  The  valioe  of  the  reasoning  power  is 
all-important  in  the  investigation  of  truth,  and  in 
selecting  it  as  that  which  is  to  us  of  inestimable 
value.  The  various  objects  of  our  knowledge,  how- 
ever diversified,  can  be  the  immediate  objects  of 
reason.  It  tends  to  prevent  a  too  hasty  action  or 
belief,  till  the  whole  matter  is  examined  and  tested 
with  proper  caution  and  deliberation.     That  which 

21* 


246  EEASONING. 

is  mysterious  in  nature,  science,  or  art,  must  be  un- 
raveled by  reason,  if  it  becomes  to  us  knowledge 
known  to  be  true.  The  strength  of  mental  action, 
in  the  investigation  and  the  proper  understanding 
of  truths,  is  matured  by  a  constant  exercise  of  rea- 
soning, first  in  relation  to  simple  ideas  or  truths,  till 
strength  is  acquired  to  command  and  to  comprehend 
complicated  propositions  and  events.  4.  Reasoning 
is  a  source  of  specific  and  certain  Icnowledge^  giving 
the  mind  a  controlling  power  over  the  different 
steps,  degrees,  or  relations  of  things,  or  realities, 
which  would  be  too  complicated  and  obscure  to  be 
known  to  us  in  any  other  way.  Those  things  which 
require  intermediate  steps,  or  propositions,  in  order 
to  be  directly  understood,  can  be  controlled  only  by 
the  reasoning  power.  It  enables  the  mind  to  pene- 
trate the  unexplored  mysteries  of  nature,  and  its 
action  is  the  occasion  of  the  origin  of  new  ideas 
and  new  series  of  interwoven  facts,  or  chains  of 
propositions.  5.  The  jproper  exercise  of  this  power 
is  the  occasion,  or  is  attended  with  such  vivid  dis- 
crimination, that  we  can  select  those  truths,  propo- 
sitions, events,  or  arrangements  which  are  best 
adapted  to  our  views  and  feelings.  This  involves 
a  reference  to  consciousness ;  as  reasoning  progresses 
those  facts  or  propositions  which  are  most  natu- 
rally adapted  to  the  desired  issue,  or  exploration  of 
that  which  is  presented  to  the  mind,  will  claim  our 
feelings  or  preference ;  and  we  will  love  to  reason 
on  and  in  relation  to  those  things  which  are  con- 
genial to  intuitive  influences.  Perception,  sugges- 
tion, and  judgment  can  not  do  the  work  of  reason. 
It  is  the  latter  that  mujal;  build  with  facts  the  argu- 


w 


REASONING.  34T 

ment,  conoecting  the  process,  and  exploring  the 
way  to  the  final  result,  revealing  all  the  contingent 
truths. 


.V  :\d 


248  REASONING. 


CHAPTER  V. 

REASONING,   CONTINUED. 

SECTION  I. 
1.  When  effect  is  the  object  of  a  reasoning  process, 
its  cause  is  implied ;  for  such  an  object,  first  known 
to  us  as  a  result,  or  efi'ect,  would  involve  reasons  as 
to  why  it  is  thus  characterized,  and  an  investigation 
would  employ  the  power  of  reason  in  tracing  back- 
ward each  step  to  a  cause,  and  such  a  cause  as 
would  be  adequate  to  the  efiect,  and  corresponding 
in  nature  or  qualities.  2.  The  cause  of  an  efiect 
may  be  assumed^  and  upon  a  correct  process  of 
reasoning,  we  may  and  can  proceed  to  bring  to  light 
the  proper  cause.  3.  The  final  conclusion  of  prop- 
ositions may  be  assumed^  and  a  process  of  reasoning 
be  brought  to  action,  involving  the  relations  of  in- 
termediate facts  and  propositions,  till  we  arrive  at 
the  legitimate  conclusion;  yet  propositions  which 
are  known  to  us  need  not  the  aid  of  reasoning  to 
secure  the  same  knowledge.  4.  If  a  process  of 
reasoning  takes  place  in  connection  with  or  from 
intuitive  articles  of  belief,  revealing  facts  or  truths 
to  our  knowledge,  various  combinations  of  facts,  or 
objects,  involving  a  diversity  of  mental  processes,  a 
strict  adherence  to  reason  and  reasoning  is  our  only 
guide  in  using  that  which  is  naturally  adapted  to 
the  origin,  process,  and  conclusion.  5.  The  power 
and  action  of  reason  is  involved  in  selecting  appro- 


ppp-i    I  III  I- 1 II 

SEASONING.  249 

priate  facts  relating  to  that  which  is  to  be  tested  by 
reasoning,  and  to  employ  nothing  in  the  deduction 
which  is  not  properly  added  to  each  position  or  step 
that  has  preceded  it.  All  the  series  in  this  process 
must  be  connected  by  a  correct  adaptation.  If  the 
premises  be  incorrect  the  conclusion  will  be  absurd ; 
if  the  premises  be  correct,  and  the  process  of  rea- 
soning false,  the  conclusion  will  b^  wrong ;  but  if 
the  premises  be  correct,  and  the  process  of  reason- 
ing is  also  correct,  the  conclusion  will  certainly  be 
correct. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  Reasoning  a  priori  deduces  consequences  or 
results  from  definitions  formed,  or  facts  assumed,  or 
infers  effects  from  causes  previously  known ;  and  it 
is  that  process,  or  kind  of  reasoning,  by  which  an 
effect  or  result  is  proved  from  a  cause.  From  the 
nature  and  relation  of  combined  facts,  or  proposi- 
tions, we  can  readily  assume  results  corresponding 
to  the  legitimate  tendency  of  such  antecedents  or 
causes.  That  general  adaptation  or  fitness,  blending 
and  harmonizing  existences,  naturally  leads  us  to 
infer  or  believe  in  other  corresponding  realities. 
This  kind  of  reasoning  is  common,  whether  in  the 
mind  abstractly,  or  carried  on  in  relation  to  external 
things  through  the  medium  of  the  senses.  The  cor- 
rectness of  both  turns  upon  the  testing  power  of 
intuition  in  regard  to  the  reception  of  self  evident; 
truths  as  such,  without  which  argument  could  not 
be  relied  on  as  true.  The  statement  of  terms,  defi- 
nitions, and  propositions,  which  are  known,  or  are 


S#0  REASONING. 

given,  involves  the  idea  of  other  corresponding  ex- 
istences, and  such  known  definitions  or  propositions 
evolving  other  truths  or  existences  by  comparisons 
and  inductions.  Mathematical  calculations  are 
based  upon  primary  axioms  or  definitions ;  and  dem- 
onstrations commence  with  these;  and,  if  correctly 
pursued,  the  result  is  inevitable,  and  invariably  cor- 
rect. 2.  Reasoning  a  posteriori  is  drawn  or  pro- 
ceeds from  effect,  facts,  or  results.  We  might  say 
that  reasoning  a  priori  is  from  cause  to  effect ;  but 
reasofting  a  posteriori  is  from  effect  to  cause  ;  yet 
both  methods  can  be  varied  in  accordance  with  dif- 
ferent varieties  of  facts  or  propositions.  A  process 
of  reasoning  may  commence  with  an  effect  or  result, 
and  extend  back  to  a  cause,  or  to  something  of  ante- 
rior existence.  3.  Processes  of  reasoning  must  be 
found  upon  truths  or  facts,  and  proceed  from  them. 
It  involves  the  natural  adaptation  of  facts  and  prop- 
ositions, with  such  correlative  qualities  as  will  render 
the  progressive  steps  of  the  argument  true  in  forcing 
a  correct  result.  4.  "We  proceed,  in  reasoning  or 
argumentation,  by  using  or  involving  a  sufficient 
amount  of  facts  or  combinations  in  the  argument. 
This  process  brings  to  our  knowledge  new  truths ; 
but,  to  a  great  extent,  it  requires  the  presence  and 
action  of  the  judgment  in  clearly  discriminating 
and  in  deciding  upon  that  which  should  be  used  in 
arriving  at  a  correct  result;  otherwise,  unadapted 
facts  might  be  involved  and  used  in  haste,  render- 
ing the  conclusion  uncertain  in  regard  to  truth. 


BEA80NINO.  251 

SECTION  III. 
1.  Reasoning  requires  that  the  attention  be  di- 
rected to  the  truths  of  each  step  in  the  argument. 
We  must  know  that  these  facts  correctly  corre- 
spond to  the  premises.  We  must  know  that  the 
premises  can  not  but  be  true,  and  arranged  accord- 
ingly, so  that  the  process  of  argumentation  may  be 
conducted  correctly  in  the  truthfulness  of  the  pro- 
gressive degrees  or  steps,  and  that  these  are  con- 
nected to  the  conclusion,  or  force  a  conclusion  cor- 
responding to  the  argument.  2.  We  must  also 
know  that  such  a  series  of  facts  are  so  related  and 
arranged  as  to  bring  out  a  new  fact,  or  an  intelli- 
gent result;  otherwise,  they  may  lead  to  confusion. 
But  in  this  way  the  mind  may  become  capable  of 
bringing  to  light,  or  of  disclosing  new  truths,  and  of 
forcing  new  and  important  conclusions.  3.  In  every 
correct  process  of  reasoning  there  are  three  things^ 
as  will  be  given  in  the  following  section,  which  must 
claim  our  attention. 

SECTION  IV. 
1.  We  must  know  the  premises  to  be  correct  or 
true.  If  not,  we  can  not  proceed  correctly  ;  and  if 
there  is  any  doubt  in  regard  to  this,  we  should  prove 
the  premises  true,  if  susceptible  of  proof.  2.  The 
truthfulness  of  the  premises  being  established,  the 
chain  of  reasoning,  it  may  be,  consisting  of  numer- 
ous distinct  facts,  arguments,  propositions,  or  steps, 
must  all  he  true  within  themselves^  and  correspond 
in  respect  to  the  same  premises,  and  so  connected 


f6d  REASONING. 

that  one  step  in  the  argument  becomes  an  essential 
part  of  the  premises  of  the  subsequent  one,  till  the 
entire  argument  is  completed.  All  the  interme- 
diate steps,  from  the  premises  to  the  conclusion, 
must  be  carefully  examined  and  known  to  be  cor- 
rect. 3.  With  caution  in  the  preceding  steps,  the 
conclusion  or  result  will  be  easy  and  natural ;  but 
we  must  know  that  such  conclusion  is  a  legitimate 
result  of  the  preceding  argument,  corresponding  to 
the  correct  force,  natural  existence,  condition,  or  in- 
fluence of  the  truths  which  have  compelled  such  a 
result  or  conclusion.  4.  The  reasoning  power  dif- 
fers or  varies  in  the  minds  of  different  persons. 
Some  have  great  difficulty  in  connecting  their 
thoughts,  and  more  trouble  in  connecting  realities 
in  a  process  of  reasoning,  or  in  argumentation. 
We  will  now  notice  the  origin  or  manner  in  which 
some  of  these  differences  or  variations  arise. 


SECTION  V. 
1.  TTiey  may  arise  from  the  pressure  or  inactivity 
of  the  physical  organs,  in  connection  with  which 
the  mind  holds  intercourse  with  the  things  of  the 
external  world.  The  mind,  with  all  its  faculties,  is 
affected  by  the  pressure  or  imperfect  organization 
of  the  corporeal  powers.  Doubtless  there  is  not  so 
much  difference  in  the  natural  power  of  different 
minds,  as  there  is  in  the  physical  mediums  through 
which  they  are  developed,  or  are  manifested ;  but 
we  will  speak  of  this  in  another  place.  2.  Much 
defends  'ujpon  tJie  manner  of  information  stored 
away  in  the  mind.     Knowledge  is  not  only  power, 


SEASONING.  258 

but  the  acquisition  of  it  implies,  first,  mental 
strength  or  ability  to  receive  it;  and,  secondly,  that 
there  has  been  much  exercise  and  discipline  of  the 
intellectual  powers  in  order  to  acquire  knowledge; 
therefore,  the  mind  is  capable  of  greater  cogency 
and  correctness  in  argumentation.  3.  The  power  of 
correct  reasoning  depends  very  tnuch  wpon  atten- 
tion and  the  judginerU.  Progressive  reasoning 
evolves  new  facts,  attention  places  them  under  the 
inspection  of  the  mind.  The  judgment  discrimi- 
nates and  decides  upon  their  appropriateness  and 
truthfulness. 


SECTION  VI. 
1.  Mathematical  reasoning  has  been  regarded  as 
being  superior  to  mental  reasoning,  from  the  fact 
that  there  are  fewer  intermingling  or  connected  con- 
tingencies, and  we  have  not  so  many  things  to  as- 
sume. This,  in  part,  is  true;  but  we  are  not  pre- 
pared to  admit  that  mathematical  propositions,  or 
demonstrations,  are  worthy  of  as  much  confidence 
or  belief  as  those  which  are  mental  or  moral.  2. 
If^  in  numerical  reasoning^  nothing  is  assumed  or 
taken  for  granted,  in  regard  to  the  truthfulness  and 
existence  of  premises,  upon  which  the  reasoning  is 
founded ;  and  if  all  necessary  assumptions  are  few, 
contingent,  and  easily  freed  from  intricacy,  yet  the 
power  of  knowing  and  of  receiving  these  as  true 
realities,  is  found  connected  with  and  in  the  intui- 
tive power  of  the  mind.  We  know  nothing  of  math- 
ematical facts,  or  reasoning,  only  as  the  power  con- 
nected with,  and  existing  in  the  intuitive  elements 


fiSlft  REASONING. 

of  the  mind  receives,  or  introduces  us  to  them,  and 
thereby  they  are  known  to  us  as  realities.  3.  No 
fact^  tested  by  the  power,  or  received  through  the 
medium  of  the  senses,  can  be  known  as  real  and 
true  ordy  as  tJie  internal^  intuitive  power  of  the 
primary  elements  of  the  mind  enables  us  to  receive 
and  to  know  them  to  be  such.  It  is  this  power 
alone  which  enables  us  to  know  that  the  axioms 
which  are  the  foundation  of  all  mathematical  calcu- 
lations and  demonstrations,  are  self  evident  truths; 
for  no  reason  can  be  offered  proving  them  to  be 
either  true  or  false;  yet  the  superior,  intuitive 
power  can  receive  them  as  true  independently  of 
all  proof.  4.  Internal  mental  or  moral  reasoning 
can  not  be  said  to  be  of  remote  origin,  and  received, 
in  whole  or  in  part,  through  intercepting  mediums  ; 
but  our  knowledge  of  such  is  direct,  present,  and 
experimental.  We  may  be  deceived  in  testing  ex- 
ternal truths  through  the  medium  of  the  senses ;  for 
the  correctness  of  the  sensations  thus  experienced 
by  the  mind  depends  upon  the  health  and  activity 
of  the  physical  nerves,  or  organs,  which  come  in 
contact  with  such  external  things.  Diseased  nerves 
often  are  the  means  of  deception  in  regard  to  cor- 
rect mental  states.  A  diseased  optic  nerve  often 
gives  origin  to  the  perception  of  something  which 
is  only  a  spectral  illusion.  He  who  depends  with 
more  confidence  upon  the  truthfulness  of  that  which 
is  made  known  to  him  through  the  medium  of  the 
senses,  than  he  does  upon  intuitive  power  and  ac- 
tion, by  which  the  senses  are  made  eflScient,  and 
are  regulated  and  corrected,  should  either  study  to 
know  himself  more  perfectly,  or  be  consistent,  and 


REASONING.  SW 

deny  the  existence  of  all  things.  It  is  far  more 
reasonable  to  deny  the  existence  of  all  external 
things,  the  knowledge  of  which  we  receive  through 
the  medium  of  the  senses,  the  physical  organs  of 
which,  being  diseased,  often  deceive  us,  than  it  is  to 
doubt  the  action  or  operations  of  the  internal,  intu- 
itive power  of  the  mind,  forming  a  part  of  con- 
scious experience  and  present  knowledge. 


SECTION  VII. 
1.  Our  confidence  in  the  power  and  accuracy  of 
mental  reasoning  will  be  increased  by  our  confi- 
dence in  mathematical  reasoning,  knowing  the  supe- 
riority of  the  former  over  the  latter.  In  mathemat- 
ical arguments,  or  reasoning,  if  we  have  any  doubt 
as  to  the  process,  or  conclusion,  we  have  only  to 
turn  back  to  the  premises,  and  build  the  argument 
again,  guarding  against  any  improper  step,  and 
divesting  the  same  of  all  obscurity  and  doubt ;  and 
if  there  is  any  doubt  of  a  proposition  which  is  as- 
sumed as  the  result  of  preceding  steps,  a  review  of 
those  steps,  in  the  demonstration,  or  argument,  will 
enable  us  to  detect  any  thing  that  is  wrong,  and  to 
approve  of  it  when  corrected.  2.  When  we  see  that 
all  the  terms  used  are  clearly  defined^  and  all  doubt 
being  removed  from  them,  we  regard  the  conclusion 
as  inevitably  correct.  3.  If  the  true  objects  of  nu- 
merical argumentation  or  demonstration  be  quantity 
and  its  relations^  it  is  certain  that  an  acute  atten- 
tion and  precision,  in  regard  to  the  correctness  of 
each  step  in  the  whole  process,  will  render  doubt  in 
regard  to  its  correctness  impossible.     In  defining,  or 


256  KEASONING. 

in  determining  the  correctness  of  the  various  steps 
or  facts  used,  or  to  be  involved  in  any  process  of 
reasoning,  requires  the  presence  and  action  of  the 
judgment.  We  are  guided  and  progress  by  the 
power  of  reason,  under  the  inspection  and  decisions 
of  the  judgment,  in  regard  to  that  which  is  adapted 
in  nature  or  qualities. 


SECTION  VIII. 
1.  Demonstrative  reasoning  is  that  kind  of  rea- 
soning which  is  used  to  probably  a  greater  extent 
among  the  masses  of  intellectual  beings  than  any 
other,  progressing  from  cause  to  effect,  or  from 
premises  to  the  conclusion,  showing,  or  proving, 
by  clear  and  certain  evidence,  the  result.  It  is  a 
power  demonstrating  or  connecting  the  truths  of  a 
process,  rendering  or  forcing  a  correct  conclusion 
with  clearness  and  certainty.  2.  Investigative  rea- 
soning is  that  kind  of  disquisition  which  involves 
the  idea  of  vivid,  keen,  and  penetrating  mental 
powers  and  action ;  and  it  is  that  kind  of  progress- 
ive mental  action  which  forces  its  way  into  hidden 
fields  of  realities.  It  searches  minutely,  bringing  to 
light  new  facts,  which  may  evolve  others  connecting, 
or  adding  them  into  appropriate  inciirsive  chains, 
rendering  such  dormant  treasures  the  conquest  of 
research  and  imperishable  knowledge.  3.  False 
investigative  reasoning  may  take  place  or  exist  when 
the  acknowledged  primary  facts  are  untrue,  either 
in  whole  or  in  part,  or  in  their  conditioned  combina- 
tion or  relation.  The  inductions,  or  processes  of 
arguments,  may  be  incorrect  in  some  way,  and  the 


BEASONINQr-  259^ 

conclusions  may  not  be  legitimate  or  natural  results. 
False  reasoning  may  take  place  as  noted  in  the 
order  of  the  following  section.  '^K\^^  .1 


SECTION  II.  -ifi-MT^ 

1.  J^alse  reasoning  may  take  place  by  assuming 
premises  or  propositions  which  are  incorrect  within 
ithemselves,  or  which  are  not  naturally  adapted  to 
the  conclusion  desired.  2.  J8y  assuming  a  prop- 
osition asserted  to  be  a  conclusion  of  some  previous 
process  of  reasoning,  without  examining  such  former 
process,  or  knowing  it  to  have  existed,  and  to  b^ 
true  or  correct.  3.  £y  confusing  the  distinctiveness 
of  each  step  in  the  connected  links  or  chain  of  rea- 
soning, thoroughly  rendering  a  change  in  position 
possible,  and  without  detection.  4.  ^y  commencing 
the  argument  at  some  point  far  removed  from  the 
premises.  5.  By  petiiio  principii,  or  begging  the 
question  in  assuming  a  principle  which  amounts  to 
the  same  thing  to  be  proved,  or  which  may  vary 
slightly  in  some  almost  imperceptible  way.  6.  By 
assuming  a  principle,  and  then  wandering  qff^  rea- 
soning on  many  contingent  things,  till  they  can  be 
combined  together,  from  which  the  reasoning  com- 
mences, without  any  connection  with  the  first  as- 
sumed principle;  or  by  reasoning  in  a  circle,  in 
assuming  a  principle,  and  employing  it  to  establish 
some  other  reality  or  facts,  which  fact  or  facts  are 
used  to  prove;  tlje  first; assumed  principle. 

;        ,  .  22*        , 

- 1'-     -'  -'-^ 

^a#4'  vk;  ^iiiLaA&»fc,i>  i*w  a»iA^  liaa  ;©oi».>ik*  ««aobif 


S5^  BEASONING. 

SECTION!. 
1.  False  reasoning  may  arise  by  means  of  the 
sophistical  use  of  terms  and  analogies  in  principles 
assumed,  all  of  which  can  be  corrected  by  careful 
examination.  2.  Reasoning  may  be  rendered  more 
efficient  and  more  capable  of  performing  its  work 
with  increased  exactness,  by  attending  to  the  re- 
peated efforts  in  pursuing  arguments,  and  guarding 
against  all  contingencies  which  should  not  be  con- 
nected with  the  chain,  or  process  of  its  immediate 
action.  3.  Reasoning  may  be  influenced  improp- 
erly by  an  impure  motive.  This  will  so  bias  the 
efforts  of  the  mind  as  to  cause  more  than  a  due  pro- 
portion of  attention  to  be  bestowed  upon  those 
things  most  intimately  connected  with  some  conclu- 
sion designed  or  desired,  while  real  facts,  naturally 
adapted  to  the  argument,  receive  such  a  slight  pro- 
portion of  attention  as  to  be  finally  lost  from  the 
argument,  or  have  no  special  influence.  4.  Preju- 
dice will  affect  reasoning  so  as  to  distract  or  destroy 
its  accuracy ;  for  in  this  way  opinions  are  formed 
before  the  subject  has  been  investigated  or  exam- 
ined. Such  previously-formed  opinions  will  often 
bias  the  process  of  our  reasoning  when  we  are  un- 
conscious of  the  fact.  Before  we  are  fully  aware  of 
what  is  passing  in  the  mind,  our  reasoning  power 
may  be  in  search  of  facts  to  establish  the  truthful- 
ness of  those  previously-formed  opinions,  and  the 
correct  process  of  argumentation  lost  sight  of,  or 
that  has  been  departed  from ;  but  the  principal 
ground  of  departure  is  that  of  a  willing  and  ma- 
licious choice;  and  when  we  determine  to  pursue 


BEASOKINO.  259 

a  wrong  course,  though  our  consciences  may  revolt 
at  it  for  a  long  time,  yet  perseverance  will  finally 
lead  to  uncertainty,  and  a  bewildered  stupor  and 
inactivity,  from ;  which  a  return  and  recovery  is 
almost  imposaiWe.'  Reader,  if  you  would  start  right, 
and  remain  or  continue  in  a  right  course,  never  pre- 
judge the  subject  of  your  inquiries,  and  never  dare 
to  act  according  to  or  with  an  improper  or  vitiated 
motive!    Let  motive  be  pure  forever. 


giHsion  €ig|t|. 


CHAPTER  I. 

D  R  E  A  M  I  K  G. 

SECTION  I. 
1.  Dreaming  is  having  thoughts,  notions,  or  ideas 
in  or  during  sleep.  They  may  arise  in  connection 
with  only  one  subject,  or  we  may  experience  a  series 
of  thoughts  or  moral  impressions.  Under  the  above 
heading  we  shall  define  that  which  may  be  called 
mental  dreaming;  and,  in  another  place,  we  will 
define  moral  dreaming,  as  there  are  two  kinds 
clearly  distinct  in  nature.  2.  It  may  be  regarded 
as  wholly  involu7itary  j  for  we  often  experience  im- 
pressions, or  ideas,  which  arise  in  the  mind,  of  an 
unpleasant  nature,  or  those  which  are  revolting  to 
us,  but  have  no  power  to  divert  our  notice  of  them, 
though  we  experience  an  efibrt  to  efiect  such  a 
change.  At  times  the  efibrt  made  in  resisting  un- 
pleasant impressions,  and  the  apprehensions  of  ap- 
proaching fear,  are  such  that  we  are  aroused  from 
slumber;  but  the  mind  retains  a  vivid  knowledge 
of  what  was  passing,  or  had  been  the  object  or 
objects  of  its  anxiety  and  action.  3.  We  not  only 
experience  the  presence  of  impressions  and  ideas  or 
thoughts,  but  they  associate^  or  are  combined^  to  a 
certain  degree,  and  often  they  succeed  each  other  in 
260 


DBEAMINO.  261 

regular  trains  of  thought,  and  we  have  seemingly 
no  control  over  them.  4.  That  the  mind  is  im- 
pressed or  affected  by  dreams,  or  visions,  in  this 
way,  and  that  it  experiences  the  presence  of  real 
thoughts,  and  ideas  of  real  entities  and  events,  is 
beyond  the  possibility  of  doubt.  A  great  variety 
of  different  trains  of  impressions  or  ideas  occur,  and 
some  of  them  are  so  indelibly  impressed  on  the 
mind  as  to  be  remembered  for  years.  5.  Dreaming 
is  common  to  all  persons;  yet  some  dream  much 
more  frequently  than  others.  But  very  few  have 
ever  asserted  that  they  have  never  experienced  any 
thing  of  the  kind.  Those  who  think  they  have 
never  dreamed  may  have  dreamed,  and  the  mind  be 
unable  to  recall  them  in  their  waking  hours.  The 
natural  inclination  of  the  mental  powers  to  be  in 
motion  always,  and  independently  of  the  co-opera- 
tion of  the  physical  system,  shows  the  superiority 
of  mind  over  matter,  and  strongly  argues  its  imper- 
ishability. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  Mental  dreaming^  as  a  general  rule,  arises  in 
the  mind,  or  is  one  of  those  states  which  take  place 
in  sleep,  immediately  following  and  corresponding 
with  those  facts,  or  subjects,  which  were  the  objects 
of  mental  action  previous  to  the  slumber  in  which 
such  ideas  arise;  but  the  manner  in  which  trains 
of  ideas  arise  is  mysterious.  Kecent  occurrences 
and  recent  mental  states  may  be  connected,  or  have 
some  relation  to  that  which  is  passing  through  the 
mind,  or  is  impressed  upon  it  in  the  hours  of  sleep. 


1,'iil''  ■'"'W*f'-»p 


DREAMING. 

The  hearing  of  some  sad  news,  or  the  witnessing 
of  some  horrible  event,  are  often  followed  by  dreams, 
in  which  the  different  items,  as  they  were  made 
known,  or  were  witnessed  by  us,  reappear  to  the 
mind ;  but  not  often  without  some  change,  or  the 
absence  of  some  thing,  and  the  addition  of  others. 
2.  They  are  not  always  immediately  successive  to 
preceding  events  or  facts.  Under  the  influence  of 
dreams  we  may  be  impressed  with  realities,  or  have 
ideas  revived,  which  took  place  years  before,  and 
even  of  things  which  had  been  forgotten ;  and,  in 
our  waking  hours,  we  can  often  recall  the  percep- 
tions which  the  mind  had  in  dreams  of  facts  or 
events  which  are  to  come,  of  which  we  have  never 
had  knowledge  before ;  yet  the  real  occurrence  of 
such  things  can  not  be  regarded  as  certainly  coming 
to  pass,  from  the  fact  that  we  had  such  dreams ; 
they  may  or  may  not  occur.  3.  Mental  states  of 
mind,  which  take  place  under  the  influence  of 
dreams,  are  not  to  be  depended  upon  as  true  pre- 
ludes of  things  to  come.  They  are  mere  circum- 
stantial or  casual  states,  which  can  not  be  regarded 
as  positive  evidence  that  those  things  made  known 
in  dreams  will  ever  occur,  or  that  their  opposites 
will  come  true.  They  are  w^orthy,  perhaps,  of 
no  more  confidence  than  the  notions  which  arise  in 
a  flighty  mind,  under  the  influence  of  delirium, 
caused  by  an  intense  or  high  fever;  but  impressions 
of  moral  dreaming,  or  visions,  are  worthy  of  confi- 
dence, and  are  to  be  depended  upon  as  being  in- 
tended for  our  instruction  in  some  way.  4.  Perhaps 
the  principal  or  most  important  truth  we  derive 
from  the  existence  or  occurrence  of  mental  dream- 


DREAMING.  263 

ing  is,  that  the  mind  is  active  within  itself  a/ad  in- 
dependently of  the  body;  and  if  it  can  act  while 
the  body  is  inactive  under  the  power  of  sleep,  which 
is  typical  of  temporal  death,  we  are  left  to  infer 
that,  as  it  thus  acts,  and  is  ever  acting,  it  can  act  on 
or  continue  to  act  when  the  body  is  silent  in  death. 


SECTION  III. 
1 .  Dreaming  may,  in  some  degree,  be  caused  by 
physical  debilitation.  On  careful  observation  it  has 
been  ascertained  that  dreams  are  pleasant  or  revolt- 
ing in  proportion  to  the  strength  and  health  of  the 
body.  In  good  health,  the  occurrences  which  are 
experienced  in  the  mind,  while  under  the  influence 
of  slumber,  are  apt  to  be  of  an  agreeable  or  pleas- 
ant character ;  and  if  we  are  verging  to  an  attack, 
or  the  influence  and  power  of  disease,  we  are  apt  to 
rest  imperfectly  in  sleep,  and  our  dreams  are  oppress- 
ive and  generally  of  a  disagreeable  character.  2. 
The  character  of  dreams  often  vary  with  the  laws 
of  anatomical  departments,  or  localities,  which  are 
aftected  by  disease;  and  they  may  vary  with  the 
kind  of  disease.  The  difierent  ways  in  which  the 
nervous  system  is  afiected  has  some  corresponding 
influence  upon  the  mind,  and  this  may  be  connected 
to  those  mental  states  which  occur  in  sleep.  When 
the  physical  system  is  reduced  by  dyspepsia,  the 
mind  is  apt  to  be  filled  with  gloom,  so  that  its  ac- 
tion, whether  we  are  awake  or  sleeping,  is  of  a  mel- 
ancholy character.  If  the  nerves  are  excited  by 
fever,  the  action,  whether  in  dreams  or  in  waking 
hours,  will  be  quick,  with  an  uneasy  influence,  or 


2M  DREAMING. 

unpleasant  sensations.  3.  Bodily  sensations^  which 
have  been  once  experienced  in  such  a  way  as  to 
make  a  lasting  impression  upon  the  mind,  may  be 
recalled,  in  part,  if  an  object  of  similar  qualities,  or 
properties,  be  brought  in  contact  with  the  physical 
nerves,  during  slumber,  that  affect  them  in  giving 
rise  to  the  first  sensations  experienced.  If  the  body 
in  slumber  becomes  chilled  with  cold,  we  often 
dream  of  winter,  or  of  the  sufferings  of  others,  or 
of  self  with  cold.  If  burning  with  fever,  the  mind 
is  apt  to  dream  of  sufferings  from  a  hot  sun  or  room. 
If  we  experience  an  acute  pain  while  sleeping,  we 
are  apt  to  dream  of  similar  sufferings  as  endured  by 
others  or  ourselves.  4.  When  realities  or  events  are 
presented  to  the  mind  under  the  influence  of  dream- 
ing, they  appear  directly  opposite  to  what  they  are, 
in  fact,  but  corresponding  with  the  natural  inclina- 
tions or  desires  of  the  soul  in  waking  hours.  The 
poor  man  dreams  of  receiving  a  vast  amount  of 
wealth ;  he  who  can  not  compose,  dreams  of  writing 
poetry  or  a  book ;  the  man  who  can  not  express  his 
thoughts,  dreams  of  speaking  with  great  fluency; 
but  an  orator  seldom  ever  dreams  of  delivering  a 
discourse  with  freedom.  The  eloquent  extempora- 
neous speaker  generally  dreams  of  being  embarrassed 
in  addressing  an  assembly ;  so  there  is  no  general 
rule  or  uniformity  in  the  order  or  character  of 
dreams. 


SECTION  IV. 
1.  There  is  no  fixed  law  of  conformity  or  of 
agreement  in  relation  to  dreams ;  for  there  is  great 


DREAMING.  265 

disasrreement  and  contradiction  in  dreams.  Such 
thoughts  are  often  disconnected  and  desnltory. 
These  irregularities  are  not  corrected  by  reason, 
judgment,  and  the  exercise  of  the  senses,  in  regard 
to  definite  truths  and  settled  laws  in  external  things ; 
and  those  mental  powers  which  have  a  correcting 
control  over  the  mind,  are  partially  suspended.  2. 
Though  the  power  of  the  senses  is  suspended^  and 
the  principal  faculties  of  the  mind  appear  to  be  in- 
active^ in  many  respects,  yet  our  conception  of  reali- 
ties, or  events,  while  under  the  influence  of  sleep, 
appears  to  be  vivid  and  strong.  The  power  of  sug- 
gestion and  comparison  appears  to  be  also  in  lively 
exercise.  No  sensations  affect  the  mind  through 
the  medium  of  the  senses :  hence,  the  mind  attends 
to  the  objects  of  conception.  This  may  account  for 
the  tenacity  of  the  mind  in  recalling  that  which  ap- 
peal's to  be  real  in  our  dreams.  3.  Old  associations 
and  facts  that  have  been  forgotten,  are  often  called 
up  or  revived  in  dreams,  so  that  they  become  the 
objects  of  thought  again  in  our  waking  hours.  It  is 
utterly  impossible  to  account  for  their  origin,  or  re- 
occurring  upon  any  fixed  principle  or  definite  law. 
That  such  things  have  and  do  take  place  is  experi- 
mental knowledge,  but  to  assign  any  certain  cause 
is  impossible.  4.  We  are  now  prepared  to  go  still 
further,  and  say  that  we  may  have  facts  revealed  to 
us  in  dreams  of  which  we  have  never  had  am,y  con- 
clusive knowledge.  Students  have  been  known  to 
work  till  late  at  night  at  propositions  in  mathemat- 
ics, and  have  retired  to  rest  without  solving  tlie  dif- 
ficulties in  regard  to  them  ;  but  when  under  the 
power  of  sleep  the  wliole  difiiculty,  or  difficulties, 

23 


-'^l^tW^i 


m!m^ 


26Q  DREAMING. 


have  been  clearly  solved  in  a  dream,  and,  on  wak- 
ing, with  joy  they  have  placed  all  the  work  down  on 
paper  correctly,  and  without  any  trouble. 


SECTION  V. 
1.  Our  conceptions  of  the  length  of  time  occupied 
in  dreaming  appears  to  be  of  very  long  duration, 
when,  in  fact,  it  can  only  extend  to  but  a  few  min- 
utes. A  chain  of  events  may  pass  through  the 
mind  in  one  dream  which  would  require  many  days 
in  reviewing  them,  but  on  waking  we  discover  that 
it  has  been  the  work  of  a  few  minutes  ;  yet  our 
dreaming  conception  of  it  would  appear  to  have 
continued  months.  Such  conceptions  appear  to  be 
present  as  real ;  and  our  successive  thoughts,  ac- 
tions, or  that  which  is  noticed  or  experienced  in  our 
dreams,  appear  to  employ  very  much  time  and  de- 
liberation, when,  on  being  suddenly  wakened,  we 
ascertain  that  we  have  been  slumbering  only  a  few 
minutes.  This  is  evidence  that  the  mind  can  and 
does  act  in  sleep,  and  that  such  action  is,  in  reality, 
far  more  rapid  than  it  is  in  our  waking  hours  ;  for 
that  which  is  experienced,  or  passes  through  the 
mind,  at  certain  times,  within  ten  minutes,  would 
require  a  whole  day  to  review  in  our  waking  hours, 
or  state.  If  the  action  of  the  mind,  without  the 
immediate  use  of  the  senses,  is  increased,  v^q  may 
infer  that  its  capacity  and  power  of  action,  when 
freed  from  the  inertness  connected  with  the  nature 
of  the  physical  system,  will  far  transcend  all  com- 
prehension and  thought  in  regard  to  such  action. 
2.  Mere  mental  dreaming  is  often  regarded  as  true 


DBEAMIN6.  267 

when  some  feature  or  fact  thus  experienced  happens 
to  come  to  pass  by  casual,  or  even  by  natural  causes. 
When  we  dream  of  events  taking  place,  of  great 
variety,  and  for  a  long  continuance  of  time,  it  is  not 
unlikely  for  something  to  occur  corresponding  to 
some  event,  or  fact,  of  which  we  had  conceptions  in 
a  dream.  The  mere  occurrence  of  such  a  fact,  or 
facts,  will  recall  that  part  of  our  dream,  the  remem- 
brance of  which  tends  to  strengthen  our  confidence 
in  the  truthfulness  of  them.  These  mental  states 
may  be  affected,  or  may  be  the  result  of  disease  or 
of  some  kind  of  physical  debilitation ;  but  that 
which  occurs  corresponding  to  something  realized  in 
dreaming,  becomes  the  object  of  special  mental  ac- 
tion, while  perhaps  a  thousand  other  facts,  or  events, 
contained  in  dreams,  pass  unnoticed  in  our  waking 
hours,  not  being  recalled  by  facts  corresponding  to 
them.  3.  Dreams  vary  with  different  individu- 
als. Some  persons  never  dream  of  objects  they 
have  never  seen,  while  the  reverse  is  true  with 
others.  There  is  another  class  who  never  dream  of 
tastes,  smells,  or  sounds,  only  as  the  presence  of 
these  to  the  slumberer  are  the  occasion,  or  are,  in 
part,  the  cause  of  such  corresponding  dreams ;  but 
there  are  others  again  whose  experience  differs. 
Some  persons,  after  the  loss  of  their  sight,  never 
dream  of  seeing  objects;  so  that  there  appears  to  be 
retained  in  the  mind,  while  under  the  influence  of 
sleep,  at  least  a  partial  sense  of  defects  which  may 
exist  in  connection  with  the  senses,  in  apprehending 
or  in  knowing  realities  or  facts  of  the  external  world. 
4.  Dreaming  conceptions  are  not  confined  to  old 
conceptions.     Under  the  influence  of  slumber,  poets 


26$  DKEAMING. 

have  composed  parts  of  poems,  and,  in  their  waking 
hours,  have  written  out  the  same.  The  logician  has 
unraveled  mysterious  things,  and  concluded  his  ar- 
gument correctly;  the  mathematician  has  concluded 
his  demonstration ;  and  the  linguist  has  seen  how  to 
translate  a  difficult  passage. 


SECTION  VI. 
1.  Dreams  may  have  existed  in  the  mind,  of 
which  there  is  no  recollection  in  our  waking  hours. 
Persons  often  talk  in  sleep  without  being  conscious 
of  any  thing  of  the  kind  in  their  waking  hours.  It 
is  clearly  evident  that  such  conversation  is  the  re- 
sult of  dreaming,  yet  it  can  not  be  recalled.  This 
may  account  for  the  opinion  of  many  persons,  who 
think  they  never  dream.  They  may  dream,  but  not 
be  able  to  recall  them  in  their  waking  hours.  2. 
The  loss  of  power ^  in  dreaming  over  the  succession 
of  our  thoughts,  is  probably  the  most  striking  pecu- 
liarity connected  with  the  phenomena  of  such  men- 
tal influences  or  states.  We  may  dream  of  trying 
to  rehearse  some  facts,  or  chain  of  facts,  connected 
with  some  general  principle  or  subject,  and  lose  the 
connection,  or  wander  away  from  the  desired  course. 
While  the  chain  of  facts,  or  ideas,  are  passing 
through  the  mind,  it  is  not  unlikely  that  the  general 
subject,  or  some  important  truth  came  up,  when  the 
thoughts  wandered,  in  the  absence  of  power  to  con- 
trol them,  and  that,  too,  while  tliere  is  an  internal 
conviction  or  impression  that  the  regular  process  of 
investigation,  or  of  examination,  proceeds  undis- 
turbed;  yet  we  can  discover  that  we  have  some 


mw* '  •*  m 


DREAMING.  269 

power  at  times,  and  by  an  effort,  to  check  our 
thoughts  to  some  extent,  and  to  direct  them  again  to 
the  desired  object,  though  this  power  is  not  apt  to 
be  of  long  duration.  3.  It  is  useless  to  try  to  define 
the  causes  of  dreams.  The  best  we  can  do  is  to 
regard  them  as  varying  with  the  many  and  myste- 
rious influences  connected  with  the  phenomena  of 
mind.  Each  person  can  best  determine  the  cause 
of  such  mental  influences,  or  states,  by  carefully 
attending  to  his  own  experience  in  regard  to  them. 
All  the  facts  connected  witl;  the  phenomena  of 
dreaming  are  evidences  that  mind  is  ever  active 
and  imperishable. 


STO^  CLAIRVOYANCE. 


CHAPTER  II. 

CLAIRVOYANCE. 

SECTION  I. 
1.  Clairvoyance  does  not  properly  belong  to  this 
work,  and  should  not  receive  this  brief  notice,  were 
it  not  for  the  fact  that  it  has  been  regarded,  by 
many,  as  being  an  essential  part  of  the  phenomena 
of  mind.  2.  It  is  the  clear-sigJitedness  of  the  mind 
in  perceiving,  or  in  apprehending  facts  or  events, 
without  the  aid  of  the  senses,  as  a  medium,  in  whole 
or  in  part,  in  arriving  at  a  knowledge  of  such  facts, 
or  events.  This  is,  in  reality,  closely  connected  with 
dreaming,  though  it  appears  to  take  place  further 
removed  from  any  internal  controlling  power  gov- 
erning it.  This  ulterior  process  appears  to  occur 
when  we  are  under  the  deepest  influence  of  Somnus, 
and  when  the  senses  are  entirely  inactive  to  external 
affecting  causes,  so  far  as  can  be  determined.  3.  It 
is  a  power  attributed  to  persons  in  a  mesmeric  state, 
of  perceiving,  or  of  discriminating  objects  or  reali- 
ties not  present  with,  nor  objects  of  the  action  of 
the  senses.  To  define  such  a  power  and  its  action, 
or  to  give  bounds  to  it,  we  regard  as  a  work  more 
properly  belonging  to  beings  more  perfect  in  knowl- 
edge, and  cogent  in  thought,  than  we  are,  or  ever 
expect  to  be  in  this  world.  4.  Such  a  powder  does 
not  appear  to  be  comnnon   or  naturally  connected 


CLAIRVOYANCE.  271 

with  earthly  intelligences,  in  the  proper  existence 
and  relationship  which  characterizes  thefn.  How- 
ever natural  it  may  be  to  the  action  of  spirit  within 
itself,  or  abstracted  from  the  inertness  of  bodily 
organs,  yet  such  action  is  not  common  to  the  masses 
of  intelligences,  or,  if  so,  we  are  unable  to  recall 
such  action  in  our  waking  hours. 


SECTION  II. 
.  1,  If  such  a  power  does  really  exist  in  connection 
with  some  minds  when  it  is  unknown  to  others,  or  to 
the  great  majority  of  persons,  we  can  not  account 
for  its  existence  as  an  essential  element  of  spirit,  or 
any  thing  superadded  to  one  that  is  withheld  frorii 
another;  therefore,  the  only  rational  way  we  have 
of  meeting  the  subject  is,  that  such  difterences 
depend  upon  some  peculiarity  in  the  physical  or 
nervous  constitution,  which  is  connected  with  the 
mind's  developments  and  action.  The  nerves  are 
connected  with  the  brain,  and  are  so  inseparably 
connected  with  the  sensations  experienced  in  and 
by  the  mind,  that  mental  states  may  be  affected  by- 
them ;  and  we  know  not  how  far  such  states  may 
vary  or  correspond  to  the  peculiar  sensitiveness, 
condition,  or  influence  of  the  nervous  system.  2. 
Sow  far  or  to  what  extent  the  doctrine  of  clairvoy- 
ance is  true,  we  shall  not  determine ;  but  we  shall 
claim  the  privilege  to  say  that  too  much  faith  or 
belief  in  such  things  is  deceptions  and  dangerous, 
and  it  adds  no  essential  truths  to  knowledge.  For 
the  mind,  with  confidence,  to  dwell  long  in  such  a 
field,  and  to  become  all  absorbed  in  exploring  what 


272  CLAIRVOYANCE. 

seems,  in  its  imagination,  to  be  therein  contained,  is 
to  advance  midway  from  a  world  of  reason  to  that 
of  insanity.  3.  That  a  simple  state  of  clairvoyance 
may  be  experienced  by  some  minds  connected  with 
a  peculiar  nervous  constitution,  or  system,  is  neither 
unnatural,  nor  a  new  reality  or  truth,  in  the  exist- 
ence and  bounds  of  scientific  research.  Such  per- 
sons are  so  naturally  constituted  that  they  can  be 
affected  by  mesmerism,  anxiety  of  mind,  fatigue,  or 
disease,  so  as  to  have  some  kind  of  stupor  over  the 
action  of  the  senses,  and,  at  the  same  time,  they 
experience  some  kind  of  perception  of  things  which 
can  be  the  objects  of  mental  action.  This  is  no 
new  theory,  either  in  reality  or  the  investigations  of 
science.  It  is  as  old  as  this  kind  of  peculiar  nerv- 
ous constitutions.  It  is  natural  with  the  nervous 
sensitiveness  of  some  persons,  though  the  perverted 
use  that  is  often  made  of  it,  in  the  necromancy  and 
feats  performed  in  the  world,  is  deceptions,  tending 
to  absurdities  and  ruin.  4.  So  far  as  any  person 
has  a  natural  disposition  and  tendency  to  such  men- 
tal states  as  may  be  included  under  the  meaning  of 
clairvoyance,  it  is  innocent  j  but  when  an  inten- 
tional perversion  takes  place,  it  becomes  wickedly 
absui-d  or  sinful.  No  one  can  be  so  operated  on  by 
another  as  to  reveal  facts  of  the  spirit-world  beyond 
the  limits  of  its  personal  identity,  or  mental  re- 
sources and  action. 


SOMNAMBULISM.  273 


CHAPTER  III. 

SOMNAMBULISM. 

SECTION  I. 
1.  This  is  the  act  or  jpractice  of  walkiDg  in  sleep. 
In  dreaming  the  mind  acts,  but  the  somnambulist 
walks  abroad,  or  has  power  voluntarily  to  move 
from  place  to  place  while  under  the  influence  of 
sleep.  This  singular  affection  differs  from  dream- 
ing. Simple  dreaming  involves  only  the  action  of 
the  mind,  while  somnambulism  includes  the  affec- 
tion and  action  of  the  physical  powers  in  connection 
with  mental  inclinations  and  action.  2.  It  differs 
from  dreaming  as  to  the  exercise  of  the  mind.  The 
mind  may  be  fixed  upon  its  own  impressions,  or 
ideas,  which  are  passing  under  its  inspection,  but 
there  appears  to  be  less  power  in  recalling  such  an 
exercise  in  our  waking  hours  than  there  is  to  recall 
the  substance  of  dreams.  There  are  but  few  if  any 
somnambulists  who  can  ever  recall  the  fact  of  walk- 
ing in  sleep.  As  a  general  thing  they  never  have 
the  slightest  knowledge,  in  their  waking  hours,  that 
ever  such  an  occurrence  took  place,  or  was  the  result 
of  their  own  action.  3.  The  same  appears  to  be 
true  in  regard  to  talking  in  sleep.  There  is,  per- 
haps, not  one  case  out  of  a  thousand  where  persons 
who  are  in  the  habit  of  talking  in  sleep,  ever  have 
the  slightest  knowledge  of  such  a  fact  from  any 


VPIt  SOMNAMBULISM. 

action  of  their  own  minds,  though  it  is  highly 
probable  they  are  dreaming,  or  the  mind  is  acting 
in  some  way  all  the  time.  4.  The  first  degree  of 
somnambulism,  with  some  persons,  is  an  inclination 
to  talk  in  sleep,  though  others  are  not  known  to 
talk.  The  former  often  rehearse  what  is  passing  in 
the  mind,  and  frequently  that  which  was  not  in- 
tended to  be  known.  If  this  propensity  increases, 
we  may  expect  them  to  walk  during  sleep.  A 
friend  of  mine  intentionally  lodged  in  the  same 
room  with  a  man  who  was  in  the  habit  of  walking 
during  sleep,  intending  to  follow  him.  About  mid- 
night the  somnambulist  arose,  walked  down  stairs, 
passed  out  at  the  door,  took  a  path  across  the  field, 
crossed  a  water  course  on  a  high  log,  not  touching 
the  hand-pole,  and  without  either  stooping  or  paus- 
ing. In  this  way  he  could  not  pass  over  in  his  wak- 
ing hours  by  daylight,  yet  he  passed  on  without 
any  difiiculty ;  then  turning  into  a  dark  valley,  he 
ascended  and  seated  himself  upon  drift  wood.  In 
a  few  moments  he  returned,  by  the  same  way,  to  his 
Toom  and  bed,  and  knew  nothing  of  the  occurrence 
on  the  next  morning. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  Somnambulism  differs  from  dreaming,  in  the 
^ower  which  the  action  of  the  mind  has  over  the 
muscles  and  the  nervous  system,  whether  such  men- 
tal, action  or  volitions  can,  in  any  way,  be  recalled 
in  our  waking  hours  or  not.  Dreams  appear  to  be 
real  in  the  mind  of  any  one,  and  the  same  appears 
to  be  true  in  regard  to  that  which  is  passing  in  the 


IIPII.IIIPIIII  I J     ill II  ip>  I    ip     i^ 

SOMNAMBULISM*  276 

mind  of  the  somnainbulist.  The  additional  power 
18  added  in,  and  by  which  he  can  and  does  put  his 
physical  powers  in  motion.  A  servant  in  the  south, 
during  sleep  at  night,  often  responds  to  his  master's 
call,  on  his  return  home,  takes  his  horse,  waters  him, 
puts  him  in  the  stable,  feeds  him,  and  fastens  the 
door,  returns  to  bed,  and  knows  nothing  of  the  trans- 
action on  the  next  morning.  He  has  often,  under 
the  influence  of  sleep,  gone  to  mill,  then  returned  to 
his  bed,  and  had  no  knowledge  of  it  in  his  waking 
hours.  2.  Another  peculiarity  is,  that  in  sleep  the 
senses  and  mitscles  appear  to  be  powerless  and  inact- 
ive; but  in  somnambulism  the  latter  is  active,  while 
the  former  is  inactive.  This  can  not  be  defined 
unless  it  exists  in  connection  with  that  peculiar  sen- 
sitive class  of  nerves  connected  with  the  muscles, 
and  not  with  the  senses,  being  affected  in  some  way, 
and  in  such  a  manner  as  to  invoke  or  induce  an 
effort  of  the  muscular  powers  under  the  influence 
of  mental  volitions.  In  this  way  the  senses  may  be 
powerless,  while  muscular  action  is  a  natural  result; 
and  persons  often  perform  hard  labor,  or  travel  a 
long  distance,  without  having  experienced  percep- 
tions of  any  thing  which  they  can  afterward  recall. 

3.  The  absence  of  fear  is  another  peculiarity  con- 
nected w^ith  somnambulism.  The  somnambulist  can 
go  where  he  could  not  in  his  waking  state  without 
fear  or  loss  of  life.  They  have  been  known  to  pass 
out  of  windows  and  climb  up  on  the  tops  of  houses, 
and,  in  an  erect  posture,  walk  narrow  joists  or  beams 
of  timber  from  twenty  to  forty  feet  above  the  ground. 

4.  The  strength  of  the  investigative  power  seems  to 
be  more  vigorous  under  the  influence  of  somnambn- 


2fd  SOMNAMBULISM. 

iism  than  in  waking  hours.  While  under  its  influ- 
ence students  have  finished  tasks  which  they  had 
given  up  in  despair  on  going  to  sleep.  Some  have 
composed  poetry  which  they  failed  to  accomplish 
before ;  others  have  solved  propositions  which  they 
could  not  do  in  their  waking  state. 


SECTION  III. 
1.  A  very  singular  phenomenon  is  sometimes  wit- 
nessed in  the  presence  oi  paroxysms^  which  come  on 
in  the  daytime  as  well  as  at  night.  At  times  they 
are  preluded  by  a  singular  sensation  or  noise  in  the 
head,  but  frequently  they  are  xperienced  without 
any  warning.  The  mind  seems  to  be  abstracted 
from  external  impressions,  yet  there  is  no  apparent 
difficulty  in  conversing  about  that  which  is  passing 
through  the  mind  at  the  time  of  such  conversation, 
so  that  they  could  narrate  correctly  events  which 
they  could  give  but  an  imperfect  account  of  when 
freed  from  such  paroxysms.  2.  Some  persons  are 
totally  unconscious  of  any  external  thing;  others 
can  hear  and  answer  questions.  There  have  been 
instances  given  where  persons  have,  while  under  the 
paroxysm,  conversed  readily  in  Latin,  which  they 
could  not  do  at  other  times.  3.  A  contingent  fea- 
ture of  this  affection  has  been  referred  to  as  being 
produced  by  an  attack  of  somnolency.  In  recover- 
ing from  one  attack,  persons  have  lost  all  literary 
knowledge ;  but  in  recovering  from  the  second  at- 
tack, all  the  lost  attainments  have  been  restored, 
and  thus  alternating  for  years.  4.  It  would  almost 
appear  that,  under  such  paroxysms,  the  mind   or 


SOMNAMBULISM.  2Y7 

spirit  has  some  kind  of  sight  and  perception  inde- 
pendently of  the  senses.  Philosophers  have  given 
instances  of  persons  who  have  had  their  eyes  closed 
while  under  the  paroxysm,  and  bandaged  with  many 
thicknesses  of  black  silk;  yet  they  could  read  and 
answer  questions  in  regard  to  distinct  objects  cor- 
rectly, and  in  regard  to  some  things  which  they  had 
never  seen  before.  We  know  of  no  way  to  explain 
this,  unless  in  proportion  as  the  soul  is  abstracted 
from  the  bodily  organs,  the  more  perfectly  its  powers 
are  developed,  and  the  more  correctly  is  its  action. 
5.  Whatever  there  may  be  that  is  strange  or  novel 
in  the  preceding  part  of  this  chapter,  yet  it  should 
be  borne  in  mind  that  all  these  facts  go  to  show  that 
mind  cam,  act  without  the  body,  from  which  it  is 
reasonable  to  believe  in  its  superiority,  and  to  infer 
its  imperishable  nature  or  its  eternal  duration. 

24 


278  MESMERISM. 


'Hfffi 


CHAPTER  IV. 

MESMERISM. 

SECTION  I. 
1.  By  mesmerism  we  understand  animal  magnet- 
ism, or  the  existence  of  a  peculiar  kind  of  sleep,  in 
which  the  mind  is  active,  though  the  mesmerized 
person  appears  to  be  unconscious  of  external  objects. 
The  mind  is  active  within  itself,  or  in  regard  to 
something  specially  passing  within  itself,  while  all 
external  things  are  lost  sight  of  or  are  precluded. 
2.  The  act  of  mesmerizing  is  that  of  affecting  the 
hody  in  different  ways,  so  as  to  produce  a  species  or 
kind  of  sleep,  while  the  mind  retains  its  activity 
and  power.  This  is  no  new  discovery  in  scientific 
research  and  knowledge.  Long  has  it  been  known, 
and  it  has  and  does  exist,  in  reality,  in  the  very  nat- 
ural constitution  of  some  persons.  3.  A  constitu- 
tion which  is  capable  of  being  mesmerized  is  almost 
the  same  as  those  which  come  under  the  influence 
of  somnambulism.  It  is  natural  to  some  constitu- 
tions, and  all  such  may  be  mesmerized ;  but  a  dif- 
ferently-constituted person  can  not  be  mesmerized. 
The  mesmeric  susceptibility  is  connected  with  a  pe- 
culiar condition  or  nature  of  the  nervous  system, 
and  never  can  be  imparted  to  one  who  has  it  not; 
yet  the  influence  or  power  of  disease  might  effect 
such  a  change,  or  condition  of  the  nerves,  aa  to 


MESMERISM.  STt 

render  a  person  capable  of  being  mesmerized  who 
had  no  natural  disposition  to  it.  This  constitutional 
or  natural  affinity  to  mesmeric  affection,  or  influ- 
ence, can  be  affected  or  produced  by  external  agen- 
cies or  causes,  which  are  neither  marvelous  nor  un- 
common ;  but  there  is  a  mystery  in  the  nature  of 
such  a  constitution,  which,  like  many  other  things, 
can  only  be  fully  comprehended  in  the  future  world. 
4.  There  are  hut  very  few  persons^  if  any,  who  are  in 
the  habit  of  talking  or  walking  in  sleep,  while  in 
health,  but  what  can  be  mesmerized ;  yet  this  can 
not  be  done  contrary  to  the  will  or  permission  of  the 
subject.  5.  Some  subjects,  under  the  influence  of 
mesmerism,  are  wholly  unconscious  of  external 
things,  while  others  are  not,  but  have  not  immediate 
power  to  break  the  influence.  Mesmerizers  claim 
that  the  former  class  can  be  operated  upon  by  will, 
in  commanding  them  to  do  as  they  please,  while  the 
latter  class  can  resist  only  in  part.  It  may  be  that 
persons,  being  mesmerized,  go  into  that  state  with 
the  mind  almost  entirely  directed  to  the  operator, 
and  when  a  stupor  comes  over  the  power  of  the 
senses,  the  mind  still  having  liberty  to  act,  and  the 
operator  being  the  object  of  the  mind,  he  may  have 
more  controlling  power  over  it  than  any  other  per- 
son, and  more  than  would  seem  natural ;  but  there 
is  far  more  contained  in  the  assertions  of  such 
agents  than  there  is  in  the  facts  as  they  are. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  In  this  way  it  has  been  maintained  that  the 
truthfulness  of  phrenology  has  been  established  by 


S8$  MESMERISM. 

the  action  of  the  mesmerized  person,  corresponding 
to  the  nature  of  the  organ  touched  bj  the  operator ; 
but  this  is  no  proof,  if  what  the  mesmerizer  claims 
is  true,  that  subjects  can  be  operated  upon  by  will ; 
for  he  knows  what  organ  he  intends  touching,  and 
what  kind  of  action  he  expects.  This  being  fixed 
in  his  mind  would  be  that  which  he  would  will : 
hence,  the  action  of  the  subject  would  correspond  to 
the  will  of  the  operator.  With  all  the  obscurity 
and  doubt  of  the  correctness  of  this  conclusion,  yet 
that  spirit  can  thus  operate  upon  spirit  is  far  more 
reasonable  than  to  believe  a  mere  physical  organ  of 
the  head  can  possess  within  itself  spiritual  rational- 
ity sufficient  to  act.  If  spirit  can  act  as  spirit,  why 
may  it  not  act  without  involving  the  inert  existence 
and  medium  of  the  skull.  The  truthfulness  of  phre- 
nology can  not  be  established  by  mesmerism  while 
mind  and  matter  are  dissimilar  and  divisible.  2. 
If  the  somnambulist  becomes  lost  to  every  thing  but 
that  upon  which  his  mind  is  intently  fixed,  and  if 
he  has  power  to  walk  abroad  in  obedience  to  any 
internal  inclination,  may  not  a  person,  on  being 
mesmerized,  become  unconscious  of  every  thing  in 
regard  to  the  action  of  the  senses,  yet  be  controlled 
by  the  thoughts  of  the  mind,  which  still  cluster 
around  the  existence  and  will  of  the  operator,  so  as 
to  be  thus  influenced  in  some  way  ?  But  deceptions 
in  regard  to  these  things  are  far  more  probable  than 
conjectures  in  favor  of  such  mysteries.  We  men- 
tion them  only  to  induce  investigative  thought, 
while  the  student  is  left  to  form  his  own  conclusions. 
3.  There  are  persons  who,  under  mesmeric  influ- 
ences, are  partially  sensible  of  what  is  passing,  but 


MESMEBISM.  281 

are  unable  to  move  from  any  position  they  may  be 
placed  in,  though  they  may  try  to  do  so.  By  a 
well-tried  effort,  some  of  them  have  succeeded  in 
breaking  the  influence,  as  they  have  testified.  4. 
There  is  another  class  which  appears  to  be  uncon- 
scious of  every  thing,  yet  they  will  respond  to  ques- 
tions, or  walk,  if  ordered  to  do  so.  This  ma}'^  be 
accounted  for  upon  the  same  principle  that  a  person 
continues  to  converse  with  another  in  sleep.  When 
some  individuals  begin  to  talk  in  sleep,  they  will 
answer  almost  any  question  asked.  In  this  way 
confidential  truths  have  been  revealed.  But  to 
fully  explain  such  phenomena  must  be  the  work 
of  each  one  who  thinks  upon  the  subject.  5. 
Though  this  constitutional  or  natural  tendency  to, 
or  susceptibility  of  mesmeric  states,  can  not  be 
defined,  yet  we  can  but  believe,  to  some  extent,  in 
its  mysterious  existence ;  but,  when  properly  viewed, 
it  contains  no  more  mystery  than  dreaming  or  som-  i 
nambulism.  This  far  we  may  go  in  safety;  but  the 
idea  that  men  may  send  the  spirits  of  others  to 
distant  worlds,  or  have  the  facts  of  the  spirit-world 
revealed  by  them,  is  not  only  absurd,  but  tends  to 
ruin.  Finity  has  no  such  power. 
24* 


38S  PHKENOLOGY. 


CHAPTER  V. 

PHRENOLOGY. 

SECTION  I. 
1.  Phkenologt  proceeds  upon  the  supposition 
that  the  brain  is  the  organ  of  thought  and  passion ; 
that  the  science  of  the  human  mind  is  inseparably 
connected  with  this  supposed  organ;  and  that  the 
different  powers  of  the  mind  may  be  determined 
principally  by  the  size  and  shape  of  the  head,  to- 
gether with  the  undulations  of  the  skull,  embracing 
the  position  and  condition  of  such  undulations.  As 
to  the  general  features,  or  outline  of  phrenology,  we 
would  file  no  very  special  objections ;  but  when  we 
come  to  define  and  settle  the  divisions  of  the  organ, 
w^e  are  plunged  into  darkness  and  confusion.  2. 
The  size  and  the  general  appearance  of  the  head, 
together  with  the  expression  of  the  eye  and  the 
countenance,  are  important  in  forming  a  correct 
judgment  in  regard  to  the  mind.  Doubtless  more 
is  indicated  by  physiognomy  than  is  by  phrenology. 
The  expression  of  the  countenance,  as  a  general 
thing,  is  more  important  in  deciding  upon  the 
strength  and  character  of  the  mind,  than  all  that 
can  be  gathered  from  the  different  sections  in  crani- 
ology.  3.  There  are  several  important  points  to  he 
settled^  and  to  be  acknowledged  as  true,  before  the 
philosophy  of  mind,   with  its  well-tried  chain   of 


\ 


PHRENOLOGY.  283 

truths,  can  be  supplanted  by  it.  We  do  not  regard 
the  doctrine  of  phrenology  as  being  sufficiently  in- 
terwoven with  mental  science  to  require  an  exten- 
sive analysis :  hence,  we  shall  refer  briefly  to  only  a 
few  facts  in  connection  with  it. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  The  trutTis  which  support  the  doctrine  of  phre- 
nology must  be  sufficiently  clear  and  strong  to  show 
that  it  is,  in  fact,  a  science ;  but  no  two  writers  have 
entirely  agreed,  in  every  respect,  in  regard  to  the 
localities  of  the  different  organs,  as  indicated  by  the 
peculiar  shape  of  the  skull,  which,  according  to 
phrenology,  is  essential  to  the  existence  of  such  a 
theory  or  doctrine.  2.  It  must  be  demonstrated 
vyithout  a  doxibt^  that  the  brain  is,  and  is  wholly,  the 
organ  of  the  mind,  otherwise  the  cranium  might 
deceive  us ;  and  as  all  the  nervous  matter  in  the 
entire  system  is  of  the  very  same  properties  as  that 
of  the  brain,  and  is,  to  some  extent,  and  in  some 
way,  connected  with  it,  there  might  be  some  diffi- 
culty involved  in  locating  the  organ  of  the  mind. 
3.  Phrenologists  should  first  prove  that  the  hrain  is 
the  organ  of  the  mind,  and  then  they  must  agree  in 
locating  the  different  powers  or  faculties  of  the  mind 
according  to  the  exterior  surface  of  the  skull,  and 
especially  those  locations  should  be  made  and  be 
defined  without  doubt,  which  have  so  long  been  the 
objects  of  doubt  and  contention  among  different 
writers.  An  intelligent  world  will  expect  these 
questions  of  doubt  to  be  settled  before  they  will 
consent  to  regard  such  a  system,  as  a  whole,  conr 


iw^ippw^wpj  -I*  ^^'iwippip 


im 


PHRENOLOGY. 


sistent  with  reason,  or  that  it  is  true  science.  4.  It 
must  be  clearly  shown  how  the  skull  bone,  which  is 
inert  within  itself,  is  better  adapted  to  the  develop- 
ment of  the  various  influences  and  powers  of  an 
immaterial  nature,  than  such  a  nature  would  be  to 
develop  its  own  powers  and  action.  5.  If  we  ad- 
here to  the  exactness  of  phrenological  claims,  it 
must  be  demonstrated^  according  to  general  uniform- 
ity, that  each  undulation  on  the  external  surface  of 
the  skull  has  a  concavity  corresponding  to  it  on  the 
inner  surface  of  the  skull,  answering  to  the  different 
lobes  of  the  brain,  which  lobes  have  been  assumed 
as  being  the  basis  respectively  from  which  the  ac- 
tion of  the  various  powers  of  the  mind  are  elimi- 
nated; but  this  is  impossible.  6.  There  should  be  ^ 
clear  showing,  or  proof,  that  the  brain  does  really 
contain  lohes^  or  ^protuberances^  as  has  been  assumed, 
and  just  a  sufficient  number  to  correspond  with  the 
different  powers  and  affections  of  the  mind ;  but  the 
almost  imperceptible  waves  of  the  brain  can  not  be 
called  lobes,  as  is  set  forth  in  the  doctrine  of  phre- 
nology. 


SECTION  III. 
1.  Should  such  lobes  exist  as  organs  of  the  differ- 
ent powers  of  the  mind,  it  would  appear  that  they 
would  have  to  exist  in  immediate  contact  with  the 
skull,  so  that  the  external  surface  would  indicate  the 
size  and  strength  of  such  organs  thus  manifested ; 
therefore,  no  vacuum,  or  space,  could  exist  between 
the  brain  and  the  skull  without  confusing  the  defi- 
nite location  and  action  of  the  various  mental  pow- 


I 


PHKENOLOGY.  285 

ere.  But  there  is  a  vacuum,  or  space,  between  the 
brain  and  skull  which  severs  the  connection  between 
the  two,  and  renders  it  impossible  to  trace  the  con- 
nection between  the  external  surface  of  the  skull 
and  the  brain  at  any  time,  without  taking  into  the 
account  the  changes  under  different  circumstances. 
2.  Philosophers  agree  that  the  hrain  may  be  re- 
garded as  the  organ  of  the  mind  by  reason  of  the 
wise  order  in  the  arrangement  of  infinite  wisdom, 
and  not  that  it  is  or  can  be  the  organ  of  the  mind 
from  its  peculiar  essence,  or  natural  qualities ;  for 
in  this  case  the  whole  nervous  system  would  be  the 
organ  of  the  mind,  as  it  is  connected  with  the  brain, 
and  contains  precisely  the  same  essence,  or  proper- 
ties, when  analyzed.  3.  The  idea  that  the  mind  is 
whoUy  dependent  upon  the  nature  and  condition  of 
the  physical  organs,  in  order  to  be  manifested,  or 
for  the  character  of  its  action,  is  absurd;  for  we 
have  already  seen  that  the  mind  can  act  without  the 
bodily  organs,  and  when  the  senses  are  locked  up, 
or  their  power  is  suspended  by  sleep.  4.  The  doo- 
trine  of  phrenology,  when  not  sufficiently  guarded, 
often  misleads  the  mind.  In  some  instances  it  has 
given  origin  to  tendencies  which  have  resulted  in 
the  worst  forms  of  infidelity,  by  and  in  which  it  has 
been  assumed  that  all  the  sufferings  of  both  body 
and  mind  are  the  results  of  imperfect  physical  or- 
ganization, and  that  the  fall  of  man  affects  only  the 
physical  powers,  by  and  through  which  the  mind 
acts.  If  this  be  true,  and  it  is  possible  for  us  to 
have  any  consciousness  of  guilt  or  sin,  then  tJiat 
which  tests  this  fact  must  be  matter,  and  when  the 
body  dies  all  our  consciousness  of  guilt  must  perish 


286  PHRENOLOGY. 

with  it.     This  would  result  in  the  doctrine  or  idea 
of  annihilation,  which  is  false. 

SECTION  ly.  ,^4, 

1.  The  physical  organs,  being  inert  within  and  of 
themselves,  they  have  no  power  to  comprehend  the 
knowledge  of  suffering,  and  report  the  same  to  the 
mind,  in  order  that  it  msij  be  known.  Matter  can 
never  originate  intuitive  mental  convictions  and 
feelings  of  our  lost  estate ;  for  it  is  by  the  existence, 
presence,  and  self-action  of  innate  mental  elements 
that  we  can  have  any  knowledge  of  the  capability 
of  the  body  to  suffer,  or  that  it  ever  has  experienced 
pain.  2.  While  the  reasonableness  and  truthfulness 
of  the  outlines  of  phrenology  are  acknowledged,  yet 
we  are  unable  to  admit  the  more  peculiar  specific 
doctrines  connected  with  it,  and  all  we  can  do  is  to 
receive  that  which  is  correct,  and  reject  the  incor- 
rect, or  that  which  is  false.  The  same  cause  will 
not  affect  every  person  in  the  same  way.  3.  Inju- 
ries received  upon  the  head  often  affect  some  power 
of  the  mind,  and  an  injury  received  upon  a  certain 
organ  affects  one  mind  very  differently  from  the  re- 
sult the  same  cause  would  produce  upon  another 
mind.  The  same  organ  in  kind  may  be  affected  on 
different  heads,  and  the  results  are  not  similar;  but, 
in  most  instances,  they  are  very  different.  The 
same  organ  in  the  same  head  may  be  affected  by  a 
blow,  at  different  times,  without  producing  similar 
effects  upon  the  mind ;  therefore,  it  is  impossible  to 
locate  the  different  organs  from  the  similarity  in  the 
effects  realized.     4.  Different  portions  of  the  brain 


PHBENOLOGY.  28T» 

may  be  diseased  without  affecting  the  mind  corre- 
sponding to  the  office,  nature,  and  action  of  the 
organs  thus  affected.  A  lady  has  been  mentioned, 
one  half  of  whose  brain  was  completely  paralyzed 
by  disease,  yet  the  faculties  of  her  mind  were  per- 
fect, notwithstanding  the  destruction  of  one  half  of 
the  cerebral  organs.  A  man  has  been  mentioned, 
who  retained  the  right  use  of  all  his  faculties  up  to 
the  moment  of  his  sudden  death,  and  on  opening 
his  head  it  was  discovered  that  suppuration  had 
destroyed  the  whole  right  hemisphere  of  his  brain. 
Though  one  half  of  his  cerebral  organs  were  de- 
stroyed, yet  his  mind  was  not  affected.  Operators 
testify  that  they  have  removed,  in  a  similar  way,  as 
much  as  a  half  pound  of  matter  found  in  the  brain, 
when  the  mind  did  not  appear  to  have  been  affected 
up  to  the  time  of  death. 


SECTION  V. 
1.  We  learn,  from  different  experiments^  that  large 
portions  of  the  brain  have  been  often  removed  with- 
out destroying  the  exercise  of  the  mental  faculties. 
A  man  has  been  mentioned,  whose  head  had  been 
so  injured  that  a  large  portion  of  the  right  wing  of 
the  OS  frontis  was  removed,  suppuration  had  taken 
place,  while  at  each  dressing,  for  over  two  months, 
the  matter  discharged  brought  with  it  large  quanti- 
ties of  the  brain ;  yet  he  retained  the  right  use  of 
all  his  faculties  to  the  time  of  his  death.  2.  Instan- 
ces have  been  given,  in  cases  of  fracture  of  the 
skull,  when  large  portions  of  the  brain  have  been 
removed  without  the  slightest  injury  to  the  minds 


^288  PHRENOLOGY. 

of  the  persons  thus  suffering.  These  facts  are  con- 
clusive evidences  that  different  organs  in  the  brain 
can  be  entirely  destroyed  without  marring  the  cor- 
rect action  of  the  mind.  3.  How  can  this  be  ac- 
counted for  upon  the  principles  of  phrenology  f 
There  is  only  one  way  of  escape,  so  far  as  can  be 
determined  at  present ;  that  is,  when  the  organs  on 
one  side  of  the  head  are  destroyed,  we  have  to  as- 
sume that  there  are  double  organs,  and  those  on  the 
other  side  correspond  to  those  lost.  But  this  is  only 
assumption,  as  it  can  not  be  based  upon  any  pri- 
mary principle  of  phrenology.  4.  While  the  gen- 
eral principles  of  phrenology  may  be  regarded  as 
true,  yet  we  are  unprepared  to  adopt  it  in  lieu  of 
mental  philosophy,  as  the  latter  has  been  long  es- 
tablished upon  true  principles,  attested  by  almost 
any  amount  of  experiments  and  facts  known  to  be 
true. 


^mii^ 


\i^-w^^ 


MP  I'll      I  <i  ipp 


CHAPTER  I. 

RBFLECTION. 
SBCTION  I. 

1.  Eeflection  is  the  act  or  operation  of  the  mind 
by  which  it  turns  its  views,  or  thoughts,  back  upon 
itself  or  its  operations.  Memory  is  the  power  by 
which  past  thoughts  or  events  are  retained,  com- 
manded, or  recalled ;  but  reflection  is  the  power  by 
which  the  thoughts  are  turned  back  upon  them- 
selves, or  upon  past  events  or  facts.  2.  By  this 
power  our  thoughts  may  be  thrown  back  upon  the 
past,  or  upon  that  which  is  absent.  In  this  way  the 
field  of  past  events  can  be  entered,  and  diligent 
search  instituted,  in  regard  to  facts  which  are  de- 
sired to  be  used  by  the  mind  in  forming  combina- 
tions, or  in  tracing  relations  and  associations  of 
truths.  3.  Reflection  is  involuntary^  when  it  takes 
place  without  any  willing  or  intentional  effort ;  and 
the  prominency  of  some  truth  or  fact,  under  its  ac- 
tion, may,  in  its  relation  to  other  things,  give  rise  to 
repeated  action  in  many  different  ways,  while  there 
is  an  internal  desire  or  inclination  to  direct  the  mind 
to  some  other  object,  or  in  some  other  way.  4.  It  is 
voluntary  when  we  pause  the  action  of  the  mental 
powers,  and  throw  back  our  thoughts  in  search  of 
25  289 


# 


BEFLECTION. 

some  express  object,  or  for  some  special  purpose; 
and  in  connection  with  this  is  the  exercise  of  the 
judgment,  and  the  presence  of  reason.  5.  It  is  con- 
nected with  the  power  of  reason,  but  more  inti- 
mately is  it  connected  with  the  power  of  remember- 
ing past  perceptions,  and  past  mental  acts  or  proc- 
esses, so  that  they  can  be  compared  with  present 
facts,  feelings,  and  inclinations  as  experienced  by 
the  same  sentient  being.  It  traces  the  laws  by 
which  the  processes  of  mental  action  are  governed, 
regulated,  and  known. 


I 


SECTION  II. 

1.  While  the  mind,  by  the  power  of  reflection^  is 
canvassing  and  considering  past  events  or  realities, 
there  is  called  into  action  the  power  of  memory, 
comparison,  and  judgment,  which  give  rise  to  new 
states  of  mind,  and  new  trains  of  thought.  2.  In 
connection  with  these,  there  arises  certain  internal 
convictions^  and  the  exercise  of  an  intuitive  belief 
in  the  existence  of  external  and  internal  realities. 
They  are  embraced  by,  or  are  objects  of  the  under- 
standing, without  being  connected  in  any  chain  of 
reasoning.  Here  the  action  of  the  mind  rests  upon 
fixcts  or  elements  which  are  original,  or  enter  into 
our  natural  constitution.  These  primary  truths  are 
prominent  when  we  are  under  the  influence  of  care- 
ful reflection.  3.  Under  the  jprocess  of  reflecting^ 
we  are  confident  that  we  experience  an  internal  con- 
viction and  belief  that  w^e  are  real  existences,  and 
that  we  possess  cogitative  minds,  with  powers  supe- 
rior to  materiality.     4.  While  the  action  of  the  mind 


REFLECTION.  291 

is  paused  to  give  place  to  mature  and  deliberate 
reflection^  there  arises,  in  connection  with  the  mind's 
intuitions,  a  conviction  of  the  truthfulness  of  the 
report  of  the  senses,  and  the  power  to  believe  in  the 
reality  of  external  things.  5.  The  importance  of 
reflection  is  invaluable.  It  leads  to  the  safest  and- 
most  effectual  preventives  of  evil,  and  enables  us  1^ 
to  take,  in  due  time,  the  necessary  steps  to  avoid 
danger  and  ruin. 


'<P^'' 


SJ^v 


292    CONNECTION    OF    MIND    AND    MATTBE. 


$. 


CHAPTER  II. 

CONNECTION  AND  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  BODY  UPON 
THE  MIND. 

SECTION  I. 
1.  The  mysterious  union  of  mind  with  matter  can 
never  be  defined  in  this  life  so  as  to  leave  no  doubt 
in  regard  to  the  subject;  but  the  fact  that  such  a 
union  exists  is  knowledge  which  can  not  be  doubted. 
The  soul  is  the  life  of  the  body,  and  the  body  with- 
out the  soul  is  inactive  and  lifeless,  or  dead.  2. 
Temporal  death  has  power  over  and  terminates  the 
life  of  the  body ;  but  it  has  no  annihilating  power 
over  any  of  its  essential  elements,  as  we  have  no 
evidence  that  any  thing  of  either  matter  or  mind 
can  or  will  ever  cease  to  be.  3.  The  efiect  which 
temporal  death  has  upon  us,  so  far  as  we  can  under- 
stand, goes  no  further  than  to  destroy  the  ties  of 
affection  which  unite  the  two  natures  in  one,  decom- 
posing and  scattering  the  elements  of  our  physical 
nature,  while  the  soul  has,  in  one  sense,  experienced 
freedom  from  the  inertness  of  earthly  organs.  4. 
Temporal  death  can  have  no  power  over  the  soul's 
being,  or  in  limiting  its  power  of  action  in  any 
possible  way.  5.  It  can  have  no  destructive  power 
over  either  intuitive  or  acquired  knowledge.  True 
knowledge  will  ever  live  in  the  imperishable  soul, 
and  flourish  in  immortality. 


CONNECTION    OF    MIND    AND   MATTER.     293 

SECTION  II. 
1.  Intellectual  action  can  Jbe  rendered  imperfect 
by  the  disorders,  frailties,  and  imperfections  of  the 
human  body.  All  these  affect  the  developments  of 
mind,  and  give  origin  or  influence  to  mental  states 
contrary  to  its  ordinary  principles,  and  in  violation 
to  the  laws  of  its  natural  constitutional  organization 
or  existence.  2.  We  can  not  have  conceptions  of 
mind  within,  and  of  itself,  as  being  capable  of  ever 
deviating  from  correctness,  in  all  its  processes,  at- 
tended with  uniform  harmony:  hence,  all  its  voli- 
tions of  uniformity  in  action  are  wholly  attributed 
to  the  effect  or  influence  of  the  physical  organs  upon 
them.  We  are  not  to  conclude  that,  because  the 
strong-minded  young  man  becomes  forgetful,  blind, 
and  deaf  in  old  age,  his  soul  or  mind  is  dying,  or  is 
becoming  powerless  on  its  journey  to  annihilation'. 
Speak  of  the  occurrences  of  early  life,  and  they  are 
fresh  in  his  memory.  Apply  the  optic  to  his  eye, 
and  he  can  see ;  with  the  ear-trumpet  he  can  hear. 
All  these  facts  are  evidences  that  the  internal  power 
is  not  lost,  but  is  trammeled  by  increasing  bodily  in- 
firmities. 3.  It  is  impossible  for  us  to  believe  that 
an  idiot  will  be  lost  in  the  future  world,  for  he  is  in- 
capable of  doing  an  intentional  wrong  from  knowl- 
edge ;  and  it  is  equally  impossible  that  an  idiot 
should  exist  an  idiot  in  heaven,  for  as  such  he  could 
not  answer  any  wise  purpose  or  design  of  his  Crea- 
tor ;  but  it  is  reasonable  to  believe  that  when  his 
deformed  body  suffers  the  paralyzing  touch  of  death 
his  soul  will  be  free,  and  possessed  of  rational  pow- 
ers, in  the  right  use  of  which  he  will  ever  love  and 
25* 


294    CONNECTION    OF    MIND    AND    MATTEB. 

adore  the  Author  of  unending  bliss.  4.  The  mind, 
in  some  instances,  under  the  influence  of  bodily  in- 
firmities, revolts  from  its  natural  uniformity  of  ac- 
tion, and  violates  the  laws  by  which  its  processes 
have  been  regulated.  In  seeking  for  the  causes  of 
this,  we  need  go  no  farther  back  than  the  diseases 
and  deformities  of  the  body.  It  is  impossible  to 
describe  the  variety  of  ways  in  which  the  bodily 
organs  are  affected  by  disease,  or  to  trace  from  a 
cause  a  corresponding  effect  upon  the  mind;  but 
that  the  mind  can  be,  and  is  affected  by  such  things, 
is  too  plain  to  admit  of  any  doubt. 


SECTION  III. 
1.  The  physical  system,  when  advanced  in  years, 
or  is  under  the  infirmities  of  age,  does  not  affect  the 
internal  operations  of  the  mind  as  it  does  the  medi- 
ums by  and  through  which  it  holds  intercourse  with 
external  things.  The  internal  mental  states  and 
processes  can  take  place,  or  be  carried  on,  without 
any  special  reference  to  the  external  world,  and  con- 
sequently they  are  not  dependent  upon  the  external 
senses.  The  physical  organs  may  be  so  diseased 
that  the  external  senses  become  incapable  of  proper 
discrimination  or  action,  but  the  internal  elements 
and  operations  of  the  mind  remain  vigorous  and 
active,  though  the  earthly  house  of  this  tabernacle 
is  being  dissolved.  2.  The  influence  of  disease  will 
and  does  affect  the  action  or  operations  of  the  mind, 
whether  the  individual  thus  affected  be  advanced  in 
life  or  be  possessed  of  the  vigors  of  youth.  Many 
persons,  on  recovering  from  violent  attacks  of  fever. 


CONNECTION    OF    MIND    AND    MATTEB.    295 

or  other  diseases,  lose  their  memory  so  that  they  can 
not  recall  past  events.  Others  can  not  calculate, 
and  some  individuals  can  not  recognize  their  nearest 
friends.  These  influences  generally  pass  away  in  a 
short  time  with  young  persons  of  vigorous  constitu- 
tioDS,  while  some  older  persons  never  recover  en- 
tirely. 3.  The  mind  may  be  affected  or  excited  by 
affecting  influences  upon  the  nervous  system.  That 
which  produces  acute  pain,  as  is  experienced  in  am- 
putating a  limb,  or  in  piercing  the  nerve  of  a  tooth, 
will  arouse  the  mind  to  its  utmost  capability  of  ac- 
tion. More  soothing  effects  are  produced  by  the 
application  of  gases,  or  other  strong  stimulants. 
These  show  the  connection  of  mind  with  matter, 
and  the  influence  which  matter  has  upon  mind.  4. 
Intense  excitement  of  the  mind  has  a  very  great  in- 
fluence upon  the  body.  Sudden  fright  or  imminent 
danger  will  often  shake  the  whole  nervous  system, 
and  in  some  instances  death  has  ensued.  Cases 
have  been  mentioned,  where  persons  suddenly  ex- 
posed to  danger  have  been  so  affected  that  the  hair 
of  the  head  has  become  white  in  a  short  time ;  oth- 
ers fall  sick  immediately,  and  often  go  deranged,  or 
sink  into  the  embrace  of  death. 


SECTION  IV. 
1.  JExcited  imagination  and  conceptions  often  ex- 
ist in  connection  with  hypochondria.  Instances  are 
referred  to  where  persons  assert  that  they  have  real 
conceptions  of  fearful-looking  beings,  and  of  awful 
calamities  just  about  to  take  place;  others  imagine 
that  they  are  sick  with  some  special  disease,  or  that 


296     CONNECTION    OF    MIND    AND    MATTER. 

they  have  become  deformed.  A  man  has  been 
mentioned,  who  imagined  that  his  nose  had  become 
so  enlarged  that  it  filled  his  bedroom,  and  that 
there  was  not  room  for  the  door  to  open  in  order 
to  admit  any  person  to  render  him  assistance  with- 
out afflicting  his  nose,  and  causing  insupportable 
pain.  He  was  relieved  by  a  man  blowing  through 
the  keyhole  for  the  purpose  of  driving  away  the 
inflammation.  On  opening  the  door  gradually,  he 
pretended  to  reduce  the  inflammation  by  an  appli- 
cation of  ointment  till  he  advanced  to  the  bed. 
Then  he  succeeded  in  persuading  him  that  his  nose 
was  cured,  upon  which  the  invalid  rose  and  walked 
about.  2.  Another  man  has  been  referred  to,  who 
imagined  that  he  had  two  small  black  dogs  in  his 
stomach.  His  physician  failing  to  correct  his  sup- 
position, proposed  vomiting  as  an  efiectual  cure. 
When  the  invalid  raised  to  vomit  the  second  time, 
the  physician,  before  laying  him  back  to  rest,  dis- 
closed two  small  black  dogs,  exclaiming,  "  Here 
they  are !"  It  is  stated  that  the  sick  man,  on  seeing 
them,  lifted  his  languid  eyes,  thanking  Heaven  that 
he  was  freed  from  them.  3.  An  instance  is  recorded 
of  a  man,  who  imagined  himself  to  be  really  dead. 
His  physician,  finding  it  impossible  to  change  his 
mind,  proposed  burying  him.  He  was  placed  in  a 
coffin,  and  sentinels  were  stationed  along  the  road 
to  make  unpleasant  remarks.  As  the  procession 
moved  on,  the  first  sentinel  cried  out,  "  Who  have 
you  got  there?"  On  being  answered,  he  continued, 
"  O,  happy  thing  he  is  gone!"  This  seemed  to  have 
some  efl'ect  upon  the  invalid.  The  second  cried  out, 
''Who  have  you  there?"     On  being  informed,  he 


OONKECTION    OF    MIND    AND    MATTER.   297 

continued  to  say,  "  We  are  all  glad  he  is  dead ;  lie 
was  a  great  scoundrel ;  pity  lie  had  not  died  years 
ago."  At  that  the  invalid  mutteringly  remarked, 
"  If  I  was  not  dead  I  would  pay  you  for  that."  The 
third  cried  out,  "  Who  is  dead  ?"  On  hearing  the 
name,  he  responded,  "  Good !  I  have  no  doubt  but 
that  he  is  gone  to  destruction;  the  devil  has  his 
own  at  last."  At  this  the  dead  man  bounded  from 
his  coffin,  and  pursued  the  sentinel  through  the 
streets.  These  only  show  how  the  mind  can  be 
affected  by  its  connection  with  a  diseased  body./^ 
The  mind  within  itself  is  rational. 


APPARITIONS 


CHAPTER  III. 

APPARITIONS. 

SECTION  I. 
1.  Apparitions  are  only  another  source  of  evi- 
dence, showing  the  connection  and  influence  which 
physical  organs  have  over  mental  states.  Such  ap- 
pearances, or  visibilities,  are  mere  appearances,  and 
are  opposed  to  realiiy.  Persons  often  speak  of  see- 
ing angels,  or  individuals  who  are  absent  from  them. 
Others  suppose  they  see  ghosts  or  spirits  of  departed 
friends.  That  angels  can  and  have  been  seen,  in 
ages  past,  we  do  not  doubt;  and  we  know  of  no 
well-grounded  reason  why  spirits  may  not  reveal 
themselves  to  us  in  this  age  of  the  world ;  yet  such 
things  never  were  common  or  frequent  events,  and 
we  have  no  well-grounded  reasons  why  they  should 
appear  now.  It  is  much  easier  for  us  to  be  deceived 
in  regard  to  such  things  than  it  is  to  be  not  deceived ; 
but  by  repeated  efforts  the  mind  may  become  pos- 
sessed with  excited  conceptions,  and  it  become  com- 
mon for  us  to  speak  of  seeing  spirits,  or  persons  who 
are  distant,  with  the  utmost  confidence,  when  there 
is  no  reality  in  regard  to  such  things,  and  w^e  are 
laboring  under  a  delusion.  2.  These  may  be  caused 
by  the  effect  and  influence  of  disease  upon  the  eye. 
All  that  enters  into  the  composition  of  the  eye  is 
more  or  less  affected  by  disease.     The  transparent 


APPARITIONS.  299 

properties  are  liable  to  change,  so  as  to  present  the 
appearance  of  objects  which  do  not  exist.  It  can 
be  discovered  that  a  change  in  the  appearance  of 
the  outer  divisions  of  the  eye  have  taken  place 
while  the  person  is  under  the  influence  of  severe 
disease,  or  after  their  recovery.  3.  Disease  often 
affects  the  nerves  and  delicate  cords  by  which  the 
eyeball  is  directed,  or  is  moved,  so  as  to  cause  a 
quick  or  an  irregular  motion,  presenting  objects 
which,  at  the  time  can  not  be  accounted  for. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  The  effect  produced  upon  the  retina,  or  optic 
nerve,  is  the  greatest  cause  of  deception,  giving  rise 
to  perceptions  of  objects  as  real,  which  do  not  exist 
at  the  time  the  perception  is  experienced  by  the 
mind.  Yiolent  attacks  of  fever,  or  some  other  dis- 
ease, often  produce  a  morbid  sensibility  of  the 
retina,  or  optic  nerve.  This  fact  can  be  arrived  at 
with  safety  from  that  which  is  experienced  by  per- 
sons under  the  influence  of  disease.  The  organ  of 
the  visual  sense  is  far  more  perfect  in  health  than  it 
is  when  diseased,  and  it  is  not  a'  difficult  task  to 
mark  the  variations  of  its  power  passing  under  the 
influence  of  different  kinds  of  disease.  2.  If  dis- 
ease has  power  to  change  the  form  or  condition  of 
the  eye,  or  diminish  its  power  in  any  way,  this  may 
cause  a  change  in  the  direction  of  the  rays  of  light 
upon  the  optic  nerve,  and  cause  appearances  as  real 
where  they  do  not  exist.  3.  Internal  mental  excite- 
ment may  have  power  to  change,  in  some  way,  the 
retina,  or  optic  nerve,  in  whole  or  in  part,  so  as  to 


300  APPARITIONS. 

give  origin  to  perceptions  of  existences  which  have 
no  present  or  real  being.  This  would  suppose  self- 
power  with  nervous,  constitutions  to  affect  the  optic 
nerve,  by  sudden  alarm  or  excitement,  so  as  to  give 
origin  to  the  notion  of  entities  where  they  do  not 
exist;  and  as  such  changes  belong  to  the  physical 
system,  and  as  such  perceptions,  through  the  me- 
dium of  the  visual  sense,  are  not  intentional  or  vol- 
untary, that  which  is  seen  and  thought  to  be  real, 
which,  in  fact,  has  no  existence,  is  at  first  received 
with  the  utmost  confidence,  and  often  requires  a 
strict  exercise  of  reason  in  correcting  the  perceptions 
arising  in  this  way. 


.rtf 


SPECTRAL    ILLUSIONS.  ^01 


CHAPTER  IV. 

SPECTRAL   ILLUSIONS. 

SECTION  I. 
1.  Spectral  illusions  may  be  regarded  as  being 
of  more  importance  than  is  proper  or  right.  Those 
who  are  accustomed  to  such  illusions  have,  as  a 
general  thing,  the  utmost  confidence  that  the  beings 
they  see  are  real,  and  that  they  themselves  can  not 
indulge  any  doubt  in  regard  to  such  things  as  being 
true.  A  man  of  our  acquaintance,  who  gives  evi- 
dence of  being  a  good  man,  and  truthful  in  all 
things,  has  given  accounts  of  frequently  seeing 
angels  and  the  spirits  of  his  departed  friends,  and 
of  his  conversation  to  them,  with  as  much  solemnity 
and  confidence  as  he  has  in  believing  in  his  own  ex- 
istence ;  yet  he  never  could  succeed  in  getting  any 
answer  to  his  inquiries  from  them.  2.  An  instance 
has  been  recorded  of  a  man  who  was  advanced  in 
life,  possessed  of  a  good  or  sound  mind,  and  having 
enjoyed  good  health,  in  the  latter  years  of  his  life 
he  had  almost  daily  visitations  from  spectral  forms. 
These  forms  or  figures  generally  appeared  as  human 
beings.  The  forms  often  varied,  but  the  counte- 
nances appeared  to  be  the  same.  He  could  see 
them  at  difi*erent  times,  and  with  his  eyes  either 
opened  or  closed.  By  pressure  on  his  eyes,  they 
disappeared  ;  yet,  when  they  were  present,  their 
.*  26 


302  SPECTRAL    ILLUSIONS. 

appearance  was  pleasant,  and  their  features  were 
clear  and  distinct.  Any  stimulant  or  excitement 
increased  the  number  of  those  visitors.  By  exam- 
ining this  history,  we  have  no  difficulty  in  ac- 
counting for  these  spectral  beings,  as  any  thing 
which  excited  him  produced  the  presence  of  those 
existences.  His  constitution  was  so  easily  affected, 
that  the  optic  nerve  was  influenced  by  the  same, 
and  forms  appeared  which  had  no  existence.  3. 
Irregular  and  sudden  dreams  may  lead  to  the  same 
kind  of  deception.  It  is  not  unfrequently  the  case, 
that  persons  studying  intensely  on  some  subject,  or 
after  the  mind  becomes  weary  in  pursuing  some 
train  of  thought,  suddenly  to  fall  asleep  for  a  mo- 
ment, without  being  sensible  of  the  fact,  the  mind 
uninterruptedly  perceives  its  succession  of  thoughts. 
Some  persons,  or  figures,  appear  in  a  dream ;  the 
person  starts  suddenly,  with  the  impression  that 
what  he  saw  was  real,  and,  losing  sight  of  the 
intermediate  state  of  slumber,  he  believes  that  that 
which  has  been  seen  is  real.  It  is  frequently  the 
case,  that  when  persons  thus  suddenly  dream  of 
some  alarming  appearance,  on  waking  they  will  re- 
alize, for  some  time,  a  view  of  the  same  thing,  and 
in  probably  the  same  place  they  dreamed  it  was. 
This  may  be  caused  by  excited  conceptions  in  con- 
nection with  the  influence  the  startled  mind  has 
in  affecting  the  optic  nerve.  4.  Some  feeble  con- 
stitutions, when  in  solitude,  with  the  busy  world 
closed  out  from  the  mind,  and  the  existence  of  ex- 
ternal things  seemingly  separated  from  the  senses, 
experience  such  intense  mental  invpressions  and 
conceptions  that,  after  a  brief  space  of  time,  such 


t 


SPECTRAL    ILLUSIONS.  303 

conceptions  of  things,  or  of  forms,  have  been  so 
vivid  that,  under  the  action  of  memory,  they  are 
called  up  as  real,  and  they  become  objects  of  belief, 
and  are  finally  reported  as  real  occurrences.  A 
case  is  recorded  of  a  man,  who  had  heard  of  the 
sudden  death  of  an  intimate  friend,  which  caused 
great  agon 3^  of  mind.  At  night  that  friend  ap- 
peared before  him.  All  the  particular  peculiarities 
of  his  features  and  dress  were  distinctly  presented 
to  his  view,  and  on  advancing  toward  him,  he  ap- 
peared to  melt  away  in  the  air.  This  may  be  ac- 
counted for  by  the  visual  organ  being  affected  or 
influenced  by  the  excitement  of  the  mind  on  that 
subject.  There  are  natural  causes  for  all  these 
things,  if  carefully  examined,  or,  at  least,  such  as 
will  be  satisfactory  to  the  mind ;  yet  it  is  impossible 
to  explain  away  all  the  mysteries  connected  with 
the  most  simple  existence  in  nature.  But  the  idea 
of  specters  and  phantoms  can  create  more  excite- 
ment in  the  world  than  the  mysteries  connected 
with  real  existences.  To  say  that  angels  or  disem- 
bodied spirits  can  not,  under  any  circumstances,  be 
seen  by  earthly  intelligences,  is  only  to  make  an 
assertion  without  either  reason,  evidence,  or  facts  in 
science  to  support  it;  but  that  which  we  are  con- 
tending for  is,  that  no  one  should  place  any  confi- 
dence in  the  real  truthfulness  of  phantoms  and  spec- 
ters which  can  be  so  easily  accounted  for  on  natural 
principles,  or  from  that  which  may  be  styled  natural 
causes. 


# 


304  SPECTRAL    ILLUSIONS. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  Images  or  persons^  which  seem  to  appear  to 
individuals  influenced  out  of  the  ordinary  way, 
either  physically,  or  by  the  effect  of  excited  minds 
upon  physical  organs,  seldom  speak  or  answer  any 
questions ;  but,  in  some  instances,  they  are  reported 
as  having  conversed.  There  is  a  case  recorded, 
where  a  man,  mourning  over  the  loss  of  his  wife, 
who  had  been  the  victim  of  sudden  death,  realized, 
as  he  thought,  while  in  deep  study,  the  door  of  his 
room  open.  The  form  of  his  wife  reappeared,  and 
informed  him  that  she  had  entered  into  rest,  and  de- 
sired him  to  prepare  for  the  same  happiness  in  the 
future.  The  specter  could  have  been  the  result  of  a 
change  in  the  visual  organs,  while  the  language  he 
thought  she  spoke  might  have  originated  in  a  dream 
of  which  he  was  not  sensible,  the  mind  being  in- 
tensely exercised  at  the  time.  2.  There  is  further 
proof  that  spectral  illusions  will  arise  in  connection 
with  intense  mental  excitement.  A  case  of  this 
kind  has  been  mentioned,  in  regard  to  a  man  who, 
at  one  time,  thought  he  was  about  to  be  wrecked  at 
sea.  He  maintained  that  he  distinctly  saw,  during 
the  greatest  danger,  his  family  in  the  same  perilous 
condition,  though  they  were  distant.  Men  who  have 
fallen  from  buildings  say  that  almost  the  entire 
prominent  scenes  and  events  of  their  lives  rushed 
through  their  minds  ere  they  reached  the  ground. 
3.  Though  the  m^ajority  of  sjpectral  illusions  can  be 
accounted  for  in  some  way,  yet  no  reasonable  mind 
will  deny  but  that  there  are  cases  recorded,  if  they 
be  true,  which  no  philosophical  argument  or  research 


SPECTBAL    ILLCStONS.  305 

can  account  for  in  a  clear  and  satisfactory  manner. 
A  case  has  been  given,  and  attested  as  true,  of  a 
man  who  was  seated  in  a  worshiping  congregation, 
who  suddenly  shrieked  out  with  great  intrepidation, 
rising  to  his  feet,  steadily  looking  toward  the  stand, 
and  exclaimed,  "Do  you  not  see  the  minister  clothed 
in  a  shroud  ?"  In  a  few  minutes  the  minister,  who 
liad  not  yet  arrived,  came,  entered  the  stand,  and 
preached.  Before  the  next  Sabbath  he  was  dead, 
and  in  his  grave.  If  this  be  ti*ue,  what  rule  in  met- 
aphysics can  solve  the  mystery  ?  4.  The  tcse  of  aiu 
odynes  and  opiates  is  often  the  occasion  of  giving 
rise  to  spectral  illusions.  Instances  have  been 
known  where  pei-sons  have  taken  opium,  and,  while 
under  its  influence,  without  having  fallen  under  the 
influence  of  sleep,  and  perfectly  conscious  of  all  that 
was  passing,  the  form  of  some  friend,  about  whose 
safety  they  had  great  concern,  appeared  to  their 
visual  organ  of  sense,  and,  though  knowing  at  the 
time  that  it  was  only  a  mere  phantom,  yet  they 
could  not  banish  it  away.  We  can  but  conclude 
that  spectral  illusions  have  their  origin  in  connec- 
tion with  the  condition  of  the  physical  organs. 


SECTION  III. 
1.  Nyctalopia^  in  its  various  forms,  exerts  no  an 
nihilating  power  over  the  mental  elements,  but  ex- 
hibits a  peculiar  acuteness  and  power  of  the  visual 
organ,  by  which  the  sensibility  of  the  optic  nerve 
must  be  very  much  increased.  This  is  only  another 
evidence  that  the  optic  nerve  is  capable  of  various 
changes,  and  that  the  presence  of  spectral  illusions 


806  SPECTRAL     ILLUSIONS. 

depends  upon  certain  influences  affecting  the  retina, 
or  optic  nerve.  If  the  eye  was  perfect  in  all  its 
parts,  and  free  from  the  power  of  disease,  it  would 
be  free  from  the  presence  of  phantoms,  or  specters. 
2.  The  hrain  can  be  easily  affected  by  erroneous  im- 
pressions while  the  body  is  under  the  influence  of 
disease.  Errors  which  at  one  time  have  been  re- 
ceived as  real,  are  apt  to  return  in  affliction  and 
excite  the  mind.  The  disease,  in  connection  with 
these  mental  emotions,  tending  toward  the  brain, 
increases  the  confusion  and  sight,  and  at  times  the 
hearing  becomes  influenced  or  changed  in  some  way 
so  as  to  deceive  us.  3.  Those  who  are  approaching 
epileptic  fits,  often  are  troubled  with  the  appearing 
of  phantoms  or  specters.  The  evidence  of  a  man 
has  been  recorded,  who  says  that  the  prelude  to  the 
paroxysm  with  him  was,  the  appearing  of  a  peculiar, 
looking  human  being,  who  struck  him  on  the  head ; 
then  the  paroxysm  commenced.  This  specter  was, 
no  doubt,  caused  by  the  effect  the  approaching  at- 
tack had  upon  the  brain  and  eyes.  4.  The  influ- 
ence oi  febrile  diseases  upon  the  peculiar  sensitive- 
ness of  some  constitutions,  may  be  regarded  as  oc- 
casions of  the  origin  of  spectral  illusions.  A  case 
has  been  given,  where  a  man  thus  affected,  while 
under  the  influence  of  a  violent  pain  in  the  head, 
distinctly  saw  his  family  in  the  room,  who  were,  at 
that  time,  three  thousand  miles  distant.  A  lady 
has  been  mentioned,  who,  under  the  influence  of 
severe  illness,  saw  her  father,  at  different  times, 
come  into  her  room,  and  speak  in  his  natural  tone 
of  voice,  though  he  had  not  been  there  at  any  time. 
The  records  of  the   past   contain    any  number  of 


SPECTRAL    ILLUSIONS.  307 

cases,  varying  in  some  respects ;  but  they  establish 
the  fact  that  diseased  physical  organs  have  an  influ- 
ence over  the  mind.  5.  A  too  highly -excited  im- 
agination may  lead  to  a  belief  in  existences  as 
real  when  they  are  not.  An  excitable  mind,  when 
aroused,  will  and  can  imagine  fearful  sounds,  or  the 
footsteps  of  an  enemy  approaching.  They  see  some- 
thing in  the  distance,  which  appears  to  draw  near; 
and  as  it  appears  to  come,  it  enlarges  with  more 
perfect  form,  till  the  beholder  is  so  terrified  as  to  be 
awed  or  overcome  with  fear.  6.  The  sense  of  sight 
is  not  the  only  one  of  the  senses  which  can  be  af- 
fected by  disease.  All  the  senses  can  be  so  influ- 
enced as  to  lead  to  deception.  The  ear  can  be  so 
affected  that  we  can  have  conceptions  of  sounds  as 
real  which  never  existed.  Taste  may  lead  to  decep- 
tion. The  sense  of  smelling  may  deceive  us,  and 
the  same  is  true  of  feeling.  7.  All  these  facts  show- 
that  our  knowledge,  which  we  receive  through  the 
medium  of  the  senses,  can  be  rendered  uncertain,  as 
these  organs  can  be  so  easily  affected  by  disease; 
but  our  internal  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  self 
can  not  be  doubted,  as  we  do  not  depend  upon  any 
physical  elements  in  arriving  at  the  certainty  of  such 
knowledge,  or  in  knowing  that  we  do  really  exist. 


308  SPIRIT-RAPPING 


CHAPTER  V. 

SPIEIT-RAPPINa. 

SECTION  I. 
1.  Necromancy,  though  not  intimately  or  closely 
connected  with  mental  science,  yet  it  has  been  in- 
volved with  mental  phenomena,  for  the  purpose  of 
adding  importance  to  the  office  of  modern  teachers, 
or  those  who  would  be  gifted  in  enchantment  or 
conjuring.  It  is  styled,  or  called,  the  art  of  reveal- 
ing future  facts  or  events.  There  is  a  pretended 
medium,  or  means  of  communication,  with  the  dead, 
or  with  minds  disembodied.  Philosophy  knows 
no  rule,  or  way,  by  or  in  which  finite  and  disem- 
bodied spirits  can  convey  words  or  ideas  to  us, 
only  through  the  medium  of  the  senses.  This 
would  require  that  such  spiritual  agencies  should 
be  tangible,  and  if  tangible  why  not  visible?  2. 
Spirit-rapping  may  be  called  a  delusion.  That 
some  peculiar  nervous  constitutions  may  be  af- 
fected in  a  way  mysterious  to  the  individuals 
themselves,  and  to  others,  is  perfectly  correct;  but 
that  such  physical  constitutions  are,  or  can  be,  the 
medium  of  other  finite  spirits  in  communicating 
facts  to  us  from  the  spirit-world,  is  contrary  to  the 
laws  of  both  mind  and  matter,  and  must  be  absurd. 
3.  Persons  who  style  themselves  mediums  may  be 
sincere  in  not  understanding  why  the  physical  or- 
gans have  an  involuntary  action,  and  often  contrary 


SPIRIT-RAPPING.  309 

to  their  wish.  The  delusion  is  not  in  the  fact  that 
such  action  takes  place,  but  it  exists  in  the  fact  that 
their  excited  minds  refer  the  cause  of  such  action  to 
spirits,  when  it  is  natural  to  their  peculiar  nervous 
constitutions.  The  diflBculty  is  that  they  do  not 
understand  the  peculiar  sensitiveness  which  is  natu- 
ral to  the  frailty  of  their  own  physical  systems, 
where  the  cause  of  motion,  by  which  mediums  write 
or  convey  their  messages,  exists.  That  palsied  man 
can  not  tell  why  he  shakes  contrary  to  his  will ;  yet 
he  knows  that  it  is  even  so.  He  might  atti-ibute 
such  action  to  spirits  with  as  much  propriety  as  a 
medium  can  refer  to  them — the  motion  by  which  his 
hand  writes.  The  mere  turning  of  the  mind  of  a 
nervous  person  to  the  thought  that  they  are  moved 
by  spirits,  will  startle  them,  and  cause  involuntary 
action.  If  they  can  keep  their  own  excited  spirits 
from  rapping  out  thoughts  by  accidental  marks,  or 
their  own  intentional  thoughts,  they  will  not  be 
likely  to  ever  be  troubled  by  the  spirits  of  others. 
4.  If  it  is  right  for  finite  spirits  to  communicate 
future  events  to  us  after  they  have  left  the  world, 
why  is  it  done  in  such  an  obscure  way,  and  with  so 
much  doubt  or  imperfection  ?  It  is  reasonable  to 
suppose  that  such  knowledge  is  perfect,  and  that  it 
should  be  conveyed  correctly;  then  why  should  they 
move  a  nervous  arm  to  write  it  out  with  irregular  or 
accidental  motions  ?  If  it  is  right  that  they  should 
send  important  messages  to  earth,  it  has  always 
been  so;  then  why  have  the  spirits  of  dear  departed 
friends  been  so  idle  and  careless  in  this  respect,  dur- 
ing the  past  ages  of  the  world? 


810  SPIRIT-KAPPING. 

SECTION  II. 
1.  That  disembodied  sjoirits  can  reveal  facts,  or 
ideas  to  us,  must  be  either  true  or  false.  If  false, 
further  argument  would  be  useless  ;  but  if  true,  then 
those  privileges  and  communications  must  be  either 
right  or  wrong.  If  right,  they  are  not  only  per- 
mitted, but  take  place  according  to  the  will  and 
purposes  of  Deity.  If  these  things  are  ordered  of 
Heaven,  they  must  be  right  in  his  sight,  and  ar- 
ranged for  the  good  and  happiness  of  this  world's 
inhabitants.  All  means  employed  by  infinite  Wis- 
dom for  the  happiness  of  this  world's  inhabitants,  are 
adapted  to  all  ages  and  all  circumstances  connected 
with  our  race ;  therefore,  such  messages  would  not 
have  been  delayed  for  the  discoveries  of  modern  me- 
diums, and  without  any  special  regard  to  the  moral 
character  of  such  agents.  2.  If  these  things  be  or- 
dered and  sent  hy  the  divine  Being,  the  object  must 
be  pure  and  holy,  and  all  connected  influences  and 
operations  must  correspond  in  purity  and  holiness. 
Then,  none  but  holy  beings  can  reveal  such  messages, 
or  be  mediums  for  pure  spirits.  None  but  good  mes- 
sages can  be  sent,  and  such  as  are  calculated  to  do 
good  to  man,  and  cause  him  to  glorify  God.  3. 
Therefore,  according  to  all  our  ideas  of  infinite  pu- 
rity, and  the  holiness  of  good  spirits,  it  would  be  ut- 
terly impossible  for  such  spirits  to  communicate 
to  any  on  earth  but  pure  and  holy  mediums.  4. 
The  character  of  all  such  messages  must  not  only 
be  pure,  but  they  must  correspond  with  truth  as  it 
is  evidenced  in  the  works  of  nature;  and  they  must 
agree  with  the  volume  of  revelation,  and  in  no  case 
deviate  from  its  truths. 


SPIBIT-BAPPINa.  31t 

SECTION  III. 
1.  But  if  the  tidings  thus  revealed  be  imrpure.^  or 
contrary  to  these  sources  of  truth,  we  have  a  right 
to  suspect  that  the  medium  is  bad,  or  is  vile  in  heart; 
and  if  this  be  true,  the  spirit  vehich  moves  or  influ- 
ences such  an  unholy  medium,  must  be  vile  or 
wicked  within  itself.  2.  If  such  a  spirit  is  from 
Satan,  or  from  under  his  influence,  we  have  a  right 
to  question  its  declarations,  as  Satan  would  not  have 
any  truth  published  to  us,  as  that  would  thwart  his 
own  interests  and  purposes.  Then,  if  such  tidings 
be  from  an  evil  source,  and  calculated  to  lead  to  de- 
lusion and  misery,  the  less  we  have  of  such  news  the 
better  it  will  be  for  the  world.  We  have  a  right  to 
doubt  the  correctness  and  truthfulness  of  such  things, 
as  we  have  no  evidence  that  the  Lord  ever  intended 
to  instruct  the  world  in  this  way.  3.  This  view  of 
the  subject  would  compel  us  to  believe  in,  and  to 
be  much  influenced  by  what  has  been  called  demon- 
ology.  This  would  comport  with  the  intimations  of 
some  of  the  alchemists  of  England,  who  profess  to 
have  borrowed  much  of  their  skill,  in  turning  com- 
mon metals  into  silver  and  gold,  from  Satan.  We 
know  not  what  or  how  much  power  Satan  may 
have  over  wicked  men,  in  regard  to  such  things,  but 
one  thing  appears  to  be  certain,  that  tidings  calcu- 
lated to  do  good,  and  from  a  pure  source,  never  could 
come  from  an  unholy  medium.  If  spirit-rappings 
be  true,  we  have  no  evidence  that  they  could  be 
either  ordered  or  blessed  of  Heaven.  4.  As  these 
things  have  been  improperly  connected  with  mental 
phenomena  by  many  writers,  we  can  only  add  that 


312^  SPIRIT-KAPPING. 

the  philosophy  of  mind  knows  no  principle  or  action 
of  the  mind,  abstracted  from  the  peculiar  sensitive- 
ness of  physical  organs,  which  is  capable  of  forming 
a  basis  for  such  spiritual  revelations. 


CONCEPTIONS   BOEDEKING   ON   INSANITY.  313 


CHAPTER  VI. 

EXCITED   CONCEPTIONS  BORDERING   ON 
INSANITY. 

SECTION  I. 

1.  We  understand  by  excited  conceptions  those 
conceptions  which  arise,  or  take  place,  in  connection 
with  an  excited  nervous  system  and  vivid  or  highly- 
wrought  mental  states.  An  unnatural  excitement 
of  mind  depends  very  much  upon  the  proper  organ- 
ization and  health  of  the  physical  powers.  A  de- 
fective organized  physical  nature  often  impedes  the 
development  of  mind,  in  certain  respects,  and  is  the 
occasion  of  the  mind  acting  too  powerfully  in  other 
ways  or  through  other  organs  more  perfect.  This 
leads  to  extraordinary  developments  of  mind  in 
certain  respects,  or  in  regard  to  certain  degrees 
of  strength,  while  there  is  almost  a  total  deficiency 
in  regard  to  other  qualities  or  powers.  A  mind 
blessed  with  an  extraordinary  memory  is  apt  to 
be  deficient  in  judgment.  Often  when  strong  or 
certain  extraordinary  gifts  or  powers  are  pressed 
a  little  too  hard,  or  with  severe  efforts,  the  phys- 
ical organs,  through  which  such  action  is  made, 
give  way,  or  become  paralyzed,  so  that  a  state 
of  insanity,  or  of  partial  insanity,  is  the  result.  2. 
A  mind  with  unusual  power  of  action^  connected 
with  a  frail,  nervous  system,  which  is  gradually 
sinking  by  disease,  may  overpower  the  strength  of 

27 


314r  CONCEPTIONS   BOKDEBING   ON   INSANITY. 

the  physical  organs,  with  which  its  action  is  con- 
nected, and  become  bewildered  with  excited  con- 
ceptions till  the  system  becomes  paralyzed,  and  the 
mind  either  inactive  or  incapable  of  rational  life. 
3.  The  strong  jpliyaical  constittotion  may  retain  its 
strength,  while  some  organ  essential  to  the  right  use 
of  reason  may  become  diseased  or  prostrated  by 
some  extraordinary  mental  effort,  leaving  the  mind 
to  wander  amid  the  wilderness  of  excited  concep- 
tions, and  the  imaginations  of  things  that  exist 
only  in  phantom.  4.  General  debility^  caused  by 
disease,  often  produces  excited  conceptions,  or  a 
wildness  of  thought,  which  disqualifies  the  mind  for 
usefulness ;  yet  general  debility,  caused  by  disease, 
seldom  affects  or  exists  in  connection  with  all  the 
organs  of  sense  in  the  same  way,  or  to  the  same  de- 
gree. An  important  law  in  regard  to  disease  is,  its 
sympathetic  tendency  to  the  weakest  physical  organ. 
Those  physical  organs  connected  with  the  more  pow- 
erful influence  or  action  of  the  niind,  are  apt  to  be- 
come fatigued  or  weakened ;  then,  in  a  low  state  of 
health,  they  are  the  concentrated  objects  of  disease. 
This  tends  to  affect  the  mind,  producing  excited  con- 
ceptions, wildness  of  thought,  stupor,  or  delirium. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  We  can  not  conceive  that  the  mind,  abstractly, 
or  within  and  of  itself,  is  capable  of  either  excited 
conceptions  or  of  deliriuTn  /  for  these  affections  can 
exist  only  in  its  connection  with  the  body,  otherwise 
delirium  or  idiocy  might  exist  on  forever,  which  is 
absurd.     2.  Excited  conceptions,  connected  with  the 


CONCEPTIONS   BOKDEBINO   ON   INSANITY.   315 

sense  of  sights  may  vary  in  degrees  of  strength,  in 
different  minds,  without  any  perceptible  variation 
caused  by  disease.  The  ardor  of  the  mind,  in  con- 
nection with  a  vigorous  imagination,  may  give  rise 
to  excited  conceptions  of  things  and  events  as  real.     , 

3.  Such  conceptions  may  arise  in  connection  with 
some  emotion  of  spirit  or  mental  excitement.  Great 
anxiety  of  mind  in  regard  to  some  approaching  event, 
or  the  arrival  of  a  dear  friend,  who  has  been  long  ab- 
sent, may  bias  the  mind.  With  what  fondness  the 
eye  traces  the  road  till  the  track  is  lost  in  the  dis- 
tance! -Ever  and  anon  we  imagine  we  see  an  object 
approaching,  and  if  some  one  should  appear,  we 
can  imagine  the  features  of  our  friend,  till  the  short- 
ened distance  checks  our  hope  with  disappointment. 

4.  The  excitement  of  great  joy  often  gives  rise  to 
excited  conceptions,  and  we  see  things  very  differ- 
ently, for  a  short  length  of  time,  from  what  we  do 
ordinarily;  and  it  is  frequently  the  case  that  we 
have  conceptions  of  things  which  were  not  present 
at  the  time,  and  we  are  deceived  in  regard  to  mag- 
nitude, qualities,  and  form.  5.  The  effect  produced 
by  grief  or  desjpair  appears  to  so  affect  the  mind 
as  to  almost  hang  the  earth  in  mourning.  Under 
such  influences  we  have  conceptions  only  of  scenes 
or  facts,  like  those  we  have  just  witnessed ;  and  as 
the  thoughts  pioneer  the  road  of  misfortune,  we  have 
vivid  conceptions  of  series  of  calamities,  which  be- 
come the  principal  objects  of  mental  action. 


SECTION  III. 
1.  Though  the  principal  cause  of  excited  concep- 


oi6   CONCEPTIONS    BOliDEKIJSG    0:n    i:NSANITY. 

tions  of  sight  may  be  found  in  the  effect  and  influ- 
ence which  disease  exerts  upon  the  visual  organ 
and  the  drain,  an  instance  is  recorded  of  a  man, 
whose  physical  organs  were  so  affected,  that  for 
months,  in  his  waking  hours,  he  saw  passing  through 
the  field  of  vision  the  forms  of  men,  women,  ani- 
mals, and  birds.  Under  all  such  exciting  influ- 
ences, the  mind  is  only  advancing  to  a  midway 
condition  between  a  rational  state  and  that  of  insan- 
ity. Too  much  excitement  has  a  destructive  influ- 
ence upon  a  well-balanced  mind,  and  much  more 
destructive  upon  those  not  so  well  guarded.  2.  The 
mind  is  capable  of  excited  conceptions,  in  connec- 
tion with  sound.  These  take  place  in  connection 
with  great  mental  excitement.  Many  cases  are 
given  where  persons,  having  conceptions  of  human 
forms,  have,  in  connection  with  them,  conceptions 
of  sound,  as  they  not  only  hear  them  speak,  but  re- 
hearse that  which  they  say  ;  yet  excited  conceptions 
of  sound  are  common  with  some  persons,  when  there 
is  nothing  of  the  kind  takes  place  in  relation  to  the 
sight.  When  the  mind  is  abstracted  from  the  world 
at  large,  and  pursuing  some  train  of  thought,  or  is 
in  silent  meditation,  it  is  apt  to  be  suddenly  startled 
by  some  singular  sound,  as  that  of  music,  the  hum 
of  a  wheel,  or  that  of  a  voice  speaking  or  calling. 
The  peculiar  excitement  of  the  moment  increases 
the  vividness  of  the  excited  conception,  and  that 
which  seemed  to  be  heard  becomes  an  object,  or 
objects,  of  belief.  3.  Many  instances  are  given  in 
history,  where  men,  on  the  eve  of  some  great  event 
or  daring  expedition,  have  their  minds  so  intensely 
excited  that  they  suddenly  rouse  and  cry  out,  "  W/io 


CONCEPTIONS   BOEDEEING   ON   INSANITY.   317 

called  meV*  We  know  not  why  excitement  may  not 
affect  the  auditory  nerve  as  well  as  the  optic  nerve. 
'Disease  which  affects  the  head  can,  and  often  does, 
give  rise  to  excited  conceptions  of  sound.  These 
are  evidences  that  internal  operations  of  the  mind 
are  more  to  be  depended  upon  as  true  than  the  cer- 
tainty of  that  which  is  reported  to  the  mind  through 
the  medium  of  the  senses.  4.  It  is  remarkable  how 
acute  the  hearing  of  persons  becomes  under  the  in- 
fluence of  a  severe  fever.  They  are  often  troubled 
with  conceptions  of  what  was  said ;  and  when  the/ 
appear  to  be  delirious  for  an  hour  or  two,  yet  they 
can  recollect,  in  moments  of  relief,  a  part,  if  not  all 
that  was  said,  when  it  was  thought  by  those  who 
spoke  that  they  were  not  conscious  of  what  was" 
passing.  Often,  in  conversing  so  low  in  the  room 
of  sick  persons  that  the  parties  themselves  can 
barely  understand  each  other,  the  sick  can  hear  and 
understand  all  that  is  said.  May  we  not  infer  from 
this  that,  though  disease  and  death  may  affect  the 
body,  yet  the  soul  remains  vigorous  in  power  of 
action  evermore? 


SECTION  I?. 
1.  JEkciied  conceptions^  in  connection  with  the 
sense  of  touch,  are  not  so  common  or  important  as 
those  which  have  been  already  noticed ;  yet,  under 
the  influence  of  disease,  it  is  not  uncommon  for 
conceptions  to  be  experienced  in  regard  to  the  cause, 
location,  and  character  of  such  afflictions,  which  are 
deceptions.  A  certain  individual,  under  a  lingering 
disease,  became  established  in  the  belief  that  he 

27* 


318  CONCEPTIONS    EORDEEING    ON    INSANITY. 

Could  feel  the  motions  of  a  snake  living  in  his  stom- 
ach. Another  man  said  that  there  were  small 
snakes  in  his  veins,  and  that  the  veins  would  ex- 
pand as  they  coursed  their  onward  way.  It  is  fre- 
quently the  case  that  afflicted  persons  have  concep- 
tions of  others  laying  their  head  upon  them,  or 
touching  them,  so  as  to  often  cause  pain  or  unpleas- 
ant sensations.  2.  Similar  variations  exist  in  regard 
to  the  other  senses^  which  can  be  supplied  at  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  reader.  The  cases  already  referred 
to  may  readily  lead  the  mind  to  call  up  clearer  and 
stronger  cases,  in  which  there  is  evidence  of  influ- 
ences which  give  rise  to  excited  conceptions,  uneasi- 
ness, and  wildness  of  thought.  All  such  instances 
are  evidence  of  the  departure  of  the  mind  from  its 
true  balance  and  correct  action.  There  is  great 
danger  of  delirium  or  insanity,  to  some  extent,  if 
the  mind  is  permitted  to  take  up  one  idea,  or  sub- 
ject, and  dwell  upon  it  exclusively.  If  the  mind 
does  not  tire  in  dwelling  on  one  subject  for  a  long 
period  of  time,  but  rather  loses  all  relish  for  all 
things  else  quickening  in  its  action,  insanity,  to  some 
extent,  is  almost  certain.  Never  dwell  too  long  on 
any  one  subject,  if  you  would  preserve  a  healthy 
mental  action  and  avoid  insanity.  3.  Excited  con- 
ceptions may  be  caused  by  the  influence  of  disease 
upon  the  wTiole  nervous  system^  under  which  the 
mind  becomes  unusually  excited,  immediately  fol- 
lowed by  indications  of  a  bewildered  wildness.  It 
can  be  caused  by  a  highly-aggravated  spinal  afiec- 
tion.  The  sensitive  connection  existing  between  the 
part  affected  and  the  brain,  often  causes  an  irregular 
mental  action,  while  the  countenance  and  expression 


CONCEPTIONS   BOBDEEING   ON   INSANITY.   319 

of  the  eye  will  indicate  an  improper  change.  4.  It 
may  be  caused  by  inflammation  or  other  diseases  of 
the  hrain.  A  fracture  of  the  skull,  or  a  removal  of 
a  part  of  the  brain,  are  apt  to  affect  the  exercise  of 
the  mental  powers.  Any  thing  like  nervous  pros- 
tration, or  severe  attacks  of  fever,  affecting  the 
cerebral  substance,  will  affect  or  influence,  to  some 
extent,  the  correct  or  right  use  of  the  mental  proc- 
esses ;  and  when  this  takes  place,  there  is  connected 
with  it  excited  conceptions  or  wild  notions  of  im- 
agination. 5.  The  last  general  cause  we  shall  notice 
is,  that  which  exists  in  febrile  influences  upon  the 
physical  organs.  This  influence  is  not  only  general 
upon  the  system,  but  the  exciting  effect  it  produces 
upon  the  nervous  system,  and  the  brain  in  particu- 
lar, causes  singular  and  strange  excited  irregularities 
in  the  action  of  the  mental  powers. 


320  PARTIAL    INSANITY. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

PARTIAL   INSANITY. 

SECTION  I. 
1.  The  mind,  under  the  influence  oi partialin- 
sanity^  is  disqualified  for  healthy  action ;  though  the 
mind,  thus  affected,  may  appear  perfectly  sane  or 
correct  on  some  subjects,  yet  it  is  the  reverse  on 
other  topics.  Often,  when  such  a  mind  is  employed 
on  subjects  foreign  from  those  upon  which  it  is 
wild,  all  appears  to  be  right  and  reasonable ;  but 
when  we  speak  of  any  thing  which  has  a  relevancy 
or  connection  with  that  upon  which  its  action  is  im- 
perfect, there  is  an  immediate  change  in  the  excita- 
bility of  the  mental  state  or  action,  and  from  this 
the  chain  of  thoughts  begin  to  disconnect,  and  the 
mind  wanders,  till  the  old  theme  is  brought  up  with 
all  the  vigor  of  which  the  mind  is  capable.  There 
is  an  instance  recorded,  where  a  man  was  charged 
with  insanity,  when,  on  being  brought  before  the 
court  for  examination,  he  gave  no  evidence  of  insan- 
ity, though  thoroughly  tested.  When  the  case  was 
about  to  be  dismissed,  an  intimate  friend  proposed 
that  he  be  asked  when  he  was  going  to  judge  the 
world.  He  was  instantly  excited,  and  assumed  the 
character  of  the  judge  of  the  universe  2.  The 
mind  may  be  called  partially  insane  when  it  gives 
evidence  of  wildness  upon  certain  topics  only  peri- 


PAKTIAL    INSANITY.  321 

odically.  There  are  such  persons  who,  at  times, 
and  in  their  deliberate  moments,  appear  to  be  rea- 
sonable and  mild  in  their  feelings  or  disposition ; 
but,  at  other  times,  they  can  not  control  the  action 
of  their  mental  powers.  With  care  and  proper 
treatment,  some  of  this  class  of  persons  can  be  re* 
stored.  3.  Another  class  of  individuals  appear  to 
be  sarie  on  all  the  events  or  occurrences  of  their 
early  life,  but  can  not  converse,  in  a  connected  way, 
upon  recent  facts  or  events.  This  change  is  clearly 
the  effect  of  physical  debility  by  the  influence  or 
power  of  disease.  If  the  difficulty  existed  wholly 
in  the  mind,  past  events  would  be  forgotten  as  read- 
ily as  those  of  recent  occurrence,  and  the  imperfect 
action  of  the  mind  would  apply  to  the  one  as  well 
as  the  other.  4.  This  affection  may  exist  in  the 
unhealthy  state  or  defective  action  of  one  or  more 
of  the  mental  faculties,  though  the  mind  may  act 
correctly,  with  the  exception  of  the  affected  element 
or  department.  Though  such  a  defect  is  diflicult  tQ 
define,  the  only  way  in  which  we  can  form  any 
thing  like  a  correct  idea  is,  in  watching  the  charac- 
ter of  mental  action,  or  the  defects  in  the  manifesta- 
tion of  mental  powers  corresponding  to  the  office  of 
certain  elements,  and  the  change  that  has  taken 
place  in  regard  to  such  action. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  The  influence  of  insanity  can  exist  in  connec- 
tion with  the  judgment.     When  there  is  no  healthy 
action  of  this  power,  if  the  mind  loses  the  correct 
power  of  perceiving  relations,  and  of  rightly  dis- 


PARTIAL    INSANITY. 

criminating  differences,  it  can  not  confidently  decide 
upon  the  same,  or  in  relation  to  them;  and  when 
decisions  are  thus  made,  they  are  as  likely  to  be  ab- 
surd as  correct,  or  they  are  almost  certain  to  be 
wrong  in  some  way.  And  where  the  decisions  of 
the  mind  are  wrong,  or  if  right,  it  is  so  by  mere 
accident,  and  to  which  the  mind  does  not  seem  in- 
clined to  abide  or  adhere  only  for  the  moment,  we 
have  clear  evidence  of  partial  insanity.  The  mind 
appears  to  arrive  at  conclusions  accidentally,  and  to 
abandon  them  at  pleasure,  so  that  its  action  is  like  a 
log  floating  upon  the  waves  of  the  sea,  and  its  decis- 
ions can  not  be  depended  upon.  2.  Partial  insanity 
may  be  connected  with  the  irrvperfect  action  of  orig- 
inal suggestion.  The  ideas  and  convictions  which 
arise  in  connection  with  this  power  of  the  mind, 
must  be  objects  of  belief  or  unwavering  confidence. 
We  must  believe  that  we  exist,  and  that  we  have 
personal  identity,  and  that  the  objects  of  belief  re- 
main unchanged ;  for  without  this  belief  we  can  not 
be  sane.  The  facts  which  arise  by  and  in  connec- 
tion with  this  faculty,  must  be  realized  on ;  and  if 
this  function  is  alienated,  or  ceases  correct  action, 
we,  in  proportion,  cease  to  be  sane.  3.  The  power 
of  association  may  act  so  imperfectly  that  the  decis- 
ions of  the  mind  can  not  be  regarded  as  correct. 
When  the  power  of  associating  ideas  or  facts  is  de- 
fective, there  is  evidence  of  great  recklessness  in  the 
arrangement  of  facts.  The  thoughts  appear  to  fly 
in  every  direction,  and  words  are  apt  to  be  used 
without  number,  and  without  any  special  force,  un- 
less they  be  to  weary  those  to  whom  they  are  ad- 
dressed.    Minds  of  this  character  seldom  ever  retain 


PABTIAL    INSANITY.  323 

the  objects  of  conversation  for  any  length  of  time. 
All  that  the  mind  dwells  upon  seems  to  be  visionary 
and  like  the  morning  cloud  or  early  dew.  Such 
minds  can  not  be  depended  upon;  for  every  thing 
appears  to  be  uncertain  and  confusion.  Arguments 
will  not  be  listened  to ;  reason  is  of  no  considera- 
tion ;  the  erratic  motions  of  the  mind,  sweeping  a 
thousand  different  things,  exhausts  the  power  of 
speech,  yet  nothing  definite  is  accomplished.  4. 
The  power  of  reason  may  be  defective  as  to  correct 
action.  Facts  can  only  be  received  as  abstract 
truths,  as  there  is  no  power  of  reason  in  connecting 
facts  together,  or  of  forcing  a  conclusion  from  the 
premises.  There  appears  to  be  no  power  of  tracing 
effects  to  cause,  or  of  reasoning  from  cause  to  effect. 
All  chains  of  thought  are  disconnected.  But  the 
worst  feature  is  that  where  the  premises  are  not  rec- 
ognized, and  conclusions  are  made  without  either 
premises  or  correct  argument.  It  consists  in  assert- 
ing a  thing  to  be  so,  and  will  not  be  moved  from  the 
same  by  any  possible  fact  or  timely  consideration. 
These  minds  are  far  removed  from  any  probable 
correction.  5.  There  is  another  class  who  evidence 
insanity  by  the  celerity  of  the  reasoning  power  in 
hasty  deductions  or  quick  conclusions.  There  is  a 
quick,  shrewd  cunning,  and  by  either  watching  the 
movements  or  appearance,  they  can  suspect  the  con- 
clusion without  waiting  to  scan  the  intermediate 
steps.  If  any  special  design  is  indulged  in  regard 
to  them,  such  as  placing  them  in  confinement,  they 
are  apt  to  suspect  something  of  the  kind  from  mere 
observation. 


83i  PARTIAL    INSANITY. 

SECTION  III. 

1.  The  physical  organs  connected  with  the  senses, 
or  the  action  of  the  senses,  may,  under  the  influence 
of  disease,  cause  the  deception  in  the  character  of 
sensations  experienced,  and  a  state  of  partial  insan- 
ity ensue.  This  brings  us  to  the  general  cause  of 
insanity,  the  effect  of  material  organs  upon  the  ac- 
tion of  the  mind,  which  are  imperfect  within  them- 
selves, or  are  paralyzed  in  some  way  by  disease.  2. 
Partial  insanity  may  exist  in  connection  with  the 
power  of  perception.  Perceptions  of  internal  proc- 
esses of  the  mind  can  not  be  connected  with  insan- 
ity only  as  it  is  affected  by  the  physical  nature, 
either  directly  or  indirectly,  as  we  can  have  no  con- 
ceptions of  mind  aside  and  apart  from  the  body  in 
its  fallen  state,  as  being  any  thing  but  sane  within 
and  of  itself;  but  perceptions  of  external  things  are 
more  apt  to  deceive  us,  or  to  become  so  influenced 
as  to  bring  the  mind  under  partial  insanitj^  This 
reference  of  the  internal  mental  state  to  the  outward 
cause  may  be  trammeled  or  improperly  influenced. 
All  such  influences  have  their  effect  upon  the  correct 
action  of  the  mind.  If  sensation  corresponds  in  any 
way  to  the  external  cause,  then  perception,  which  is 
an  immediate  sequence,  must  agree  with  the  internal 
mental  state,  and  both  sensation  and  perception  are 
dependent  upon  the  healthy  state  and  action  of  the 
physical  organs ;  otherwise,  it  would  appear  evident 
that  there  could  be  no  deception  involving  any  thing 
like  insanity.  But,  from  the  true  state  of  the  case, 
insanity  may  exist,  in  part,  in  connection  with  or 
under  the  influence  of  disease.     3.  Partial  insanity 


PARTIAL    INSANITY.  325 

often  exists  in  connection  with  the  power  exercised 
in  accrediting  testimony.  Such  minds  never  find 
any  thing  too  hard  to  believe.  If  that  which  is  nar- 
rated is  unreasonably  extravagant,  it  is  believed 
with  the  same  degree  of  confidence  that  exists  in 
believing  truth :  hence,  all  that  is  heard,  if  real  or 
true,  and  though  such  information  be  right,  the  re- 
verse of  that  which  has  just  been  presented,  yet 
both  are  often  regarded  as  true.  In  this  way  things 
which  conflict  with  each  other,  whether  in  classes  or 
otherwise,  are  objects  of  belief.  The  great  difficulty 
appears  to  exist  in  the  fact  that  the  mind  is  incapa- 
ble of  comparing  contraries  together,  and  of  discov- 
ering the  difierence  between  truth  and  falsehood. 
4.  Another  trait  of  insanity  exists  in  connection 
with  a  loss  of  confidence  in  every  thing.  The  mind 
is  disposed  to  doubt  every  thing,  and  the  more  we 
try  to  relieve  such  a  mind,  by  presenting  truths  or 
facts  for  its  action  and  consideration,  the  more  dis- 
inclined it  is  to  believe.  No  doubt  but  that  many 
false  notions  and  doctrines  are  imbibed  and  taught 
by  partially-insane  persons;  and  such  persons  should 
be  adjudged  of  guilt  or  crime  in  proportion  to  the 
healthy  action  of  the  mental  powers.  Nevertheless, 
this  should  never  be  pleaded  in  the  defense  of  crimi- 
nals, in  order  to  clear  them  ;  for  if  they  are  so  insane 
as  to  be  guilty  of  horrible  crimes,  molesting  the 
peace  and  happiness  of  society,  they  should  be  cared 
for,  and  placed,  as  a  merciful  act,  where  they  could 
not  have  the  privilege  of  committing  such  injuries ; 
and  if  they  commit  such  oftenses  without  being  in- 
sane, they  should  never  be  cleared  upon  the  ground 
of  insanity,  though  they  may  feign  insanity,  or  it 

28        ^ 


326  PARTIAL    INSANITY. 

may  be  pleaded  for  them.  5.  Indolent  habits  have  a 
tendency  to  mental  alienation.  Such  habits  increase 
as  age  advances.  The  vigor  of  youth  will  serve  as 
a  stimulant,  counteracting  such  influences,  till  the 
individual  is  passing  into  confirmed  adult  years. 
Then  this  vivacity  begins  to  diminish,  while  indo- 
lence increases ;  and  with  the  increase  of  such 
habits  of  indolence,  the  bodily  energies  and  organs 
become  affected  or  weakened  by  the  power  of  dis- 
ease, which  follows,  though  it  be  barely  perceptible. 
The  mind  ceases  to  act  correctly,  and  it  is  plainly 
evident  that  dotage  has  set  in,  and  the  mental  pow- 
ers have  been  rendered  imperfect  in  action. 


SECTION  lY. 
1.  Partial  insanity  may  be  induced,  or  it  may 
have  its  origin  in  connection  with  too  great  jpJiysical 
efforts.  The  physical  constitution  is  capable  of  per- 
forming a  certain  amount  of  service,  under  which  it 
will  preserve  the  greatest  amount  of  health  and  ac- 
tivity ;  and  to  pass  beyond  that  is  abuse,  and  tends 
to  destroy  the  health  of  the  body  and  the  correct 
activity  of  the  mind.  2.  It  sometimes  results  from 
a  too  Mgh-wrougJit  zeal  of  soul^  or  too  great  a  degree 
of  mental  excitement.  In  proportion  as  the  mind 
becomes  excited  beyond  the  bounds  of  propriety,  is 
there  danger  of  the  physical  organs  being  overpow^- 
ered  and  paralyzed,  so  that  mental  action,  in  some 
way,  will  be  defective.  A  certain  young  man,  with 
a  well-educated  mind,  stepped  into  a  shop  to  try  on 
his  wedding  coat,  and  while  there,  a  messenger 
came  in  haste  to  tell  him  that  his  intended  was  then 


PABTIAL    INSANITY.  88f 

on  the  floor  being  married  to  another  man.  The  ex- 
citement in  regard  to  such  an  unexpected  occurrence 
overpowered  him,  and  in  fifteen  minutes  he  was  said 
to  be  mentally  deranged,  from  which  he  never  recov- 
ered, though  he  lived  some  forty  years  after  the 
event  of  his  derangement.  3.  Any  unnatural  ex- 
citement will,  at  times,  affect  the  mind  unfavorably 
in  some  way.  All  fits  of  anger  should  be  avoided 
as  deadly  poison.  Revenge  should  be  expelled 
from  every  heart,  and  should  be  regarded  as  one  of 
the  worst  foes  to  our  race  in  the  effect  which  it  pro- 
duces upon  the  development  and  regularity  of  men- 
tal action.  Perhaps  the  first  effect  produced  by 
such  influences  will  be  fits  of  stupor  and  peevishness, 
then  self-chagrin,  with  loathful  melancholy.  These 
will  be  followed  by  a  decline  of  health,  or  the  inac- 
tivity of  some  organ  upon  which  the  mind  is  de- 
pendent, and  influenced  in  its  action.  4.  Repeated 
mental  excitement  affects  mental  action  in  some  way 
when  it  does  not  amount  to  insanity.  Public  speak- 
ers, who  draw  heavily  upon  their  powers  repeatedly 
and  under  great  excitement,  suffer,  at  some  periods, 
uninvoked  mental  influences,  which  border  on  in- 
sanity, and  give  them  much  trouble.  It  is  often  a 
source  of  trouble  to  ministers  who  speak  often  and 
under  great  excitement.  Such  heavy  draws  upon  the 
nervous  system,  and  especially  the  brain,  which  is  re- 
garded as  the  organ  of  the  mind,  have  a  tendency  to 
affect,  in  some  way,  the  action  of  the  mind.  Though 
their  minds  may  remain  clear,  firm,  and  decisive  in 
action  for  many  years,  yet,  at  some  unexpected  hour, 
they  may  change  in  regard  to  their  views  on  many 
subjects.     Such  persons  are  not  to  be  regarded  as 


828  PARTIAL    INSANITY. 

having  intentionally  and  maliciously  changed  in 
their  views,  nor  are  they  to  be  held  so  strictly  ac- 
countable as  earlier  years  would  require.  Though 
unwilling  to  acknowledge  it,  yet  the  truth  is  the 
nerves  and  cerebral  mass  have  been  so  heated  and 
taxed  with  repeated  excitement  and  efforts,  that  the 
mind  becomes  flighty,  erratic,  or  changed  in  regard 
to  many  things.  These  changes  should  be  regarded 
as  a  misfortune  and  as  a  result  of  partiall^^-para- 
lyzed  organs  more  than  intentional  crime.  The  pu- 
rity or  impurity  of  motive  should  be  the  object  of 
applause  or  censure  more  than  that  which  is  con- 
nected with  the  judgment,  which,  under  the  circum- 
stances, is  defective. 


TOTAL    INSANITY.  329 


CHAPTER  VIII.  ; 

TOTAL    INSANITY. 

SECTION  I. 
1.  We  understand  by  insanity  a  deranged  mind 
or  intellect;  that  the  mind  is  without  reason  or  is 
delirious.  We  now  come  to  that  state  of  delirium 
which  is  a  total  disorganizatiop  at*  mind,  or  of  cor- 
rect mental  action.  The  power  of  reasoning  is 
wholly  in  ruins.  All  the  mental  states  are  total 
confusion,  and  all  mental  acts  are  conflicting  wild- 
ness.  This  kind  of  insanity  presents  the  mind  un- 
natural and  in  ruins.  Perhaps  any  rational  mind 
would  prefer  death  rather  than  to  be  plunged  into  a 
state  of  total  insanity.  2.  Insanity  destroys  the 
healthy  action  of  the  mind  and  the  power  it  has 
over  its  own  mental  states^  of  connecting  and  of  di- 
recting the  chains  of  its  thoughts,  fixing  the  atten- 
tion to  internal  realities,  or  upon  those  of  the  ex- 
ternal world.  The  continuation  it  has  of  attending 
to  one,  or  a  class  of  objects,  ceasing  to  think  of 
them,  or  of  changing  to  certain  relations  and  analo- 
gies, running  them  out  in  a  thousand  directions,  till 
millions  of  facts  are  brought  into  the  account ;  but 
all  these  operations  are  destroyed  by  delirium.  3. 
The  power  of  mental  action  may  cease  in  regard  to 
all  subjects  only  in  a  wild  and  utterly-confused 
manner.  There  may  be  an  indistinct  apprehending 
28* 


830  TOTAL    INSANITY. 

of  things,  but  without  any  rational  conception  of 
order,  classification,  or  of  law.  4.  The  mind  may 
be  influenced  hy  only  one  imjpression^  without  any 
power  of  varying  from  it,  or  of  dismissing  it  from 
the  most  intense  excitement.  There  is  an  instance 
recorded  of  a  man  who  became  insane,  yet  he  al- 
ways moved  as  though  he  was  in  great  haste.  The 
only  answer  he  ever  gave  to  any  inquiry  was,  "  I 
am  going  home,"  though  it  could  not  be  discovered 
that  any  thing  had  the  slightest  degree  of  his  atten- 
tion. The  melancholy  case  of  a  young  minister  has 
been  recorded,  who,  by  a  fall,  was  deranged,  while 
on  his  way  to  be  married.  Never  afterward  was  he 
known  to  pay  attention  to  any  thing;  and  never  was 
he  known  to  speak  of  any  thing  but  his  expected 
marriage.  All  other  thoughts  seemed  to  have  been 
forever  banished;  and  that  which  he  did  say  ap- 
peared to  be  abstracted  from  every  thing  else.  5. 
The  mind  may  be  absorbed  in  a  certain  chain  of 
impressions  which  are  limited,  having  no  connection 
with  other  things,  by  mental  action,  and  over  which 
the  mind  has  no  control  in  any  way.  Such  impres- 
sions appear  to  be  believed  as  having  a  real  exist- 
ence, whether  they  be  true  or  not.  If  false,  there  is 
no  healthy  action  of  the  mental  powers  by  which 
any  correction  can  take  place. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  Mcmia  may  be  regarded  as  varying  in  degree 
of  mental  range  or  action  from  certain  limited  ab- 
Btract  impressions  to  a  wild,  amplified  view  of  im- 
aginary realities.     Though  such  a  mind  may  glance 


TOTAL    INSANITY.  331 

at  real  truths,  yet  there  can  be  no  exercise  of  reason 
in  relation  to  them.  Under  this  kind  of  mania  per- 
sons are  most  apt  to  suppose  themselves  as  possess- 
ing great  power  and  authority  to  control ;  and  when 
they  think  of  their  privilege  and  authority,  they  be- 
come instantly  excited  in  exercising  their  great 
power.  They  are  apt  to  fancy  themselves  to  be 
kings  with  great  power,  and  that  they  are  sur- 
rounded with  splendor  and  glory,  which  error  the 
mind  has  no  power  to  correct.  2.  The  hallucina- 
tions of  a  maniac  can  not  be  corrected,  as  the  dis- 
ordered action  of  the  principal  mental  faculties  is  so 
extensive  that  there  is  no  way  or  means  of  correct- 
ing that  which  is  wrong.  Though  the  physical  or- 
gans connected  with  the  power  of  the  senses  may 
appear  perfect  in  action,  yet  there  is  no  way  to 
restore  the  power  of  reason  by  reason  or  arguments. 
The  maniac  will  continue  to  fancy  himself  a  king  or 
ruler  of  this  world,  having  a  right  to  command  and 
to  force  obedience  to  his  authority.  Though  such 
persons  may  be  of  the  lowest  degree  of  obscurity, 
still  they  appear  to  have  conceptions  of  great  honor 
and  glory,  and  that  all  the  world  contributes  to 
their  glory.  The  presentations  of  any  kind  of  ad- 
verse circumstances  which  may  surround  them,  have 
no  power  to  gain  their  attention  so  as  to  produce 
any  salutary  effect  upon  their  mental  states.  3.  A 
common  characteristic  of  maniacs  is  evidenced  in 
the  fact  that  some  impression  or  idea  has  taken  pos- 
session of  the  mind,  and  upon  the  onene&s  of  the 
theme  the  mind  acts,  without  being  corrected  by 
truths,  which  would  produce  an  equilibrium  of  the 
intensity  of  mental  action,  and  relieve  wrong  im- 


332  TOTAL    INSANITY. 

pressions.  "Whenever  the  mind  is  permitted  to  act 
upon  some  one  idea,  exduding  all  other  facts  which 
would  be  examined  in  connection  with  it,  such  ac- 
tion will  become  intense,  and  the  longer  we  dwell 
upon  one  thought  the  more  excited  the  concentrated 
action  of  the  mind  will  become,  and  the  tendency 
of  the  mind  to  lose  all  power  of  reason  or  control 
in  relation  to  the  existence  of  real  facts  will  be 
increased.  4.  In  total  insanity  the  mind  is  incapa- 
ble of  correct  reasoning  on  either  correct  or  false 
premises.  The  connection  of  thoughts  or  facts  in 
argumentation  are  broken  and  so  confused  that  no 
correct  steps  can  be  taken  in  pursuing  any  subject; 
all  is  confusion  and  uncertainty.  It  is  incapable  of 
assuming  even  false  data,  and  of  reasoning  upon  it. 
If  it  is  capable  of  assuming  data  in  any  degree, 
that  which  is  assumed  is  more  likely  to  be  false 
than  true ;  and  if  false,  the  mind  is  incapable  of 
making  any  corresponding  deductions ;  and  if  that 
which  is  assumed  is  true  within  itself,  there  is  no 
power  to  connect  the  steps  or  truths  in  order  to  ar- 
rive at  any  thing  like  correct  deductions.  The 
powers  of  such  a  mind  may  be  said  to  be  in  ruins. 


SECTION  III. 
1.  In  connection  with  some  degrees  of  insanity 
there  is  a  remarkable  activity  of  mental  action. 
This  peculiar  vividness  of  mental  action  may  be 
accounted  for,  in  part,  from  the  fact  that  the  mind 
is  withdrawn  from  all  subjects  except  that  which  13 
embraced  in  its  present  notice,  irrespective  of  all 
other  truths  which  should  be  examined  in  connec- 


TOTAL    INSANITY.  333 

tion  with  it ;  therefore,  it  seizes  rapidly  upon  parts 
of  connected  events,  or  facts,  without  any  apparent 
perception  of  relations  in  return,  or  of  those  which 
arise  in  the  order  of  time.     The  memory  may  ap- 
pear to  be  strong  and  more  active  than  in  health,  in 
regard  to  some  things,  yet  those  things  called  up 
are  only  parts  of  facts,  and  they  are  in  disorder  and 
confusion.     The  mind  has  no  power  to  use  them ; 
the  vigorous  efforts  to  connect  them  are  instantly 
broken,  while  all  the  thoughts  are  suspended,  and 
some  other  impression  appears  to  aflfect  the  mind ; 
but  ere  it  is  brought  forward  the  mental  effort  is  in 
ruins.     In  some  instances,  the  memory  appears  to 
call  up  facts,  events,  and  associations  which  had 
been  forgotten  in  the  healthy  action  of  the  mind. 
This  is  in  accordance  with  the  statements  of  persons 
who  have  recovered  from  short  or  brief  attacks  of 
insanity.     Many  things  which  they  had  long  for- 
gotten became  the  objects  of  recollection.     2.  There 
is  great   readiness   and  vividness  of  thought  pos- 
sessed by  some  minds  as  they  are  verging  on  to 
total    insanity.      Such    maniacs    give   evidence  of 
great  acuteness  and  ingenuity  in  a  peculiar  way. 
They    may    have    some    indications    of  remaining 
power  to  reason,  from  the  rapidity  of  the  mind  in 
sketching   isolated  facts,  and,  in    selecting  partial 
relations,  mingled  with  other  things  which  may  be 
true  or  they  may  be  false.     But,  without  doubt,  it  is 
utterly  impossible  for  an  insane  person  to  argue  cor- 
rectly on  any  subject.     If  they  arrive  at  the  truth,  it 
is  wholly  accidental.     3.  It  appears  that  the  greatest 
peculiarity  connected  with  either  partial  or  total 
insanity  is,  that  a  certain  idea  or  impression  be- 


334  TOTAL    INSANITY. 

comes  the  object  of  undivided  mental  action;  all 
other  existences  or  influences  appear  to  be  excluded, 
and  that  which  is  the  object  of  consideration  may- 
be true  or  it  may  be  wholly  visionary.  If  true,  the 
deduction,  if  any  is  attempted,  is  always  wrong, 
unless  it  should  be  true  accidentally;  and  those 
things  which  become  the  objects  of  belief,  with 
them  are  apt  to  be  entirely  absurd.  4.  Another 
peculiarity  connected  with  maniacs  is,  the  indispo- 
sition to  cliange  tJieii'  helief^  which  arises  in  con- 
nection with  certain  impressions^  whether  such  im- 
pressions be  true  or  false.  The  subject  which 
appears  to  have  control  of  the  mental  powers,  has 
been  known  to  continue  with  some  maniacs  for  a 
number  of  years.  The  hallucination  of  others  has 
been  known  to  change  from  one  object  to  another  in 
the  space  of  a  few  years.  The  former  maj-  argue 
an  unchanging  influence  of  disease  upon  the  phys- 
ical organs,  through  which  the  mind'  acts;  and  the 
latter  may  be  accounted  for  upon  the  ground  that 
the  power  of  disease  upon  the  physical  organs, 
through  which  mind  is  manifested  in  action,  has 
changed  to  some  other  organ,  or  that  the  nature  of 
the  disease  has  changed  in  some  way.  These  facts 
only  lead  to  the  confirmation  of  the  opinion  that 
mind  is  never  insane  only  in  connection  with  a  de- 
formed or  a  diseased  physical  system  in  some  way. 


SECTION  IV. 
1.  Mental  hallucinations  may  suspend  or  dismiss 
the  impressions  which  have  been  of  abiding  experi- 
ence, and,  after  a  long  interval,  they  may  be  sud- 


TOTAL    INSANITY.  335 

denly  revived,  which  can  not  be  accounted  for 
unless  it  is  attributable  to  some  change  in  the  phys- 
ical constitution,  either  in  regard  to  increased 
degrees  of  maturity,  or  in  the  diminishing  power 
of  disease,  so  that  the  mind  can  be  more  vigorously 
exerted.  Instances  are  given  of  persons  who  were 
employed  in  doing  a  certain  piece  of  work,  when 
they  were  suddenly  struck  with  insanity;  and,  after 
the  lapse  of  years,  on  being  restored,  the  first  thing 
of  their  inquiries  was,  in  regard  to  the  work  in 
which  they  were  employed  when  they  went  into 
insanity,  while  all  the  time  and  events  which  had 
intervened  were  entirely  lost.  It  has  been  stated 
that  persons  who  are  addicted  to  periodical  parox- 
ysms of  delirium,  have  been  known  to  resume  the 
conversation  on  their  recovery  precisely  at  the  place 
where  they  left  off  when  the  paroxysm  came  on, 
without  any  knowledge  of  what  transpired  in  the 
interim ;  and  it  has  been  stated  that  some  of  these 
persons,  when  the  paroxysm  reappeared,  commenced 
with  that  part  or  subject  of  their  hallucination  pre- 
cisely where  they  left  off  when  reason  returned; 
but,  as  a  general  thing,  there  is  not  such  a  uniform- 
ity in  connection  with  insanity.  It  is  more  gener- 
ally characterized  by  a  fearful  erratic  wildness.  2. 
The  extremes  and  modulations  which  characterize 
the  feelings,  and  the  deportment  or  acts,  of  mani- 
acs, may  be  accounted  for,  in  part,  as  corresponding 
to  the  different  temperaments  connected  with  each 
constitution;  and  they  may  arise,  in  part,  from  the 
uncultivated  viciousness  of  the  one,  and  the  guarded 
mildness  of  the  other.  They  may  vary  again  with 
the  mind  that  had  been  under  religious  influence, 


336  TOTAL    INSANITY. 

contrasted  with  the  mind  which  had  always  been 
vicious  and  revengeful.  When  insanity  becomes 
the  lot  of  such  persons,  it  is  natural  to  expect  that 
they  will  be  influenced  by  these  things  in  some  way. 
3.  Insanity^  as  it  exists  in  the  case  «f  the  maniac, 
is  apt  to  be  of  a  restless  and  turbulent  character. 
Great  excitement  generally  prevails  over,  and  is  con- 
nected with  the  entire  mental  powers.  There  appears 
to  be  a  constant  disposition  to  keep  moving  or  to  be 
traveling  from  place  to  place.  This  is  not  the  kind 
of  derangement,  under  the  influence  of  which  the 
person  loathes  life,  and  seeks  death ;  for  persons  un- 
der the  influence  of  this  kind  of  derangement  are 
always  suspecting  danger,  and  are  flying  from  it  with 
feelings  of  appalling  frenzy  or  dread.  4.  The  general 
cliaracter  of  mental  derangement  is  that  which  has 
connected  with  it  a  fearful  apprehension  of  danger 
or  death;  and  such  persons  are  always  trying  to 
escape  from  harm.  Such  persons  are  generally 
harmless,  and  have  no  disposition  to  inflict  injuries 
upon  their  fellow-beings,  though  the  care  of  such  is 
attended  with  great  trouble.  5.  There  is  another 
class  of  insane  persons,  who  are  malicious  in  feel- 
ings, and  are  always  seeking  revenge.  It  is  not 
unfrequently  the  case  that  they  imagine  that  they 
are  expressly  ordered  to  take  the  life  of  some  fellow- 
being;  and,  as  a  general  thing,  those  who  are  se- 
lected by  them  to  be  tortured,  or  put  to  death,  are 
the  nearest  and  dearest  friends. 


INSANITY MELANCHOLIA.  3S7 


CHAPTER  IX. 

INSANITY— MELANCHOLIA. 
SECTION  I. 

1.  That  kind  of  irhental  depression  called  melan- 
cholia may  be  regarded  as  a  result  of  some  kind  of 
disease  upon  the  physical  constitution,  or  it  may 
have  its  origin  with,  or  in  connection  with,  repeated 
and  powerful  mental  exertion,  prostrating  the  powerj 
in  part,  of  the  organs  through  which  mind  acts,  or 
is  manifested.  There  is  a  difference  between  real 
nxania  and  that  of  melancholia.  The  former  is  con- 
nectijd  with  the  presence  of  hallucination,  under  the 
influence  of  which  the  individual  appears  to  be  car- 
ried away  with  his  excited  conceptions  of  his  condi- 
tion in  life,  and  does  not  appear  to  bo  under  any 
sense  of  want,  or  that  such  a  state  of  things  could 
be  possible.  The  latter  condition  is  connected  with 
those  who  are  depressed  in  feeling,  which  may  arise 
from  the  influence  of  lingering  disease,  or  it  may 
arise  with  trouble  of  mind,  which  prostrates  the  bod- 
ily powers,  rendering  them  subject  to  disease.  This 
gloomy  or  melancholy  state  of  mind  may  increase 
till  maniacal  excitement  takes  place ;  but  melan- 
cholia generally  continues  in  a  state  of  mental  de- 
pression. Such  a  state  may  arise  from  different 
causes.  The  same,  or  similar  causes,  may  produce 
mania  with  one   person,  and  that  of  melancholia 

29 


8^&  INSANITY MELANCHOLIA. 

with  another.  These  dissimilaritous  results  appear 
to  arise  from  constitutional  differences.  2.  A  very 
peculiar  difference  between  melancholia  and  mania 
is,  that  a  person  under  the  influence  of  the  former 
has  power  to  reason  more  accurately,  and  the  mind 
evinces  stronger  features  of  the  action  of  the  power 
of  reason  than  in  the  latter  state;  yet,  the  impres- 
sions of  such  a  mind  can  be  changed  with  far  greater 
diflSculty  than  those  of  the  maniac.  The  impres- 
sions of  the  mind,  under  a  melancholy  influence,  can 
be  acted  upon  with  greater  deliberation,  and  gener- 
ally with  a  greater  degree  of  unwavering  intention, 
than  those  of  the  maniac.  3.  Melancholia  differs 
in  a  j^eculiar  manner  from  mania^  in  the  tendency 
of  minds,  under  such  an  influence,  to  commit  sui- 
cide. Heal  maniacal  insanity  seldom  ever  gives 
rise  to  any  feeling  or  inclination  which  would  lead 
to  such  an  act  or  horrible  result.  It  is  very  common, 
when  suicide  is  committed,  to  say  that  the  person 
was  totally  insane,  or  was  devoid  of  all  reason ;  but 
there  is  no  instance  recorded  of  totally-deranged 
persons,  or  one  devoid  of  all  reason,  ever  being 
guilty  of  suicide.  Such  persons  are  devoid  of  all 
such  feelings  or  inclinations ;  for,  under  such  a  state 
of  mind,  they  have  run  back  to  the  mental  inefli- 
ciency  of  children,  while  all  their  intentions  and 
feelings,  under  such  influences,  are  harmless.  4.  A 
raving  Quaniac  has  never  been  known  to  commit 
suicide.  All  their  feelings  and  manifested  inclina- 
tions are  averse  to  any  thing  of  the  kind.  When 
they  possess  any  traits  of  reason,  or  conscientious 
thought,  they  evince  the  utmost  degree  of  excite- 
ment and  horror  in  regard  to  any  thing  like  danger 


INSANITY MELANCHOLIA.  330 

or  death ;  and  they  are  ever  flying  from  their  own 
apprehensions  of  danger  in  seeking  for  safety. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  It  is  dejcyression  or  melancJiolia  Vfhiah  leads  to 
suicide,  and  that,  too,  before  reason  has  entirely 
banished,  or  has  left  the  mind.  We  are  forced  to 
the  gloomy  acknowledgment  that  all  persons  who 
commit  this  horrible  act  have  a  sufficient  amount  of 
reason  remaining  to  know  what  they  are  about  to  do 
when  they  use  the  weapons  of  death ;  otherwise,  the 
act  could  not  and  would  not  be  perpetrated.  2.  All 
persons  who  commit  suicide  do  so  of  their  own  indi- 
vidual and  voUintary  choice.  It  is  impossible  for 
any  who  are  totally  deranged  to  have  the  control 
of  their  mental  states,  or  thoughts,  long  enough  to 
carry  such  an  intention  into  effect.  By  the  most 
accurate  examination,  no  feeling  or  tendency  to  sui- 
cide can  be  discov^ered  to  exist  in  the  minds  of  per- 
sons who  are  devoid  of  reason.  They  abhor  every 
thing  of  the  kind,  and  all  their  inclinations  lead 
them  to  act  in  flyino^  in  haste  from  everv  thino^  like 
danger  or  death.  3.  He  who  takes  his  own  life  has 
the  right  use  of  reason.,  to  a  sufficient  extent.,  to  know 
what  poisonous  drug,  or  weapon  of  death,  will 
effect  the  work;  also,  the  amount  necessary  to  be 
taken,  or  the  way  for,  or  manner  of,  applying  the 
deadly  weapon,  require  some  degree  of  rationality 
and  judgment.  All  such  facts  show  that  the  person 
is  not  totally  insane.  4.  Another  proof  that  such 
persons  are  not  totally  insane  is  manifested  in  their 
conduct.     With  what  tenacity  they  keep  such  inten- 


34©  INSANITY — MELANCHOLIA. 

tions  or  conclusions  from  being  known  to  others! 
See  their  shrewd,  artful  cunning  and  management 
in  avoiding  detection  in  the  obtaining  of  that  which 
will  take  life,  often  securing  it  under  false  pretense! 
How  carefully  they  select  a  time  and  place  suitable 
to  avoid  all  detection,  so  their  design  and  plans  may 
be  carried  into  effect!  All  these  facts  show  that 
such  persons  are  not  totally  deranged.  5.  We  are 
compelled  to  the  conclusion,  that  all  persons  who 
deliberately  commit  suicide  have  a  sufficient  amount 
of  reason  to  know  what  they  are  going  to  do,  and 
how  they  are  going  to  effect  the  w^ork ;  also,  what 
the  result  will  be,  otherwise  they  would  not  have 
presence  and  control  of  mind  to  determine  upon 
such  a  course:  and  if  they  had,  the  mind  would 
lose  sight  of  such  an  arrangement  before  they  could 
arrive  at  the  final  result.  It  is  perfectly  contrary 
to  all  facts,  as  well  as  to  the  nature  and  effect  of 
total  insanity  upon  the  mind.  To  say  that  persons 
destroy  their  lives  because  they  are  totally  deranged, 
and  have  no  knowledge  as  to  what  they  are  doing, 
is  contrary  to  all  the  facts  in  such  cases.  If  a  per- 
son must  be  totally  devoid  of  all  reason,  in  order  to 
commit  suicide,  then  he  would  have  no  inclination 
to  do  so;  for  a  child,  before  it  has  the  right  exercise 
of  reason,  never  manifests  any  inclination  to  destroy 
its  own  existence.  The  same  fact  is  true  in  relation 
to  idiots.  If  persons  could  commit  suicide  who 
were  totally  ignorant  of  what  they  were  doing,  then 
they  would  be  innocent;  but  if  they  know  what 
they  are  doing,  in  laying  violent  hands  on  their  own 
lives,  they  are  guilty  of  sin,  and  will  be  held  ac- 
countable for  such  offenses. 


IF8ANITY MELANCHOLIA.  341 

SECTION  III. 
4.  TJie  hallucination  which  takes  place  under 
the  influence  of  melancholia,  or  depression,  becomes 
the  onlj  object  of  mental  action.  All  other  impres- 
sions, or  facts,  naturally  connected,  which  would  cor- 
rect any  excited  perception  in  regard  to  supposed 
realities,  can  not  become  the  object  of  attention  or 
of  mental  action.  All  mental  power  to  change  the 
action  of  the  mind  to  many  facts,  or  of  examining 
them  in  connection  with  erroneous  impressions,  ap- 
pears to  be  lost.  There  is  also  a  loss  of  power  in 
correcting  internal  mental  states  by  comparing  them 
with  external  truths.  The  mind  becomes  bewildered- 
and  overwhelmed  with  hopeless  misery,  and,  being 
unable  to  contemplate  any  future  relief,  the  whole 
soul  appears  to  be  plunged  into  a  cloud  of  aug- 
mented gloom.  Many  persons,  under  such  circum- 
stances are  apt  to  begin  to  imagine  that  all  their 
friends  have  forsaken  them,  and  then  they  begin  to 
lose  confidence  in  every  person.  The  very  appear- 
ance of  nature  is  gloomy  and  mournful.  They  begin 
to  feel  that  life  is  a  burden,  and  commence  foi*ming 
conclusions  to  leave  the  world.  When  such  resolu- 
tioiis  are  once  formed,  then  the  mind  acts  upon  them 
exclusively,  by  connecting  with  such  purposes  the 
most  effectual  way  to  accomplish  the  dreadful  act ; 
which  act  becomes  more  harmless,  in  their  opinion, 
as  the  mind,  under  great  excitement,  dwells  upon  it. 
^.  Such  purposes  can  he  and  have  heen  abandoned 
when  the  mind  has  been  suddenly  arrested  by  some 
new  and  alarming  object  of  thought.  A  man  has 
been  mentioned,  who    left   home  at  night  for  the 


^^  INSANITY  —  MELANCHOLIA. 

purpose  of  drowning  himself;  but,  on  being  suddenly 
attacked  by  robbers,  he  fled  for  refuge,  where  he 
soon  realized  that  all  intimation  to  suicide  was  gone. 
Other  cases  have  been  referred  to,  which  resulted  in 
a  change,  of  purpose  after  the  individuals  had  determ- 
ined upon  their  own  destruction ;  when,  on  going 
to  the  place  selected,  their  attention  has  been  sud- 
denly surested  by  some;  accident,  calamity,  or  dan- 
ger, which  have  changed  their  thoughts  from  the 
one  object  to  the  other  facts,  causing  all  their  incli- 
nations to  suicide  to  be  dissipated.  3.  There  is  an 
imjpression  of  insanity^  connected  with  the  idea  of 
suicide,  which  the  mind  appears  to  possess  while 
there  is  the  least  manifestation  of  reason  remaining; 
and  it  is  certainly  true,  that  when  the  mind  is  totally 
lost  to  all  reason,  it  is  incapable  of  determining  upon 
suicide,  or  of  remaining  in  the  same  state  long 
enough  to  effect  such  a  result,  if  it  could  form  such 
a  determination.  This  sense,  or  impression  of  crim- 
inality, does  not  correct  the  mind  so  as  to  deter  from 
the  act  of  suicide.  It  is  a  common  occurrence  for 
another  idea  to  arise  in  connection  with  this,  which 
is,  that  such  persons  conclude  that  they  justly  de- 
serve to  die,  and  that  in  taking  their  existence  away 
they  are  only  dying  according  to  justice,  and  in  this 
way  the  crime  will  only  be  slightly  imputed  to 
them.  4.  Another  hallucination  often  arises  in 
connection  with  the  impression  of  the  criminality 
of  suicide.  Persons  have  been  known,  in  the  his- 
tory of  the  past,  to  commit  murder  for  the  sole  pur- 
pose of  rendering  their  lives  up  to  the  requirements 
of  the  just  law  of  the  land,  and  thereby  die  by  the 
requirements  of  justice.     This  they  seem  to  have 


INSANITY— MELANCHOLIA.  343, 

supposed  frees  them  from  the  sin  of  suicide.  Many 
persons  have  avowed  their  intention  of  murdering 
some  one,  without  having  the  first  improper  feeling 
toward  them  ;  and  often  such  selections  were  made 
of  some  one  whom  they  loved  more  than  any  other. 
They  have  confessed^  on  some"  Occasions,  that  they 
only  wished  to  commit  murder  in  order  that  they 
themselves  might  die  by  the  just  sentence  of  the 
law;  and  they  have  been  known  to  go  still  farther, 
by  selecting  a  child,  which  they  believ^ed  woqld  be 
happy  after  death,  and  console  themselves  that  \if 
would  be  no  special  injury  to  the  child  to  take  its 
life,  and  then  they  could  themselves  die  by  the 
hand  of  justice.  The  right  exercise  of  reason  is 
lost  with  such  persons,  and  it  would  appear  that 
their  long-cherished  desire  to  die  had  always  been 
checked  by  their  connection  with  the  exceeding  sin- 
fulness of  suicide:  hence,  the  resolve  on  the  death j 
of  some  innocent  person  was  favorably  entertained 
from  the  thought  that  such  persons  would  be  happy 
after  death,  and  it  would  give  themselves  the  oppor-; 
tunity  of  dying  according  to  justice. 


Br- 


'i*  f 


3M»  INSANITY. 


CHAPTER  X. 

INSANITY. 

SECTION  I. 
1.  There  are  degrees  of  insanity.  The  mind 
which  borders  on  total  insanity,  or  has  passed  into 
that  state  which  is  called  total  insanity,  clearly  indi- 
cates its  extreme  alienation.  We  have  no  hesitancy 
in  deciding  npon  such  cases  with  confidence,  or  with 
full  assurance  that  they  are  entirely  deranged.  2. 
No  one  should  hastily  decide  upon  slight  mental 
alienation  without  the  clearest  proof  that  such  is 
true;  for  in  this  way  persons  have  been  declared 
deranged  when  they  were  only  bordering  upon  in- 
sanity; and  such  indications  seldom  ever  become 
the  objects  of  thought  or  remark,  only  when  the 
individual  was  under  some  mental  excitement.  3. 
The  jprincijpal  cause  of  insanity.^  doubtless,  has  its 
origin  in  connection  with  imperfect  organized  phys- 
ical organs,  or  with  the  power  and  influence  of  dis- 
ease on  those  physical  organs,  upon  which  the  mind 
is  dependent  in  its  action,  both  as  it  relates  to  its 
intercourse  with  external  facts,  or  in  revealing  its 
internal  states  or  thoughts  to  other  intelligences  or 
beings.  It  is  utterly  impossible  for  us  to  have  con- 
ceptions of  minds  that  are  insane  when  they  are 
separated  from  the  body ;  and  to  believe  that  an 
all-wise  Being  would  create  a  spirit  to  exist  in  a 


INSANITY.  345 

state  of  insanity  in  the  future  world,  is  contifuy  to 
all  facts,  and  is  absurd.  Insanity  is  either  directly 
or  indirectly  the  effect  of  sin.  Its  influence  upon 
the  physical  organs,  connected  with  the  manifesta- 
tions or  the  action  of  the  mind,  renders  them  imper- 
fect in  some  way,  and  often  to  such  a  degree  as  to 
produce  mental  alienation ;  but  to  clearly  define 
such  a  connection  or  process  is  impossible.  4.  Atn- 
hition,  as  it  exists  in  the  minds  of  some  pei-sons, 
may  give  origin  to  insanity.  Such  minds  are  very 
excitable,  and  are  capable  of  great  efforts  in  trying 
to  attain  some  desirable  object  or  eminence  in  this 
world's  fame.  These  efforts  can  not  be  strictly  said 
to  destroy  or  paralyze  any  of  the  mental  faculties, 
as  they  exist  in  essence  abstracted  from  the  body ; 
but  such  efforts  may  be  too  powerful  for  the  physical 
organs,  and  such  repeated  mental  efforts  may,  and 
often  do,  paralyze  the  physical  organs,  or  produce 
disease,  which  so  paralyzes  them  as  to  impair  the 
correct  action  of  the  mind  in  some  way. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  In  like  manner  will  the  states  and  action  of  the 
mind  affect  the  condition  and  health  of  the  hody 
when  it  suffers  from  disappointed  hope  or  affections, 
or  from  a  fearful  sense  in  regard  to  the  soul's  safety 
in  the  future  world.  All  intense  and  fearful  mental 
excitement  will  affect  the  strength  and  health  of  the 
bodily  powers  in  some  way ;  and  often,  on  the  sud- 
den reception  of  an  overwhelming  mental  shock, 
some  individuals  fall  sick,  and,  in  some  cases,  the 
mind  is  ever  afterward  deranged.     2.  With  a  cer- 


B4S  INSANITY. 

tain  class  of  persons  there  appears  to  be  a  constitu- 
tional tendency  to  insanity ;  but  we  can  not  say  that 
such  a  tendency  exists  solely  or  only  in  the  nature 
or  essence  of  the  elements  of  mind,  aside  and  apart 
from  any  connection  it  may  have  with  physical  or- 
gans ;  for  if  we  do,  we  assert  that  which  we  can 
never  prove,  and  we  will  be  forced  to  acknowledge 
that  the  soul  may  or  may  not  be  sane  in  the  future 
world ;  and  even  if  it  should  enter  that  immortal 
state  perfectly  sane,  those  elements  of  its  being 
ma}^,  somewhere  in  the  unbounded  future,  become 
deranged,  if  such  immortal  elements  contain  any 
thing  like  insanity  within  and  of  their  own  essence 
and  being.  But  it  is  utterly  impossible  for  us  to 
have  any  conception  of  mind  of  and  within  itself  as 
possessing  any  natural  tendency  to  insanity;  there- 
fore, what  we  understand  by  such  tendencies  must 
exist  in  the  physical  constitution,  as  evidence  will 
abundantly  show.  3.  Under  the  influence  of  liigli 
fevers^  some  minds  often  hecome  insane^  and  remain 
so  till  the  fever  subsides.  We  dare  not  say  that  the 
mind  only  is  sick,  or  that  it  is  abstractly,  in  whole 
or  in  part,  the  object  of  fever  influence;  for  the 
fever  preys  only  upon  the  physical  organs  or  consti- 
tution. Then  the  delirium  did  not  arise  from  the 
debility  of  the  mind,  but  from  the  debility  whicb 
affected  the  body.  When  this  excitement  leaves  the 
body  the  mind  is  right  again ;  but  we  have  no  evi- 
dence that  if  the  mind  could  be  excited  without 
affecting  the  physical  powers,  any  thing  like  delir- 
ium could  or  would  take  place.  4.  A  sane  man 
may  be  rendered  insane  by  a  slight  injury  upon  Ms 
skull.     It  was  not  the  mind  that  was  bruised  or  in- 


INSANITY.  347 

jured  by  contact  with  some  dense  object,  but  it  was 
the  physical  nature,  or  organs  through  which  mind 
is  manifested  or  acts,  thereby  rendering  such  action 
confused  or  imperfect.  But  if  this  injury  could  be 
properly  healed,  the  mind  is  often  restored  to  reason. 
It  would  be  worse  than  heterodoxical  to  say  that,  in 
applying  remedies  to  heal  the  fracture  or  injury  of 
the  skull,  such  remedies  were  applied  only  to  the 
mind.  The  truth  is,  we  can  have  no  conceptions, 
founded  upon  facts,  of  mental  debility,  or  paralysis, 
only  as  it  is  affected  by  defects  in  the  physical  con- 
stitution, or  the  effect  of  disease  upon  it. 


SECTION  III. 
1.  A  Jiereditary  jyredisposition  to  insanity  may 
have  its  origin  with  the  way  in  and  by  which  the 
mind  is  influenced  in  connection  with  the  constitu- 
tion or  condition  of  the  physical  existence.  Rea- 
sons can  be  assigned  favoring  this  position,  when  it 
is  impossible  to  give  reasons  in  favor  of  the  hered- 
itary mental  alienation,  aside  and  apart  from  any 
influence  derived  from  the  physical  constitution 
favoring  such  a  result.  If  the  mind  can,  wholly  of 
itself,  continue  for  years  perfectly  sane,  and  then, 
entirely  independent  of  any  influence  from  the 
physical  powers,  change  to  a  state  of  insanity,  we 
might  readily  conclude  that  it  may  change  to  insan- 
ity at  any  period  in  the  infinity  of  its  future  being; 
but  w'e  can  not  believe  that  any  mind,  abstractly, 
can,  by  a  hereditary  disposition,  or  in  any  other 
way,  become  insane,  only  in  connection  w4th  the 
body^  and   in  being   influenced  by  it  favorably  to 


.1^ 

348  INSANITY. 

such  a  result  in  some  way.  We  have  positive  proof 
that  bodily  deformities,  injuries,  and  diseases  can 
and  do  produce  insanity;  but  we  have  no  proof  that 
the  mind,  wholly  within  and  of  itself,  ever  has,  or 
ever  can  become  insane.  2.  This  tendency  to  in- 
sanity may,  in  part,  be  attributed  to  an  intense  and 
vigorous  action  of  the  mind^  which  becomes  a  habit 
incapable  of  being  suspended  till  the  physical  or- 
gans are  overpowered  in  some  way.  A  paral- 
ysis  of  some  of  them,  produced  in  this  way,  or  that 
of  an  intense  nervous  excitability,  may  render  the 
action  of  mind  ever  afterward  imperfect.  This 
character  of  intense  mental  habit  may  be  of  hered- 
itary origin,  as  well  as  the  weakness  or  defects  of 
the  physical  organs,  connected  with  mental  action. 
3.  This  sad  state  of  mental  alienation  may  com- 
mence by  permitting  the  mind  too  vigorously  to 
dwell  on  one  and  the  same  tojpic^  or  in  allowing  the 
mind  to  be  wrought  into  ecstasies  of  excitement 
upon  continued  scenes  of  imagination.  This  gives 
rise  to  excited  mental  feelings  and  emotions,  which 
overwhelm  all  connected  objects,  and  entirely  sup- 
presses all  real  facts  and  relations  connected  with 
the  primary  truths  of  that  which  is  supposed  to 
exist,  and  which  would  correct  such  extravagances, 
if  they  could  be  objects  of  the  judgment  and  the 
understanding.  4.  The  imjpressions  made  upon  the 
mind,  by  sudden  and  unexpected  events  or  occur- 
rences, are  often  the  cause  of  excited  conceptions, 
and  a  wild  extravagance  of  the  imaginary  powers. 
In  this  kind  of  hasty  mental  action,  the  true  princi- 
ples which  are  connected,  or  which  lie  at  the  foun- 
dation, are  lost  sight  of,  and  no  connection  takes 


INSANITY.  '  349 

place  by  the  mind  deliberately  contemplating  sach 
events  in  their  true  relations.  On  such  occurrences 
the  well-balanced  mind  is  thrown  upon  the  correct 
exercise  of  the  understanding  and  the  judgment; 
but  the  mind  tending  to  alienation,  is  like  a  ship 
loosed  from  its  moorings,  yielding  to  the  sport  of 
wrecking  tempests. 


SECTION  lY. 
1.  Too  {intense  hahiU  of  mental  application  often 
alienates  the  mind  from  correct  action.  In  this  way 
the  energies  of  the  body  and  niind  become  wearied 
and  exhausted,  and  repeated  efforts  tend  to  a  con- 
tinued erratic  theorizing,  or  to  speculative  imagina- 
tions or  thoughts.  Whenever  false  impressions 
become  the  prominent  objects  of  mental  action,  the 
mind  is  but  little  removed  from  the  lower  degrees 
of  insanity.  2.  It  has  been  asserted,  from  actual 
observation,  that  the  mind  is  seldom  efoer  alienated^ 
though  it  be.  severely  disciplined  in  regard  to  plain 
facts,  with  which  God,  -in  his  inliiiite  wisdom,  has 
filled  the  vast  universe.  The  conteuiphitiou  and  ex- 
amination of  such  truths,  with  proper  cai-e,  is  calcu- 
lated to  produce  a  healthy  mental  action,  in  which 
happiness  is  much  increased.  It  is  stated,  by  good 
authority,  that,  by  inquiring  into  the  causes  of  in- 
sanity among  any  number  of  persons  who  have 
been  of  studious  habits,  there  is  a  lower  proportion 
of  philosophers,  physicians,  mathematicians,  and 
chemists,  who  have  become  insane,  than  of  almost 
any  other  classes  devoted  to  scientific  research.  3. 
It  is  also  stated,  that  the  Myliest  numbers  include 

30 


350  INSANITY. 

those  who  have  loved  the  works  of  fiction,  imagina- 
tion, or  taste,  among  whom  may  be  classed  poets, 
sculptors,  painters,  musicians,  and  artists ;  but  this 
chain  can  be  lengthened  to  embrace  a  still  higher 
number  of  those  who  are  always  looking  for  that 
which  is  enigmatical  or  appalling,  such  as  look  for 
the  speedy  destruction  of  the  world,  the  appearing 
of  ghosts,  or  will,  with  breathless  intensity,  bow  low 
to  the  incursion  and  dictates  of  spirit-rappings.  4. 
The  punisJiment  of  the  insane  should  not  be  in- 
flicted without  the  utmost  caution,  and  then  only  in 
regard  to  the  partially  insane.  Correction  is  of  no 
use  where  reason  is  gone,  and  where  it  is  not  entirely 
absent,  severity  only  tends,  in  most  cases,  to  drive 
those  thus  affected  further  from  reason  by  enraging 
the  mind,  or  by  depressing  the  spirit.  The  maniac 
should  be  kept  as  quiet  as  possible,  and  should  al- 
ways be  dealt  with  in  a  kind  and  affectionate  man- 
ner. The  melancholists  should  have  their  attention 
wholly  diverted  from  their  special  topics  of  grief, 
and  they  should  be  exhilarated  with  cheerful  music 
or  society,  so  as  to  keep  thetn  from  dwelling  on  their 
calamities.  Never  do  any  thing  to  excite  those  who 
are  addicted  to  madness,  and  always  avoid  every 
thing  that  would  discourage  those  who  labor  under 
depression  of  feelings. 


IDIOCY.  351 


CHAPTER  XL 

IDIOCY, 

SECTION  I. 

1.  The  term  idiocy  conveys  to  the  mind  the  idea  of 
a  natural  defect  of  the  understanding.  The  degrees 
which  have  been  acknowledged  to  exist  in  idiocy 
are  not  well  defined,  as  any  thing  like  partial  idiocy 
is  only  another  department  of  partial  insanity ;  yet 
there  are  some  distinctions  by  which  a  difference 
may  be  discriminated.  2.  Fatuity  includes  that 
kind  of  mental  weakness  which  differs  from  the  tur- 
bulence and  fierceness  of  the  maniac,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  that  of  a  desponding  state  of  insanity  on 
the  other.  In  the  latter  case  or  state,  a  part  of 
the  faculties  may  retain  power  of  healthy  action ; 
but,  under  fatuitous  influences,  the  mind  appears  to 
suffer  a  general  suspension  of  healthy  action  in  all 
its  departments.  3.  Cretinism^  as  it  was  anciently 
understood  among  the  valleys  of  the  Alps,  con- 
tained an  amplitude  of  signification,  which  will  not 
philosophically  apply  to  a  correct  idea  of  idiocy. 
The  cretins  were  classified  so  as  to  convey  an  idea 
of  the  strength  and  action  of  the  mind.  The  intel- 
lectual action  of  the  first  class  was  not  far  removed 
from  animal  life,  having  no  language  to  convey 
thoughts,  or  judgment  in  seeking  happiness,  or  in 
avoiding  danger.     4.  There  is  another  class,  which 


IDIOCY. 


evinces  some  signs  of  intellectual  action^  with  occa- 
sional traces  of  rationality;  but  the  whole  mental 
powers  are. so  inactive  that,  in  looking  on  such  a 
countenance,  we  appear  to  have  conceptions  of  the 
presence  of  a  form,  while  the  mind  or  soul  appears 
to  have  taken  its  departure.  Insanity  appears  to 
involve  a  part  of  the  mental  powers,  while  other 
powers  are  capable  of  action ;  yet  they  are,  in  most 
cases,  unable  to  arrive  at  any  correct  conclusion. 
But  idiocy  involves  the  idea  of  inactivity  of  the 
mental  faculties  as  a  whole.  5.  When  a  rational 
mind  becomes  wholly  inactive,  we  can  not,  with 
strict  propriety,  call  such  a  state  that  of  idiocy  ;  for 
it  properly  belongs  to  total  insanity.  Neither  can 
we  properly  say  that  a  mind  is  under  the  partial 
influence  of  idiocy,  when  all  the  mental  powers  are 
rendered  almost  inactive  and  without  reason ;  for 
such  a  state  would  more  properly  belong  to  partial 
insanity. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  An  idiot  is  one  who  has  ever  been  under  the 
influence  of  mental  imbecility,  so  that  the  mind  can 
not  be  said  to  have  been,  at  any  time,  sound  or 
rational.  The  mind  of  such  a  person  has  always 
heen  in  rains.  Never  has  there  been  power  in  such 
-a  mind  to  move  with  vigorous  action.  It  is  not 
reasonable  to  suppose  that  this  inefficiency  is  natu- 
rally connected  with  the  mental  functions  as  an 
essential  defect;  for  such  a  supposition  would  be 
unsupported  by  clear  evidence ;  but  it  is  more  rea- 
sonable for  us  to  suppose  that  the  natural  defect  in 


IDIOCY.  353 

its  influence  is  connected  with  the  mind,  while  the 
true  cause  is  to  be  sought  for.  and  to  be  found,  in 
other  considerations.  2.  We  have  already  seen  that 
insanity  is  principally  caused  by  the  effect  of  dis- 
ease and  deformity  iipon  or  in  the  jpkysical  system. 
It  is  reasonable  to  believe  that  natural  imperfections, 
or  deformity  of  the  physical  nature,  hinders  or  im- 
pedes the  action  and  proper  development  of  the 
mind,  so  that  idiocy  is  the  inevitable  result.  All 
injuries  or  debilities  arising  from  the  results  of  acci- 
dent, or  the  power  of  disease,  may  be  remedied 
with  the  same  hope  of  relief;  but  not  so  with  nat- 
ural deformity,  connected  with  the  internal  physical 
organs,  upon  or  by  which  the  mind  is  dependent 
for  action,  or  is  to  be  manifested.  These  internal 
imperfections  may  exist  when  we  have  no  power 
to  apprehend  the  nature  of  the  influence  which  af- 
fects the  physical  organs.  Such  natural  defects, 
preventing  mental  action,  can  never  be  remedied  in 
this  world:  hence,  an  idiot  must  renuiin  an  idiot 
during  life.  3.  Idiocy  is  incurable  in  this  li/e^  from 
the  fact  that  the  cause,  which  is  principally  deform- 
ity, can  not  be  removed  from  such  persons  by  reme- 
dies which  remove  the  power  and  influence  of  dis- 
ease. We  can  have  no  conception  that  the  essence 
called  mind  can  be  naturally  deformed,  or  that  it 
can  be,  within  and  of  itself,  under  the  influence  arid 
power  of  idiocy;  for  such  a  conclusion  would  be 
without  proof;  therefore,  all  our  ideas  of  idiocy  have 
their  origin  in  connection  with  the  deformities  and 
imperfections  which  we  believe  to  exist  in  the  phys- 
ical nature.  '4.  We  know  that  our  material  natures 
cany  and  that  they  do  exert  an  almost  tmbounded 
30* 


854^  IDIOCY. 

control  over  the  power  and  manner  of  mental  devel- 
opments. Delirium  is  often  the  result  of  fever  and 
other  diseases,  which  prey  only  upon  the  physical 
powers,  and  can,  in  no  case,  be  said  to  aifect  the 
mind  only  as  the  mind  is  affected  by  its  connection 
with  a  diseased  body.  Insanity  is  often  the  result 
of  a  blow  received  upon  a  portion  or  part  of  the 
nervous  system.  The  mind  was  not  affected  only 
by  being  connected  with  those  deranged  physical 
entities;  and  just  as  soon  as  these  are  restored  the 
mind  is  sound  again.  This  shows  the  influence  of 
bodily  organs  over  mental  action. 


SECTION  III. 
1.  If  the  quick  and  intense  excitement  and  action 
of  the  mind  can  cause  derangement  or  delirium,  the 
cause  of  such  delirium  is  not  wholly  in  the  mind; 
for,  if  so,  a  state  of  complete  alienation  would  prob- 
ably take  place  instantaneously,  or  as  quickly  as  the 
whole  powers  of  the  mind  felt  the  influence ;  but 
the  work  of  alienation  often  progresses  by  degrees, 
which  shows  that  the  excitement  of  the  mind  has 
influenced  or  affected  the  bodily  organs,  so  that  they 
perform  their  ofiice  but  imperfectly,  or  they  have,  in 
part,  or  in  some  way,  become  paralyzed,  and  thereby 
the  development  of  the  mind  is  confused  or  im- 
peded. There  never  has  been  one  philosophical 
argument  advanced,  which  will  demonstrate  the  as- 
sumed fact  that  mind  naturally,  within  and  of  itself, 
aside  and  apart  from  any  bodily  influence,  can  be 
•either  under  the  influence  and  power  of  idiocy  or 
that  of  insanity;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  we  know 


IDIOCY.  355 

that  facts  can  and  do  clearly  prove  that  insanity 
can,  and  often  does,  result  from  physical  influences 
upon  the  mind :  hence,  it  is  rational  to  infer  that  no 
person  is,  by  the  nature  of  mental  essence,  an  idiot, 
but  that  all  idiots  are  such  by  reason  of  natural  de- 
fects and  deformities  existing  in  the  physical  organs, 
by  means  of  which  mind  is  more  or  less  connected 
in  its  power  of  motion  or  action.  2.  If  the  mind  is 
naturaUy  capable  of  hewming  insane^  <??•  of  coming 
wider  the  power  of  idiocy^  without  any  possible  aid 
from  the  physical  nature,  or  connection  with  it,  then 
it  is  capable  of  destruction  and  even  annihilation; 
for  if  mind  is  imperishable,  then  its  being  is  incapa- 
ble of  any  destruction  or  annihilation  from  teni])oral 
disease  or  death ;  then  it  would  follow  that  any 
obstruction  to  the  right  development  of  its  powers 
exists  either  in  the  nature  of  the  mind  within  itself, 
or  that  such  obstructions  were  caused  by  defects  or 
the  effect  of  disease  in  the  physical  nature.  We 
can  have  no  conceptions  of  the  mind,  or  the  spir- 
itual existent  naturally  defective  in  faculties,  or 
without  the  right  use  of  them  ;  for  if  any  such  de- 
fects belong  to  and  exist  wholly  in  the  mind,  then 
such  a  mind  must  suffer  such  defects  forever,  as  we 
have  no  promise  of  any  new  creations  in  the  future 
appearing  and  existence  of  mental  powers,  where 
deficiencies  have  or  do  now  exist.  To  suppose  the 
existence  of  a  mind  naturally  imperfect  in  its  imma- 
terial nature,  or  as  to  the  existence  of  some  or  all 
of  its  faculties,  and  that  it  can  and  will  maintain 
such  an  imperfect  existence  in  the  spirit-world,  is  to 
suppose  an  absurdity,  and  reflect  dishonor  upon 
the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  its  Creator.     If  our 


366  IDIOCY. 

immaterial  nature  is  capable  of  being,  in  whole  or 
in  part,  destitute  of  mental  elements,  then  we  can 
only  conclude  that  they  must  exist  forever  in  the 
same  unaltered  condition  of  partial  or  total  insan- 
ity, or  that  of  idiocy.  Then  it  will  follow,  as  an  ir- 
resistible conclusion,  that  if  the  soul  can  be  or  always 
has  been  totally  insane,  or  idiotic,  it  has  violated  no 
law  or  rule  of  right,  and  must  be  sane  in  heaven. 
An  idiot  in  heaven  can  never  fulfill  the  design  of  a 
gracious  Creator,  in  glorifying  and  in  praising  the 
Author  of  all  good ;  therefore,  such  a  being  will  not 
exist  any  where  on  the  plains  of  infinite  life.  The 
idiot  will  be  saved,  but  he  will  leave  his  idiocy  with 
the  deformity  of  his  body  in  the  grave,  while  his 
rational  and  exalted  spirit  will  ever  move  the  harp 
of  eternity.  3.  We  are  convinced  that  the  cauae  of 
idiocy  exists  not  in  the  essence  of  mind,  but  in  the 
deformity  and  diseased  condition  of  the  physical 
organization.  There  is  no  evidence,  neither  can  we 
believe  that  an  all-wise  Being  ever  created  an  insane 
mind,  or  one  that  was  in  mind  abstractly  an  idiot. 
ISTeither  can  we  believe  that  the  mind  can,  of  itself, 
cause  its  own  idiocy,  unaided  by  material  influences ; 
therefore,  if  any  mind  is,  at  any  time,  insane,  or  in 
a  state  of  idiocy,  it  is  so  by  reason  of  its  connection 
with  defective  physical  organs.  4.  If  the  mind 
was  naturally  capahle  of  losing  the  right  exercise  of 
its  faculties  or  their  existence^  in  whole  or  in  part, 
then  it  would  have  self-power  to  destroy  itself  at 
any  future  period ;  but  such  a  position  is  contrary 
to  all  facts,  and  is  absurd.  We  can  form  no  idea, 
founded  on  reason,  that  the  mind,  within  itself,  or 
separated  from  the  bodily  influences,  ever  has  been 


IDIOCY.  367 

or  ever  can  be  either  insane  or  idiotic.  There  will 
be  no  insanity  or  idiocy  beyond  the  vale  of  tem- 
poral death. 


SECTION  IV. 

1.  We  have  evidence  of  the  destruGti/oe  iiifiuence 
of  the  physical  organs  over  the  power  of  inemory 
in  the  aged.  An  active  and  retentive  memory  often 
loses  its  power  of  action  as  a  person  or  individual 
advances  in  age.  If  we  say  this  loss  of  power  is 
wholly  in  the  mind,  then  it  would  follow  that  the 
mind  is  capable  of  losing  its  faculties,  and  it  would 
be  reasonable  to  suppose  that  they  were  entirely 
destroyed,  under  the  power  of  temporal  death,  or 
the  destruction  of  the  body.  But  this  is  absurd ; 
for  when  aged  persons  are  unable  to  recollect  the 
occurrences  of  one  hour  past,  or  even  forget  that 
which  only  took  place  a  few  moments  previous,  yet, 
if  their  attention  is  directed  to  what  took  place  in 
the  early  part  of  their  lives,  they  can  often  narrate 
that  which  transpired,  and  connect  facts  and  events 
together,  without  any  hesitancy.  This  is  conclusive 
proof  that  the  power  of  memory  is  not  lost,  nor  is  it 
ceasing  to  be;  but  its  action,  in  advanced  life,  is 
trammeled  only  so  far  as  it  is  connected  with  phys- 
ical organs  which  are  becoming  paralyzed  by  age, 
disease,  and  their  tendency  to  decay  or  death.  2. 
That  the  physical  nature  curtails  the  power  of  hear- 
ing^ is  clearly  demonstrated  in  the  example  of  those 
who  are  far  advanced  in  age.  Such  persons  often 
become  deaf;  and  if  this  defect  was  abstractly  in 
the  mind,  then  we  could  conclude  that  the  mind,  in 


358  IDIOCY. 

this  respect,  was  becoming  annihilated;  but  when 
the  ear-trumpet  is  applied  the  hearing  is  restored : 
hence,  the  power  is  not  gone  nor  destroyed,  but  is 
ever  living  in  the  nature  and  essence  of  the  im- 
perishable mind.  Then  the  defect  is  not  of  the 
mind ;  but  it  belongs  to  and  exists  in  the  bodily 
powers,  which  are  affected  by  the  paralyzing  touch 
of  age  or  disease.  3.  The  same  evidence  is  true 
in  regard  to  the  organ  of  sight.  The  eye  becomes 
affected  as  persons  advance  in  old  age,  so  that 
they  dimly  see  objects  which  pass  through  the 
field  of  vision ;  but  when  an  optic  is  applied,  the 
sight  is  restored.  The  jiower  is  still  there,  and  the 
whole  difficulty  must  exist  in  the  physical  organs. 
All  these  facts,  and  many  others,  prove  that  the 
physical  powers  can  and  do  often  trammel  the  right 
action  of  the  mind.  Having  referred  to  facts  which 
are  conclusive  in  establishing  the  destructive  power, 
in  part,  which  matter  has  over  the  development  and 
right  action  of  the  mind,  it  is  only  reasonable  to 
go  still  farther,  and  say  that  the  power  of  disease, 
and  the  existence  of  deformity  in  the  physical  or- 
gans, may  and  can  give  origin  to,  or  cause  the  exist- 
ence of  idiocy.  4.  Then  we  are  forced  to  the  con- 
clusion that  the  cause  of  idiocy  is  wholly  connected 
with  the  bodily  powers ;  for  if  we  believe  in  the  im- 
mortality of  the  soul,  we  must  believe  that  all  idiots 
are  saved  in  the  future,  from  the  fact  that  they  have 
never  had  power  to  willfully  transgress  any  law  or 
rule  of  right.  If  the  soul  or  mind,  disconnected 
with  the  body,  is  capable  of  being  idiotic,  in  whole 
or  in  part,  in  this  life,  it  must  exist  as  such  forever; 
and  if  all  the  inhabitants  of  the  good  world  are 


IDIOCY.  359 

there  for  the  purpose  of  rendering  perpetual  praise 
and  glory  to  the  great  Author  of  all,  then  an  idiot 
can  have  no  place  there,  for  he  is  naturally  incapa- 
ble of  filling  this  design  in  perfection  and  holiness. 
It  is  consistent  with  all  our  ideas  of  infinite  wis- 
dom and  purity,  to  believe  that  idiocy  can  exist 
only  in  connection  with  the  deformities  and  infirm- 
ities of  the  bodily  powers,  all  of  which  may  be  re- 
garded as  a  curse,  and  only  the  result  of  sin.  If  sin, 
either  directly  or  indirectly,  can  cause  idiocy,  then 
it  follows  that  the  remedial  plan,  in  destroying  such 
a  power  and  influence,  will  reveal  rationality  as 
inherent  in  the  very  nature  of  those  elements  of 
mind  which  were  locked  up  during  the  existence* 
of  the  body ;  therefore,  we  are  led  to  believe,  that 
when  the  soul  of  an  idiot  is  released  from  his  sin- 
diseased  body,  it  will  be  possessed  of  rational  pow- 
ers and  knowledge,  in  the  enjoyment  of  which  it 
will  flourish  in  immortality. 


IPW^^iiiPFWf^Pipi 


i&isifln  ®fnt| 


CHAPTER  I. 

INTERNAL  ORIGIN  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

SECTION  I. 
1.  The  soul  has  knowledge  in  itself^  and  its  power 
to  know  and  to  retain  knowledge  is  wisely  arranged 
by  its  great  Author.  It  has  internally  perception, 
thinking,  reasoning,  believing,  doubting,  knowing, 
with  various  mental  operations,  or  acts,  which  are 
experienced,  and  we  are  conscious  of  their  real 
existence,  in  connection  with  which  we  receive  dis- 
tinct ideas  of  them,  or  in  relation  to  them,  without 
traveling  beyond  the  internal  being  and  action  of 
mind,  and  unaided  by  the  power  of  the  senses  as  a 
medium  of  knowledge  in  regard  to  external  things. 
The  mind  can  and  does  possess  ideas  wholly  within 
itself,  and  it  receives  them  with  confidence  by  at- 
tending to  its  own  operations  or  action.  2.  The 
mind  has  ^ower  of  hiowledge  within  itself  which 
power  is  connected  with  the  existence  and  action 
of  inttdtive  mental  elements.  The  mind  is  not  ca- 
pable of  receiving  or  of  possessing  knowledge  of 
external  things  unless  it  has  knowledge  of  a  purely 
internal  origin;  for  all  knowledge  of  external  facts 
are  unknown  to  us  only  as  we  have  internal  power 
to  receive  them  as  such.  And  if  those  elements  of 
360 


mm 


INTERNAL    ORIGIN    OF    KNOWLEDGE.       361 

mind,  connected  with  the  origin  of  intuitions,  have 
interna]  power  to  receive  external  existences  as 
facts,  they  have  power  within  themselves  to  know 
thoughts  of  internal  origin,  and  to  have  ideas  of 
interior  operations  or  mental  action.  3.  The  pri- 
mary power  of  knowledge  is  not  material,  but  is 
mental,  and  has  its  origin  in  connection  with  the 
existence  and  action  of  the  internal  mental  elements. 
Connected  with  these  is  the  self-power  of  knowing 
existing  truths,  and  with  them  is  the  origin  of  all 
our  knowledge.  4.  Knowledge  received  through  the 
medium  of  the  senses  from  the  external  world,  and 
in  regard  to  external  things,  may  be  regarded  as  of 
a  secondary  order,  or  of  an  ulterior  nature,  when 
compared  with  knowledge  of  internal  origin.  6. 
The  internal  action  of  the  mind  or  soul,  by  which 
items  of  knowledge  are  appreJiended,  is  so  con- 
nected with  such  an  immaterial  essence,  or  being, 
that  the  rational  force  and  vigor  are  derived  from 
it;  yet  the  soul  employs  material  elements  or  organs 
to  aid  in  the  acquisition  and  in  the  perfecting  of 
knowledge  in  regard  to  the  external  universe  of 
materialities.  The  soul  is  aided  by  material  eyes  to 
aid  in  seeing  material  existences;  also,  with  other 
material  organs  of  sense,  or  those  which  are  in  some 
way  connected  with  the  origin  of  sensation.  Aided 
by  these,  the  mind  becomes  acquainted  with  the  ex- 
istence and  nature  of  material  existences;  yet  the 
soul  has  knowledge  within  itself,  which  has  not  and 
can  not  be  imparted  to  it  by  physical  entities,  or  by 
the  senses.  Though  all  the  senses  were  to  fall  under 
the  power  of  sleep,  yet  the  soul  would  exist  even  on 
forever,  and  would  possess  reason  and  knowledge. 

31 


362      INTERNAL    ORIGIN    OF    KNOWLEDGE. 

SECTION  II. 

1.  Knowledge  is  of  internal  origin^  though  it  may 
be  said  to  begin  in  the  senses ;  yet  only  so  far  as 
sensations  through  the  medium  of  the  senses,  being 
caused  by  external  things,  are  necessarily  followed 
by  new  mental  states.  But  knowledge  does  not 
and  can  not  begin  with  the  senses,  unless  sensa- 
tion within  itself  can  be  called  knowledge  ere  it 
makes  its  report  to  the  mind ;  otherwise,  we  can 
have  no  knowledge  of  external  things,  till  sensation 
is  followed  by  the  perception  of  the  cause  or  causes 
of  such  sensation  or  sensations,  and  the  mind  de- 
cides upon  them.  Sensation,  which  is  followed  by 
new  mental  states,  may  be  said  to  have  its  origin  in 
connection  with  the  senses  ;  but  we  can  not  say  that 
knowledge  begins  with  the  senses,  only  as  we  have 
knowledge  of  the  origin  of  sensation  ere  its  report 
is  decided  upon  by  the  mind  in  determining  the 
cause  of  such  sensations.  2.  The  source  or  origin 
of  knowledge,  according  to  the  general  acceptation 
of  the  term,  is  in  the  mind.  In  taking  this  position 
we  must  retain  in  the  mind  the  difference  between 
knowledge  as  it  exists  in  connection  with  mental 
states,  and  the  influences  which  may  lead  to  or  cause 
the  existence  of  such  mental  states.  3.  Ideas  of 
internal  origin  may  be  readily  and  clearly  defined; 
yet  it  will  not  be  necessary  to  dwell  long  here.  The 
origin  of  the  idea  expressed  by  the  terms  thinking, 
willing,  and  believing  can  not  be  traced  to  the  power 
or  action  of  the  senses;  for  they  are  not  the  objects 
of  the  test  or  action  of  any  of  the  senses.  J^either 
can  we  say  that  the  ideas  of  cause  and  effect,  right 


INTEBKAL    ORIGIN    OF    K:N0WI*KDGE.      363 

and  wrong,  space  or  infinity,  order,  truth,  and  power 
can  have  their  origin  in  the  senses.  The  internal 
operations  of  the  mind  can  exist  and  be  known  to 
us  as  primary  sources  of  knowledge.  4.  Intei^nal 
ideas  or  notions  may  arise  in  connectien  with  the 
jpower  of  intuition^  and  may  be  embraced  in  the 
understanding,  where  such  ideas  or  notions  may  be 
inspected  by  the  mind,  and  decided  upon  by  the 
judgment.  5.  TTie  primary  origin  of  knowledge 
can  not  be  said,  philosophically,  to  commence  with 
any  ulterior  faculty  or  medium  of  mental  action,  but 
such  origin  of  knowledge  must  be  connected  with 
the  power  of  intuition.  Intuitions  appear  to  be 
spontaneous,  and  such  intuitions,  when  they  are 
brought  under  the  power  and  action  of  reason  and 
the  judgment,  may  be  known  as  ideas  or  notions. 
Hero  appears  to  be  the  beginning,  under  the  inspec- 
tion of  the  mind,  of  the  knowledge  of  the  existence 
of  such  notions  or  ideas,  or  the  beginning  of  the 
knowledge  of  what  such  ideas  or  notions  reveal.  6. 
This  may  be  extended  by  noticing  complex  ideas  of 
internal  origin.  Such  ideas  are  composed  of  ele- 
mentary facts,  and  these  parts  are  simple  or  individ- 
ual entities.  Consciousness,  original  and  relative 
suggestion,  are  regarded  as  contributing  to  the 
origin  of  simple  ideas,  which  are  combined  by 
reason  and  the  judgment.  The  process  of  combin- 
ing tliese  ideas  may  be  carried  on  without  reference 
to  external  things,  and  may  be  entirely  an  internal 
action  or  mental  operation. 


864:  LIMITATION    OF    MIND. 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE  DOCTRINE  OF  PSYCHOLOGY  AND  ANTHROPOL- 
OGY CONTRASTED  IN  THE  EXAMINATION 
OF  THAT  WHICH  RESEMBLES  MIND 
IN   BRUTES. 


SECTION  I. 
1.  We  do  not  introduce  all  the  contents  of  this 
chapter  as  properly  belonging  to  the  analysis  of 
mind,  yet  it  contains  many  things  which  should  be 
studied  in  connection  with  the  examination  of  the 
elements  of  mind.  That  mind  or  spirit  exists  can 
not  be  doubted ;  and  almost  the  next  inquiry  con- 
nected with  this  conclusion  is  in  regard  to  the  extent 
of  mental  or  spiritual  existence.  Can  any  order  or 
form  of  physical  existence  below  that  of  man  pos- 
sess, or  have  connected  with  it,  any  thing  which  in 
nature  is  similar,  in  any  respect,  to  the  human  soul 
or  mind?  If  human  beings  are  only  possessed  with 
spirit  or  mind,  then  all  inferior  orders  of  beings  are 
wholly  inert,  or  without  sensitive  animation.  2.  The 
mysterious  connection  of  mind  and  matter  is  beyond 
the  power  and  limits  of  philosophical  investigation ; 
yet  it  is  not  improper  for  us  to  detect  any  power  or 
influence  existing  in  matter,  or  that  is  superadded 
to  it,  which  naturally  differs  from  perfect  material 
entities.  We  can  more  readily  discriminate  and 
decide  upon  that  which  differs  from  matter  by  com- 
mencing with  the  lowest  orders  of  material  existeji- 
ces,  and  travel  up  to  the  real  existence  of  man.     3. 


LIMITATION    OF    MIND.  365 

111  fixing  the  attention  upon  inert  and  inanimate 
matter,  we  can  not  discover  any  property^  essence^ 
or  influence  which  reserribles  mind  or  spirit  j  but 
some  combinations  of  crude  matter  may  differ  from 
other  masses  or  portions  of  inert  existences.  A  por- 
tion of  clay  may  lie  in  the  earth  lor  thousands  of 
years,  without  any  increase  or  diminution,  or  any- 
other  change,  so  far  as  we  can  determine  from  any 
evidence  within  our  power;  but  there  are  evidences 
which  indicate  and  even  establish  the  fact  that  other 
combinations  increase  in  size,  or  grow  with  seem- 
ingly no  cessation  or  interruption.  Petrifactions 
are  conclusive  of  the  beginning  and  advancement 
of  the  work  of  change.  The  formation  and  growth 
of  rock  can  not  be  doubted.  This  process  of  ad- 
vancement or  growth,  which  characterizes  the  vari- 
ous degrees  or  conditions  of  such  inert  existences, 
has  been  called  inanimate  life  in  contradistinction 
to  those  existences  which  contain  no  real  or  contin- 
gent evidences  of  change.  If  the  advancement  or 
change  indicated  in  maturing  petrifications,  crystal- 
lization, and  enlargement  of  rocks  can  be  called  life^ 
it  ii  certainly  the  lowest  order  of  life  of  which  the 
mind  can  have  any  conception,  while  the  student  is 
left  to  controrert  at  pleasure  the  propriety  or  impro- 
priety of  using  the  term  life  in  this  way.  We  will 
simply  say  that  no  geologist,  lapidarian,  or  min- 
eralogist will  dissent  from  the  fact  that  such  life,  or 
change  is  very  diflferent  from,  and  is  of  a  lower  de- 
gree or  order  than  the  life  of  timber  or  of  vegeta- 
tion. The  latter  is  periodical,  and  depends  upon 
the  change  and  condition  of  the  seasons,  while  the 
former  appears  to  be  continuous  and  of  an  inherent 

31* 


S66  LIMITATION     OF    MIND. 

nature,  independent  of  the  influence  of  the  vernal 
sun,  summer  solstice,  or  tropical  shadow;  but  in 
connection  with  this  process  or  change,  there  is  no 
evidence  of  mind  or  spirit,  in  any  possible  vraj,  or 
in  the  slightest  degree.  4,  That  kind  of  inanimate 
life^  an  idea  of  which  is  presented  to  the  mind  in 
the  growth  of  timber  or  "vegetation^  is  of  a  higher 
order  than  that  to  which  our  attention  has  just  been 
called.  The  growth  of  vegetation  depends  upon 
certain  infl.uences  immediately  connected,  such  as 
the  warming  and  invigorating  power  of  the  sun,  and 
the  reviving  effect  and  motion  of  the  atmosphere ; 
but  a  sufl5cient  cause  can  destroy  the  emerald  hues 
of  the  summer  forest,  which  shows  that  this  kind  of 
life  is  more  easily  disturbed  and  destroyed  than  that 
of  a  still  lower  order;  yet  there  is  not  connected 
with  vegetable  life  any  thing  which  indicates  the 
presence  of  mental  or  spiritual  influences  in  the 
filightest  degree. 


SECTION  II. 

1.  Animated  existences^  or  animal  life^  is  very 
different  from  that  of  inanimate  realities.  Animals 
or  brutes  are  classed  in  a  higher  order  or  scale  of 
beings  than  those  orders  of  which  we  have  just 
been  speaking.  The  evidences  of  this  fact  are 
plain  and  of  universal  acknowledgment,  and  we 
are  forced  to  the  conclusion  that  beasts,  birds, 
and  fish  possess  something  more  than  is  or  can 
be  contained  wholly  or  only  in  material  elements 
or  existences.  2.  Brutes  exist  either  wholly  or 
oiily   of  material   elements^    or   that    influence    or 


EXTENT    OF    MENTAL    INTIMATIONS.       367 

power  which  is  connected  with  or  is  possessed 
by  such  elements  differing  from  them,  must  be 
superadded  or  is  superior  to  any  essence  or  ele- 
ments of  matter;  and  if  there  is,  in  the  existence 
of  brutes,  any  thing  which  is  different  from  the  es- 
sential elements  and  qualities  of  matter,  and.  supe- 
rior to  them,  we  must  look  elsewhere  for  such  influ- 
ences or  qualities  than  in  those  things  which  are 
essential  to  the  existence  of  matter.  3.  Insensibil- 
ity and  inertness  are  essential  to  the  existence  of 
matter,  and  without  these  matter  would  cease  to  be 
matter;  but  brutes  could  not  exist  and  be  wholly 
pervaded  and  possessed  of  these.  4.  Brutes  possess 
animation,  or  life,  differing  very  much  from  any 
thing  belonging  to  inanimate  existences.  The  life 
of  the  zoological  world  is  of  a  different  nature,  and 
under  different  laws  from  any  existence  of  an  inani- 
mate order.  We  will  now  proceed  to  notice  some 
of  the  leading  differences  in  which  all  beings  hav- 
ing animate  existence  or  life,  and  the  power  of  self- 
action  or  motion,  is  superior  to  all  insensible  and 
inert  existences. 


SECTION  III. 
1.  Brvies  differ  from  inert  existences  in  being 
possessed  of  life  with  sensitiveness,  or  are  capable 
of  experiencing  sensations ;  and  they  can  not  expe- 
rience sensations  without  having  internal  power  to 
realize  such  influences ;  and  if  they  are  capable  of 
realizing  or  experiencing  sensations,  that  internal 
power  by  which  such  sensations  are  tested  is  differ- 
ent from  crude  matter,  and  is  superior  to  it.     If  we 


368       EXTENT     OF    MENTAL    INTIMATIONS. 

have  no  evidence  that  matter  can  or  will  ever  be 
annihilated,  it  would  be  absurd  to  conclude  that  a 
superior  influence  or  nature  possessed  by  brutes,  or 
if  it  be  superadded  to  them,  can  or  will  ever  be 
annihilated.  2.  Brutes  have  ^ower  of  self-action^ 
which  is  perfectly  opposed  to  the  nature  of  matter, 
and  contradictory  to  all  laws  governing  material 
elements  or  existences.  If  a  brute  is  wholly  a  ma- 
terial existent,  motion  would  be  utterly  impossible, 
as  inertness  is  essential  to  the  existence  of  matter; 
therefore,  that  power  in  brutes  which  moves,  or 
causes  motion,  is  different  in  nature,  and  is  superior 
to  matter.  3.  To  a  certain  extent  brutes  see,  feel, 
taste,  smell,  and  hear.  Some  of  these  powers  are 
more  acute  than  they  are  in  connection  with  the 
human  body,  yet  they  are  not  connected  with  a 
mind  that  can  reason  or  that  is  capable  of  moral  in- 
fluences ;  but  these  are  so  exercised  by  brutes  as  to 
give  clear  proof  that  they  are  not  wholly  and  only 
material  entities.  In  connection  with  their  physical 
natures  there  is  something  more,  or  another  nature 
which  is  distinct  from  matter,  and  must  be  superior 
to  it.  4.  This  internal  and  superior  natural  and 
motive  power  possessed  hy  brutes  has  been  called 
instinct;  but  what  is  instinct  with  the  lowest  degree 
of  meaning  that  can  be  properly  attached  to  it?  It 
is  a  certain  internal  influence,  disposition,  or  power 
by  which,  independent  of  all  instruction  or  experi- 
ence, animals  are  correctly  directed  to  do  spontane- 
ously whatever  is  necessary  for  the  preservation 
of  life,  or  the  securing  of  pleasure :  hence,  it  is 
utterly  impossible  to  define  the  power  of  instinct  to 
be  in  nature  and  reality  only  matter.     We  will  now 


EXTENT    OF     MENTAL    INTIMATIONS.       369 

proceed  to  notice  the  powei-s  and  action  of  that 
which  is  called  instinct  in  brutes,  which  resembles 
mind,  and  appears  to  establish  the  fact  that  brutes 
are  possessed  with  that  which  may  be  called  spirit, 
as  well  as  that  part  of  their  existence  which  is  called 
physical. 


SECTION  IV. 
1.  Volition,  to  some  extent,  is  evidenced  in  the 
freedom  of  a/aimal  action.  This  can  be  noticed  in 
the  manner  of  their  movements  or  acts.  If  they  are 
escaping  from  danger,  there  is  care  manifested  in 
selecting  the  safest  and  quickest  way  of  escape. 
This  is  clearly  tested  from  the  fact  that  they  never 
choose  the  direction  of  danger  or  of  their  foe. 
Whether  this  power  of  voluntary  preference  should 
be  called  volition  or  not,  we  are  certain  that  it  is  not 
matter,  and  that  it  is  superior  to  it.  2.  Brutes  ap- 
pear to  have  power  to  detect  a^pproachi/ng  danger 
and  a  knowledge  of  the  way  to  escape.  This  appears 
to  be  connected  with  the  nature  of  their  existence ; 
but  it  also  admits  of  degrees  of  maturity ;  for  the 
young  of  all  sagacious  animals  appear  at  first  to 
have  but  little  alarm  at  danger,  though  this  is  soon 
remedied  by  a  more  matured  degree  of  care.  All 
of  these  things  are  unknown  to  the  nature  and  exist- 
ence of  matter.  3.  Brutes  appear  to  have  naturally 
a  knowledge  of  courses.^  and  have  but  little  confusion 
in  determining  and  in  pursuing  the  proper  direction 
to  any  place  where  they  have  ever  been,  and  often 
are  seen  moving  from  one  section  of  the  globe  to  a 
more  plentiful  region,  though  they  may  have  never 


370       EXTENT    OF    MENTAL    INTIMATIONS. 

passed  that  way  before.  Bears,  in  times  of  great 
scarcity,  have  traveled  from  their  native  woods 
through  cultivated  parts  of  the  country  for  hundreds 
of  miles,  on  a  direct  course  to  a  new  wilderness 
abounding  with  supplies.  And  with  what  exact- 
ness and  certainty  do  the  different  kinds  of  birds 
direct  their  course  in  the  heavens,  alternating  with 
the  seasons  in  going  from  one  climate  to  another ! 
No  philosopher  can  say  that  all  these  evidences  of 
mind,  in  some  way,  and  degree,  are  wholly  the  re- 
sult of  material  entities  and  of  material  laws.  Such 
implications  would  almost  astonish  the  insensible 
earth.  4.  The  horse  and  dog  Tinow  their  masters 
ly  sight^  mid  they  hnow  them  hy  the  sound  of  the 
"voice.  They  are  capable  of  being  so  trained  that 
they  will  act  or  move  in  different  ways  by  certain 
motions  or  sounds  of  the  voice.  This  is  positive 
proof  that  they  are  more  capable  of  improvement  or 
cultivation  than  mere  inert  matter,  l^o  one  can 
doubt  such  a  conclusion.  5.  The  power  of  judg- 
ment and  comparison  appear  to  be  evidenced,  to 
some  degree,  in  the  acts  of  some  animals.  Some 
horses  have  been  known  to  move  with  much  more 
care  if  some  female  or  timid  person  is  driving  them, 
and  especially  if  the  harness  should  begin  to  give 
way  in  some  dangerous  place.  A  fox  was  once  ob- 
served to  run  down  into  water,  and  gradually  sink 
under,  holding  a  lock  of  wool  in  his  mouth  above 
the  water.  On  drawing  his  head  under  the  water, 
the  wool  floated  off,  which  was  found  to  be  full  of 
fleas.  Another  instance  is  given  of  a  fox  that  was 
observed  in  a  field,  playing  round  a  group  of  pigs 
as  though  the  large  swine  were  objects  of  terror. 


EXTENT    OF    MENTAL    INTIMATIONS.       371 

The  fox  suddenly  caught  up  a  piece  of  wood  about 
the  size  of  a  pig,  and  running  toward  the  fence, 
jumped  through  a  large  crack;  then  he  dropped 
the  wood,  and  returned  to  the  swine,  seized  a  pig, 
and  ran  through  the  fence  with  it  at  the  very  same 
place.  No  doubt  but  that  he  compared  the  pig 
witli  the  size  of  the  wood,  in  order  to  judge  of  the' 
chance  to  escape  with  his  prey.  All  these  traits  of 
mind  or  spirit  can  not  be  the  result  of  insensible 
matter.  The  foregoing  facts  are  evidences  of  a 
spiritual  nature ;  and  if  brutes  have  a  spiritual  na- 
ture, we  will  have  to  call  it  an  immaterial  nature; 
and  if  immaterial,  we  have  no  evidence  to  believe 
but  that  it  is  indestructible;  for  if  we  have  no  evi- 
dence that  material  elements  will  ever  be  annihi- 
lated, we  have  still  less  reason  to  doubt  the  imper- 
ishability of  spiritual  existences. 


SECTION  V. 
1.  We  have,  from  the  preceding  arguments,  ar- 
rived at  the  fact,  that  hmtes  have  some  kind  of  a 
spiritual  existence  or  nature,  as  well  as  a  material 
one.  This  is  clearly  set  forth  in  the  great  and  mul- 
tiplied differences  existing  between  inert  elements, 
whether  separate  or  compounded,  and  the  condition, 
action,  and  conduct  of  brutes  as  they  are.  This  is 
also  established  upon  the  degrees  of  difference  among 
brutes  themselves.  Some  are  by  nature  but  little 
i^moved  from  mere  self-moving  matter,  while  others 
are  naturally  sagacious,  and  are  capable  of  improve- 
ment by  careful  training.  2.  Whatever  may  be  the 
character  of  hrute  intelligence,  and  notwithstanding 


372       EXTENT    OF    MENTAL    INTIMATIONS. 

the  high  degree  to  which  it  may  be  elevated  by  care- 
ful training,  yet  they  are  very  far  removed  from  real 
rationality,  and  the  power  and  action  of  any  thing 
like  conscience.  3.  Tliat  natural  inclination  or 
influence  which  is  present  with  brutes  in  aiding 
them  to  search  out  that  which  is  naturally  adapted 
to  the  appetite,  or  the  demands  of  their  constitu- 
tional existence,  has  been  called  instinct ;  but  that 
power  which  is  susceptible  of  being  cultivated,  and 
of  choosing  ways  and  means  adapted  to  certain  re- 
sults, has  been  called  instinctive  intelligence;  yet 
the  student  is  not  to  conclude  from  such  facts  that 
brutes  are  reasonable,  moral,  and  intellectual  beings, 
for  they  are  far  from  such  an  exalted  position.  With 
all  the  manifestations  of  their  nature  and  being,  they 
only  serve  to  draw  that  contrast  by  which  intellect- 
ual man  stands  pre-eminent  above  all,  towering  in 
thought  amid  the  imperishable  realities  and  glories 
of  infinite  duration.  4.  Instinctive  intelligence  is 
manifested  in  the  conduct  or  operations  of  bees. 
How  appropriately  thej^  arrange  the  house  of  the 
governing  bee !  and  whenever  this  bee  is  there  all  is 
harmony.  If  this  bee  leaves  the  hive,  all  of  the 
others  will  follow;  and  if  this  bee  dies,  the  fact  is 
soon  known  throughout  the  hive.  The  work  is  sus- 
pended, gloom  spreads  over  them,  and  they  appear 
to  die  in  despair ;  but  there  appears  to  be  wisdom 
and  skill  displayed  in  the  manner  and  form  of  their 
work.  The  very  form  of  their  cells  evidences  wis- 
dom. Mathematicians  are  indebted  to  them  for  a 
form  after  that  of  the  cells  of  the  honeycomb, 
which  will  hold  more  than  any  other  upon  a  base 
of  the  same  dimensions.     Similar  intimations  of  a 


EXTENT    OF    MENTAL    INTIMATIONS.       373 

high  order  of  instinctive  power  is  evidenced  in  the 
mysterious  ways  in  which  wild  aninaals  procure  or 
take  their  prey.     These  traits  are  not  matter. 


SECTION  YI. 
1.  There  is  a  great  dissimilarity  existing  between 
the  powers  of  man  and  that  of  the  brute.  The 
former  is  naturally  constituted  with  superior  powers, 
and  has  control  of  them  in  the  examination  of  any 
subject.  He  can  combine  or  abstract  at  pleasure. 
His  cogitations  can  be  continued  or  suspended,  va- 
ried or  changed  by  a  voluntary  act.  The  brute 
may  be  said  to  have  perceptions  of  external  things, 
and  may  move  in  the  direction  of  some  object  of 
sight ;  yet  there  is  no  power  to  combine  facts  or  to 
reason  in  regard  to  them.  2.  There  is  an  intuitive 
inclination  in  man  to  look  for  a  cause  when  an  effect 
is  produced,  and  involuntarily  we  begin  to  progress 
in  thought  or  argumentation  from  the  effect  back  to 
its  corresponding  cause ;  but  there  appears  to  be  no 
power  connected  with  the  manifestations  of  instinct- 
ive intelligence  to  look  at  any  thing  in  this  way — • 
no  contingencies  are  seemingly  involved.  3.  The 
human  mind,  from  the  nature  of  its  structure^ 
and  its  power  of  action,  is  really  scientific  in  its 
research.  It  is  from  its  organization  naturally  di- 
rected to  the  apprehending  and  comprehension 
of  primary  truths,  following  them  out  either  singly 
or  in  a  combined  relationship  to  their  various 
results.  In  this  process  the  mind  must  be  capable 
of  making  science  explain  enigmatical  scientific 
propositions  and    combinations    of  supposed    facts. 

82 


374       EXTENT    OF    MENTAL    INTIMATIONS. 

The  brute  appears  to  act  froni  what  he  sees,  hears, 
and  feels,  without  any  reference  to  the  cause,  or  as 
to  why  such  cause  or  causes  exist.  He  appears  to 
be  governed  by  a  simple  perception  of  objects,  with- 
out any  explanation  in  regard  to  them.  4.  The 
human  mind  is  capable  of  progressive  improvement, 
and  its  rising  efforts  and  conquests  in  scientific 
knowledge  appear  to  be  bounded  only  by  the  fee- 
bleness or  paralyzing  weakness  of  physical  organs. 
The  brute  intelligence  appears  to  be  susceptible  of 
improvement,  in  some  instances,  to  a  very  limited 
extent,  and  none  of  them  can  pass  beyond  certain 
limits  or  bounds.  They  may  be  said  to  remain  in 
their  generations  in  the  same  limitations  of  instinct- 
ive action ;  but  the  imperishable  mind  of  man,  lim- 
itless in  research,  sends  out  its  exploring  thoughts, 
like  a  burning  sun  radiates  its  million  beams  of 
light,  filling  the  universe  with  the  brilliancy  of 
effulgent  day.  Man  is  possessed  of  a  conscience, 
and  feels  himself  to  be  a  moral  agent,  and  accounta- 
ble to  God;  but  the  brute  is  without  any  innate  moral 
principle,  and  can  not  possess  moral  feelings,  or  in- 
ternally, from  desire,  perform  a  moral  action. 


SECTION  VII. 
1.  The  human  mind  can  not  become  familiar 
with  scientific  research,  and  arrive  at  true  knowl- 
edge, without  the  presence  and  action  of  self-con- 
sciousness, reason,  07'iginal  suggestion,  the  under- 
standing, and  the  judgment.  These  appear  to  be 
absent  in  the  manifestations  of  brute  intellio:ence;  or, 

O  7  7 

if  there  be  any  resemblance  of  them,  in  connection 


EXTENT    OF    MENTAL    INTIMATIONS.      375 

with  the  existence  and  acts  of  brutes,  it  is  so  faint 
that  it  is  not  worthy  a  passing  notice  at  present. 
The  absence  of  reason  only  would  destroy  all  power 
of  arriving  at  scientific  knowledge,  and  many  other 
faculties  would  be  rendered  useless  if  not  destroyed. 
Eeason  appears  to  be  absent  in  brute  instinct: 
hence  a  distinguishing  difference  between  man  and 
the  brute.  2.  The  brute  does  not  appea/r  to  possess 
the  power  of  reason^  self -consciousness^  understand- 
ing^ judgment^  classification^  nm'  generalization. 
These  are  essential  to  a  rational  and  an  intellectual 
mind ;  but  the  entire  absence  of  them  in  brute  in- 
telligence is  evident,  and  enters  into  the  cause  of 
such  a  great  difference  between  the  contrasted  exist- 
ences. 3.  Man  is  a  moral  agent,  and  is  subject  to 
moral  feelings,  his  conscience  constituting  the  great 
court  of  appeal ;  and,  in  connection  with  it,  the 
moral  sensibilities,  emotions,  and  feelings  appear  to 
harmonize.  Here  inticitive  convictions  arise  in  re- 
gard to  right  and  wrong ;  but  the  brute,  heirvg  to* 
tally  destitute  of  all  these^  must  hold  a  lower  posi- 
tion in  the  scale  of  beings,  having  claim  to  a  spiritual 
existence.  4.  "We  have  proceeded  far  enough  in 
contrasting  the  mental  powers  of  man  with  the  in- 
stinctive intelligence  of  the  brute.  It  is  sufficient 
for  us  to  know  that  the  human  mind  is  very  differ- 
ent, and  that  it  is  almost  infinitely  superior  to  any 
thing  possessed  in  brute  instinct  or  existence ;  but, 
on  the  other  hand,  it  is  illogical  and  absurd  to  deny 
Ithe  brute  that  which  he  does  possess,  and  that  which 
he  possesses  to  our  certain  knowledge.  5.  That 
which  appears  to  have  been  overlooked  by  writers  is 
that  the  brute  has,  as  far  as  we  can  determine,  a 


■mpmm^^i   iippiiii  i^m 


876       EXTENT    OF    MENTAL    INTIMATIONS. 

spirit  as  well  as  a  hody^  and  that  the  spirit  in  its 
manifestations  is  far  more  intellectual  tlian  mere 
inert  matter  could  be  in  its  most  refined  nature. 


SECTION  VIII. 
1.  The  brute,  to  a  limited  extent,  is  capable  of 
heing  taught^  which  is  utterly  impossible,  if  there 
was  no  principle  of  any  kind  capable  of  being 
taught  differing  from  any  thing  that  can  be  found  in 
matter.  The  fact  that  they  can  be  taught  to  any 
degree,  or  that  they  naturally  know  any  thing,  or 
have  self-power  to  move,  is  conclusive  proof  that 
they  have  a  nature  differing  from  matter,  and  supe- 
rior to  it.  2.  The  dog  can  be  taught  to  go  errands 
for  his  master,  and  to  look  for  game  in  any  direc- 
tion, by  the  motion  of  the  hand.  If  he  is  com- 
manded to  watch  at  any  certain  place,  he  will  re- 
main there  till  released  by  his  master.  The  sound 
of  two  words  will  change  alternately  the  course  of 
a  horse.  3.  Animals  have  been  learned  to  dance  at 
the  sound  of  music.  This  has  been  thought  to  arise 
from  the  fact  that  they  were  trained  upon  hot  plates 
of  iron  in  the  first  place,  and  that  ever  afterward, 
on  hearing  music  similar  to  that  played  while  they 
were  dancing  on  the  hot  iron,  they  would  begin  to 
dance;  "and  that  the  associations  which  had  been 
established  between  the  sound  of  music  and  the 
mere  animal  sensibilities  reproduced  dancing."  If 
this  is  true,  and  proves  any  thing,  it  proves  too 
much ;  for  then  the  brute  must  have  power  to  dis- 
tinguish such  associations  of  music  from  other  asso- 
ciations of  music,  or  of  sounds,  in  order  to  know 


EXTENT    OF    MENTAL    INTIMATIONS.       377 

when  to  dance;  and.  in  the  next  place,  it  proves 
that  the  brute  has  power  of  memory  in  calling  up 
the  associations  connected  with  music  and  circum- 
stances long  since  past ;  therefore,  we  know  that  the 
principle  of  their  nature  which  can  be  thus  affected, 
can  not  be  inert  matter,  and  all  we  contend  for  is 
true,  that  brutes  have  a  spiritual  nature  which  must 
be  superior  to  matter.  4.  That  memory  in  the  human 
mind  is  distinctly  different  from  hrute  memory  is 
very  clear  and  conclusive ;  but  the  idea  that  no  such 
thing  exists  in  connection  with  brutes  as  memory  is 
absurd.  It  will  not  do  to  define  it  to  be  nothing 
more  than  mere  animal  sensibilities  affected  in  a 
certain  way.  To  say  that,  when  a  brute  has  been 
affected  in  a  given  manner,  the  same  sensations  are 
reproduced  in  him  when  under  similar  circum- 
stances, and  the  same  actions  are  repeated,  is  ac- 
knowledging, in  substance,  the  very  fact  which  is 
intended  to  be  refuted  by  transferring  the  power  of 
memory  from  any  thing  like  spirit  or  mind  in  brutes 
to  mere  sensations  or  sensibilities  which  can  not 
be  within  and  of  themselves  inert  matter ;  and  if 
we  have  to  acknowledge  some  spiritual  power  con- 
nected with  brutes — and  to  this  issue  we  are  driven 
whether  we  desire  it  or  not — then  we  can  have  no  dif- 
ficulty in  believing  that  this  superadded  or  superior 
spiritual  nature  can  exercise,  to  a  limited  extent,  the 
power  of  memory,  and  just  such  a  memory  as  the 
wise  Author  of  their  being  saw  best  adapted  to  them 

as  brutes. 

32* 


m  ^ 


378       EXTENT    OF    MENTAL    INTIMATIONS. 

SECTION  IX. 
1.  A  Jiorse  can  reooUect  the  road  in  returnincr  to 
his  home  from  a  distant  country.  We  have  an  ac- 
count of  a  horse,  owned  by  an  itinerant  minister  in 
this  country.  In  one  part  of  his  circuit  he  always 
turned  off  from  the  highway,  along  a  path  at  a  cer- 
tain tree.  After  the  lapse  of  seven  years,  he  was 
returning  along  the  same  highway ;  when  he  came 
to  the  same  tree,  the  horse  turned  off  with  an  enliv- 
ened speed,  and  it  was  with  difficulty  that  he  could 
be  turned  back  to  the  road.  Such  facts  are  common 
to  those  who  travel  with  horses.  To  account  for 
such  evidences  of  memory  and  knowledge  in  any 
other  way  than  that  of  real  memory,  and  real  knowl- 
edge, in  a  limited  extent,  existing  in  connection 
with  the  existence  of  brutes,  is  impossible.  2.  We 
are  compelled  to  helieve  that  in  brutes  there  is  an  act- 
ive^ living  principle  which  in  itself  is  not  and  can 
not  be  matter.  However  revolting  this  may  be  to 
unthinking  minds,  let  them  meet  the  case  with  argu- 
ments and  facts,  and  we  will  submit  the  whole  mat- 
ter at  once.  3.  Then,  is  there  any  thing  more  upon 
which  we  can  ground  a  belief  that  brutes  have  spir- 
its ?  We  will  say,  first,  that  we  have  no-  evidence, 
from  any  source,  which  clearly  shows  that  they  have 
no  spiritual  nature,  but  there  appears  to  be  soyne 
additional  evidence  proving  that  they  have. 


SECTION  X. 

1.  The  term  ruach^  as  it  is  used  in  the  Hebrew 
Bible,  when  applied  to  human  beings,  mijans  the 


EXTENT    OF    MENTAL    INTIMATIONS.       379 

soul ;  but  the  same  term  is  used  in  Scripture  in 
regard  to  beasts,  and  means,  without  doubt,  the 
spirit,  or  soul.  But  there  are  other  terms  which 
detine  the  great  difference  which  exists  between 
the  human  soul  and  the  soul  of  the  beast.  It  is 
clear  that,  from  the  meaning  of  the  term,  men  have 
souls,  and  that  beasts  have  souls.  The  difference 
appears  to  be  also  defined,  that  the  human  soul  was 
made  for  God,  and  it  was  intended  that  he  should 
be  its  portion ;  that  it  should  return  to  him  and  enjoy 
endless  happiness ;  but  that  the  soul  of  the  beast 
was  adapted  to  this  lower  world,  and  is  to  derive  its 
happiness  from  it.  2.  If  the  brute  has  a  spirit^  or 
90vl^  will  not  that  spirit,  or  soul,  exist  forever  f  Wq 
may  base  an  argument  on  this  position  upon  the 
fact  of  the  indestructibility  of  matter,  or  that  we 
have  no  proof  that  any  property  of  matter  can  or 
will  ever  cease  to  be.  We  have  seen  that  all  matter 
is  under  the  influence  of  change  only  by  reason  of, 
or  in  connection  with,  the  existence  and  effect  of 
sin.  When  the  world  was  made  it  was  holy,  and 
we  can  but  believe  that  it  was  designed  to  continue 
so  forever.  If  this  be  true,  then  it  follows  that 
when  the  effect  of  sin  is  wholly  removed,  all  mate- 
rial elements  will  still  exist,  and  never  to  be  annihi- 
lated. If  this  be  true,  it  is  reasonable  to  infer  that 
the  spirit  of  brutes,  which  we  have  seen  differs  from, 
and  to  be  superior  to  matter,  will  exist  forever,  and 
that,  in  connection  with  their  bodies,  immortalized 
in  the  restoration  of  all  things.  3.  Does  it  not  ap- 
pear reasonable,  that  if  beasts  existed  before  the 
fall  of  man,  they  were  pure  in  nature  and  free  from 
servitude;  and  that  they  were  designed  to  be  happy 


380       EXTENT    OF    MENTAL    INTIMATIONS. 

forever  ?  If  their  sufferings  and  death  were  brought 
upon  them  by  man,  and  are  the  results  of  sin,  what 
can  be  their  condition  and  state,  when  sin  and  its 
effects  are  wholly  removed,  but  that  of  happiness 
and  life?  If  the  brute  suffers  innocently  it  is  only 
reasonable  to  suppose  that  they  will  be  restored.  4. 
It  is  impossible  for  us  to  conceive  that  an  all-wise 
Being  would  create  beasts  for  the  purpose  of  cmni- 
hilating  them  at  some  future  time.  If  they  had 
been  created  suffering  and  dying  before  the  fall, 
then  we  might  have  room  to  doubt;  but  as  they 
were  originally  pure  and  happy,  it  is  reasonable  to 
suppose  that  such  will  be  their  condition  in  the  final 
restoration. 


INTUITIONS.  881 


CHAPTER  III. 

INTUITIONS. 

SECTION  I. 
1.  By  mental  intuition  is  understood  a  natural 
internal  power  which  acts  in  perceiving  realities. 
It  is  the  act  by  which  the  mind  perceives  the  agree- 
ment or  disagreement  of  two  or  more  ideas,  or  real 
facts  or  truths,  the  moment  they  are  presented.  It 
is  the  power  of  perceiving  facts  immediately,  with- 
out the  intervention  of  reason,  arguments,  or  testi- 
mony. It  presents  truths  to  the  mind  on  bare  in- 
spection, and  this  simple  inspectipn  is  knowledge. 
2.  This  intuitive  i)Ower  has  its  origin  in  connection 
with  the  primary  elements  of  the  mind.  Here  phi- 
losophical inquiries  must  pause,  as  we  can  go  no 
further  back  than  original  elements.  3.  Several  of 
the  primary  elements  of  mind  may  be  regarded  as 
intuition  faculties ;  but  there  are  no  powers  of  our 
being  more  closely  connected  with  the  origin  of 
intuitions  than  consciousness  and  conscience.  4. 
In  tJie  reciprocal  relations  of  intuitions  it  is  impos- 
sible for  them  to  be  opposed  to  each  other.  They 
appear  to  arise  as  perfect  spontaneities  of  empirical 
order.  They  are  simple  in  their  origin,  being  free 
from  all  contingent  influences  which  may  follow; 
and  it  is  impossible  for  the  intuition  faculties  to  be 
opposed  to  each  other,  or  to  the  different  intuitions 
which  arise  in  connection  with  each  one  or  all  of 


1382  INTUITIONS. 

them,  as  there  can  be  nothing  in  the  philosophy  of 
mind  anterior  to  those  primary  elements  which  lie 
at  the  foundation  of  mind. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  Ideas  arise  in  the  mind  in  connection  with  the 
existence^  nature,^  and  power  of  original  elements. 
When  intuitions  arise  they  are  immediately  followed 
by  the  action  of  the  judgment,  in  discriminating 
difference  and  resemblance,  which  presupposes  the 
presence  of  consciousness,  and  afterward  they  are 
embraced  by  the  understanding  and  reason.  Thus, 
ideas  may  be  said  to  commence  with  the  notice  the 
mind  takes  of  intuitions  in  conditioning  them,  and 
in  amplifying  or  changing  them  from  the  concrete 
to  ideas  known  to  exist  either  as  entities  combined 
or  abstracted.  2.  Simple  ideas  arise  wiiJwut  nat- 
ural classification.  It  requires  a  special  action  of 
mind  in  evolving  them  as  objects  of  reason,  and  in 
combining  or  in  eliminating  from  the  original,  sim- 
ple concrete.  3.  General  ideas^  or  notions^  may 
arise  in  connection  with  simple  or  even  eliminated 
ones.  We  may,  in  the  first  instance,*have  the  per- 
ception of  a  tree  without  any  general  idea  of  more 
at  first  than  a  specific  tree ;  but  the  perception  of  a 
second  tree  is  succeeded  by  the  suggestion  of  a  third 
or  more,  till  the  judgment,  discriminating,  causes 
the  mind  to  be  led  in  contemplating  an  extended 
number  of  trees.  The  same  process  will  hold  good 
in  regard  to  other  objects. 


INTUITIONS.  383 

SECTION  III. 
1.  Spontaneous  dction^  or  developments  of  the  in- 
telligence, are  those  which  exist  in  the  mind  ante- 
rior to  attention  and  a  full  apprehension  of  them ; 
but  a  correct  and  distinct  apprehension  of  objects 
depends  upon  attention ;  for,  till  the  mind  gives  at- 
tention to  them,  they  can  not  be  properly  appre- 
hended, and  be  inspected  or  considered,  in  which 
they  become  the  objects  of  reason  and  judgment. 
But  there  are  states,  or  intuitive  motions  or  affirma- 
tions of  mind,  which  exist  anterior  to  any  act  of 
attention.  iSuch  internal  motions,  states,  or  affirma- 
tions, which  become  objects  of  the  motion  and  di- 
rection of  attention,  are  spontaneous  eliminations 
or  developments  of  intuitive  power.  2.  When 
spontaneous  developments  are  sujjiiciejiily  appre- 
hended  to  secure  attention^  then  the  full  apprehen- 
sion of  them,  in  connection  with  which  they  are 
conditioned  and  decided  upon,  is  voluntary  as  well 
as  the  exercise  of  those  other  powers  in  receiving 
them  as  knowledge;  but  the  manifestations  or  de- 
velopment of  spontaneities  previous  to  the  voluntary 
action  of  the  power  of  apprehension,  attention,  and 
judgment,  must  be  regarded  as  involuntary.  We 
can  only  be  said  to  have  merely  a  consciousness  of 
them,  and  also,  from  the  act  of  apprehending  them, 
that  something  must  have  had  an  anterior  existence. 
3.  In  connection  with  the  action  of  these  internal 
spontaneous  affirmations  is  the  intuitive  conviction 
of  self,  and  by  reason  of  such  action  is  the  mind 
revealed  to  itself,  and  its  real  existence  becomes 
knowledge.     4.  Though  a  hnowledge  of  self  is  ye- 


384:  INTUITIONS. 

vealed  by  reason  of  these  spontaneities,  acting  out 
or  from  natural  intuitive  power,  yet  the  character 
of  self  must  begin  with  apprehension,  attention,  i-e- 
flection,  and  consideration.  Under  the  inspection 
and  decisions  of  the  mind  the  process  is  continued, 
and  our  knowledge  matured,  after  our  existence  has 
been  first  affirmed  by  natural  or  spontaneous  intui- 
tions. 


SECTION  17. 

1.  Instinct  is  that  jpower  or  disjposition  of  mind 
by  which,  wholly  unaided  by  instruction  or  expeii- 
ence,  hriites  are  spontaneously  and  unerringly  di- 
rected in  self-preservation  ;  therefore,  instinct  is  not 
material  in  nature  or  existence,  but  it  is  spiritual, 
and  belongs  to  mind.  2.  It  has  been  admitted  that 
the  human  mind  is  capable,  and  that  it  does  possess 
instinctive  power.  This  power  or  disposition  of  the 
mind  arises  in  connection  with  intuitive  affirmations 
of  the  mind,  and  is  spontaneous  without  instruction, 
experience,  deliberation,  or  reasoning.  3.  If  this 
be  the  true  origin  of  instinctive  manifestations,  how 
can  we  so  distinguish  between  its  essential  nature 
and  action  and  that  of  mind  so  as  to  determine  that 
it  is  not  of  mind  ?  If  we  admit  the  existence  of  in- 
stinct, we  are  compelled  to  acknowledge  that,  wher- 
ever it  exists,  and  in  connection  with  the  origin  of 
all  such  existences,  there  is  mind,  or  a  soul ;  but 
the  order  or  character  of  such  a  mind,  or  soul,  must 
be  determined  by  the  facts  existing  in  connection 
with  it. 


COMMON    SENSE.  385 


CHAPTER  IV. 

COMMON    SENSE. 
SECTION  I. 

1.  Common  sense  may  be  regarded  as  the  process 
or  power  of  practical  judgment.  In  character  it  is 
regarded  as  that  which  is  sound  and  safe,  and  it  is 
efficient  in  directing  us  in  proper  deportment  and  to 
correct  action.  2.  It  may  be  defined  as  the  imme- 
diate or  instantaneous  decision  of  correct  reason. 
It  is  universally  appealed  to  as  a  correct  guide  in 
detecting  falsehood,  and  in  testing  that  which  is 
true,  and  so  presenting  the  same,  confirming  our 
confidence,  while  the  objects  of  its  power  and  action 
are  received  with  the  utmost  degree  of  certainty. 

3.  The  mental  process  which  results  in  that  to  which 
the  name  of  common  sense  is  applied,  appears  to  be 
controlled  and  modulated  by  certain  facts,  or  classes 
of  facts,  common  to  the  notice  and  experience  of  all 
minds  ;  and  there  is  a  peculiar  similarity  in  the  way 
all  minds  are  affected  and  influenced,  or  are  condi- 
tioned by  such  classes  of  facts.  The  sameness  as  to 
a  general  medium  in  which  many  minds  are  thus 
affected  and  guided,  forms  a  concentrated  equilib- 
rium of  practical  judgment,  which  is  common  to 
all  minds  in  apprehending  such  truths  or  facts,  and 
the  influence  they  thus  receive  in  common.  This 
process  gives  rise  to  what  is  caJled  common  sense. 

4.  Mental  affii^mations^  which  arise  in  connection 

S3 


386  COMMON    SENSE. 

with  the  same  order  or  classes  of  truths  common  to 
all  minds,  being  a  result  of  unaffected  reason,  forms 
the  peculiar  condition  and  sound  mental  action,  in- 
specting and  presenting  to  ns  those  events  or  facts 
which  we  immediately  depend  on  and  receive  as 
true.  Such  a  mental  process,  under  circumstances 
common  to  all  minds,  forms  the  basis  of  certain  ac- 
tion, and  in  connection  with  it  is  our  belief  of  real 
facts  or  events ;  therefore,  common  sense  becomes 
something  like  a  similar  and  medium  court  of  ap- 
peals common  to  all  minds,  and  by  which  much 
uniformity  of  action  among  all  classes  is  preserved, 
and  that  of  correct  sentiment  and  feeling.  It  is  the 
instantaneous  decision  of  reason  in  connection  with 
real  mental  affirmations. 


SECTION  II. 


1.  TJie  vivid  and  correct  exercise  of  this  mental 
power,  which  is  not  really  a  faculty,  is  of  the  utmost 
importance  in  constituting  a  well-regulated  mind. 
Some  minds  are  capable  of  being  called  great  and 
overwhelming  in  that  which  might  be  called  uncom- 
mon sense,  while  they  are  almost  entirely  destitute 
of  common  sense.  The  former  is  attended  with 
strong,  hasty,  and  ill-timed  efforts  or  action,  while 
the  latter  is  characterized  with  prudence  and  suc- 
cessful efforts  with  increasing  influence.  2.  The 
mental  action  or  power  called  common  sense  is  man- 
ifested by  no  appeal  to  casualities  or  assumption, 
but  it  commences  with  the  real  affirmations  of  the 
mind.  The  origin  of  its  action  is  not  with  external 
objects,  but  it  commences  whollj^  w^ithin  the  mind, 


COMMON    SENSE.  38^ 

in  connection  with  truths  apprehended,  and  the  im- 
mediate action  of  reason.  3.  Common  sense  is  not 
only  dependent  upon  the  power  and  correct  action 
of  reason  in  connecting  facts  necessary  to  final  re- 
sults, but  it  is  more  dependent  upon  a  well-balanced 
judgment.  Real  mental  affirmations  can  not  bo 
connected  with  the  true  facts  and  principles  of  com- 
mon sense  till  they  are,  by  a  proper  discrimination, 
classified,  combined,  or  abstracted,  which  is  the 
work  of  the  judgment.  In  this  way  all  the  facts 
connected  with  any  subject,  or  class  of  objects,  are 
carefully  considered,  and  contribute  their  proper 
weight,  while  the  mind  is  deciding  upon  any  sub- 
ject or  course  of  action.  The  mass  of  mankind,  in 
different  ages  of  the  world,  have  been  appealed  to, 
and  have  heard  almost  every  variety  of  contradict- 
ory views  and  doctrines;  yet  they  were  not  and  are 
not  compelled  to  adopt  any  extreme  by  falling  back 
upon  that  uniformity  which  is  found  in  the  general 
medium  called  common  sense.  4.  The  reality  of 
common  sense  involves  a  general  understanding  of 
facts^  notions,  and  feelings  evident  in  themselves, 
which  are  the  objects  of  the  judgment,  giving 
strength  to  belief  and  direction  to  our  action.  In 
the  very  nature  of  this  power  there  appears  to  be  a 
healthy  action  of  the  various  faculties  concentrating 
in  a  common  consent  to,  and  a  correct  understand- 
ing of  that  which  is  true  of  the  thousands  of  facta 
and  events  which  are  present.  This  process  appears 
to  be  common  to  all  minds,  and  forms  a  medium  in 
the  judgment  and  for  the  action  of  the  masses. 
Then  it  is  peculiar  to  the  office  of  common  sense  to 
direct  in  solving  questions  from  our  experience  in, 


-Wfimmmm 


\  -W  ip'vp 


COMMON    SENSE. 


and  knowledge  of  past  and  present  truths ;  and  it 
is,  in  reality,  a  combination  of  solutions  to  questions 
forming  a  basis  or  power  in  judging  and  acting  cor- 
rectly. 


SECTION  III. 
1.  Jff^  common  sense  he  affirmations  common  to  all 
ininds^  and  that  these  are  inunediately  connected 
with  the  exercise  of  reason  and  judgment,  then  it 
can  not  be  absent  in  any  mind,  or  such  a  mind  must 
act  almost  by  accident,  and  always  appear  to  be  un- 
settled and  unhappy  in  the  midst  of  contentions,  or 
when  surrounded  by  storms.  2.  Common  sense 
directs  in  correct  investigations^  and  is  a  guide  to 
truth.  Its  aid  in  the  detection  of  error  is  of  the 
utmost  importance.  An  appeal  may  be  made  to 
this  power  with  full  assurance,  and  with  confidence 
of  certain  success.  We  can  not  have  confidence  in 
the  correctness  in  any  process  or  conclusions  which 
are  perfectly  contradictory  to  it,  as  the  lapse  of  time 
and  the  bestowment  of  more  thought  almost  inva- 
riably reveals  some  error  or  absurdity.  This  power 
must  have  its  place,  and  exercise  its  influence  in  the 
mind,  or  we  are  soon  wild  with  extravagance  and 
endless  delusions.  To  think  of  ever  or  of  really 
feasting  the  immortal  mind  in  extended  fields  of 
mere  assumptions  and  conjecture,  is  only  to  be 
always  deluded,  and  rendered  unfit  for  that  which 
is,  good  or  honorable  within  the  range  of  that  re- 
quirement which  will  not  tolerate  impurity.  3.  This 
power,  so  indispensably  connected  with  a  well-reg- 
ulated mind,  may  he  cultivated  and  rendered  more 


COMMON    SENSE.  389 

efficient  in  directing  to  proper  conclusions.  This 
may  be  done  by  carefully  attending  to  the  process 
or  reasoning,  and  the  true  and  correct  discrimina- 
ting power  of  the  judgment.  Repeated  efforts  should 
be  made,  litidei*  delil)erate  reflection,  to  compare  and 
properly  weigh  all  the  facts  present,  which  form  an 
aggregate  union  or  equilibrium  force  of  agreement, 
which  may  be  regarded  as  a  safe  basis  or  ground  of 
confidence  or  belief,  in  regulating  our  decisions  and 
action.  Common  sense  is  an  invaluable  treasure  of 
the  soul,  and  wherever  it  exists  the  mind  is  capaci- 
tated for  undisturbed  happiness  and  great  useful- 
'UOAS  in  the  world. 


^m$ 


I J I     III!    wnmm 


piiiWiiiiiiJP 


CHAPTER  I. 

VOLITION. 


SECTION  I. 
1.  YoLiTioN  has  been  regarded  as  the  power  of 
willing  or  of  determining.  Under  the  just  and 
equitable  laws  by  which  the  Creator  governs  the 
work  of  his  hands,  volition  is  essential  to  the  exist- 
ence of  sentient  beings  of  high  moral  destiny.  This 
power  is  very  closely  connected  with  the  existence 
and  nature  of  the  entire  faculties  of  the  mind,  or 
soul.  2.  It  is  also  defined  to  be  the  act  of  willing 
and  the  act  of  deteriinining  choice^  or  of  forming 
purposes  to  be  carried  out  by  the  action  of  the  whole 
mind.  We  shall  see  that  this  subject  is  of  the  high- 
est importance,  and  that  it  has  been  trammeled 
under  the  power  and  influence  of  prejudice  and 
imperfect  reasoning  for  ages,  and  that,  without  a 
clear  and  correct  knowledge  of  it,  the  writer  and 
speaker  will  always  be  embarrassed  in  presenting 
and  in  enforcing  some  of  the  most  important  truths 
connected  with  our  happiness  in  this  life,  and  our 
felicity  in  a  peaceful  immortality.  3.  A  president 
of  one  of  our  western  colleges,  favorably  and  exten- 
sively known,  defined  volition.^  in  a  baccalaureate 
address,  in  substance  as  follows :  "  Volition  in  man 
390 


voLiTioir.  391 

is  that  power  which  moves  his  body.  That  it  has, 
in  whole  or  in  part,  any  power  or  influence  over  the 
mind,  is  a  doctrine  we  think  long  since  lost  in  obliv- 
ion." How  are  students  to  gain  correct  ideas  of 
mental  powers  from  such  instruction  ?  It  would  be 
far  better  for  them  to  trust  their  own  cogitations 
and  the  books,  without  any  other  means  of  instruc- 
tion upon  the  subject.  If  volition  has  power  to 
move  matter,  and  has  no  power  or  influence  over 
the  mind,  then  it  is  neither  matter  nor  immaterial  in 
its  nature.  If  matter  it  would  be  inert,  and  if  it 
was  of  mind  it  would  act  with  the  mental  powers, 
and  have  power  and  influence,  otherwise  it  would 
not  have  the  power  to  move  the  body.  4.  Volition 
is,  in  nature,  freedom  within  itself.  It  has  power 
of  and  within  itself  to  act  or  refuse  to  act.  This  is 
implied  in  the  use  of  the  very  term,  its  meaning, 
and  the  nature  of  the  power  it  is  intended  to  repre- 
sent. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  There  is  or  there  is  not  such  a  power  as  voli- 
tion. If  there  is  no  such  power,  then  all  arguments 
about  it  are  unmeaning ;  but  the  existence  of  such 
a  faculty  or  power  has  been  acknowledged  by  gen- 
eral consent;  therefore,  if  there  is  such  a  mental 
power,  it  is  characterized  by  its  nature,  oflSce,  and 
its  relation  to  other  faculties  or  powers.  So  far  as 
it  can  be  defined,  its  existence  is  real,  and  its  nat- 
ural power  to  act  within  and  of  itself  is  untram- 
meled.  2.  The  doctrine  that  volition  is  only  and 
simply  the  "<JkJ^"of  the  will,  or  that  the  "will  is  the 


d9S  VOLITION. 

mental  power  or  suseeptibility  by  which  we  put 
forth  volitions,"  and  admit  such  volitions  to  be  sim- 
ple action,  can  not  be  clearly  sustained;  for  action  is 
only  action*  and  if  we  say  the  will  has  power  to  act, 
then  volition  w^^ould  be  lost  in  the  same  action,  unless 
•we  w^ere  to  say  it  was  a  secondary  or  double  action 
in  one.  But  this  would  be  absurd;  therefore,  we 
claim  that  there  is  a  more  extensive  and  deeper 
meaning  to  be  attributed  to  volition  than  simple 
will-act  or  will-action.  3.  If  volition  be  only  sim- 
jde  action^  such  action  may  be  applied  to  the  ac- 
tion of  water,  or  of  the  atmosphere,  with  as  much 
propriety  as  it  can  be  to  the  action  of  the  will,  if  its 
reality  is  wholly  dependent  upon  the  action  of  the 
will ;  therefore,  we  must  understand  volition  to  have 
a  far  more  important  meaning  than  that  which  has 
been  given  to  it  by  the  preceding  statement.  4. 
Volition  can  not  be  any  thing  more  or  less  than 
an  internal  jpower  existing  naturally  of  self-freedom 
in  action.  No  power  of  the  mind  restrains  its  ac- 
tion, in  any  way,  by  an  authoritative  or  mandatory 
power,  or  by  an  unalterable  necessity.  It  is  a  power 
truly  volitive  in  its  essential  nature.  Its  action, 
naturally  within  itself,  is  unembarrassed,  forming  a 
basis  or  reason  why  sentient  beings  can  have  an 
existence ;  for  this  power  renders  us  capable,  freely 
of  and  within  ourselves,  to  render  praise  to,  and  to 
glorify  the  Creator;  and  this  design  could  not  be 
complied  with,  or  be  fulfilled  by  us,  unless  we  were 
constituted  with  liberty  to  either  render  such  hom- 
age or  to  refuse.  And  of  necessity  this  universal 
liberty  must  be  given,  or  the  great  object  of  man's 
creation  would  have  been  destroyed  by  law;  and, 


VOLITION.  398 

therefore,  his  existence  would  have  been  impossible; 
and  as  he  is  not  compelled  by  law  to  glorify  God, 
neither  is  he  legally  compelled  to  decline  or  refuse 
such  homage. 


SECTION  III. 
1.  Volitions  differ  from  volition  only  in  the  plu* 
rality  of  their  various  actions,  or  the  almost  simulta- 
neous eliminations  of  spontaneous  motion,  corre- 
sponding to  various  qualities  of  objects,  or  to  those 
entities  closely  combined.  2.  It  is  impossible  to 
give  a  true  definition  of  the  nature  of  volition  or  of 
volitions.  It  is  not  proper  to  say  they  are  simple 
states  of  mind,  or  that  they  are  either  mental  de- 
terminations or  conclusions;  for  they  are  still  more 
important,  and  lie  back  of  all  these.  The  moment 
we  appeal  to  conscience  and  our  experience,  we  are 
satisfied  as  to  the  existence  of  the  power  and  action 
of  volition,  though  the  nature  of  either  or  both  can 
not  be  defined.  Consciousness  appears  to  be  the 
test  power  in  relation  to  a  knowledge  of  many  influ- 
ences and  principles  of  internal  origin  ;  therefore, 
when  we  follow  a  subject,  or  fact,  till  the  analysis, 
by  means  of  reasoning,  is  lost,  or  can  go  no  further, 
then,  if  we  can  have  a  belief  in  realities,  grounded 
upon  the  approval  of  consciousness,  and  relatively 
strengthened  by  experience,  we  are  safe  in  our  be- 
lief in  such  existences,  and  should  not  yield  to  doubt 
without  being  influenced  by  a  new  class  of  intuitions 
and  convictions.  3.  Volition  may  exist  in  reference 
to  some  object  or  objects,  and  also  without  any  object. 
The  belief  that  it  can  not  exist  without  some  object, 


894  VOLITION. 

is  contrary  to  all  our  conceptions  of  its  nature  and 
office.  If  it  only  exists  with  an  object,  then  its  ex- 
istence is  either  an  accident,  as  an  object  may  or 
may  not  exist,  or  the  object  is  the  cause  of  its  exist- 
ence ;  therefore,  such  an  existent  has  its  origin 
wholly  in  or  in  connection  with  the  object  which 
may  be  inert;  but  this  is  absurd.  We  can  form  no 
correct  idea  of  it  only  by  the  aid  of  consciousness  : 
hence,  the  origin  of  our  knowledge  of  it  commences 
with  consciousness.  If  the  existence  and  action  of 
intuitions  are  spontaneous,  we  can  only  conclude 
that  volition  may  and  does  exist  and  act  without 
any  object ;  for  its  very  nature  is  freedom  and  self- 
authoritative  action ;  yet  it  has  power  also  to  act  in 
relation  to  objects.  4.  If  volition  can  not  exist  only 
in  relation  to  or  with  an  ohject^  then  it  follows  that, 
if  there  is  no  object  present,  volition  is  non-ex- 
istence. It  is  dependent  upon  the  presence  of  an 
object  for  its  real  being ;  therefore,  volition  may 
have  its  origin  in,  or  in  connection  with,  external 
material  entities.  This  position  is  false,  though  it  is 
a  correct  conclusion  drawn  from  the  statements  of 
some  writers.  The  existence  of  volition  is  not  de- 
pendent upon  either  the  existence  and  presence  of 
an  object,  or  any  ulterior  action  of  the  will;  it  is  a 
power  of  the  mind,  and  has,  from  its  nature  and 
action,  an  internal  origin,  and  is  not  a  casual  entity, 
wholly  dependent  upon  certain  contingencies  or  ab- 
stract action  for  its  being.  It  has  its  origin  in  con- 
nection with  the  existence  and  action  of  intuition 
faculties  and  intuitions.  5.  It  is  utterly  impossible 
for  volition  to  consist  only  and  wholly  in  the  action 
of  any  faculty  or  faculties  of  mind ;   for  then  its 


mi^«^9«iip  jii«  I  mm»  »   "■    t  ^ ' " 


volition;  395 

existence  would  be  an  accident,  as  such  faculty  or 
faculties  may  or  may  not  act;  and  if  such  action 
was  not  put  forth,  then  volition  could  not  be  called 
up  from  nonentity,  which  would  be  natural  to  it; 
and  if  it  could  be  thus  called  up,  then  each  appear- 
ing of  it  would  be  a  new  creation,  which  is  absurd, 
as  no  element  of  the  mind  has  power  to  create  an- 
other element  or  faculty.  The  definition  of  volition, 
as  it  has  been  given  by  a  majority  of  writers,  ia 
based  upon  assumptions,  without  one  clear  and  con- 
clusive argument  or  fact  given  in  favor  of  such  a 
definition ;  for  if  volition  is,  in  nature,  only  action, 
then  the  very  idea  of  action  implies  something  capa- 
ble of  acting ;  otherwise,  action  could  not  exist  and 
volition  would  not  and  could  never  have  an  ex- 
istence. '»    fnH  MOT  -TiWOf 


SECTION  lY. 

1.  Volition  can  cmd  does  exist  of  and  within  its  own 
essential  nature;  and  such  real  existence  is  inde" 
pendent  of  all  contingent  entities.  It  exists  either 
with  reference  or  without  any  reference  to  what  we 
believe  to  he  in  our  power.  The  latter  consideration, 
which  may  be  the  object  of  belief,  can  neither  cre- 
ate nor  annihilate  the  abstract  existence  of  volition 
as  belonging  to  and  existing  in  the  mind ;  and  the 
action  of  belief  has  nothing  to  do  in  originating 
this  internal  power.  2.  The  exercise  or  action  of 
volition  can  exist  either  in  reference  to  or  without 
any  reference  to  what  we  believe  to  be  in  our  power ; 
for  the  very  nature  of  this  internal  power  is  self-lib- 
erty of  motion  or  action;  and  though  such  action 


39^  VOLITION. 

may  be  restricted  or  varied  by  opposing  causes,  yet 
these  are  not  necessitated  laws  authoritatively  im- 
posed upon  it  by  its  Author.  In  nature  it  is  still 
real,  and  possessed  of  spontaneous  action.  3.  Voli- 
tion is  one  thing,  and  volitive  action  is  another. 
The  former  is  an  abiding  jpower^  and  the  latter  may 
or  may  not  exist.  The  former  may  exist  without 
the  latter,  but  the  latter  can  not  exist  without  the 
former.  No  man  believes  that  he  can  fly,  yet  he 
has  power  to  desire  to  do  so ;  and  he  is  capable  of 
volitive  action  in  regard  to  it,  though  he  may  not 
make  the  effort,  and  he  may,  as  many  have  done  in 
the  past,  make  the  effort,  however  unreasonable  it 
may  be.  Yolition,  in  relation  to  any  impracticable 
thing,  or  results,  is  no  more  than  the  free  motion  of 
the  volitive  powder  toward  or  in  relation  to  them. 
"We  are  not  to  understand,  therefore,  that  volition 
implies  that  the  act  desired  is  actually  performed  in 
order  to  constitute  volitive  action ;  for,  in  that  case, 
it  would  appear  that  the  action  must  first  be  com- 
pleted, in  order  to  know  that  we  have  had  volition 
or  volitive  action. 


SECTION  v. 
1.  Volition  and  desire  are  not  one  and  the  same. 
The  former  may  exist  in  nature  independent  of  tlie 
latter,  and  it  may  act  in  reference  to  an  object,  or 
refuse  to  act.  It  can  also  act  from  its  liberty  in 
relation  to  inaccessible  objects,  or  those  we  do  not 
expect  to  obtain ;  yet  such  action  is  soon  suspended 
on  the  clear  apprehending  of  intervening  impossi- 
bilities; but  desire,  in  many  instances,  seems  to  be 


VOLITION.  39t 

undying  in  its  nature.  When  we  have  fondly  cher- 
ished our  desires  for  some  object  which  we  think 
might  reasonably  be  ours,  though  there  is  not  the 
slightest  possibility  of  realizing  the  object,  yet  we 
can  not  totally  suppress  our  desires.  2.  The  power 
of  volition  exists  in  tJie  nmid^  and  it  can  so  exist  at 
times,  and  under  certain  circumstances,  without  ac- 
tion ;  but  we  generally  understand  by  the  term  voli- 
tion this  power  acting  or  in  action.  The  desires 
have  no  authoritative  power  over  volition  in  con- 
trolling it;  yet  our  desires  have  their  influence  in 
inducing  volitive  action  in  the  direction  of  them. 

3.  Desire  is  no  more  than  an  emotion  or  excitement 
of  the  mind,  directed  to  the  attainment  of  some  ob- 
ject, or  a  mental  passion  existing  by  the  love  of 
some  object,  which  may  be  either  good  or  bad ;  but 
volition  inclines  or  influences  the  mind  to  act  in 
reference  to  objects,  whether  they  be  desired  or  not. 

4.  A  difference  between  desire  and  volition  can  be 
tested  by  consciousness.  We  can  experience  an 
internal  discovery  and  decision  of  the  two  exist- 
ences with  a  conviction  of  the  reality  of  that  which 
is  peculiar  to  the  nature  or  character  of  each  as 
clearly  distinct.  If  from  consciousness  and  experi- 
ence we  can  have  knowledge  of  such  powers,  with 
their  dissimilar  characteristics,  then  it  is  impossible 
for  us  to  ever  have  conceptions  of  them  as  one  and 
the  same.  These  differences  have  already  been  dis- 
cussed to  a  sufficient  length.  We  know  that  we 
often  have  volitions,  and  act  entirely  contrary  to  our 
desires.  Persons  may  desire  to  participate  in  some 
luxury,  pleasure,  or  gain  of  earth,  fraught,  to  some 
extent,  with  evil,  while  the  strength    of  such    de- 

34 


fPiiipn^.  ..j|f.ip  piii^p^ppp^pmipi 


398  VOLITION 


sires  are  overruled  by  the  volitive  power,  in  determ- 
ining and  in  pursuing  a  high  and  holy  Christian 
course. 


SECTION  VI. 
1.  Volition  differs  from  desire  in  its  power  of 
sudden  change,  and  its  controlling  power  over  it  or 
in  counteracting  it,  while  the  latter  can  not  readily 
change,  and  can  only  aflfect  the  action  of  the  former 
by  a  mild  influence,  inducing  action.  Volitions  can 
be  changed  with  the  rapidity  of  thought,  till  such 
changes  may  number  thousands  in  a  few  hours.  So 
rapid  is  this  process,  that  we  have  only  to  appeal  to 
the  action  of  this  power  as  it  is  experienced  in  each 
mind,  as  proof  or  knowledge  of  the  fact;  but  desire, 
though  it  may  be  attended  with  joy  or  heaviness  of 
spirit,  yet  it  can  not  be  easily  changed  under  certain 
circumstances.  The  traveler  from  home  may  desire 
to  return,  but  he  voluntarily  conquers  its  power  by 
pursuing  his  lonely  journey,  while  his  eyes  give  vent 
to  his  feelings  in  a  flood  of  tears.  That  man  who 
has  been  exposed  to  the  storms  of  maritime  life 
can  not  change  his  desires  to  see  his  loved  friends 
at  home,  having  been  long  absent  from  them.  No 
person  who  is  rocked  on  ocean  waves,  in  returning 
from  some  transmarine  country,  can  cease  to  eherisli 
a  thrilling  desire  to  see  his  home  and  dearest  friends 
in  his  native  land.  2.  If  the  power  of  volition 
necessarily  acted  in  conformity  with  our  highest  or 
strongest  desire^  we  would  be  destitute  of  any  rule 
of  morality,  which  would  be  capable  of  restraining 
from  any  evil  a  depraved  nature  could  wish  ;  but 


VOLITION.  399 

conscience  furnishes  correction  to  evil  desires  by 
dictating  that  which  is  right  and  that  which  should 
be  done.  In  this  way  conscience  furnishes  motive 
to  volition,  but  in  no  case  can  it  command  or  control 
it ;  and  if  the  presence  of  correct  motive  is  wholly 
dependent  upon  conscience  and  consciousness  as 
that  which  is  proper  for  volitive  action,  and  that 
neither  conscience  nor  consciousness  has,  by  nature, 
power  to  authoritatively  govern  the  volitive  power, 
then  it  is  absolutely  certain  that  motive  furnished 
by  them  can  not  peremptorily  govern  or  control  voli- 
tion, or  the  will,  under  any  circumstances;  there- 
fore, motive  may  and  can  invoke  volitive  action,  but 
never  can  command  its  action :  heuce,  such  an  idea 
is  not  only  without  proof,  but  it  is  clearly  absurd 
within  itself.  3.  There  is  a  vast  difference  in  the 
condition  or  character  of  motive  furnished  by  the 
elements  of  mind,  which  lie  at  the  foundation  of 
moral  action,  and  that  which  is  furnished  by  our 
propensities  or  passions.  The  former  is  presented 
in  counter-distinction  to  impure  influences,  while 
the  latter  corresponds  with  the  corruption  of  our 
fallen  and  depraved  natures ;  and  to  pursue  it  or  to 
be  led  by  it  is  delusion  and  hopeless  despair.  4. 
Intellectual  and  moral  beings  are  capable  of  being 
led  hy  ^ure  motive^  and  such  motive  is  furnished 
by  those  mental  powers  which  lie  at  the  foundation 
of  moral  action.  Without  the  development  of 
these  powers  of  moral  action,  man  would  be  like 
the  brute,  led  by  desires  which  correspond  to  and 
act  in  conformity  with  mere  animal  nature;  but, 
possessed  of  moral  susceptibilities,  we  have  light 
to  act  correctly,  and  if  we  refuse,  guilt  is  the  result. 


400  VOLlTI02f. 

And  when  we  voluntarily  act  in  reference  to  any 
object,  we  have  an  immediate,  internal  conviction 
as  to  whether  it  be  right  or  wrong. 


VOLITION,  4M, 


CHAPTER  II. 

VOLITION,   CONTINUED. 
SECTION  I. 

1.  The  volitive  power  is  manifested  with  various 
degrees  of  st/rength.  Like  other  mental  powers,  it 
may  be  strongly  or  vigorously  developed  in  some 
minds,  while  others  appear  to  possess  not  so  much 
of  strength  or  degrees  of  power ;  and  this  power,  in 
the  same  mind,  may  be  more  vivid  or  energetic  at 
some  times,  and  under  some  circumstance^  than 
others.  This  waning,  so  far  as  it  is  manifested  in 
the  latter  case,  may  arise  from  a  confused  or  wearied 
state  of  mind,  or  a  diseased  physical  nature  may 
trammel  its  action;  but  the  former  difficulty  may 
exist  in  the  natural  conditio^?  of  the  mental  consti- 
tution. 2.  The  same  degrees  of  difference  may  be 
applied  to  the  force  of  the  action  of  the  volitive 
power.  Action  may  be  either  weak  or  strong,  and 
the  force  of  such  action  must,  necessarily,  depend 
upon  the  original  power  to  act;  for  without  such 
power  action  would  be  wholly  an  accident,  if  it 
could  possibly  have  an  existence.  The  different 
degrees  of  force  connected  with  it  are  similar,  in 
particular  respects,  to  those  connected  with  the  ac- 
tion of  other  powers  of  the  mind.  A  knowledge  of 
these  differences  or  degrees  can  be  readily  appre- 
hended or  determined  by  an  appeal  to  conscious- 
ness, in  which  we  feel  satisfied  that  what  we  realize 

34* 


4^2  yOLITION. 

is  true,  and  our  belief  is  unshaken ;  yet  these  de- 
grees may  be  varied  by  other  causes  than  those  im- 
mediately connected  with  the  immaterial  nature — 
the  incursive  defects  or  diseases  of  the  body  may 
have  either  a  direct  or  remote  influence.  3.  The 
action  of  the  volitive  power  becomes  vivid  and 
strong  in  proportion  to  the  strength  of  our  feelings 
and  desires  in  relation  to  or  for  any  object.  Though 
volitive  action  may  take  place  in  regard  to  any  ob- 
ject of  our  wish  or  desires,  yet  it  is  not  naturally 
dependent  upon  them  for  such  action.  We  have 
seen,  from  its  nature,  that  it  has  power  to  act  either 
with  or  without  such  desires,  and  also  with  or  with- 
out any  special  object.  4.  Volitio'/i  differs  from 
feeling.  The  former  is  the  power  of  free  or  liberty- 
action,  and  its  leading  characteristic  is  motion  or 
action,  and  not  emotion  or  feeling:  hence,  volitive 
action  is  not  necessitated  by  preference,  feeling,  or 
ijesire ;  it  has  power  to  act  either  in  connection  with 
them  or  wholly  without  them.  We  should  be  very 
careful  always  to  distinguish  between  those  powers 
which  lie  at  the  foundation  of  mental  action,  and 
those  which  lie  at  the  foundation  of  moral  action. 
The  nature  of  volition  is  clearly  different  from  the 
moral  sensibilities. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  Volition  relates  to  self-action^  both  as  it  relates 
to  body  and  mind.  The  body  may  move  volunta- 
rily or  involuntarily,  yet  it  can  be  made  to  move  or 
be  set  in  motion  by  volitive  power.  We  may  de- 
termine to  put  forth  action  of  the  bodily  powers 


VOLITION.  ^m 

^.netantaneously,  or  that  it  shall  be  done  at  a  certain 
epoch  in  the  future.  The  mind  can  act  either  with 
or  without  any  physical  motion.  In  this  way  the 
mind  can  act  in  arranging  any  process  of  future  or 
contemplated  events  or  facts.  It  is  diflScult  to  ex- 
press the  liberty  and  limitlessness  of  the  volitive 
power.  It  is  peculiar  in  nature  to  itself,  and  can 
not  be  arbitrarily  trammeled  by  preference,  desires, 
or  motive.  In  its  essential  nature  and  existence  it 
is  free  from  all  of  them ;  yet  its  action  may,  in  a 
contingent  way,  be  influenced  by  them.  2.  We 
have  seen,  by  the  preceding  argument,  that  volition, 
in  its  nature,  embraces  more  than  mere  action^  being 
a  power  capable  of  action,  and  at  liberty  to  act  in 
any  way  independently  of  other  powers  of  the 
mind.  It  may  and  can  be  influenced  in  acting  by 
other  internal  powers,  but  such  action  can  not  be 
compelled  by  contingent  or  external  causes.  We 
have  demonstrated  that  mere  action  can  not  exist  if 
there  is  nothing  capable  of  acting :  hence,  the 
very  term  volition  implies  the  action  not  of  non- 
existence, but  of  something  capable  of  motion  or 
action.  "We  have  seen  that  volition  is  not  desire, 
and  that  the  essential  existence  of  the  former  is  not 
dependent  upon  the  latter;  neither  can  the  latter 
authoritatively  originate  the  former.  It  may  exert 
an  influence  upon  it,  but  can  never  compel  volitive 
action.  3.  Volition  differs  from  choice.  If  our 
liberty  consists  wholly  and  only  in  our  power  of 
acting  according  to  choice,  then  choice  must  inva- 
riably precede  action,  and  be  the  cause  of  such  ac- 
tion ;  therefore,  we  can  not  commit  crime  till  we 
first  choose  to  do  so,  neither  can  we  do  a  righteous 


1 


4M  VOilTION. 

act  till  we  choose  so  to  do ;  but  when  a  variety  of 
objects  are  presented  to  us  at  the  same  time,  we  can 
have  no  voluntary  mental  action  of  any  kind  in 
comparing  the  properties  or  preferable  qualities  of 
them,  in  order  to  choose  which  we  prefer,  till  we 
first  choose  to  know  that  we  can  apprehend  differ- 
ences in  them,  and  that  we  can  choose  to  originate 
mental  action  in  apprehending  their  existence  at 
all.  This  is  absurd.  Choice  can  never  give  origin 
to  the  volitive  power.  It  may  have  a  contingent  or 
persuasive  influence  upon  its  action,  but  it  can  do 
no  more.  4.  Volitive  liberty  is,  within  itself,  the 
power  of  acting  or  7iot  acting,  and  that  either  with 
or  without  choice.  Choice  has  no  creative  power 
by  which  volition  is  a  mandatory  result.  Man's 
free  agency  consists  not  in  the  power  to  originate 
volition,  but  in  the  liberty  of  which  such  a  power  is 
naturally  constituted.  If  this  liberty  is  destroyed 
by  necessity,  then  our  existence  has  never  taken 
place,  as  we  would  have  no  self-power  to  volunta- 
rily glorify  the  Author  of  our  being;  and  we  can 
have  no  conception  that  such  an  infinitely-wise  and 
holy  Being  could  ever  have  been  employed  in  crea- 
ting intellectual  and  inert  blanks  to  adorn  the  per- 
fection of  limitless  creation ;  therefore,  liberty  is 
essential  to  our  existence. 


SECTION  III. 

1.  Volition  is  anterior  to  choice;  for  choice,  in  its 

very  nature,  implies  the  possibility  of  a  different  or 

opposite  selection  to  that  which  is  made.     Then  if  a 

different  selection  could  hg-ve  been  made,  the  power 


VOLITION.  405 

and  liberty  of  such  selecting  must  necessarily  exi&t 
anterior  to  choice,  and  the  selection  made;  there- 
fore, choice  can  not  exist  till  we  have  volitive  ac- 
tion, at  least,  in  connection  with  apprehending  the 
presence  of  objects  of  choice.  2.  There  is  an  cmte- 
cedent  volitive  power^  in  which  there  is  always  an 
alternative  to  that  which  the  mind  decides  on,  with 
the  consciousness  that  we  can  choose  either.  Thid 
is  a  liberty  we  can  not  doubt.  If  many  objects  aro 
presented  to  the  mind,  we  are  in  possession  of  the 
same  liberty  to  choose  or  not  to  choose  any  one  or 
class  of  them ;  and  to  deny  this  is  to  disorganize 
the  rational  mind,  raftering  in  darkness  the  can- 
opy of  its  being  and  future  hope  with  immovable 
conlines  and  eternal  clouds.  If  choice  can  not  pre* 
cede  volitive  action^  it  is  clear  that  it  can  not  pre- 
cede the  existence  of  the  volitive  power.  3.  Then 
it  follows  that  our  choice,  or  act  of  choosing^  is  free> 
being  opposed  to  any  thing  like  an  unchanging  ne- 
cessity. Volitions  can  exist  as  opposed  to  the  lawa 
over  matter  and  natural  causation,  and  even  t)ie 
laws  of  instinct.  Thus,  the  mind  has  volitive  power 
to  choose,  in  which  alternatives  are  disposed  of 
without  respect  to  any  natural  relationship,  ele- 
ments, or  of  cause  and  effect.  The  mind  of  man 
is  free  to  act  in  accordance  with  the  course  of  nat- 
ural laws  and  tendencies,  or  contrary  to  them ; 
and  this  same  liberty  exists  in  relation  to  imma- 
terial elements  and  laws.  Mind  is  free  in  its 
natural  existence,  or  liberty  of  action,  amid  all 
relations  and  laws  of  realities  around  him.  4. 
Yolition  is  possessed  either  of  self-freedom^  or  it  is 
under  the  law  of  fatal  necessity.     If  it  is  governed 


406  VOLITION. 

by  choice,  and  choice  is  an  effect  of  our  constitu- 
tional organization,  then  the  whole  mind  is  under 
the  law  of  necessity,  whether  it  be  regarded  in  a 
primary  or  a  secondary  point  of  light.  It  has  been 
asserted  that  we  are  free,  or  are  at  liberty  to  act  ac- 
cording to  choice ;  but  we  have  seen  that  volition  is 
anterior  to  choice,  and  that  choice  is  dependent  on 
it  for  existence.  Sentient  beings  have  self-power  to 
act  as  opposed  to  natural  tendencies  and  physical 
laws.  The  wheels  of  an  extensive  manufactory 
tend  to  rest,  but  they  can  all  be  thrown  into  motion 
by  the  great  water-wheel,  which  yields  to  the  weight 
of  water,  according  to  the  law  of  gravitation.  Tiie 
force  of  this  law  is  the  cause  or  necessity  of  action. 
If  man  acts  only  under  the  law  of  necessity,  then  it 
is  the  law  which  is  accountable  for  either  good  or 
bad  deeds,  as  it  is  wholly  the  cause  of  every  act  of 
every  order  or  kind.  The  idea  and  the  possibility 
of  choice,  without  the  possibility  of  a  different  or  a 
contrary  choice,  is  utterly  impossible ;  and  this  lib- 
erty to  choose  is  anterior  to  choice,  and  is  only  found 
in  connection  with  intuitive  power. 


SECTION  IT. 
1.  Another  y^Z^^  proposition  is,  that  "motives  are 
causes,  of  which  volitions  are  effects."  It  is  again 
asserted  that  "  every  volition  has  a  motive,  and  if 
the  motive  be  single,  which  operates  upon  the  will, 
such  motive  will  determine  it ;  but  if  there  are  sev- 
eral operating  upon  it  at  the  same  time,  the  strong- 
est one  will  determine  the  will-action."  It  would 
appear  that  no  proposition,  or  propositions,  could  b€ 


V^OLITION.  40(| 

much  more  unreasonable  or  absurd.  2.  Motive 
may  be  regarded  as  tJiai  which  has  power  to  invoke 
will-action;  and  when  wo  speak  of  it,  in  connection 
with  volition,  we  do  not  saj  motive  is  action,  but  it 
is  that  which  invokes  action  of  the  volitive  power; 
otherwise,  motive  and  volitive  action  would  be  on^ 
and  the  same.  If  motive  is  not  volition,  then  it  can 
only  influence  the  mind  to  action  in  a  secondary 
wa}^;  for  it  is  clear  that,  as  it  is  not  volition,  it  can 
not  act  either  as  or  for  volition,  but  it  is  rather  a 
contingent  object  or  influence  inducing  volitions. 
Then,  in  all  cases,  volitive  power  must  exist  anterior 
to  motive,  and  motive  can  not  and  does  not  have 
any  authoritative  power  over  it.  All  that  it  can  do 
is  to  invoke  volitive  action,  which  may  be  granted 
or  refused  at  the  pleasure  of  the  will.  3.  The  origin 
and  arrangement  of  motive,  or  motives,  presujpposes 
and  proves  the  pre-existence  and  action  of  the  voli- 
tive power.  If  we  can  pre  arrange  motives  to  pro- 
duce in  the  mind  certain  volitions,  then  the  determ- 
ining to  make  such  pre-arrangements  is  a  volition, 
which  volition  must  exist  previous  to  motive,  as  its 
being  is  a  prelude  to  the  origin  and  arrangement  of 
motive.  Motive  can  exist,  in  the  order  of  time, 
after  volition;  but  motive,  in  the  human  mind,  can 
never  precede  and  give  origin  to  the  power  of  voli- 
tion. 4.  Volitions  are  spontaneous^  and  can  exist 
independent  of  motive,  and,  in  many  instances, 
without  being  influenced  by  it  in  the  slightest  de- 
gree. Like  intuitions,  they  can  exist  and  become 
connected  with  the  action  of  other  powers  of  the 
mind ;  so  there  is  nothing  like  chance  or  irrational- 
ity in  regard  to  them  while  connected  with  sentient 


40§  VOLITION. 

beings.  We  know,  from  the  preceding  argument, 
that  motive  can  only  have  a  secondary  or  an  ulterior 
influence  upon  volition.  The  same  principle  applies 
to  mind  in  general.  The  relation  of  cause  and  ef- 
fect, when  referred  to  the  acts  of  the  divine  Being, 
destroys  all  law  of  motive- control.  Such  a  law,  then, 
could  not  exist  unless  by  Divine  volition.  Then,  if 
he  could  act  once  without  motive-infl.uence,  he  could 
continue  doing  so  forever:  hence,  motive  <jan  not 
authoritatively  control  either  mind  or  volition. 


VOLITION.  #fe 


CHAPTER  III. 

VOLITION,   CONTINUED. 

SECTION  I. 
1.  Motive  can  not  cont/ivl  the  Divine  mind.  Dr. 
Edwards,  in  trying  to  sustain  the  doctrine  of  mo- 
tive, gives  lis  to  imderstand  that  the  ''''energy  of 
motives  exists  in  the  natm*e  of  things  anterior  to  the 
will  of  God."  Mr.  Upham  says  that  "the  supreme 
Being  is  inevitably  governed^  in  all  his  doings,  by 
what,  in  the  range  of  events,  is  wisest  and  best." 
Thus,  he  is  inevitably  subordinate  to  that  which  is 
superior  in  control,  and  which  governs  him ;  there- 
fore, motive  is  superior  to  every  thing,  and  it  gov- 
erns all  beings  in  the  vast  universe.  If  the  above 
propositions  be  true,  the  sovereign  Ruler  of  the  uni- 
verse, or  of  universal  being,  is  the  energy  of  motives. 
This  conclusion,  if  true,  or  if  we  could  believe  it  to 
be  true,  would  compel  us  t  j  adopt  Atheism  as  an  in- 
evitable result ;  but  we  have  seen  already  the  ab- 
surdity of  all  such  statements,  in  the  fact  that  voli- 
tion in  mind  any  where  is  anterior  to  motive,  and 
that  motive  never  can  originate  volitive  power,  nor 
authoritatively  control  any  of  its  acts.  2.  Such  a 
high  motive-law  leads  to  materialism;  for  the  mind 
could  not  move  only  as  it  was  influenced  by  motive, 
and  in  the  same  direction,  and  to  the  same  degree, 
with  motive-influence.  Then,  if  the  volitions  of  the 
mind  should  be  operated  upon  by  two  or  more  mo- 

35 


.lilJp.NIHJilMP^IIII 


PIPP 


410  VOLITION. 

lives  of  the  same  or  equal  importance  in  every  way, 
the  mind  must  cease  to  act,  and  remain  at  rest  for- 
ever ;  therefore,  mind  would  become  inert,  and  if  so 
it  would  become  insensible,  as  sensation  would  im- 
ply action,  and  action  could  not  take  place.  Deity 
in  wisdom  placed  fixed  laws  over  the  material  uni- 
verse, but  he  has  placed  self-moving  and  imperisha- 
ble minds  under  very  different  laws;  and  it  only 
requires  plain,  common  perception  in  order  to  dis- 
cern the  difference.  3.  It  is  utterly  impossible  to 
establish  a  conclusion  that  rrwtive  governs  volition^ 
without  reasoning  in  a  circle.  If  we  ask  certain 
philosophers  what  controls  and  determines  the  voli- 
tions, they  answer  that  it  is  the  strongest  motive. 
But  what  constitutes  the  strongest  motive?  They 
say,  that  which  determines  the  volitions.  And  they 
can  not,  neither  dare  they  travel  beyond  this  circle ; 
otherwise,  this  high  law  of  motive  is  broken  or  sev- 
ered forever. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  That  volitions  are  authoritatively  controlled 
and  determined  by  either  motive  or  choice  is  di- 
rectly opposed  to  the  consciousness  of  mankind.  Of 
nothing  are  we  more  competent  to  judge,  or  are  we 
more  thoroughly  prepared  to  decide,  than  that  the 
volitive  power  lies  back  of  both  motive  and  choice; 
and  nothing  do  we  know  with  more  absolute  cer- 
tainty than  in  regard  to  the  action  of  the  volitive 
power,  as  to  whether  it  is  necessitated  or  free. 
Evidence,  reported  to  the  mind  through  the  medium 
of  the  senses,  may  deceive  us,  from  the  fact  that  the 


VOLITION.  411 

physical  organs  connected  with  the  senses  may  be 
affected  or  even  paralyzed  by  disease ;  but  an  appeal 
to  consciousness  is  an  end  to  all  controversy  or  doubt. 
Its  evidence  can  not  be  increased  within  itself,  and 
its  testimony  is  direct  without  the  frailty  of  inter- 
vening material  nerves,  tending  to  paralysis  and  de- 
cay. If  it  be  unreasonable  to  doubt  evidence  or 
testimony  from  external  objects,  it  is  infinitely  more 
unreasonable  and  absurd  to  doubt  our  consciousness 
or  its  evidence.  Its  voice  is  without  contingencies, 
or  the  possibility  of  deception,  and  to  doubt  its  un- 
erring truthfulness  is  to  be  coerced  into  universal 
doubt  and  skepticism.  2.  In  the  unerring  truthful- 
ness of  consciousness,  we  feel  and  know  that  our  ac- 
tion in  choice,  and  even  in  the  selection  of  correct 
motive  from  evil,  is  not  arbitrary^  hwi  free;  and  we 
can  no  more  doubt  it  than  we  can  the  consciousness 
of  self  as  a  reality.  In  calling  up  our  past  acts 
which  were  evil,  we  feel  that  we  were  free  at  the 
time  to  have  acted  differently:  hence  the  responsi- 
bility and  accountability,  a  sense  of  which  we  could 
not  feel  if  our  acts  were  necessitated.  If  we  intend 
to  do  WTong,  at  a  certain  time  in  the  future,  we  feel 
that  it  is  positively  in  our  power  to  avoid  such  an 
act,  and  consequently  we  feel  and  know  we  shall 
incur. guilt,  a  sense  of  which  we  could  not  have  if 
our  volitions  were  controlled  and  determined  by 
either  choice  or  motives.  3.  The  untrammeled  lib- 
herty  of  our  volitions  is  clearly  established,  from  the 
fact  that  the  existence  of  consciousness  in  man  pre- 
vents him  from  being  effectually  reasoned  out  of  a 
sense  of  his  accountability.  They  who  have  faith- 
fully tried  to  extinguish   this   internal  light,  have 


412  VOLITION. 

found  it  to  be  like  smuggling  subterraneous  iires, 
the  accumulation  of  which  suddenly  rends  every 
obstruction  with  the  throes  of  an  earthquake.  The 
reason  is  plain.  We  are  more  absolutely  conscious 
of  the  liberty  of  our  volitions  in  acting  right  or 
wrong,  than  we  can  be  of  any  law  of  motives  or 
even  as  to  whether  they  can  have  any  existence  at 
all.  We  can  have  no  aense  of  remorse  for  any  act, 
however  bad,  without  consciousness.  While  we  feel 
that  our  evil  acts  are  freely  our  own,  we  experience 
condemnation ;  but  if  our  acts  are  not  wholly  volun- 
tary, it  is  impossible  to  feel  that  we  have  done  wrong. 


SECTION  III. 
1.  We  are  more  vividly  conscious  of  the  sensa- 
tions or  feelings  we  experience  in  choosing,  and  in 
voluntarily  choosing  motive,  than  we  can  be  even 
of  the  real  objects  of  choice,  or  of  that  which  gives 
rise  to  motives.  When  many  motives  influence  the 
mind,  such  influence  implies  a  previous  voluntary 
action,  which  must  take  place  in  apprehending  tlie 
presence  or  existence  of  such  motives.  The  strong- 
est among  many  motives  can  not  be  determined  till 
a  previous  voluntary  action  takes  place:  first,  in 
apprehending  them;  and,  secondly,  in  comparing 
them,  in  order  to  determine  upon  the  preferable  or 
strongest  one;  otherwise,  the  strongest  one  could 
never  be  known  to  the  mind,  as  such  motive  or  mo- 
tives have  not  self -power  to  make  themselves  known 
to  the  mind.  2.  There  is  a  difference  between  re- 
solving to  act  according  to  the  strongest  motive, 
after   it  is   voluntarily   discovered,  and   in   acting 


VOLITION 


i^ 


from  fatal  necessity.  In  the  very  act  of  yielding  to 
the  strongest  motive,  after  we  have  voluntarily  de- 
termined it,  we  distinctly  feel,  in  the  resolving  to 
conform  to  it,  that,  at  the  same  time,  we  are  entirely 
able  and  free  to  resolve  on  a  different  course.  While 
standing  on  the  projecting  rocks  of  Niagara  Falls,  I 
may  determine  not  to  throw  myself  over,  and,  at 
the  same  moment,  feel  that  I  am  able  and  can  leap 
over  and  fall  into  the  abyss  below.  From  an  inter- 
nal conscientious  sense,  I  know  that  I  am  perfectly 
free  to  either  result,  and  to  doubt  it  is  utterly  impos- 
sible. In  all  cases  we  have  a  distinct  consciousness 
of  a  power  to  act  either  in  accordance  with  motives 
or  in  direct  opposition.  3.  If  motives  control  and 
determine  the  volitive  power,  we  are  "unable  to  find 
any  well-founded  and  sound  arguments  establishing 
such  a  result ;  but  when  the  mind  falls  back  upon 
the  spontaneous  afiimiations  arising  in  the  depths 
of  its  inner  being,  we  teel  and  know  that  we  are 
free  from  any  law  of  fatal  necessity.  4.  The  strong- 
est motive  affecting  the  mind  is  embraced  in  the 
law  of  self  preservation ;  yet  we  feel  and  know  that 
it  depends  upon  ourselves  whether  we  may  adhere 
to  such  a  law  or  not.  It  is,  with  us.  to  become  obe- 
dient to  the  rules  or  laws  of  health,  or  to  be  inten- 
tionally reckless  of  them,  or  we  are  at  liberty  to 
destroy  life  by  violence;  but  if  we  were  compelled 
to  this  by  motive,  the  act  would  be  perfectly  harm- 
less, as  we  have  seen,  according  to  the  law  of  neces- 
sity, maintained  by  others,  in  which  they  hold  that 
motive  governs  the  entire  universe ;  but  this  is  ab- 
surd. 

86* 


414  VOLITION. 

SECTION  IV. 
1.  The  law  of  motive-necessity  is  contrary  to  the 
conscious  feeling  and  acts  of  mankind  in  general. 
All  claim  to  refer,  in  some  way,  to  right  and  wrong, 
reward  and  punishment,  merit  and  demerit.  There 
is  a  universal  feeling  prompting  to  reward  him  who 
does  right,  and  to  punish  the  transgressor.  This 
universal  conformity  of  belief,  conduct,  and  actions, 
which  are  regulated  according  to  an  internal  con- 
scious feeling  of  liberty,  in  which  we  know  that 
they  can  be  correct  or  the  reverse,  according  to  the 
freedom  of  the  volitive  power,  forever  destroys  any 
necessitated  restrictions  upon  our  spontaneous  voli- 
tions. 2.  Yolitions  are  spontaneous  and  free^  from 
the  fact  that  there  is  a  universal  conviction  experi- 
enced in  the  human  mind  that  our  former  course  of 
conduct  or  acts  might  have  been  different  from  what 
they  have  been  or  are.  E'o  further  proof  is  neces- 
sary, further  than  to  attend  to  our  feelings  when  we 
recall  to  mind  the  imperfections  of  our  past  acts. 
"With  deep  regret  we  feel  that  they  might  have  been 
right,  or  very  different  from  what  they  are.  This 
conscious  regret  is  evidence  that  we  could  have 
acted  differently;  for  if  the  acts  of  our  past  lives, 
however  wrong,  were  necessitated,  it  would  be  ut- 
terly impossible  for  us  to  experience  any  regret  in 
regard  to  them  ;  but  having  such  regret,  or  remorse 
of  feelings,  is  positive  proof  that  our  acts  are  volun- 
tary. If  others  commit  crime,  it  is  impossible  for 
us  to  feel  guilty  of  their  offenses ;  and  so  it  is  with 
us.  If  motive  controls  us  into  crime,  we  are  inno- 
cent, and  can  not  feel  remorse;  for  the  crime  or  guilt 


VOLITION.  41fr 

is  wholly  in  the  motive  which  controlled  us,  and  was 
the  cause  of  that  which  was  wrong.  3.  The  remem- 
brance of  past  acts  is  attended  with  a  conviction  or 
consciousness  the  most  positive,  that,  in  the  same 
condition,  or  under  identically  the  same  circum- 
stances, our  volition  and  acts  might  have  been  pre- 
cisely the  reverae  of  what  they  were.  In  the  recall- 
ing of  any  act,  the  consciousness  of  our  power  to 
have  voluntarily  determined  and  acted  differently 
will  be  distinctly  recalled  in  connection  with  the 
act,  and  the  one  is  as  clearly  vivid  as  the  other.  If 
we  are  certain  that  we  have  ever  had  action  of  the 
volitive  power,  we  are  equally  as  conscious  and  cer- 
tain that  we  were  free,  and  at  liberty  to  have  willed 
and  acted  to  the  reverse  of  such  action.  4.  In  de- 
ciding upon  the  acts  of  others,  we  have  a  conscious 
sense  of  that  which  is  right  or  wrong.  These  con- 
victions arise  from  a  consciousness  of  mental  lib- 
erty. We  have  an  unerring  conviction  that  all 
offenders  might  act  differently  if  they  would ;  hence 
their  condemnation ;  for  if  we  could  feel  and  believe 
that  their  acts  w^ere  necessitated,  it  would  be  impos- 
sible to  censure  them  for  any  act.  Therefore,  the  fact 
that  we  feel  justified  in  condemning  that  which  is 
wrong  in  others,  is  conclusive  proof  that  we  have 
an  intuitive  and  spontaneous  conviction  that  voli- 
tions are  controlled  or  determined  by  no  other  fac- 
ulty or  power  of  the  entire  mind. 


SECTION  Y. 
1.  This  conscious  sense  of  liberty  is  evidenced  in 
regard  to  acts  of  present  time.     If  a  variety  of  ob- 


416  VOLITION. 

jects  are  presented  to  the  mind,  we  know  that  we 
have  power  to  collect  any  one  of  them,  or  any  class ; 
and  by  this  act  of  volition  the  object  or  motive  is 
distinguished  and  selected,  in  connection  with  which 
we  can  act,  continue  to  act,  or  refuse  to  act  at  any 
time.  We  are  just  as  conscious  that  we  naturally 
possess  this  liberty-power  as  we  can  be  that  there 
are  any  real  entities  in  the  universe.  2.  The  doc- 
trine that  "motive  produces  volition,  and  that  volition 
produces  the  act,  and  all  the  circumstances,  taken 
together,  constitutes  the  motive,"  is  only  favored 
with  words  and  confusion  of  thought.  It  is  a  speci- 
men of  that  continuous,  argumentative  circle  which 
is  adopted  by  all  who  vindicate  the  laws  of  Vitality. 
Volition  is  antecedent  to  choice,  and  choice  is  ante- 
rior to  motive.  3.  Volition  may  be  regarded  as 
spontaneous  liberty-power  of  action  in  any  way, 
though  this  power  may  not  be  exerted  in  action.  4. 
It  is  the  power  of  motion  in  determining  an  action 
within  itself,  and  in  relation  to  other  things,  though 
the  action  of  the  mind  toward  or  in  reference  to 
such  objects  may  not  be  completed.  5.  It  is  the 
power  of  action,  of  determining  action^  and  of  en- 
forcing action  under  the  full  meaning  of  the  will. 
6.  The  ground  of  our  accountability  exists  in  the 
possession  of  a  liberty-power  to  do  right,  and  to  re- 
frain from  evil  or  wrong.  No  where  can  we  find  the 
ground  of  accountability  beyond  the  fact  and  nature 
of  voluntariness.  We  are  satisfied  tliat  man  is  ac- 
countable for  all  his  voluntary  acts,  and  we  are 
equally  as  well  satisfied  that  he  is  not  accountable 
for  any  thing  beyond  this ;  therefore,  if  our  volitions 
are  controlled  and  ciX>/rced  by  any  law  or  infiueuce 


VOLITION.  417 

in  the  range  of  thought,  then  free  will  and  all  ac- 
countability ceases  together,  and  our  ideas  of  obli- 
gation, right  and  wrong  tend  to  fatal  deception.  7. 
Man  naturally  possesses  volition,  and  he  is  capable 
of  volitive  action,  or  oi  jpuUing  forth  volitions.  If 
he  is  not  capable  of  voluntary  action,  then  it  is  need- 
less to  exhort  him  to  action  in  order  to  do  right ;  for 
he  has  no  power  to  act.  If  we  could  ascertain,  by 
some  process,  what  the  sovereign  motive-power  was, 
then  it  would  be  reasonable  to  appeal  to  that;  for 
man  is  passive,  while  the  motive  power  is  the  whole 
action  and  cause  of  action.  Indeed,  it  would  be 
useless  to  let  man  know  any  thing  about  duty,  as 
motive  must  do  all  and  is  accountable  for  all ;  there- 
fore, if  he  should  not  act  he  is  clear,  and  the  whole 
blame  is  with  the  motive-power,  which  governs  him. 
But  we  have  pursued  this  topic  far  enough.  The 
human  mind  exists  in  perpetual  or  unending  freedom. 
By  its  self-power  of  action,  under  its  present  rela- 
tions to  its  Author,  it  either  rises  to  happiness  and 
heaven,  or  forces  its  way  into  gloomy  despair. 


i..Wi^  SECTION  yi. 

1.  Mr.  Stewart  says  that  "  will  properly  expresses 
that  power  of  the  mind  of  which  volition  is  the 
act."  If  volition  is  only  the  act  of  the  will,  why 
call  it  volition  ?  for  the  act  of  the  will  is  the  act  of 
the  will,  and  it  is  no  more  or  less.  If  will  has  real 
action,  it  would  be  foolish  presumption  to  say  that 
volition  was  the  same  action,  and  only  the  same,  in 
essence  and  action ;  yet  this  would  be  the  case  if 
volition  is  the  action  of  the  will;  but  this  is  false. 


418  VOLITION. 

Then,  if  volition  be  only  the  action  of  the  will,  and 
is  dependent  upon  such  action  for  its  origin,  and 
can  not  be  the  action  of  the  will,  as  the  will  is 
acknowledged  to  have  its  own  action,  it  must  be 
an  accidental  and  superadded  action,  which  may 
have  a  casual  being,  and  then  sink  into  annihila- 
tion ;  but  this  is  absurd.  2.  Then  we  must  come  to 
a  more  rational  conclusion  that  volition  can  not  exist 
only  as  action,  unless  there  is  something  capable  of 
moving  or  acting.  The  very  idea  of  action  implies 
a  power  capable  of  acting ;  therefore,  volition  is  a 
power  of  the  mind  capable  of  motion  or  action.  3. 
Mr.  Upham  says  the  will  is  "  the  mental  power,  or 
susceptibility,  by  which  we  put  forth  volitions." 
This  amounts  to  about  the  same  thing  as  that  given 
by  Mr.  Stewart.  But  it  would  stand  thus  :  that  vo- 
lition, or  the  act  of  the  will,  is  that  which  puts  forth 
the  act  of  the  will.  Who  can  understand  such 
logic?  Here  comes  again  the  same  old  hackneyed 
argumentative  circle,  the  last  resort  of  every  philos- 
opher who  attempts  to  chain  or  fatalize  the  free  and 
imperishable  human  mind !  4.  Yolition  and  the 
will  are  not  distinct  powers  of  the  mind,  neither  are 
they  co-ordinate  branches  of  any  mental  power. 
One  can  not  give  rise  to  the  other,  nor  are  they  de- 
pendent upon  each  other  for  existence.  The  two 
terms  refer  the  mind  to  the  different  conditions  and 
degrees  of  strength  naturally  connected  with  and 
contained  in  the  one  intellectual  power.  5.  The 
term  volition  refers  the  mind  to  the  natural  liberty- 
power,  essentially  free  to  act  in  any  way  or  manner 
corresponding  to  the  nature  of  such  freedom.  6. 
The  term  will  refers  the  mind  to  the  same  mental 


VOLITION.  41^ 

power  of  action,  embracing  not  only  its  primary 
spontaneity,  bnt  involves  an  idea  of  its  higher  de- 
grees of  strength,  and  authoritative  and  mandatory 
power,  not  only  in  giving  origin  to  action,  but  in 
continuing,  contracting,  and  in  compelling  action. 
All  the  difference  that  need  be  referred  to  in  this 
place,  in  the  meaning  of  the  two  terms,  is  embraced 
in  the  nature  of  the  condition  of  the  one  power  in 
its  varied  manifestations.  We  now  enter  upon  the 
analysis  of  the  wiU  in  its  more  extensive  manifesta- 
tions, and  will  define,  in  brief  form,  its  relation  to 
other  faculties  of  the  mind. 


»iS# 


^u- 


liHsion  CfodftJ. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE      WILL. 

SECTION  I. 
1.  The  will  is  that  faculty  of  the  mind  by  which 
we  determine  either  to  do  or  forbear  an  action.  It 
is  an  inherent  power  or  faculty  which  we  exercise  in 
deciding  among  two  or  more  objects,  as  to  which  we 
shall  choose  or  pursue.  Its  very  nature  precludes 
the  necessity  of  an  extensive  analysis ;  therefore,  we 
do  not  feel  called  upon  to  amplify  by  following  the 
example  of  previous  writers,  taxing  the  time  and 
toils  of  the  student  in  examining  a  general  variety 
of  subjects,  having  only  a  very  remote  and  common 
relevancy  to  the  important  doctrine  of  the  will ; 
yet  we  desire  to  involve  in  the  argument  more  facts 
intimately  connected  with  the  doctrine  of  the  will 
than  can  be  found  in  any  one  work  now  extant.  2. 
The  will,  in  its  very  nature^  is  the  liberty-power  of 
the  mind.  The  peculiar  condition  of  its  essential 
being  is  the  nature,  which  is  self-freedom  and  self- 
power  of  action.  3.  It  is  not  only  free  in  its  very 
nature,  but  it  has  determining  power,  deciding  in 
the  mind  that  something  shall  be  done  or  forborne ; 
and  it  possesses  mandatory  power,  leading  to  such 
mental  action  as  will  be  effectual,  or  will  secure  cer- 
420 


THE    WILL.  421 

tain  results.  4.  The  mind  is  coni/r oiled  by  the  will 
in  a  sense  superior  to  the  nature,  office,  or  capability 
of  any  other  faculty  or  power  of  the  mind.  This 
will  more  fully  appear  when  the  nature,  office,  and 
power  of  the  will  are  examined  in  connection  with 
other  faculties  which  are  closely  connected  with  it. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  The  will  is  closely  connected  with  the  judg- 
ment^ and  can  be  and  is  often  influenced  by  it ;  yet, 
while  the  latter  can  discriminate  and  decide  upon 
realities  or  facts,  it  requires  the  presence  of  the  will 
in  determining  or  in  compelling  action.  The  judg- 
ment can  only  act  in  relation  to  truths ;  and  when  it 
decides,  such  decision  is  knowledge ;  but  the  mind 
is  wholly  free  to  act  or  to  forbear  action.  But  when 
we  will  to  secure  that  which  is  the  object  of  decis- 
ion, the  powers  of  the  mind  are  directed  to  the 
work  necessary  to  be  accomplished.  2.  The  under- 
standing cam,  not  control  the  will.  It  has  power 
to  contain  or  embrace  all  that  is  necessary  to  be 
brought  under  the  inspection  of  the  mind,  and,  in 
this  way,  it  can  go  no  further  than  to  invoke  volitive 
action.  3.  Reason  may  connect  the  different  steps, 
or  a  chain  of  facts,  from  the  premises  to  the  result, 
but  it  has  no  authority  over  the  will  in  causing  ac- 
tion. Its  power  is  under  the  control  of  the  will,  by 
which  its  action  can  be  continued  or  suspended  at 
pleasure.  Its  process  may  aid  in  inducing  volitive 
action,  but  never  can  command  such  action.  4.  We 
understand  by  the  term  will  a  commanding  power^ 
or  a  power  which  can  direct.  The  under^anding 
86 


THE    WILL. 


appears  to  contain  or  embrace  all  that  is  necessary 
to  be  furnished  for  immediate  mental  action ;  the 
judgment  determines  which  is  preferable,  while  it 
is  the  province  of  the  will  to  decide  on  which  to 
pursue,  and  to  act  in  relation  to  that  which  is  the 
object  of  such  decision. 


SECTION  III. 
1.  We  object  to  the  order  of  the  "classification 
of  the  mental  powers,"  according  to  the  arrange- 
ment of  some  writers,  upon  the  nature  of  the  will. 
A  fine  specimen  of  seemingly-unintentional,  though 
intentional,  design  may  be  detected  in  the  assump- 
tion, that  "  a  knowledge  of  the  will  implies  a  pre- 
liminary knowledge  of  the  intellect;"  and  that  such 
"  knowledge  implies  a  preliminary  knowledge  of 
the  sensibilities."  This  arrangement  will  claim  that 
we  have  knowledge  of  the  existence  and  action  of 
several  faculties  as  anterior  to  our  knowledge  of  the 
will,  thereby  fixing  a  previous  basis  containing 
laws  governing  the  will.  The  absurdity  of  this 
arrangement  will  be  clearly  defined  hereafter.  2. 
To  define  the  relation  of  the  will  to  other  faculties, 
or  to  all  of  them  combined,  in  order  to  find  some 
one  or  a  combined  influence  as  a  law  or  laws  of  the 
will,  by  which  it  may  be  and  is  governed,  is  wholly 
unnecessary,  as  the  very  nature  and  relation  of  the 
will  to  all  the  other  powers  of  the  mind  will  forever 
preclude  any  idea  of  the  correctness  of  such  con- 
fused positions  and  argumentation.  3.  Feeling^ 
ihiriking^  and  willing  are  three  faculties  distinct 
from  each  other.     They  have  been  known  as  the 


THE    WILL.  423 

sensibility,  intellect,  and  the  will.  All  sensitive 
states  and  feelings  are  referred  to  the  first;  all  ip- 
tellectual  operations  are  referred  to  the  second ;  all 
mental  determinations  are  referred  to  the  tliird. 
These  three  powers  of  the  mind  are  clearly  distinct, 
and  all  that  is  embraced  under  each  one.  The  will 
is  distinct  from  all  other  powers.  It  is  improper  to 
call  an  act  of  the  will  either  a  thought  or  feeling. 
It  is  a  determination  or  act  peculiar  to  itself  or  its 
nature.  4.  "  Laws  of  the  wiU  "  constitute  a  heading 
for  lengthy  arguments,  according  to  some  writers. 
The  term  law  implies  not  only  the  power  to  rule, 
but  a  power  which  does  control  or  direct.  If  phi- 
losophers, in  using  "laws  of  the  will,"  intend  to 
convey  the  idea  that  the  will  is  governed  by  any 
law,  or  laws,  beyond  its  own  nature  and  being,  it 
will  be  necessary  for  us  to  call  on  them  for  more 
light. 


SECTION  lY. 
1.  No  material  element,  or  elements,  anterior  to 
the  existence  of  will  in  the  human  mind,  can,  of  or 
within  themselves,  contain  any  law  or  laws  possess- 
ing action  y  and  if  inertness  would  be  essential  to 
the  nature  of  such  existences,  they  could  have  no 
power  over  the  will.  2.  If  they  intend,  by  the 
"  laws  of  the  will,"  to  say  that  the  IoajOs  which  Deity 
has  fixed  over  the  material  universe  have  power  to 
control  the  will,  then  mind  is  matter,  and  the  will 
within  itself  is  inert;  but  this  is  false.  3.  It  can 
not  be  possible  that  they  refer  to  the  existence  and 
controlling  power  of  the  divine  Being ;    for  they 


4M  THE    WILL. 

could  not  call  such  an  existence  the  "laws  of  tlie 
will,"  and  if  they  do,  it  would  follow  that  he  is  the 
action  of  our  wills,  and  we  are  both  passive  and  not 
accountable.  4.  It  can  not  be  that  they  refer  to  any 
other  faculty  of  the  same  finite  mind ;  for  it  would 
be  just  as  improper  for  any  faculty  to  have  volitive 
power  to  act  in  the  place  of  and  for  the  will,  as  it 
would  be  for  the  will  to  act  for  itself.  The  will  has 
power  of  action,  and  does  act,  in  its  own  capacity, 
without  calling  any  other  faculty  or  faculties  to  act 
for  it. 


NATURE    OF    THE    WILL.  125 


CHAPTER  II. 

.  NATURE  OF  THE  WILL. 

SECTION  I. 

1.  We  have  already  seen  that  '•''laws  cf  the  voiU^'^ 
as  contained  in  some  works  on  mental  philosophy,  can 
not  exist,  or,  if  it  is  possible  for  such  to  be  real  exist- 
ences, the  human  mind  is  incapable  of  having  any 
satisfactory  knowledge  of  them.  2,  The  will  is  gov- 
erned hy  its  own  law^  and  from  its  nature  it  is  im- 
possible that  any  other  faculty  or  faculties  should 
control  it;  and  if  the  other  powers  of  the  mind  have 
no  authoritative  power  to  control  it,  then  it  is  absurd 
to  say  that  any  object  selected,  by  the  mind  can  con- 
tain power  to  govern  the  will.  3.  "  Contingent  ac- 
tion of  the  will^^  implies  the  continued  being  and 
power  of  action  as  possessed  by  other  faculties  of 
the  mind,  and  that  volitive  action  is  accidental.  If 
the  action  of  the  will  is  wholly  accidental,  then 
there  is  no  abiding  or  real  principle  capable  of 
being  called  the  will.  Then,  if  the  will  is  contin- 
gent, or  only  exists  in  action,  it  follows  that,  when 
such  action  is  suspended,  the  will  is  annihilated ; 
but  contingent  volitive  action,  as  taught  by  many, 
is  false,  and  is  resorted  to  only  for  the  purpose  of 
destroying  the  liberty-power  of  the  will.  4.  If  the 
mind  has  power  to  act  within  and  of  itself,  the  con- 
dition of  such  power  is  freedom,  or  liberty ;  other- 
wise, no  action  could  take  place  without  an  impingi 
86* 


426  NATTJKE    OF    THE    WILL. 

ing  cause.  And  if  action  is  compelled,  in  any  way, 
or  by  any  power,  beyond  the  identity  of  self,  then 
action  is  caused  by  such  an  influence  or  power. 
Then  that  which  causes  mental  action  is  that  which 
acts  while  the  mind  is  passive  or  wholly  inactive; 
but  if  the  mind  has  self-power  to  act,  it  is  reasonable 
to  suppose  that  it  possesses  some  faculty  capable  of 
acting,  or  of  determining  action.  It  is  just  as  rea- 
sonable to  suppose  that  the  will  possesses  such  voli- 
tive  power  as  to  refer  such  power  to  any  other  fac- 
ulty or  influence. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  The  doctrine  that  the  ''''will  lias  its  laws  prelim- 
inary to  that  of  its  freedom^''  as  taught  by  Mr.  Up- 
ham,  and  others,  is  clearly  incorrect.  Under  this 
proposition,  it  is  assumed  that  "the  will  is  subject 
to  laws."  An  argument  to  prove  this  is  drawn  from 
the  fact  that  all  things  in  the  universe  are  subject  to 
law,  and  that  the  mind  of  man  can  not  be  regarded 
as  an  exception.  This  general  blending  is  very  ob- 
jectionable. Why  was  there  not  a  distinction  made 
between  the  laws  governing  the  inert  part  of  the 
universe,  and  the  laws  governing  the  intellectual 
and  immortal  soul  ?  If  an  uplifted  rock  is  ponder- 
ous, and  will  naturally  gravitate  to  the  earth,  is  that 
conclusive  proof  that  the  soul  is  ponderous,  and  that 
it  must  naturally  and  always  obey  the  same  law  of 
gravitation?  If  so  we  are  undone  forever.  2.  The 
decision  having  been  made,  by  Mr.  Upham,  and 
others,  that  "  the  will  is  subject  to  laws^^  then  they 
io,ake  this  deduction :   ''Hhe  freedom  of  the   will^ 


NATURE    OF    THE   WILL.  431" 

wTiatever  may  he  its  nature^  rmbst  accommodate  itself 
to  this  preliminary  fact?'^  Here  we  have  at  least 
the  will  fatal ized  under  the  infinite  law  of  necessity. 
But  for  this  desired  result,  the  "immortal"  work  of 
Mr.  Edwards,  Upham,  and  others,  would  probably 
not  have  been  so  amplified  in  the  order  of  careful 
argumentation.  While  it  is  our  happy  privilege  to 
profit  by  all  that  has  gone  before,  we  would  humbly 
beg  leave  to  give  reasons  for  our  belief  and  views 
of  the  doctrine  of  the  will.  3.  The  argument  seems 
to  stand  thus:  The  will  is  subject  to  and  is  governed 
by  laws,  and  that  the  freedom  of  the  will  is  the 
"liberty  of  acting"  under  and  according  to  the  na- 
ture and  requirements  of  such  laws.  These  laws 
are  regarded  as  being  infinite,  and  all  they  require 
is  of  infinite  necessity.  This  system  of  philosophy 
teaches  and  enforces  the  doctrine  of  free  will,  which 
is  our  "freedom  or  liberty  "  to  act  according  to  neces- 
sity. This  view  of  free  will  is  absurd,  as  correct 
arguments  will  show.  4.  We  have  already  seen 
that  the  will  is  not  subject  to  such  laws ;  and  it  will 
be  remembered  that  "  laws  of  the  will  "  have  been 
assumed,  without  any  attempt  to  define  them,  of 
any  one  of  them.  The  first  position  assumed  was, 
that  a  knowledge  of  the  will  implied  a  previous 
knowledge  of  other  powers  of  the  mind.  If  that  be 
true,  it  does  not  follow  that  those  previously-known 
powei-8  were  laws  governing  the  will ;  for  the  very 
nature  of  those  powers,  as  specified  by  them,  would 
forever  refute  such  a  position.  The  next  general 
position  is,  that  "  the  will  has  its  laws  preliminary 
to  that  of  its  freedom."  Here  "laws"  are  assumed 
without  telling  us  what  they  are.     We  will  now  pro- 


428  NATURE    OF    THE    WILL. 

ceed  to  notice  those  things  which  have  been  specif- 
icallj  mentioned  and  pointed  out  by  them  as  gov- 
erning the  will. 


SECTION  III. 

1.  The  will  may  he  influenced  hy  desire^  but  it 
can  never  be  controlled  by  desire,  or  desires,  only  in 
a  subordinate  way.  The  doctrine  that  the  will  is 
authoritatively  controlled  by  desire,  is  too  absurd  to 
require  any  thing  more  than  a  passing  notice.  De- 
sire is  no  more  than  a  mere  emotion  or  excitement 
of  the  mind,  directed  to  the  attainment  of  an  ob- 
ject. It  is  an  inclination  or  wish  for  something  to 
be  enjoyed.  That  which  we  wish  for  or  desire  may 
become  the  object  of  the  determining  power  of  the 
will,  or  we  may  determine  to  pay  no  attention  to  the 
object  of  our  desires,  though  the  strength  of  such 
desires  may  remain  unchanged.  In  traveling  from 
home  and  friends,  we  may  often  desire  to  return ; 
yet  we  have  volitive  power  to  continue  our  onward 
course  to  some  far-off  and  perhaps  uninteresting  part 
of  the  world.  2.  Desire,  being  only  an  emotion, 
can  never,  within  and  of  itself,  exercise  any  manda- 
tory influence  and  power  over  the  will.  3.  Desires 
may  arise  voluntarily  and  involuntarily.  We  have 
volitive  power  to  turn  our  attention  to  an  object,  or 
class  of  objects,  till  such  object,  or  something  con- 
nected with  the  class  of  objects,  becomes  the  object 
of  desire;  and,  in  connection  with  some  peculiar 
condition  or  fitness  in  some  object,  which  claims  our 
voluntary  attention,  may  arise  a  desire  to  have  the 
same  in  our  possession.     In  tlajs  way  desire  may  b© 


NATUBE    OF    THE    WILL.  42^ 

successive  to  volition,  if  not  a  result  of  volitive  ac- 
tion. Desires  may  be  involuntary,  though  the  will 
has  power  to  cross  or  counteract  the  strength  of  such 
desires;  and,  by  repeated  efibrts,  it  has  power  to 
diminish  and  to  destroy  them.  4.  Desire  can  invoke 
volitive  action^  but  can  never  command  such  action, 
and  control  its  determinations.  Our  desires  can 
exert  an  invoked  subordinate  influence  upon  the 
will,  and,  in  this  way,  induce  volitive  action;  but 
they  can  do  no  more. 


SECTION  IV. 
1.  Another  position  assumed  by  many  writers,  to 
enslave  the  will,  is,  that  it  is  directed  and  positively 
controlled  by  choice.  The  liberty  of  the  will  con- 
sists in  the  power  of  acting  according  to  choice; 
therefore,  choice  controls  the  will,  and  our  liberty  ia 
wholly  embraced  in  obeying  clwice^  our  sovereign 
ruler.  If  choice  has  mandatory  control  of  the  will, 
it  would  follow  that,  when  choice  is  exercised  by 
any  inert  object,  and  as  the  power  of  choice  could 
not  act  without  such  an  object,  the  object  would 
cause  the  exercise  of  choice ;  therefore,  the  inert  ob- 
ject governs  choice,  and  choice  controls  the  will : 
hence,  an  inert  object  may  be  the  sovereign  ruler 
of  the  soul,  with  power  to  determine  its  fate  forever ; 
but  this  is  false.  2.  The  very  nature  of  choice  im- 
plies the  possibility  of  a  different  selection  to  that 
which  is  made.  We  intuitively  feel  that  there  ie 
always  an  alternative  to  that  which  we  choose  or 
decide  on ;  and  as  we  compare  different  objects  to- 
gether, we  have  an  abiding  consciousness  that  we 


430  NATURE    OF    THE    WILL. 

are  at  liberty  to  choose  any  one  under  our  inspec- 
tion. We  know  t^at  we  have  volitive  power  to 
choose  or  not  to  choose,  and  it  is  utterly  impossible 
for  us  to  complete  the  act  of  choosing  unless  we  de- 
termine to  do  so.  When  two  or  more  objects  are 
presented  to  the  mind,  we  feel  that  we  have  power 
to  choose  any  one  of  them,  or  to  refuse  making  any 
choice.  If  choice  can  not  be  controlled  in  any  way 
by  the  will,  and  is  the  result  of  some  anterior  con- 
stitutional determination,  then  it  would  follow  that 
choice  is  inevitable,  and  that  it  can  only  take  place 
as  effect  follows  its  cause.  Then,  choice  could  never 
take  place  only  in  an  involuntary  way.  3.  We 
know  that  choice  does  exist;  then  its  origin  must  be 
caused  by  the  laws  of  natural  necessity,  or  the  mind 
has  natural  and  volitive  power  to  decide  between 
alternatives.  Choice  can  never  be  free  if  it  be  j^i^o- 
duced  by  the  laws  of  necessity.  Our  freedom  to 
act  according  to  such  necessity  is  bondage,  but 
choice  can  be  voluntary.  When  we  have  made 
choice,  we  feel  and  know  that  we  were  at  perfect 
liberty  to  have  abstained  from  such  choice,  or  to 
have  made  a  different  one.  If  choice  is  produced 
by  laws  of  natural  necessity,  it  can  never  be  free; 
but  choice,  in  its  very  nature,  implies  liberty  or  free- 
dom, and  without  this  it  ceases  to  be  choice  ;  there- 
fore, volitive  action  is  essential  to  the  existence  of 
choice.  4.  The  position  of  some  writers  is,  that 
choice  controls  the  will,  and  that  choice  is  the  effect 
of  the  laws  of  natural  necessity.  Then,  for  the 
effect  of  a  natural  cause  to  govern  the  manner, 
qualities,  or  condition  of  itself  is  impossible:  hence 
the  perfect  impossibility  of  such  an  effect  causing 


NATURE    OF    THE    WILL.  48!f 

volitive  action,  for  that  would  be  an  effect  causing 
an  effect.  Choice  may  and  does  have  a  subordinate 
influence  upon  the  will,  but  has  no  mandatory  power 
over  it.  The  will  can  control,  determine,  or  confirm 
our  choice,  and  it  has  pK)wer  to  act  contrary  to  our 
choice.  It  is  very  common  for  us  to  feel  and  say, 
in  regard  to  some  act  of  ours,  that  it  was  not  our 
choice. 


SECTION  V. 
1.  Another  assumption  is,  that  the  will  is  governed 
by-  motive.  Mr.  Upham  says  that  "  the  will  acts  in 
view  of  the  strongest  motive,  and  necessarily  so 
acts.^^  If  such  action  is  necessitated^  of  course  it 
could  not  be  otherwise;  therefore,  tlie  will  is  gov- 
erned by  motive,  which  is  clearly  and  forever  incor- 
rect, as  arguments  will  show.  2.  Motive  is  that 
which  incites  to  action^  having  only  subordinate  in- 
fluence upon  the  will  in  inducing  volitive  action.^ 
The  very  nature  of  motive  implies  no  mandatory 
power  over  its  own  origin  and  action ;  and  if  it  pos- 
sesses no  self-power  of  government,  it  would  be  im- 
possible for  it  to  govern  the  will  or  any  other  faculty 
in  a  positive  way.  The  highest  power  of  motive 
consists  only  in  action  toward  an  object,  and  this  is 
granting  more  than  its  nature  strictly  demands.  It 
is  acknowledged,  on  all  hands,  that  the  will,  in.  its 
lowest  signification,  has  power  to  act.  As  the  latter, 
in  its  very  nature,  has  higher  claims  to  liberty  than 
the  former,  why  should  it  be  regarded  as  subordi- 
nate to  motive?  3.  The  only  way  for  motive  to 
govern  the  will  is,  that  its  action  be  anterior,  in  the 


1st 


NATURE    OF    THE    WILL 


order  of  time,  to  the  origin  of  the  action  of  the  will. 
It  is  utterly  impossible  to  prove  that  the  action  of 
motive  in  the  mind  is  anterior  to  the  origin  of  the 
action  of  the  will ;  and  if  it  could  be  done,  it  would 
be  no  evidence  that  motive-action  could  control  the 
action  of  the  will;  and  the  very  nature  of  the 
former,  compared  with  that  of  the  latter,  precludes 
the  possibility  of  such  a  conclusion.  4.  If  motive 
has  power  to  act^  and  such  action  can  only  be  in- 
duced by  the  presence  of  an  object,  then  the  object 
controls  the  motive,  and  the  motive  controls  the 
will.  Then  it  would  follow,  that  when  the  object 
was  inert  it  would  control  the  mind.  We  are  not 
prepared  for  such  a  conclusion.  Motive  may  have 
power  to  induce  volitive  action,  but  it  has  no  author- 
itative power  over  such  action. 


SECTION  yi. 
1.  It  has  been  maintained,  by  many  writers,  that 
motive  governs  mind  in  general;  that  it  governs 
volitions  in  the  human  mind ;  and  that,  in  the  same 
way,  it  applies  to  the  Divine  mind.  Mr.  Upham 
says,  "Our  condition,  in  this  respect,  seems  to  be 
essentially  the  same  with  that  of  the  supreme  Being 
himself.  He  is  inevitably  governed,  in  all  his  do- 
ings, by  what,  in  the  great  range  of  events,  is  wisest 
and  best;"  therefore,  the  divine  Being  is  '-'' inevita- 
hly^^  governed  by  a  superior.  We  understand  Dr. 
Edwards,  and  others,  to  teach  that  the  ^''energy  of 
Tnotives'^'^  existed,  in  the  nature  of  things,  anterior  to 
the  will  of  God.  In  this  way,  many  writers  take 
the  ground  that  motive  governs  the  will  of  man, 


NATUEE    OF    THE    WILL.  433 

and  that  motive  governs  the  will  of  Deity,  being 
anterior  to  it :  hence,  we  are  driven  to  the  conclu- 
sion that  motive  governs  all  beings,  and  that  it  must 
be,  of  necessity,  the  supreme  ruler  of  the  universe, 
with  power  to  fatalize  all  things.  Notwithstanding 
the  opinions  of  such  writers,  we  can  not  and  never 
will  acknowledge  motive  as  the  great  ruler  of  the 
universe.  2.  Motive,  in  the  Divine  mind,  is  subor- 
dinate to  volitions.  If  "mo^'ve,"  or  any  ^^  certain 
fixed  and  irresistible  infiAiences^''  control  the  acts  of 
Deity,  such  controlling  power  could  not  have  been 
originated  and  arranged  by  the  supreme  Being;  for, 
in  that  case,  he  must  have  willed  the  existence  and 
arrangement  of  such  pre-existing  and  controlling 
power.  Then  it  follows,  that  such  a  controlling 
power  must  either  be  anterior  to  any  act  of  Deity, 
and  thereby  superior  to  him,  or  such  an  assumed 
controlling  power  could  not  have  existed  till  the 
Divine  volition  willed  it  into  real  being;  an^  if  it 
could  only  exist  by  the  will  of  Deity,  he  had  power 
to  act  independent  of  such  supposed  influence.  If 
he  had  power  to  act  once  independently  of  this  mo- 
tive, or  natural  irresistible  influence,  he  had  and  has 
power  to  act  on  independently  of  such  supposed  in- 
fluences forever:  so,  farewell  to  the  eternal  sover- 
eignty of  motive!  Sleep  peaceably  on  forever!  3. 
"We  have  already  seen  that  motive  has  no  power  to 
control  the  volitive  power  in  the  human  mind.  It 
may  have  subordinate  influence  in  inducing  volitive 
action,  but  nothing  more ;  for,  in  order  to  control 
the  will,  it  must  be  proved,  without  a  doubt,  that 
motive  exists  anterior  to  the  action  of  the  will,  and 
that  it  has  volitive  power  to  act  in  causing  the  will 
37 


434:  NATURE    OF    THE    WILL. 

to  act.  Without  this  liberty-power  of  action,  it  can 
not  move  the  will  and  determine  such  motion  ;  but, 
from  its  very  nature,  it  can  not  have  such  volitive 
power  of  action;  and  if  it  could,  it  would  be  just  as 
fatal  to  the  law  of  necessity  as  to  refer  such  power 
to  the  will,  where  it  belongs.  From  the  very  nature 
of  things,  there  is  no  possible  way  to  control  the 
will  by  any  law  of  motive.  4.  Another  position  as- 
sumed and  strongly  argued  by  Mr.  Edwards,  is,  that 
"  the  will  always  is  as  the  greatest  apparent  good ;" 
but  he  explains  this  by  admitting  that  the  "  will  is 
determined  by  the  greatest  apparent  good."  Both 
methods  amount  to  the  same  meaning.  To  blend 
the  will  with  the  intellect  is  absurd  ;  for  we  can  not 
say  that  it  is  a  thought :  and  it  is  equally  as  incor- 
rect to  blend  it  with  the  sensibilities,  for  it  is  not  a 
feeling.  If  any  other  faculty,  power,  or  influence 
of  the  mind  has  authority  to  control  the  will,  such 
faculty,  power,  or  influence  must  have  not  only  lib- 
erty of  self  action,  but  volitive  power  to  cause  the 
will  to  act ;  otherwise,  the  will  can  not  be  controlled 
in  this  way.  And  if  the  will  can  only  be  governed 
by  such  volitive  power,  why  not  refer  such  power  to 
the  will  itself,  where  it  naturally  belongs,  and  not 
labor  against  all  plain  reasoning  to  give  the  power  of 
the  will  to  some  other  power,  where  it  does  not  natu- 
rally belong?  And  if  motive  can  induce  volitive 
action,  under  the  law  of  necessity,  then  it  would 
follow  that  when  an  inert  existence  was  the  object 
of  motive ;  that  as  the  object  controlled  the  motive 
which  controlled  the  will,  so  would  such  an  object 
control  the  will :  hence,  we  would  be  compelled  to 
serve  material  elements  and  laws  in  common  with 


NATURE    OF    THE    WILL. 


m 


every  thing  else  possessed  with  power  to  influence 
motive;  but  this  is  false.  5.  That  the  will  is  un- 
trammeled  is  in  perfect  accordance  with  the  con- 
sciousness of  mankind.  Of  nothing  are  we  more 
positively  certain  than  in  regard  to  our  acts,  whether 
they  be  voluntary  or  of  necessity.  Knowledge  re- 
ceived through  the  senses,  connected  with  diseased 
and  perishing  physical  organs,  may  deceive  us ;  but 
consciousness,  possessed  of  its  own  evidence,  is 
knowledge,  without  demanding  an  increase  of  testi- 
mony from  the  senses.  It  is  of  'and  within  its  own 
existence  and  nature  the  end  of  all  controversy  or 
doubt.  To  doubt  its  power  is  to  doubt  the  reality 
of  all  things.  Our  consciousness  of  self-action,  as 
to  whether  such  action  is  of  infinite  necessity,  or  is 
free,  equals  our  consciousness  of  existence  itself; 
and  we  can  no  more  doubt  this  than  we  can  doubt 
the  existence  of  self  and  that  of  every  thing  else. 
When  we  contemplate  future  action  in  regard  to 
many  objects,  we  feel  and  know  that  we  have  natu- 
ral volitive  power,  or  ability,  to  choose  any  one,  or 
to  determine  on  any  course  we  please  in  relation  to 
one  or  all  of  them ;  and  we  are  perfectly  confident 
that  we  have  power  to  refuse  action  contrary  to 
either  motive  or  the  power  of  choice.  When  we 
reflect  upon  a  wrong  act  in  the  past,  we  feel  an 
internal  conviction  that  we  were  free  to  have  done 
difierently:  hence  our  deep  regret  or  sense  of  sin; 
for  without  this  conscious  liberty,  we  could  never 
regret  the  imperfections  of  the  past,  or  feel  that  we 
had  ever  sinned  or  done  wrong.  As  long  as  we  feel 
that  we  are  accountable  for  our  acts,  we  feel  a  con- 
sciousness of  liberty  in  acting.     If  a  consciousness 


4:36  NATURE    OF    THE     WILL. 

of  liberty  could  be  removed  from  the  mind,  just  as 
long  as  such  a  sense  was  gone,  we  would  be  incapa- 
ble of  any  regret  or  remorse.  However  much  we 
may  dread  the  results,  yet  if  we  do  not  feel  an  intu- 
itive liberty,  we  never  can  experience  any  thing 
like  regret  or  remorse  in  regard  to  any  past  act. 
Just  as  long  as  we  could  feel  that  we  had  no  con- 
scious liberty,  we  would  be  compelled  to  feel  our 
acts  were  not  our  own. 


t.A 


LIBERTY    OF    THE   WILL 


4# 


CHAPTER  III. 

LIBERTY   OF   THE  WILL. 
SECTION  I. 

1.  The  expression  "/ree  'M7^7Z,"  is,  to  some  extent, 
objectionable,  as  it  would  seem  to  imply  the  oppo- 
site, or  that  there  conld  be  such  a  thing  as  the  will 
enslaved  under  a  law  of  infinite  necessity,  which  we 
have  seen  to  be  incorrect.  Will,  in  its  very  essence, 
or  nature,  ift  a  free  principle.  Liberty  is  its  essen- 
tial condition  or  law,  I^ree  will  is  as  incorrect  as 
hound  will.  Liberty  is  essential  to  its  nature,  and 
it  is  Hot  will  if  it  be  not  free  ;  and  if  it  be  hound^ 
it  ceases  to  be  will.  Yolitive  power  of  action  is 
essential  to  the  being  of  the  soul,  and  to  all  rational, 
intellectual,  and  accountable  beings.  Action  and 
self-action  are  essential  differences  lietween  matter 
and  spirit.  Spirit  has  self-power  of  choice;  matter 
lias  not.  Ratiocination  is  essential  to  intellect,  and 
it  can  not  take  place  without  action.  Connected 
with  these,  volition  is  forever  inseparable ;  thereforel, 
mind  can  not  exist  without  self  liberty  of  action.  S."* 
The  will,  in  its  acts  and  determinations.,  is  subject  to 
the  law  of  self-liberty  in  opposition  to  the  law  of 
necessity.  We  have  seen  already  that  the  will  can 
not  fall  under  the  law  of  infinite  necessity;  there- 
fore, it  must  fall  under  that  of  liberty,  as  opposed  to 
necessity.  If  we  know  that  we  are  under  the  law 
of'  necessity,  then  we  have  the  same  power  of  know- 
37* 


488  LIBERTY    OF   THE    WILL. 

mg  that  we  are  not  accountable.  To  suppose  and 
believe  that  our  actions  are  necessary,  and  that  we 
are  accountable  for  such  actions,  is  to  suppose  and 
believe  an  absurdity ;  for  we  never  can  experience 
remorse  for  any  act,  or  acts,  which  are  not  wholly 
voluntary,  either  by  intention  or  permission.  3. 
The  doctrine  of  liberty  is  clearly  established  by  con- 
sciousness, in  which  there  is  a  universal  conviction 
that  our  past  acts,  even  under  the  same  circum- 
stances, might  have  been  very  different.  Such  a 
conviction  could  not  exist  only  in  spontaneous  origin 
or  liberty.  4.  In  connection  with  the  presence  of 
many  objects  of  choice,  we  have  a  positive  con- 
sciousness that  two  or  more  acts  of  the  will  may  be 
put  forth,  or  that  we  may  will  to  refuse  them  all, 
and  that  contrary  to  motive,  desire,  or  choice.  This 
truth  can  be  tested  by  any  one,  at  this  moment,  in 
regard  to  the  very  next  act  of  the  mind.  The  con- 
sciousness of  liberty  we  now  have,  can  no  more  be 
doubted  than  we  can  doubt  our  own  existence. 


SECTION  11. 
1.  We  objected  wholly  to  "laws  of  the  will,"  as 
used  by  different  writers.  The  will  knows  no  law 
only  that  of  liberty^  which  liberty  may  be  regarded 
as  absolute,  being  entirely  and  forever  opposed  to 
any  law  or  laws  of  necessity.  2.  I  may  determine 
to  go  to  London,  and  while  this  determination  re- 
mains unchanged,  all  the  other  powers  of  the  mind 
must  be  subject  to  the  controlling  power  of  the  will. 
This  determination  may  be  continued  or  suspended 
only  by  the  power  of  the  will.     The  ab&ence  of  voli- 


LIBERTY    OF    THE    WILL.  439 

tive  action  does  not  imply  that,  during  such  inactiv- 
ity, the  other  powers  of  the  mind  are  unemployed; 
but  the  oflBce  of  the  will  is  to  preside  over  the  men- 
tal operations.  3.  The  effort  to  sustain  the  law  of 
necessity  has  involved  reasoning  in  a  circle,  Ne- 
cessitarians have  assumed  that  "the  action  of  the 
will  is  always  in  the  direction  of  the  strongest  mo- 
tive." In  defining  the  strongest  motive,  they  say  it 
is  the  motive  in  the  direction  of  which  the  will  does 
act.  They  have  no  way  to  define  the  strongest  mo- 
tive at  first  sight,  but  wait  till  the  will  acts,  and 
then  assume  that  the  motive,  in  the  direction  of  its 
action,  is  the  strongest.  They  have  to  assume  that 
motive  determines  the  will,  without  accounting  for 
its  authority.  If  we  ask  them  what  determines  the 
will,  they  will  answer.  The  strongest  motive.  Then, 
what  is  the  strongest  motive?  That  which  determ- 
ines the  will.  Here  is  the  same  old  circle;  but  this 
generation  seeketh  after  evidence.  4.  Mr.  Edwards 
says  "  that  every  act  of  will  whatsoever,  is  excited 
by  some  motive."  Then,  motive  causes  the  action  of 
the  will;  therefore,  all  volitions  are  effects  of  mo- 
tives. If  an  effect  can  not  be  greater  than  its  cause, 
we  are  forced  to  the  conclusion  that  no  action  can 
exist,  or  take  place,  either  in  the  mind  or  body,  un- 
less it  be  caused  by  motive.  Then,  motive  is  the 
only  being  having  right  to  command  and  to  control 
our  entire  existence ;  but  we  have  already  seen  that 
this  is  false. 


C#  "iua  *A'julO<i 


440  LIBERTY    OF    THE   WILL. 

SECTION  III. 

1.  TJie  spirit  of  dependence  can  not  exist  under 
the  law  of  necessity.  The  conviction  that  we  ave 
lost  without  an  interest  in  the  merit  of  Christ,  is 
common  to  all ;  but  to  properly  feel  our  dependence 
implies  a  voluntary  act,  in  which  we  humbly  and 
confidently  rest  all  our  hope  upon  Divine  assistance. 
The  soul  is  dependent  with  a  voluntary  trust  in  God. 
2.  But  tTie  doctrine  of  necessity  can  not  naturally 
tend  to  mellow  the  exercise  of  the  heart,  and  enkin- 
dle, with  holy  awe,  the  spirit  of  fervent  love  to  the 
great  Donor  of  all  good.  Under  the  law  of  neces- 
sity, we  may  feel  conviction ;  but  we  can  not  depend 
in  Divine  grace  with  humble  gratitude;  for  a  con- 
victed mind,  which  believes  in  infinite  necessity, 
can  only  realize  the  presence  of  infinite  law,  ever 
hearing  the  deep  tones  of  the  breaking  thunder.  3. 
It  appears  that  the  learned  Dr.  Chalmers  said,  '-^  If 
man  is  not  a  necessary  agent^  God  is  a  degraded  sov- 
ereign^  Dreadful  sentiment!  If  the  doctrine  of 
liberty  be  true,  Deity  does  not  preside  over  the  myr- 
iads of  earth's  population  for  the  purpose  of  execu- 
ting the  laws  of  stern  and  infinite  fate;  for  such  laws 
could  need  no  additional  power  to  enforce  their 
claims,  as  such  claims  have  been  executed  and  en- 
forced from  all  eternity.  From  the  very  necessity 
in  their  natural  existence,  no  new  claim  or  arrange- 
ment can  ever  take  place,  or  ever  has  legally  taken 
place,  since  the  real  existence  of  the  laws  of  fate  in 
eternity  back ;  but  such  laws  must  either  be  self- 
existent  and  eternal,  or  there  must  have  been  a  point 
somewhere  in  the  range  of  duration  when  such  laws 


LIBEETY    OF    THE   WILL.  441 

took  place,  or  became  real.  Necessitarians  can  not 
admit  that  they  were  created  by  Deity ;  for  then  he 
would  have  willed  their  existence.  Then  they  must 
have  had  an  existence  anterior  to  any  volitions  in 
the  Divine  mind :  hence,  the  existence  and  claims 
of  the  laws  of  fate  were  all  arranged  before  they 
came  to  the  knowledge  of  the  divine  Being;  and, 
of  course,  he  is  subordinate  to  their  control.  Such  a 
conclusion  is  worse  than  Atheism.  O,  how  grateful 
the  tliought  that  the  Lord  still  governs  all  things, 
and  that  he  will  freely,  and  with  omnipotent  power, 
rule  forever!  4.  A  design  in  the  creation  of  man 
was,  that  he  might  voluntarily  serve  God ;  and  with- 
out such  power,  he  could  never  glorify  his  Creator. 
Doubtless,  without  natural  liberty  to  glorify  God, 
the  design  of  our  being  would  have  been  destroyed, 
and  this  would  have  prevented  our  existence  at  all. 
Man  must  exist  free  to  serve  his  Creator,  or  his  serv- 
ice wo\ild  not  be  acceptable  to  God ;  and  without 
such  liberty  he  could  not  serve  him.  And  if  it  is 
necessary  for  him  to  have  natural  liberty,  in  order 
to  glorify  his  Creator,  then  he  is  free  to  pervert  the 
exercise  or  action  of  such  liberty-power,  and  volun- 
tarily fall  from  the  favor  of  God,  as  in  the  case  of 
our  federal  head.  The  mind  is  free,  and,  under  this 
power,  we  may  aim  at  the  sun,  step  the  silent  paths 
of  innumerable  worlds,  shout  to  their  eternal  flight ; 
but,  higher  and  infinitely  better  still,  we,  through 
the  assistance  of  grace,  may  will  the  approach  of 
heaven,  the  possession  of  its  joys,  and  the  full  glory 
of  endless  day. 


44:2  POWER    OF    THE     WILL, 


CHAPTER  lY. 

POWER    OF  THE  WILL. 

SECTION  I. 
1.  It  is  difficult  to  define  the  diiFerence  between 
the  liberty  and  the  power  of  the  will.  Some  have 
thought  that  power  was  capable  of  degrees,  while 
liberty  remains  the  same.  Whether  there  be  natu- 
rally degrees  in  the  power  of  the  will,  is  not  easily 
decided;  for  the  apparent  diiference  may  be  caused, 
to  a  considerable  extent,  by  imperfect  or  diseased 
physical  organs ;  yet  it  would  appear  that  liberty,  in 
all  orders  of  mind,  was  essentially  the  same.  The 
partially-developed  mind,  or  that  of  a  child,  as  well 
as  the  strong  mind,  enjoys  the  same  liberty.  The 
power  of  the  will,  as  to  the  quality  of  its  essential 
nature,  can  not  admit  of  degrees ;  but  it  differs  in 
different  minds  as  to  the  degrees  of  vigor,  vividness, 
and  strength  in  its  mandatory  action.  While  liberty 
may  be  regarded  as  absolute,  being  opposed  to  every 
thing  like  infinite  necessity,  power  may  be  regarded 
as  more  dependent.  Liberty  is  without  any  compul- 
satory  infringement  in  any  possible  way ;  yet  power 
is  often  incumbered  by  many  contingencies.  Liberty 
does  not  appear  to  be  capable  of  being  increased ; 
but  power,  by  repeated  efforts,  can  become  more 
vigorous  and  irresistible.  2.  Mr.  Upham  says, 
"Although  the  will  has  power,  it  is  not,  therefore, 
independent — it  is  subject  to  law."    This  is  in  ac- 


POWER    OF    THE    WILL.  4^ 

cordance  with  many  other  writers;  l>ut  we  have 
seen,  by  previous  arguments,  that  the  will  is  not 
svhject  to  law^  as  taught  by  necessitarians.  The 
will  is  independent  in  its  very  nature  and  relation 
to  the  other  powere  of  the  mind.  3.  The  power 
and  freedom  of  the  will  is  clearly  evidenced  in  self- 
preservation.  If  I  were  in  a  boat,  peacefully  float- 
ing on  the  silvery  waters  of  Niagara,  above  the 
Falls,  I  feel  distinctly  that  life  depends  upon  the  ef- 
forts of  myself,  and  only  upon  myself.  I  feel  as 
conscious  as  I  can  of  any  thing,  that  I  have  power 
either  to  determine  to  row  to  the  shore,  or  to  determ- 
ine to  go  over  the  Falls  without  any  effort.  .4.  Con- 
nected with  the  remembrance  of  past  errors^  we 
experience  a  consciousness^  which  is  clear  and  posi- 
tive, that,  under  the  same  circumstances,  we  might 
have  done  differently;  and  connected  with  such  re- 
called determinations,  there  is  a  vivid  consciousness 
of  the  power  we  had  to  have  determined  differently. 
If  the  affirmations  of  conscience  are  uniformly  or 
are  always  wrong,  then  we  may  have  some  gi*ound 
for  distrusting  the  liberty-power  of  the  mind;  but 
if  such  affirmations  are  true,  then  the  doctrine  of 
the  liberty  of  the  will  is  true  and  irresistible. 


SECTION  II. 
1.  The  will  has  self-determining  power.  It  is  not 
a  matter  of  astonishment  that  necessitarians  should 
doubt  the  self-determining  power  of  the  will ;  but 
they  acknowledge  that  the  mind,  as  a  whole,  has 
self-determining  power.  So  do  we;  and  we  hold 
that  the  will,  in  its  nature  and  office,  presides  over 


444  POWER    OF    THE     WILL. 

all  the  other  faculties,  and  determines  all  the  proc- 
esses and  acts  of  the  mind.  No  event,  object,  or 
fact  can  be  made  the  subject  of  knowledge  only  by 
the  self-determining  power  of  the  mind;  for  noth- 
ing can  be  brought  under  the  inspection  of  the  mind 
without  mental  action,  and  such  action  is  in  the 
mind,  and  is  a  result  of  its  self-determining  power, 
as  no  self  action  can  arise  without  such  a  power.  2. 
Mr.  Upham  says,  "  If  by  the  phrase  self  determin- 
ing power  of  the  will  be  merely  meant  that  the  will 
itself,  that  distinct  susceptibility  of  the  mind  which 
we  thus  denominate,  has  power  of  action^  we  grant 
that  it  is  so ;"  that  is,  the  will  can  act,  but  not  au- 
thoritatively— it  can  only  act  under  the  control  of 
law  or  the  strongest  motive.  The  freedom  of  such 
action  is  in  conforming  to  necessity.  But  hear  him 
again :  "  The  will  acts,  and  with  such  freedom  and 
such  power  as  to  lay  the  basis  of  accountability." 
With  how  much  freedom  does  it  act  ?  Let  him  an- 
swer, "It  is  free  to  act  according  to  the  law  of  neces- 
sity." This  is  the  substance,  and  amounts  to  the 
fact  that  such  action  is  coerced  by  the  law  of  fate. 
Wonderful  freedom  of  volitive  action !  Yet,  he 
bases  our  accountability  upon  the  liberty  of  the 
will,  and  the  will,  at  the  same  time,  incapable  of 
acting  only  in  obedience  to  the  law  of  eternal  fate. 
How  is  it  possible  for  students  to  ever  gain  a  correct 
knowledge  of  self,  the  powers  of  mind,  and  their 
accountabilit}'^  from  such  logic?  3.  Mr.  Edwards 
says,  "  If  the  will  determines  the  will^  then  choice 
orders  and  determines  the  choice P  This  might,  in 
part,  be  correct,  if  we  were  to  acknowledge  his  pre- 
vious positions  on  this  subject  to  be  correct;  but  we 


POWEE    OF    THE    WILL.  445 

do  not  acknowledge  such  positions  as  true.  Then, 
that  which  would  destroy  his  argument  would  be 
clear  and  true  with  others.  First.  Why  did  he 
make  the  proposition  unfair,  by  lugging  in  the  term 
''^orders'''*  in  the  latter  part?  This  is  sophistical, 
wliether  so  intended  or  not.  If  the  will  can  determ- 
ine the  mind,  it  certainly  can  determine  the  will ; 
for  the  will  is  a  faculty  of  the  mind,  and  the  self- 
determining  power  of  the  mind  has  been  acknowl- 
edged to  be  true.  We  have  already  seen  that  no 
faculty  or  faculties  of  the  mind  can  determine  the 
mind  except  the  will ;  then  the  will  has  power  to 
determine  both  the  wiU  and  choice:  so  we  have  no 
difficulty  on  the  subject.  4.  Volitions  are  spontane- 
ous^ and  are  independent  of  any  law  of  necessity; 
therefore,  the  very  nature  of  the  volitive  power  is 
freedom  with  self-liberty  to  act  in  any  way. 


SECTieN  III. 
1..  The  superior  power  of  the  will  is  that  peculiar 
power  it  possesses  by  which  it  is  not  only  distin- 
guished from  the  other  powers  of  the  mind,  but 
determines  the  action  of  the  mental  powers  as  a 
whole,  or  as  united  in  the  acts  of  the  mind.  2.  The 
ground  of  offense  in  the  sight  of  God,  is  not  only 
our  power  to  perceive  the  difference  between  right 
and  wrong,  and  an  chiding  conviction  as  to  what  we 
should  do,  but  it  is  embraced  in  the  fact  that  we 
possess  the  power  to  do  that. which  is  right,  and  to 
refuse  to  do  that  which  is  contrary  to  the  Divine 
will.  3.  Connected  with  voluntariness  is  the  ground 
of  all  accountability.  Take  this  away,  and  it  is  ut- 
38 


446  POWER    OF    THE    WILL. 

terly  impossible  for  us  ever  to  be  called  to  an  account 
for  any  thought  or  act.  We  can  neither  be  ap- 
plauded nor  blamed.  4.  The  doctrine  of  the  will, 
as  taught  by  many  writers,  has  been  confused  un- 
necessarily. Too  many  topics  have  entered  into  the 
argument;  and  as  we  contemplate  defining  its  con- 
nection with  and  relation  to  the  elements  of  mind, 
which  lie  at  the  foundation  of  moral  action,  in  the 
second  volume,  we  will  close  this  volume  with  one 
more  general  proposition. 


SECTION  IV. 
1.  The  will  possesses  mandatory  jpower.  The 
mind  certainly  has  self-determining  power,  by  the 
consent  of  philosophers,  and  in  the  very  nature  of 
its  being  and  operations.  By  general  consent,  and 
true  analysis,  this  power  has  not  been  defined  as 
being  diffused  through  the  nature  and  power  of  all 
the  faculties,  separately  or  combined  ;  but  the  determ- 
ining power  has  been  referred  to  some  one  faculty 
of  the  mind.  No  faculty,  from  its  essential  nature, 
can  possess  mandatory  power  but  the  will.  2.  The 
will  appears  to  preside  over  the  combined  action  of 
the  other  faculties,  and  has  power  to  control  mental 
action.  3.  Some  necessitarians  have  erred  in  try- 
ing to  confound  the  will  With  the  5€^s^5^7^^^€5,  and 
refused  to  appeal  to  special  and  universal  conscious- 
ness. 4.  Another  evidence  of  the  independence 
and  controlling  power  of  the  will,  is  contained  in 
the  fact  that  we  can  will  to  jperform  imjpossibilities ; 
that  is,  we  can  will  the  reality  of  an  impossibility. 
The  Atheist  may  finally  be  possessed  of  such  a  hor- 


POWEB    OF    THE    WILL.  447 

rible  dread  of  the  truths  of  the  Bible,  that,  with  all 
his  soul,  he  may  will  its  annihilation ;  yet  he  knows, 
at  the  same  time,  that  this  is  impossible.  5.  Such 
is  the  wiU^  the  free  liberty  power  of  the  imperishable 
mind.  Under  its  vivid  power  and  mandatory  con- 
trol, the  minds  of  the  high  and  the  lowly,  enkin- 
dling with  feelings  of  lofty  and  holy  aspirations,  may 
assert  their  right  to  triumph  over  all  embarrassments 
and  storms,  the  mere  results  of  physical  tendencies, 
or  the  requirements  of  their  laws ;  but  mind,  intel- 
lectual and  immortal,  may  determine  upon  the  ad- 
vance of  infinite  happiness,  and  the  interminable 
progression  of  imperishable  knowledge.  How  can 
we  define  the  true  character  of  the  soul,  when  per- 
fected in  its  separation  from  the  imperfection  and 
decay  of  the  physical  organs  which  trammeled  its 
manifestations  in  time?  Possessed  of  all  the  facts 
and  knowledge  of  the  past,  its  thoughts  freely  range 
all  through  the  boundless  future ;  but  infinitely 
higher,  to  our  conceptions,  must  be  the  cfiaracter  of 
that  soul  perfected  in  the  knowledge,  favor,  and  love 
of  God!  Witli  holy  triumph  and  increasing  joy, 
burn  ,on,  thou  spirit  of  endless  day !  As  tlie  accel- 
erated travel  of  a  star,  range  the  progressive  series 
of  heavenly  knowledge;  and  when  thy  flight  has 
surpassed  the  utmost  bounds  of  unwearied  contem- 
plation, still  thou  art  in  heaven  1 


^ 


INDEX 


INTRODUCTION. 

8X0TI0K    I. 
_    _,  PAaa. 

L  Man  an  existent —  • 7 

2.  His  existence  certain. '. 7 

8.  How  existing  facts  are  made  known  to  us 7 

4.  Reasonableness  of  our  existence — how  traced • 8 

SECTION    II.  *  »" 

1»  His  relative  existence  and  liberty  of  action .• 8 

2.  His  inalienable  faculties — peculiar  natural  endowment — self-powei: 

of  action 9 

8.  His  existence  unending .9 

SKCTION-    III. 

ifc-.        ,  '     .,.f  >■ 

1.  His  being  -indestructible 9 

2.  Matter  oan  change  without  annihilation - 9 

8ECTI0K    IV. 

1.  The  existence  of  man  divided  into  jeriods  or  states 10 

(1.)  His  primitive  state-  •  •- 10 

(2.)  His  fallen  state 10 

(3.)   His  probationary  state .'11 

(4.)  His  future  state 11 

SECTION    V. 

1.  Man  compounded  of  spirit  and  matter ,  .  12 

2.  Spirit  the  principle  of  life 12 

8.  The  soul  the  intelligent  part  of  our  existence 12 

4   Its  nature  immaterial 12 

6.  It  is  immortal • 12 

SECTION    VI. 

1.  Matter  is  distinct  from  mind 12 

2.  Matter  when  inanimate 18 

8.  When  is  it  said  to  be  animate?.. : - 18 

38*  449 


460 


INDEX 


SECTION    VH. 


1.  Mind  is  not  matter ^^q 

2.  Independence  and  power  of  mental  action 13 

3.  Application  of  the  term  mind 14 

4.  The  essence  of  mind 14- 

5.  Process  by  imagination 14 

SECTION    VIII. 

1.  Knowledge  the  result  of  reasoning  and  intuition 14 

2.  Intuitive  sense  of  difference  between  mind  and  matter 15 

3.  The  power  constituting  mental  action  not  matter 15 

4.  The  thinking  principle  not  matter 15 

SECTION    IX. 

1.  Matter  is  bot  mind 16 

2.  Material  elements  have  a  natural  tendency  to  rest 16 

8.  Matter  presents  phenomena  distinct  from  mind 16 

4.  Difficulty  in  defining  the  essence  of  matter 17 

SECTION    X. 

1.  Doctrine  of  materialists  absurd 17 

2.  Impossibility  of  inert  elements  acting  or  knowing 17 

3.  The  law  of  attraction  or  of  resistance  can  not  originate  action 18 

4.  Non-existence  of  matter  more  reasonable  than  that  nothing  exists 

but  matter 18 

SECTION    XI. 

1.  The  power  of  the  soul  is  superior  to  that  of  matter 18 

2.  Matter  not  cogitative 19 

8.  Mind  not  a  result  of  a  function  of  the  brain 19 

4.  Effect  of  disease  upon  the  brain 19 

SECTION    X'll. 

1.  Existence  of  mind  independent  of  matter,  but  dependent  on  it  in 

knowing  materialities 20 

2.  Matter  can  exist  without  either  thought  or  action 20 

3.  If  matter  is  incapable  of  annihilation,  then  materialists  are  immor- 

tal   21 

4.  Matter  can  not  always  think 21 

SECTION    XIII. 

1.  Matter  incapable  of  sensations  or  emotions 21 

2.  Septennial  changes  of  the  system  can  not  change  the  identity 22 

3.  If  mind  is  matter  we  can  not  recall  past  events 22 

SECTION    XIV. 

1.  Mind  distinct  and  dissimilar  from  matter 23 

2.  The  body  incapable  of  annihilation 23 

8.  No  evidence  of  the  annihilation  of  any  things 23 


INDEX.  **  4:51 


■■OTIOV    XT. 

Pa«b. 

1.  Age  and  the  decay  of  the  body  can  not  be  annihilation 24 

2.  Phenomena  of  mind  connected  with  animal  life 24 

3.  Instinct  differs  from  matter 25 

4.  Such  traits  of  the  phenomena  of  mind  can  not  be  matter 25 

SECTION     XVI. 

1.  If  matter  is  immortal,  so  is  the  spirit  of  animals  •  ► 26 

2.  The  soul  superior  to  matter  in  its  power  of  self-knowledge 26 

8.  Matter  is  insensible  and  motionless 26 

4.  Power  of  action  from  what  we  see  or  hear 27 

SECTION    XVII. 

1.  Matter  can  not  possess  causation 28 

2.  Particles  of  matter  have  no  self-power  tb  change  in  size  or  recipro- 

cally    28 

3.  No  accident  of  matter  can  produce  action  or  cogitation 28 

4.  If  matter  consolidated  is  mind,  then  there  is  but  one  mind  in  the 

vast  universe. 29 

gKCTION    XYIII. 

1.  Matter  can  not  contain  abstract  ideas 29 

2.  Matter  possesses  no  power  to  correct  appearances  and  impressions  •  •  SO 

3.  Our  consciousness  of  being  and  liberty ". 30 

4.  No  faculty  or  thinking  power  could  be  superadded  in  constituting 

material  elements 31 

SECTION    XIX. 

1   The  soul  is  neither  a  faculty  of  the  body  nor  a  result  of  matter ••  ••  31 
2.  The  soul  incapable  of  annihilation 31 

5.  No  evidence  that  any  thing  will  pass  into  nonentity 32 

4.  Conscience  power  of  self-action 32 

SECTION     XX. 

1.  The  soul  has  a  conscious  knowledge  of  self  and  its  continued  being  33 

2.  The  high  moral  obligations  resting  upon  the  soul 33 

8.  We  should  cultivate  our  powers  for  usefulness 34 

4.  It  is  reasonable  for  materialists  and  infidels  to  believe  in  the  soul's 

immortality. , 34 

SECTION    X  XI. 

1.  Atheists  and  skeptics  should  adopt  the  Christian  system 34 

(1.)  Reason.     (2.)  Reason.     (3.)  Reason.     (4.)  Reason 35 

2.  Man  a  skeptic,  impossible ! .35 

3.  Matter  belongs  to  physical  science--. 36 


48*  9  INDEX. 


EIEMENTS  OP  MIND 

VHIOH    LIE    AT    THE    FOUNDATION    OF    MENTAL    ACTION. 

ELEMENTS    OF    MENTAL     SCIENCE. 

CHAPTER  I. 

•    PRELIMINARY    ARGUMENT. 

i     ,.       •.  SKCTIONI. 

Pag«. 

1.  Mind  immaterial  in  essence  or  nature 39 

2.  Elements  which  are  strictly  mental 89 

8.  Elements  connected  with  the  origin  of  moral  influences 39 

SECTION    II. 

1.  Powers  which  lie  at  the  foundation  of  moral  action - 39 

2.  Elements  of  mental  and  moral  influence 39 

CHAPTER    II. 

INTELLECTUAL   OR    MENTAL  POWERS. 

SECTION    I. 

1.  Various  orders  of  mind 41 

2.  That  which  resembles  mind  in  inferior  orders  of  beings 41 

SECTION     11. 

1.  Matter  is  without  either  conscious  sensation  or  self-motion 41 

2.  That  which  resembles  mind  in  inferior  orders  of  self-moving  beings  41 

CHAPTER   III. 

OUR   KNOWLEDGE   OF   THE    EXISTENCE   AND   NATURE   OP 
THE    HUMAN    MIND. 

SECTION    I. 

1.  Mind  immaterial  in  nature 43 

2.  Mind  not  constituted  by  thought  and  feeling 43 

3.  Knowledge  of  the  real  existence  of  mind  confirmed  by  intuition-  ••  43 

4.  Knowledge  of  mind  tested  by  the  known  existence  of  certain  facts  •  43 

SECTIONII. 

1.  Mental  operations  or  motion  are  not  the  mind  itself 44 

2.  Relation  of  primary  properties  in  matter 44 

8.  If  mind  be  only  action,  its  existence  is  only  an  accident 44 

4.  The  cause  of  mind .*• 45 

6    Essence  of  mind  unknown  to  us 45 


INDEX.  4S9^ 


SBCTION     III. 

Pa«s. 

1.  Mr.  Stewart's  definition  of  mind  incorrect 46 

2.  Axioms  in  science  and  mind 46 

3.  Power  of  knowing  axioms  to  be  self-evident  facts 46 

4.  Intuition  faculties  may  have  power  to  know  their  own  existence  •  •  •  47 

CHAPTER   IV. 

EXISTENCE  AND   NATURE  OF   MIND. 

SECTIOX    I. 

1.  Our  inquiries  as  to  mental  phenomena  are  more  properly  confined 

to  properties - V 4|J 

2.  Three-fold  division  of  mind 48 

(1.)   Mental  elements .' •— 48 

(2.)  Moral  elements  of  mind 48 

(3.)  The  action  of  mind 48 

3.  That  which  the  operations  of  mind  involyes 48 

jl.)  Our  duties  to  God * 48 

(2.)  Duties  to  ourselves 48 

(8.)  Duties  to  one  another 48 

8XGTZ0H    II. 

1.  Present  order  of  mental  and  moral  science— objections 49 

2.  Mental  and  moral  elements 49 

3.  Moral  action — on  what  based 49 

4.  Power  of  mind  to  know  and  to  extend  knowledge 60 

CHAPTER  V. 

SENSATION. 

SECTIOK   I. 

1.  Sensation  defined 61 

2.  Its  connection  with  physical  organs 61 

3.  Sensation  can  not  be  separated  from  the  mind 61 

4.  Sensation  is  wholly  in  the  mind 62 

SECTIOK     II. 

1.  Sensation  may  be  awakened  by  external  objects 62 

2.  It  is  a  state  of  internal  feeling 52 

3.  Sensations  from  external  things  are  not  the  images  of  such  things  •  62 

4.  Connection  between  sensations  and  physical  organs 53 

6.  In  what  respect  sensation  is  dependent  upon  the  senses 53 

6.  Sensation  and  primary  mental  powers 63 

CHAPTER   VI. 

SENSE. 
BKCTIOIT    I. 

1.  Sense  defined 64 

2i  Its  relation  to  physical  organs  and  to  sensation 64 

8.  Sense  is  succeeded  by  sensation 64 


454:  INDEX. 


SECTION    II. 

Pask. 

1.  Sense — apprehension 54 

2.  It  is  spontaneous 54 

3.  It  is  the  perception  of  the  senses 64 

4.  It  is  the  discernment  of  the  senses 65 

CHAPTER  VII. 

THESENSES. 

SECTION    I. 

1.  The  senses  connect  sensations 56 

2.  The  connection  between  the  senses  and  physical  organs  of  sense 

undefinable 56 

3.  Our  dependence  upon  the  senses  for  our  knowledge  of  external 

things  56 

SECTION    II. 

1.  Our  dependence  upon  the  senses  for  knowledge  limited  to  external 

things - 56 

2.  The  importance  of  the  senses ^  • .  •  ........ ....  . .  57 

3.  The  loss  of  the  senses  can  not  annihilate  the  mind ♦ 67 

4.  Five  senses— how  defined 67 

CHAPTER   VIII. 
(  '.    .  THE    SENSE   OF   SMELL. 

SECTION   I. 

1.  The  organ  of  smell  defined 58 

2.  Sense  of  smell  connected  with  the  nerves 68 

5.  Substance  and  extent  of  the  nerves 58 

4.  Union  of  the  nerves  and  the  sense  of  smell  indefinable 58 

SECTION    n. 

1.  The  sensations  of  smell 59 

2.  The  nature  of  the  manner  in  which  the  organs  are  aflfected 59 

3.  Limited  extent  of  sensations  i-eceived  by  the  sense  of  smell 59 

4.  Influence  of  the  sensations  of  smell  upon  life 59 

6.  Sensations  caused  by  external  bodies 60 

SECTIONIII. 

1.  Perceptions  of  smell  impossible • 60 

2.  Argument  differs  from  former  writers 60 

3.  Perception  of  the  objects  of  the  sense  of  smell 61 

CHAPTER  IX. 

THE    SENSE   OF    TASTE.' 

SECTION    I. 

1.  Organs  of  taste  defined 62 

2.  The  sense  of  taste — how  affected 62 


INDEX.  45ft 

Pagk. 

3.  Sensations  of  tagte 62 

4.  Sensations  aflfect  the  mind  in  relation  to  a  CMrect  apprehending  of 

the  qualities  of  the  cause 62 

5.  The  reverse  doctrine  absurd 63 

6.  Nature  of  the  sensations  of  taste 63 

8ECTI0V     II. 

1.  Modifications  of  taste — ^how  changed 63 

2.  Properties  of  bodies  giving  rise  to  sensations  of  taste 64 

3.  Mental  stat^  following  sensations  of  taste 64 

CHAPTER  X. 

THE    SENSE   OF   HEARING. 
SECTION    I. 

1.  The  organ  of  hearing 65 

2.  That  which  continues  the  power  of  hearing ^ 65 

3.  Sensations  of  hearing* ••% 65 

SECTION    II. 

\  Varieties  of  the  sensation  of  sound 66 

2.  Cause  of  the  sensations  of  healing 66 

.S.  Knowledge  from  hearing  not  intuitive 66 

4.  Our  knowledge  of  the  direction  and  cause  of  sounds 67 

SECTION    Hi. 

1.  Knowledge  of  the  correct  direction  of  sound — ^how  gained 67 

2.  Sensation  corresponds  to  its  cause 67 

3.  Further  proof  of  the  same  fact 68 

4.  Importance  of  the  sense  of  hearing 68 

CHAPTER  XI. 

THE    SENSE   OF   TOUCH. 

SECTION    I. 

1.  The  organ  of  touch 69 

2.  lU  extent 69 

3.  Difference  between  this  power  and  the  physical  nerves 69 

4.  Office  of  the  sensation  of  touch 69 

SECTION  II. 

1.  Extent  and  variation  of  the  sensations  of  touch 70 

2.  Influence  of  the  qualities  of  external  bodies •  •  •  •  70 

3.  Primary  and  secondary  properties 70 

4.  Knowledge  imperfect  from  only  onte  of  the  senses 71 

SECTION     HI. 

1.  Sensation  without  any  external  cause  •  •  • » 71 

2.  Nature  of  the  sensation  of  touch  differs  from  that  of  its  cause 71 

3.  Origin  of  the  idea  of  qualities  connects  with  this  sense 71 


^^6  INDEX 


Page. 


4.  With  this  sense  is  the  origin  of  our  knowledge  of  the  temperature 

of  bodies  •  •  •  • , 72 

5.  Sensation  abstractly  is  not  the  idea  of  heat  or  cold 72 

SECTION    IV. 

1.  Our  knowledge  of  the  real  existence  of  heat  and  cold 72 

2.  Origin  of  the  idea  of  external  qualities 73 

3.  No  similarity  between  sensation  and  its  external  caflse 73 

4.  This  sense  can  not  convey  to  us  a  matured  idea  or  knowledge  of  ex- 

ternal entities 73 

CHAPTER   XII. 

THE    SENSE    OF    SIGHT. 

SECTION   I. 

1.  The  organ  of  the  sense  of  sight 74 

2.  The  retina 74 

8.  Importance  of  the  sense  of  sight 75 

SECTION    n. 

1.  Mysterious  structure  of  the  eye 75 

2.  Sense  of  sight  connected  with  the  retina 76, 

3.  Acute  sensitiveness  of  the  optic  nerve 76 

4.  Sensations  of  sight — when  awakened 76 

6.  Perceptions  of  sight  incorrect 76 

SECTION    III. 

1  •  Sensations  of  sight  produced  by  colors 77 

2.  Color  of  light  influenced  by  objects 77 

3.  Sensation   caused  by  light  reflected  from  objects  upon  the  optic 

nerve 77 

4.  Degrees  of  strength  in  sensations : 78 

SECTION    IV. 

1.  Sight  may  be  modified  or  changed 78 

2.  Knowledge  received  through  the  sense  of  sight 79 

3.  Error  of  philosophers  • 79 

4.  Knowledge  of  color  from  sight 79 

SECTION    V. 

1.  Idea  of  extension  as  visual  is  not  wholly  original  with  sight •  ■   80 

2.  Connection  between  colors,  light,  and  the  objects  which  reflect 

them 80 

3.  Origin  of  our  knowledge  of  extension 81 

4.  Our  knowledge  of  objects  from  sight  only  is  confused 81 

SECTION    VI. 

1.  The  power  of  the  sense  of  sight 82 

2.  Its  power  in  judging  the  magnitude  of  objects 82 

3.  Apparent  distances  of  objects 82 

4.  Perceptions  of  the  distances  to  objects  of  sight  principally  acquired  82 

5.  Perceptions  of  visual  objects  and  distance  original • 83 


INDEX.  itt 

m 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

PRIMARY  JlTHJ>  SECONDARY  SOURCES  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

SKCTIOK    I. 

1.  In  -what  respect  the  senses  are  a  secondary  source  of  knowledge  •  •  •  84 

2.  Matter  has  no  self-power  to  impress  or  cause  motion  in  matter 84 

3.  The  senses  secondary  sources  of  knowledge 84 

4.  The  senses  limited  and  deceptions 84 

SECTION    II. 

1.  Effect  of  disease  upon  the  senses ••  85 

2.  Belief  in  the  report  of  the  senses 85 

3.  The  skeptic's  belief  false 86 

SBOTIOH     III. 

1.  Primary  source  of  knowledge 86 

2.  To  reject  a  reliance  on  internal  intuitions  h  to  reject  all  knowledge  86 

3.  Result  of  such  rejection * 87 

4.  Knowledge  directly  evidenced  to  the  mind 87 


CHAPTER   I. 

PERCEPTION. 

SKOTION    I. 

1.  Perception  defined 88 

2.  Use  of  perception  in  arriving  at  a  knowledge  of  existences 88 

3.  It  is  immediately  successive  to  sensation 88 

4.  Perception  a  sequent  of  impressions  unknown 89 

SECTION    II. 

1.  Perception  a  voluntary  mental  act 89 

2.  Sensation  not  always  followed  by  perception • 89 

3.  Perception  involuntary 90 

4.  That  which  is  inrolved  by  voluntary  perception 90 

SECTION    III. 

1.  Perception  makes  us  acquainted  with  facts 90 

2.  If  perception  is  only  an  affection  or  influence  of  the  mind,  it  is  more 

than  secondary  in  its  power 91 

3.  From  its  nature  it  is  connected  with  primary  elements 91 

SECTION    IV. 

1.  Perceptions  of  primary  properties  of  matter  differ  from  sensations-  91 

2.  Difference  of  sensation  and  perception 92 

3.  Perception  of  the  difference  between  primary  and  secondary  proper- 

ties of  matter 92 


458  INDEX. 


CHAPTER   II. 

FALSE   PERCEPTIONS. 
SECTION    I. 

1.  When  false  perception  takes  place •-••••  »;.ii-.f •  •  93 

2.  They  can  arise  in  connection  with  the  organs  of  sense •  ••  93 

3.  They  can  arise  in  connection  with  the  change  in  the  mental  states  •  93 

4.  They  can  be  caused  by  disease 93 

SECTION    II. 

1.  False  perceptions— how  corrected M 

2.  Corrected  by  comparing  our  perceptions  of  objects  with  other  ob- 

jects-•  94 

3.  By  the  exercise  of  the  judgment 94 

4.  Perception  of  two  or  more  objects — ^how  corrected 94 

CHAPTER  III. 

PERCEPTION    AND    SMELL. 

SECTION    I. 

1.  Perception  of  objects  by  means  of  the  sense  of  smell 95 

2.  Habit  in  relation  to  smell • 95 

3.  Origin  of  our  knowledge  of  odor , 95 

SECTION    II. 

1.  The  mind  affected  in  a  way  corresponding  to  the  object  or  cause-  •  •  96 

2.  If  there  be  no  connection  between  sensation  and  perception,  then 

perception  is  an  accident 96 

3.  Constitutional  elements  of  a  sentient  being 96 

4.  Office  of  sensation  and  perception 97 

CHAPTER  IV. 

PERCEPTION  AND  TASTE. 

SECTION  I. 

1.  The  perception  of  objects  reported  to  the  mind  by  the  sense  of 

taste 98 

2.  Habit  in  relation  to  taste • 98 

SECTION    II. 

1.  The  law  of  habit 98 

2.  Direction  of  perception — how  guided 99 

CHAPTER   V. 

PERCEPTION    AND    HEARING. 

SECTION   I. 

1.  Perception  of  objects  which  aflFect  the  mind  by  means  of  hearing- -100 

2.  Sensation  has  no  self-perception 100 

3.  The  eflfect  of  degrees  in  sounds -  •  -100 


INDEX.  459 

SKOTION    II. 

Pass. 

1.  Habit  in  relation  to  the  sense  of  hearing 101 

2.  Connection  of  sensation  and  perception  in  regard  to  sound 101 

3.  Our  knowledge  of  sonorous  bodies  commences  with  the  sensations 

of  hearing 101 

CHAPTER   VI. 

PBRCEPUION  AND   TOUCH. 

SECTIOS    I. 

1.  Perception  of  objects  made  known  by  the  sense  of  touch 102 

2.  Perception  increases  in  power  with  repeated  efforts 102 

8.  Habit  in  regard  to  the  sense  of  touch 102 

SECTIOK    II. 

1.  Perceptions  as  manifested  in  the  case  of  some  blind  persons 102 

2.  Origin  of  our  knowledge  of  external  things 103 

CHAPTER   VII. 

PERCEPTION   AND   SIGHT. 

8S0TI0N    I. 

1.  Perception  of  objects  of  sight 104 

2.  Inclination  of  the  axis  of  vision  important  in  determining  dis- 

tances  104 

3.  Intuitive  knowledge  of  distance ^.•.•. 104 

gSCTION    II. 

1.  Habit  in  relation  to  vision 106 

2.  Power  of  hearing  partially  supplied  by  sight 105 

3.  Discrimination  of  the  deaf  and  dumb  evidence  of  Improvement  •  •  •  ^lOS 

4.  Perception  of  external  things — how  dependent  and  affected  * .  •  •  -  •  •  •  105 

CHAPTER   VIII. 

HABIT  IN   RBIATION  TO  PERCEPTIONS. 

SECTIOK    I. 

1.  Perceptions  by  habit  in  men,  children,  idiots,  and  brutes 107 

2.  Perceptions  dependent  upon  attention  in  order  to  be  remembered  •  •  107 

3.  A  law  of  habit - ^-... 107 

^,     \      '  SECTIONII. 

1.  Power  of  perception  increased  by  repeated  efforts 107 

2.  Oneness  of  perceptive  acts 108 

3.  Vividness  of  perceptive  action 108 


460  INDEX. 


^ihision  ^I^tirlr. 


CHAPTER   I. 

OUR  KNOWLEDGE   OF    THE   DEFINITE   AND   CONTINGENT 
PHENOMENA   OF   THOUGHT. 

SECTION    I. 

*  Pagk 

1.  Thoughts  and  feelings  can  not  constitute  the  whole  of  mental  phe- 

nomena   109 

2.  Oi-iginof  thought 109 

3.  Real  existence  of  thought 109 

4.  Nature  of  thought 110 

SECTION    II. 

1.  Thought  expre'feses  action  or  thinking 110 

2.  Succession  of  thoughts 110 

3.  Thought  separated  from  the  mind  can  not  exist 110 

4.  The  importance  of  thought Ill 

CHAPTER    II. 

-;;  .  -  IDEAS. 

SECTION    I. 

1.  Definition  of  idea 112 

2.  Ideas  may  vary  with  the  nature  of  the  object 112 

3.  Ideas  of  physical  entities  contingent 112 

4.  Ideas  of  material  objects  relative 112 

5.  Idea  of  duration  absolute 112 

SECTION    11.  ^ 

1.  Idea  of  space  necessary  or  absolute • • 112 

2.  Idea  of  space  absolute,  arising  from  its  nature  or  condition 113 

3.  Idea  of  space  implies  the  absence  of  limitation 113 

4t  Idea  of  space  and  infinity  necessary  and  absolute 113 

SECTION-  111. 

1.  Effects  and  events  contingent  and  relative • 113 

2.  Idea  of  personal  identity  or  self  necessary 114 

3.  The  Atheist  compelled  to  acknowledge  the  existence  of  self  and  the 

existence  of  God 114: 

SECTION    IV. 

1.  Idea  of  the  phenomena  of  mind  contingent 114 

2.  Primary  elements  of  mind 114 

8.  Intuitive  elements — power  of  apprehending  facts 114 


CHAPTEE  III. 

POWER  OE  KNOWLEDGE   WITHOUT   TESTIMONY. 

tBOVtOT    I. 

Pass. 

1.  Primary  elements  of  mind ^15 

2.  Primary  elements  of  materiality  compared  with  those  of  mind 

3.  Prinuury  elements  of  mind — how  known 116 

SECTION     II. 

1.  Knowledge  of  primary  elements  of  mind  can  not  arise  from  argument 

nor  external  testimony 116 

2.  With  them  is  the  origin  of  the  knowledge  of  their  entity 116 

3.  Origin  of  the  knowledge  of  external  things 116 

CHAPTER  IV. 
KNOWLBDOB  THOM   TESTIMONY. 

SECTION    1. 

1.  Intuitive  power  to  arrive  at  a  knowledge  of  facts  from  testimony- •  -117 

2.  Testimony  and  evidence 117 

3.  Intuitive  power  to  receive  facts 117 

4.  Knowledge — when  uncertain » 118 

SEOTIOK    II. 

1.  Judging  facts  from  testimony 118 

2.  Power  to  receive  facts  from  testimony •  •  •  118 

3.  The  principal  ground  of  oUr  confidence 118 

4.  Confidence  increased  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  witnesses 119 

SECTION    III. 

1.  A  well-regulated  mind — how  influenced 119 

2.  Decisions  of  thelnind — how  influenced  by  known  principles 119 

3.  Power  of  correct  knowledge  from  testimony 120 

4.  Assumptions  of  infidels 120 

SECTION    IV., 

1.  Belief  in  miracles • 120 

2.  Miracles  defined ._..*^,^j, 120 

3.  Results  connected  with  the  existence  of  revelation.  *f*  •!^>W^>«r»»..  121 

SECTION    v.    , 

1.  Arguments  assumed  by  infidels ; 121 

2.  Mr.  Hume's  celebrated  argiunent  against  the  resurrection  of  Christ.  121 

3.  Christianity  true 121 

39*    '    •• 


Pass. 

.116      II 


4^  INDEX. 


CHAPTER  I. 

CONCEPTION. 
SECTIOK     I. 

PilGg. 

1.  Conceptions  arise  in  connection  with  peculiar  mental  states 123 

2.  Conception  defined 123 

3.  Conceptions  of  ideas  and  reoccurring  events ;  •  •  •  •  123 

SECTIOK    II. 

1.  Conceptions  diflfer  from  sensations  and  perceptions 123 

2.  Conception  differs  from  memory 124 

3.  Conceptions  can  refer  to  both  past  and  present  impressions 124 

CHAPTER   II. 
''^  CONCEPTION   AND   THE   SENSES. 

SECTION    I. 

1.  Conceptions  of  objects  of  sense  and  sensations 125 

2.  Conceptions  of  objects  of  taste — when  clear 125 

3.  Conceptions  of  sound •  ....126 

4.  Conceptions  of  the  objects  «f  the  sense  of  touch 126 

SECTION    II. 

1.  Conception  of  objects  of  sight 126 

2.  Importance  of  correctly  receiving  facts 127 

3.  Origin  of  the  power  of  conceiving  facts 127 

SECTION     III. 

1.  The  power  of  conceiving  facts  is  capable  of  cultivation 127 

2.  The  manner  of  cultivating • • 127 

3.  Different  minds  manifest  degrees  of  vividness 128 

4.  Our  conceptions  of  objects  when  brought  in  sudden  contact  with 

them .-128 

SECTION    IV. 

1.  Our  belief— how  affected  by  excited  conceptions 128 

2.  Such  conceptions  give  rise  to  improper  feelings 12& 

3.  Influence  of  habit  on  conceptions 129 

CHAPTER   III. 

.MEMORY. 

SECTION    I. 

1.  Memory  defined 130 

2.  The  power  of  memory  to  contain  and  retain  ideas  and  events 130 

8.  The  connection  or  relation  of  memory  to  other  faculties 131 


INDEX.  'Ml- 

•Pxr.n. 

4.  Connection  of  memory  and  conception 131 

5.  Connection  of  memory  and  perception 131 

G.  Connection  of  memory  and  suggestion 131 

7.  Connection  of  memory  and  association 131 

8.  Imagination  dependent  upon  memory 131 

8KCTION    II. 

1.  Original  differences  in  the  power  of  memory ^ 131 

2.  Memory  founded  upon  analogies 132 

3.  That  which  is  embraced  and  implied  in  the  nature  of  memory 132 

(1.)   Sensitive  impressions 132 

(2.)  Involuntary  recurring  of  impressions *> 132 

(3.)  Recurring  of  previous  existences •  • 133 

(4.)  It  implies  suggestiou,  conception,  and  perception 133 

SKCTIOK    m. 

1.  Local  memory .»... ...^ 133 

2.  Memory  contributes  to  true  knowledge* 133 

3.  Degrees  in  the  power  of  memory 133 

4.  Philosophic  memory ••  *-• 134 

5.  Different  degrees 134 

8XCTI0N   IT. 

1.  A  ready  memory • ^ 136 

2.  A  retentive  memory 135 

8.  Artificial  memory •••• 135 

4.  An  efficient  memory •••• -. 136 

5.  It  acts  with  readiness  and  ease 136 

6.  Absence  of  these  qualities — how  may  they  take  place? 136 

(1.)  Weakness ,.,.,^..,^,^^. 136 

(2.)  Insufficiency  of  the  retentive  power... •  ............> 136 

(8.)  Habit  in  relation  to  attention •"•136 

BBOTION    T. 

1.  Memory  of  the  aged 136 

2.  Defects  in  memory  not  from  perception 136 

3.  Memory  dependent  upon  perception 137 

4.  Weakened  by  defects  in  attention 137 

6.  Memory  of  the  aged  incapable  of  destruction ..*....*.  ..> ..137 

SECTION    VI. 

1.  The  improvement  of  memory ^ 138 

2.  Its  retentive  power — how  cultivated 138 

3.  Manner  of  improvement 138 

SECTIOK    VII. 

1,  Memory — how  aided '. 138 

2.  Retentive  power  increased  by  writing  our  thoughts 138 

8.  A  want  of  confidence  in  memory  tends  to  confusion 139 

4.  Constant  exercise  of  memory ..139 

5.  We  should  remember  things  in  their  natural  order 139 


4:64:  INDEX. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

REMEMBRANCE,   RECOLLECTION,   AND   THE   DURA- 
_ TION    OF    MEMORY. 

SECTION    I. 

Pagk. 

1.  Remembrance  tiefined 140 

2.  That  which  is  implied  by  remembrance 140 

3.  Memory  is  aided  by  the  tenacity  with  which  facts  are  received  •  •  •  •  140 

SECTION    II. 

1.  Recollection  defined 140 

2.  It  differs  from  remembrance 140 

3.  Recollection — when  voluntary 141 

4.  Memory,  remembrance,  and  recollection 141 

SECTION    III. 

1.  Duration  of  memory 141 

2.  Power  of  memory  to  recall  all  past  events 141 

8.  Influence  of  the  physical  system  upon  memory 142 

4.  Memory  can  not  be  annihilated  • 142 

SECTION    IV. 

1.  Influence  of  disease  upon  memory 142 

2.  Effect  of  injuries  upon  the  head 143 

3.  It  can  be  affected  by  a  diseased  body 143 

SECTION    V. 

1.  Memory  not  suspended  in  all  cases  of  mental  inactivity  or  states  of 

coma • 144 

2.  States  of  stupor  or  coma  often  results  of  intemperance 144 

3.  Power  of  memory  to  recall  that  which  transpired  during  delirium 

tremens 144 

SECTION    VI. 

1.  Importance  of  the  first  objects  of  memory  as  they  are  the  last 145 

2.  From  the  nature  and  duration  of  memory  we  infer  its  power  in  the 

future  world 145 

CHAPTER  V. 

ATTENTION. 

SECTION   I. 

1.  Attention  defined 146 

2.  Attention,  or  the  act  of  attending  to  facts 146 

3.  If  it  acts  or  can  be  acted  upon,  it  is  a  real  entity 146 

4.  It  can. not  be  a  result  of  mind 146 

6.  It  is  not  wholly  an  ulterior  principle 146 

6.  Attention  is  direction  to  an  object  exclusively 146 


INDEX.  465 


BBCTIOK    II. 

Pxec. 

1.  Attention — when  voluntary 147 

2.  "When  involuntary 147 

8.  Degrees  in  attention 147 

4.  Dependence  on  thorough  investigation 147 

sECTioar    III. 

1.  That  kind  of  attention  necessary  to  understand  arg^uments 148 

2.  The  manner  of  attending  to  truths  or  facts 148 

3.  Memory  dependent  upon  attention 148 

SXCTION    IV. 

1.  Attention  influenced  by  disease 149 

2.  This  faculty  first  affected  by  bodily  disease  •  i 149 

3.  Influence  of  fever,  intemperance,  and  old  age 149 

CHAPTER  VI. 

ASSOCIATION. 

SSGTIOir    I. 

1.  The  power  of  association 

2.  Act  of  associating — how  influenced l '.'  .i  *,'?i?I  J} 

3.  When  voluntary 250 

4.  When  involuntar — .........100 

8KCTI0K    II. 

1.  False  views  of  philosophers » 151 

2.  The  work  of  associating  not  the  power  or  cause  of  such  work 151 

3.  How  association  is  furnished 151 

SECTIOK    III. 

1.  Objects  furnishing  association — how  related 152 

2.  Fiurnished  from  resemblance • 152 

3.  Contrast  contributes  to  association 152 

4.  It  is  aided  from  the  law  of  contiguity » 152 

SECTION    IV. 

1.  Natural  association 152 

2.  It  may  arise  from  the  natural  relationship  of  facts  or  existences  ••  -153 

SECTIOK    V. 

1.  When  the  recalling  of  a  fact  is  voluntary 153 

2.  When  facts  recur  involuntary 154 

3.  Casual  associations 154 

SECTION    VI. 

1.  Facts  associated  with  places — how  revived • "• .  .155 

2.  Associations  formed  in  connection  with  localities 155 

3.  Memory  dependent  upon  association  •  • 155 


4:66  INDEX 


SECTION    VII. 

Pack. 

1 .  Intentional  association  involves  volitive  action 156 

2.  Method  of  associating  in  order  to  retain  facts 156 

3.  Associating  with  known  facts 156 

4.  Different  objects  excite  similar  feelings 156 

SECTION    VIII. 

1.  Intentional  association  further  illustrated • 157 

2.  Dependence  on  human  testimony 157 

8.  Traditional  or  written  testimony 158 

4.  Universal  belief  in  the  associated  events  and  facts  connected  with 

revelation 158 

CHAPTER  VII. 

ASSOCIATION,  CONTINUED. 

SECTION    I. 

1.  The  term  law,  as  applied  to  association,  incorrect 159 

2.  The  relationship  of  truths  may  suggest  each  other 159 

3.  Variation  of  the  associating  principle 159 

4.  It  varies  with  the  strength  of  the  emotions 160 

SECTION    II. 

1.  Associating  principle — how  affected  by  the  lapse  of  time 160 

2.  Associated  facts  of  early  life — how  affected  by  time 161 

3.  How  affected  by  differences  in  inclinations 161 

;.Ti*lW  lazMj*.   KJ  «st.    SECTION     III. 

1.  Associations — ^how  revived  and  recalled 161 

2.  Vividness  and  force  of  impressions — on  what  dependent 162 

8.  Mental  associations  under  a  direct  volitive  power 162 

4.  Associations  under  indirect  volitive  power  •  • 162 

5.  Evidences  of  skill  and  design  in  nature  lead  us  to  seek  for  an  ad- 

equate cause 163 

SECTION    IV. 

1.  Influence  of  association  upon  taste 163 

2.  Ideas  of  fashion  vary  with  the  influence  of  association 164 

3.  Influence  of  association  in  connection  with  persons 164 

4.  Effect  of  habit  on  association 164 

SECTION    V. 

1.  Effects  of  improper  associations 185 

2.  Results  of  correct  associations 165 

8.  Success  depends  upon  forming  associations  in  connection  with  cor- 
rect principles  165 


INDEX.  ^^ 


MlilMion   0iitl. 

CHAPTER   I. 

MENTAL     STATES. 

8KCTI0K   I. 

1.  A  simple  mental  state •....' i...l<Hr 

2.  Diflference  between  simple  and  complex  states 167 

3.  Simple  mental  states  indefinable 167 

4.  Relief  and  reliance  in  simple  mental  states 167 

6.  Simple  mental  states  precede  those  which  are  complex 167 

SECTION    II. 

1.  Complex  mental  states— how  affected 168 

2.  Thoughts  and  feelings  resulting  from  different  caoses  aniU  in  the 

mind 168 

3.  Complex  mental  states  in  reference  to  external  objects 168 

4.  How  such  states  exist  in  regard  to  the  relations  of  external  things- 168 

0.  Such  states  the  results  of  internal  influences 169 

CHAPTER  II. 

ABSTRACTION. 

SECTIOK    I. 

1.  Abstraction  defined 170 

2.  Method  of  examining  separated  or  eliminated  entities 170 

3.  Abstract  notions  or  thoughts — how  they  arise 170 

SECTION    II. 

1.  Mental  operations  in  separating  certain  ideas r  •  •  -171 

2.  Abstraction  can  not  apply  to  simple  ideas  or  elements  which  are  in- 

divisible   171 

8.  Abstraction  implied  in  regard  to  complex  ideas • •' -171 

4.  Particular  abstract  ideus 172 

SECTION    III. 

1.  The  power  of  abstraction — correct  use  of  it 172 

2.  Abstract  notions  or  ideas — ^how  varied 173 

3.  Primary  truths — how  examined 173 

4.  GeneriJ  abstraction — how  applied 173 

SECTION    IV. 

1,  General  abstraction  may  apply  to  classification 173 

2.  General  abstract  ideas  will  apply  to  almost  innumerable  classes  of 

'JdJ   objects 174 

8^:  Abstraction  essential  to  a  well-regulated  mind 174 

4.  Influenced  by  disease 174 


^^S  INDEX. 

CHAPTER  III, 
•      IMAGINATION. 
SECTIOK    I. 

1.  Imagination  defined , 175 

2.  As  an  ulterior  element 175 

3.  Its  close  connection  with  the  understanding 175 

L  It  may  extend  to  apprehending  and  contemplation 176 

SECTION    II. 

1.  Imagination  influences  mental  states 176 

2.  It  can  not  be  resolved  into  any  other  element  or  elements  com- 

bined   177 

3.  Imagination  leads  in  blending  diverse  existences 177 

i^,  SECTION    III. 

1.  Action  of  imagination — when  involuntary 177 

2.  Intentional  imagination  involves  artificial  combinations 178 

3.  Fictitious  delineations  dependent  on  imagination 178 

4.  Productions — when  of  a  high  moral  character 178 

5i  When  they  are  vile 178 

SECTION    IV. 

1.  Imagination  differs  from  fancy 178 

2.  It  diff'ers  from  admiration 178 

3.  It  differs  from  fictions 179 

4.  Diff'erence  between  imagination  and  bombast  •  •  •  • 179 

SECTION    V. 

1.  Imagination  differs  from  burlesque 180 

2.  It  differs  from  sarcasm 180 

3.  Feelings  of  sympathy — how  far  dependent  upon  imagination 180 

4.  Imagination  in  relation  to  works  of  fiction  without  injury 181 

5.  Influence  of  fictitious  Avritings  upon  the  imagination 181 

6.  Improvement  of  imagination — how  conditioned 181 

SECTION    VI. 

1.  Utility  and  improvement  of  the  imagination 182 

2.  A  vigorous  imagination 182 

8.  An  active  imagination  essential  to  true  oratory 182 

4.  The  blendings  and  descriptions  of  the  poet  depend  upon  imagination  -183 

5.  The  perfection  of  the  sculptor's  work  depends  on  imagination 183 

6.  It  is  present  in  affecting  compositions  of  music 183 

SECTION     VII. 

1 .  Improvement  of  the  imagination •  •  •  i'-  •  •'Vi 183 

2.  How  influenced  by  disease '• 183 

8.  When  it  tends  or  leads  to  misconceptions 188 

4.  When  it  leads  to  deception 184 

5.  Results  of  a  f.outiiuied  love  of  fiction 184 


INDEX.  4/9^ 


mihislon  Zlxil. 


CHAPTER  I. 

INTELLECTUAL   STATES   OP  TIXTERNAL   ORiaiN,   AND    IN- 
TELLECTUAL STATES   OF   INTERNAL   ORIGIN. 

8ECTI0K    I. 

Pa«k. 

1.  Intellectual  states  of  external  origin  obj«cted  to 185 

2.  Ground  of  objections 185 

3.  Certain  doctrines  absurd 185 

4.  Mind  is  not  matter 186 

SKCTION    II. 

1.  Elements  of  mind  not  of  external  origin 186 

2.  If  any  mental  state  is  of  external  origin,  how  related  to  mattei?«  '186 

3.  Connection  of  faculties  with  external  objects 187 

SECTIOM    III. 

1.  Mental  states  of  internal  origin 187 

2.  Origin  of  all  knowledge 187 

3.  Ulterior  origin  of  knowledge 188 

4.  Sequence  of  sensatioifB ., 188 

6.  Origin  of  simple  thoughts  and  ideas 188 

CHAPTER   II. 
SUGGESTION. 

SECTION    I. 

1.  Suggestion  defined • 189 

2.  Simple  suggestion  primary  and  natural 189 

3.  Our  knowledge  of  internal  action 189 

4.  Origin  of  the  notion  or  idea  of  self 189 

SECTIOK    II. 

1.  Idea  of  self-existence  not  original  with  the  senses 190 

2.  Origin  of  the  idea  of  mind  not  original  with  the  senses 190 

3.  Internal  origin  of  the  idea  of  personal  identity 190 

4.  Ideas  of  real  existence — how  they  arise 191 

SECTION    III. 

1 .  Simple  suggestion — relation  to  past  mental  states 191 

2".  Simple  ideas — how  they  arise 191 

3.  Simple  suggestion — application  to  past  thoughts 191 

4.  Suggestion  in  relation  to  past  and  future  ideas  or  facts 191 

SECTION    IV. 

1.  Suggestion  involuntary 192 

2.  When  voluntary.-.-  • 192 

40 


470  INDEX. 

8.  Importance  of  this  faculty 192 

4.  Tendency  to  relative  conceptions  •  •  • • 192 

5.  Tendency  to  relative  perceptions  • • 193 

SECTION    V. 

1.  Origin  of  our  ideas  of  material  elements 193 

2.  Suggestion — how  it  involves  our  experience  in  relation  to  mental 

states 193 

3.  Dependence  upon  it  for  the  origin  of  our  idea  of  motion 193 

4.  Dependence  upon  it  in  relation  to  oui  idea  of  cause  and  effect 194: 

SECTIOK    VI. 

1.  Origin  of  the  idea  of  time 194 

2.  Duration — when  called  time ••  ••  •• 194 

3.  Ideas  in  relation  to  time  and  space 195 

4.  Resemblance  an  ulterior  law  of  suggestion 195 

' '•^*   SECTION     VII. 

1.  Internal  action  of  the  suggestive  power 195 

2.  How  influenced  by  the  extremes  of  conditions 196 

3.  Influence  of  cotemporaneous  existences 196 

4.  Effect  of  lively  suggestive  powers 196 

5;  Realities  objects  of  suggestion •*• 196 

SECTION    VIII. 

1.  Suggestive  inteMect — ^how  improved 197 

2.  Aided  by  our  attention  to  natural  facts 197 

3.  Aided  by  attending  to  dissimilar  facts 197 

4.  It  can  be  increased  by  temperance 197 

5.  Its  activity  dependent  on  habit •  •  •  -197 

CHAPTER   III. 

RELATIVE    SUGGESTION. 

SECTION    I. 

1.  Relative  suggestion — how  defined 199 

2.  Its  office  and  character 199 

3.  Influence  of  relation — how  it  may  arise 200 

4.  Terms  of  correlative  character  and  their  power 20O 

SECTION    II. 

1.  Relative  suggestion — in  what  respects  not  dependent  on  the  senses -201 

2.  How  far  independent  of  the  senses  in  the  knowledge  of  realities- •  -201 

3.  Extent  of  this  power 201 

4.  The  soul  perfected 202 


'm 


W 


INDEX.  471 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THEJUDGMENT. 

SECTION    I. 

Pack. 

1.  The  judgment  a  real  faculty 203 

2.  It  is  the  power  by  which  we  are  enabled  to  compare  ideas  or  truths -203 

3.  It  is  the  determining  of  the  mind 203 

4.  It  is  the  act  or  p^wer  of  judging 203 

5.  It  is  a  power  within  itself,  and  is  connected  with  primary  elements '204 

6.  It  has  power  to  analyze,  abstract,  and  classify  •  •  •• 204 

SECTIOK    II. 

1.  A  naturally-defective  judgment 204 

2.  It  presupposes  the  understanding 205 

8.  Importance  of  the  judgement  compared  with  the  understanding  •  •  •  •  205 

4.  Its  determining  power 205 

5.  Its  connection  with  various  mental  operations 206 

8B0TI0K     III. 

1.  Action  of  the  judgment  closely  connected  with  reason 206 

2.  Its  active  power  that  which  can  be  comprehended 207 

3.  A  correct  development  of  the  relations  of  resemblance  dependent 

upon  the  judgment 207 

SaCTIOS    IV. 

1.  A  knowledge  of  agreement  and  disagreement  of  properties  depend- 

ent upon  the  judgment • 208 

2.  Relations  of  cause  and  effect  tested  by  the  judgment 208 

3.  Axioms  and  relations  of  existences  objects  of  the  judgment 209 

'4.  Skill  and  the  relation  of  effect  to  cause  tested  by  the  judgment 209 

SECTION    V. 

X.  Action  of  the  judging  power — how  important • 209 

2.  The  truthfulness  or  falsehood  of  decisions — how  dependent  on  the 

judgment 210 

3.  Universal  adaptation  of  this  power 210 

SECTION    VI. 

1.  Natural  defects  in  the  judgment • 211 

2.  Correct  judgment — how  unaffected 211 

3.  Relation  of  classification  to  the  judgment 212 

4.  Classification — when  involuntary 212 

SECTION    VII. 

1 .  Classification — how  dependent  upon  the  judgment 212 

2.  Abstraction — how  connected  with  the  judgment 212 

3.  Generalization — to  what  extent  connected  with  the  judging  power. 213 

4.  The  act  of  judgment  preceded  by  perception 213 


472 


li^-DBX 


SECT  10  ST     VIII. 

1.  Judgment  differs  from  the  understanding 213 

2.  Power  of  judging  closely  connected  with  that  of  suggestion 214 

3.  Relative  suggestion  diffei's  from  the  judgment 214 

4.  Importance  of  an  active  judging  power 215 


M  ih  isian   ^zhtnit.  • 
CHAPTERI. 

REASON. 
SECTION     I. 

1.  Reason  defined 216 

2.  This  principle — how  related  to  the  ground  of  argumentation 216 

3.  Existence  of  ratiocination — how  conditioned  •  • 216 

4.  Reason  the  power  of  ideas  and  facts 217 

SECTION     II. 

1.  Reason  capable  of  action 217 

2.  Character  of  its  action 218 

3-  Reason  differs  from  the  understanding 218 

4.  Ideas  of  right  and  wrong — how  tested 218 

SECTION     III. 

1.  Power  of  reason  is  in  the  mind 219 

2.  Character  of  certain  intuitive  facts 219 

3.  Self-evident  truths — how  divided  into  classes 219 

4.  These  intuitive  principles  the  origin  of  knowledge 220 

5.  Self -evident  facts  not  the  result  of  reason 220 

SECTION    IV. 

1.  Origin  of  the  knowledge  of  our  own  existence 221 

2.  Original  elements  of  mind — how  unchanging 221 

3.  With  these  is  self-power  of  knowledge 222 

4.  Origin  of  the  idea  of  personal  identity 222 

5.  Origin  of  the  notion  of  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect 222 

CHAPTER   II. 

REASON,    CONTINUED. 

SECTION    I. 

1.  Reason  a  ground  of  confidence  in  natural  laws 224 

2.  Confidence  in  the  uniformity  of  phenomena 224 

3.  Reason  indispensably  relative  to  correct  ideas  of  complex  entities  ••  224 

4.  Uniformity  of  external  entities  to  law 225 

5.  Our  knowledge  of  the  conformity  of  mi?^  d  to  law •  •  •  226 


\ 


INDEX.  i;fB 


SECTION    II. 

1.  Self-evident  truths— how  connected  with  reason 220 

2.  The  power  of  reason — how  dependent 227 

3.  The  conduct  of  all  persons  prore  their  belief  in  primary  truths-  •  •  -227 

4.  Skeptics  can  not  rtgect  such  truths 228 

SECTION    III. 

1.  Difi'erence  between  the  process  of  argumentation  and  the  action  of 

the  reasoning  power 228 

2.  Reason  differs  from  consciousness ^ 2:i9 

3.  Its  power  differs  from  that  of  the  senses 229 

4.  It  differs  from  the  judgment 229 

6.  It  differs  from  the  understanding 229 

SECTION    IV. 

1.  Convictions  of  right  and  wrong  connected  with  reason 230 

2.  Right  and  wrong  tested  by  experience 230 

3.  Intuitive  conviction  in  regard  to  right  and  wrong 230 

4.  Ideas  of  the  beautiful  aud  sublime — how  related 231 

CHAPTER   III. 

EEASONING. 

8  KC  TI  OK     I. 

1.  Reasoning  defined -232 

2.  Atheism — how  affected  by  reasoning 232 

8.  Atheism  and  infidelity — how  defeated  by  two  methods  of  rea8oning.232 

SECTIO  N    II. 

1.  The  first  method  defined 233 

2.  An  unoriginated  being  must  have  unoriginated  attributes 233 

3.  Such  attributes  must  be  absolute  and  limitless 233 

4.  Deity  must  exist  everywhere 234 

SECTION    III. 

1.  Perfections  of  Deity •- 235 

2.  Such  a  being  can  not  be  materiality 235 

3.  Limitation  of  matter  and  motion 235 

4.  First  cause — i)erfection  of  attributes 236 

SECTION    IV. 

1.  Plurality  of  infinite  beings  incredible • 287 

2.  All  finite  existences  in  time  or  duration '. '•  •  287 

3.  Such  existences  imply  a  cause -  - 238 

4.  His  acts  neither  arbitrary  nor  of  necessity • 238 

SECTION    v. 

1.  His  knowledge  not  necessitated 238 

2.  His  acts  according  to  liberty 238 

3.  Wisdom  of  such  acts 239 

4.  Object  of  man's  creation  inf^ed 239 


» 


47lr  INDEX. 

CHAPTER   IV. 

REASONING,    CONTINUED. 

SECTION    I. 

Page. 

1.  Second  mode  of  argumentation •  240 

2.  Conceptions  of  Deity — how  sustained 240 

8.  Such  knowledge  not  by  the  senses 240 

4.  Evidences  of  a  first  cause 241 

6.  Evidences  in  the  structure  of  the  earth 241 

6.  Laws  of  matter — how  deficient 241 

SECTION     II. 

1.  Evidence  in  the  order  of  Providence 242 

2.  Evidence  in  life,  sleep,  and  action 242 

3.  Evidence  in  the  circulation  of  the  blood 242 

SECTION     III. 

1.  Motion  of  the  heart — how  accounted  for 243 

2.  Demonstration  (1.)    (2.) 244 

3.  Evidence  in  the  continued  and  unwearied  action  of  the  heart 244 

4.  Action  of  the  heart -. 244 

SECTION    IV. 

1.  Reason,  or  process  of  argumentation 245 

2.  Reason  applied  to  investigation .245 

3.  Its  value 245 

4.  Reasoning  source  of  knowledge 246 

5.  Exercise  of  reason— its  tendency 246 

CHAPTER  V. 

REASONING,    CONTINUED. 

SECTION    I. 

1 .  Effect,  the  object  of  reasoning,  infers  a  cause 248 

2.  Cause  of  an  effect  may  be  assumed 248 

3.  Results  when  assumed 248 

4.  Process  of  reasoning  relative  to  intuitive  articles 248 

6.  Power  and  action  of  reason — how  involved 248 

SECTION    II. 

1.  Reasoning  a  priori 249 

2.  Reasoning  a  posteriori 250 

3.  Reasoning  founded  upon  facts 250 

4.  Reasoning — what  involved 250 

SECTION    III. 

1.  Reasoning  requires  attention 251 

2    That  which  is  necessary  to  correct  reasoning . .  251 

8.  Three  things  necea.sary  to  reasoning 251 


INDEX.  476 


8KCTI0K    IV. 

1.  We  must  know  the  premises  to  be  true 251 

2.  Facts  of  the  argument  must  be  true 251 

3.  Caution  in  relation  to  the  different  steps ••252 

4.  Keasoning  power — how  varied • 252 

SECTIOK    V. 

1.  Defects  of  I'hysical  organs  •  •  •  •  v. . .-. .' 252 

2.  Manner  of  storing  the  mind-*  ^^t'^Paf^* 252 

8.  Correct  reasoning  dependent  upon  attention 253 

SECTION    Ti.     • 

1.  Mathematical  reasoning .'253 

2.  That  which  is  and  is  not  assumed 253 

3.  All  facts — how  dependent  upon  intuition 254 

4.  Internal  reasoning — how  the  highest  order 254 

8ECTI0»    VII. 

1.  Power  and  accuracy  of  mental  reasoning 255 

2.  Proper  use  of  terms 255 

3.  Attention  necessary  to  demonstration 255 

SECTION    VIII. 

1 .  Demonstratire  reasoning — importance  of 256 

2.  Investigative  reasoning 256 

5.  False  investigative  reasoning * 256 

SBOTIOV    IX. 

1.  False  reasoning  by  assumption "• 257 

2.  False  by  assuming  incorrect  propositions 257 

8.  False  by  confusing  each  step 257 

4.  False  by  commencing  at  a  wrong  point. 267 

5.  False  in  use  of  petitio  principii ..  .257 

6.  False  in  arguing  ofl  an  assumed  principle 257 

SECTION     X. 

1.  False  in  connection  with  sophisms 258 

2.  Correct  reasoning — how  effected .258 

3.  False,  from  improper  motive 258 

4.  Influence  of  prejudice < 258 


4T6  INDEX. 


^  ihigion   35ijgH]&. 
CHAPTER   I. 

'''■  '    '"DREAMING. 

SECTION    I. 

Pag». 

1.  Dreaming — two  kinds 260 

2.  It  is  wholly  involuntary • • 260 

8.  In-voluntary  associations  of  thoughts 260 

4.  The  mind— how  affected 261 

5.  It  is  common  to  all  persons • '• 261 

SECTION    II. 

1.  Mental  dreaming  defined 261 

2.  Thoughts  in  sleep  not  always  results  of  preceding  events 262 

8.  Ideas  in  sleep  of  things  may  or  may  not  come  true 262 

4.  Activity  of  the  mind  independent  of  the  body *  •  262 

SECTION     III. 

1.  Dreaming  caused  by  physical  debility 263 

2.  Character  of  dreaming — how  varied 263 

8.  Bodily  sensations — how  recalled 264 

4.  Thoughts  in  dreaming  opposite  to  waking  desires  • 264 

SECTION    IV. 

1.  No  fixed  laws  of  conformity  in  dreams 264 

2.  Conceptions  of  relations — power  of  the  senses  suspended 265 

3.  Old  associations  recalled  in  dreams 265 

4.  Conceptions  in  dreams  of  things  of  which  we  have  had  no  previous 

knowledge • 265 

,    _     .  SECTION    V. 

1.  Conceptions  of  the  length  of  time  in  dreams 266 

2.  Mental  dreaming — when  regarded  as  true 266 

3.  Dreams  vary  with  different  persons 267 

4.  Dreaming  conceptions  not  confined  to.  old  conceptions > 267 

SECTION    VI. 

1.  Dreams  which  are  not  remembered 268 

2.  When  loss  of  power  over  our  succession  of  thoughts 268 

3.  Causes  of  dreams — how  far  definable 269 

CHAPTER   II. 

CLAIRVOYANCE. 

SECTION    I. 

1.  Clairvoyance — why  introduced  in  this  work 270 

2.  Clairvoyance  defined 270 

8.  Attributed  to  persons  in  a  mesmeric  state 270 

4.  It  is  not  common  to  all  persons ^ 270 


INDEX.  4W 

8BCXIOK    II. 

1.  This  power  not  essential  to  the  existence  of  mind 271 

2.  Clairvoyance  true — to  what  extent 271 

3.  True  in  connection  with  some  minds 272 

4.  This  natural  gift  innocent 272 

CHAPTER  III. 

SOMNAMBULISM. 

SECTION    I. 

1.  Somnambulism'  defined 273 

2.  It  differs  from  dreaming 273 

3.  Talking  in  sleep  not  recollected 273 

4.  It  is  the  first  degree  of  somnambulism  •  •  •• 274 

SKCTION    II. 

1.  It  difil>rs  from  dreaming 274 

2.  Muscidar  action  in  somnambulism,  but  not  in  gleep 275 

8.  Absence  of  fear  in  somnambulism 276 

4.  Investigative  mental  action — how  increased 276 

8KCTI0K     III. 

1.  Singular  phenomena  in  paroxysms 276 

2.  How  unconscious  of  external  things 276 

8.  Contingent  feature  by  somnolency  •  • 276 

4.  Some  kind  of  perception  without  the  senses 276 

5.  Byidence  of  the  character  of  the  soul 277 

CHAPTER  IV. 
MESMERISM. 
*  8KOTXOV    I. 

1.  Mesmerism  defined 278 

2.  Mesmerizing — how  effected 278 

3.  Constitutions  capable  of  being  mesmerized 278 

4.  Somnambulists  capable  of  being  mesmerized 279 

6.  Degrees  of  consciousness  in  such  a  state 279 

SECTION    II. 

1.  It  does  not  prove  phrenology  true 279 

2.  How  far  can  we  be  controlled  by  the  spirit  of  others 280 

3.  Partial  consciousness  under  mesmerism 280 

4.  Mesmeric  state  similar  to  that  of  talking  in  sleep ^. ..  .281 

6.  Belief  in  it — how  far  true 281 

CHAPTER  V. 

PHRENOLOGY. 

SECTION    I. 

1.  Phrenol(^  defined 282 

2.  Dependent  on  the  size  and  shape  of  the  head 282 

3.  What  points  to  be  settled  in  regard  to  its  truthfulness 282 


478  INDEX. 


SECTIOir    II. 

Pagk. 

1.  Truths  supporting  phrenology  should  be  clear  and  conclusive 283 

2.  Main  position  slioald  be  without  doubt 283 

3.  We  should  know  the  brain  to  be  the  organ  of  the  mind 283 

4.  Can  the  skull  develop  mind 284 

6.  Difficulty  in  its  formation  •  • 284 

6.  Difficulty  in  regard  to  the  lobes  of  the  brain 284 

SECTION     III. 

1.  Lobes  can  not  answer  to  the  different  powers  of  the  mind- 284 

2.  The  brain — how  the  organ  of  the  mind 285 

3.  Mental  action — how  dependent  on  matter 285 

4.  This  doctrine— when  tendency  to  infidelity 285 

SECTION    IV. 

1.  Physical  organs  powerless ••  -286 

2.  Outlines  of  phrenology  true 286 

3.  Effect  of  injuries 286 

4.  Effect  of  injuries  of  the  brain  •  •  •  • • 286 

;>».. SECTIONV. 

ih'iRemoval  of  portions  of  the  brain — how  the  mind  affected  • •287 

2.  iFractureof  the  skull— effect  of 287 

3.  Such  effects  contrary  to  phrenology •  -288 

4.  General  principle  true 288 


tJttt-  M  ih  is  ion    NCutj^.  ••    i 

.CHAPTER  I. 

REFLECTION. 

SECTION    I. 

1.  Reflection  defined - 289 

2.  Action  of  this  power » 289 

3.  When  it  is  involuntary  •  •  •  •  • 289 

4.  When  it  is  voluntary--  •• 289 

5.  Connection  with  memory 290 

SECTION    II. 

1.  Powers  acting  with  reflection 290 

2.  Origin  of  our  belief  in  external  things 290 

8.  Belief  in  the  existence  of  self 290 

4.  Convictions  as  to  the  report  of  the  senses 290 

6.  Importance  of  reflection 291 


INDEX.  ,  4f8i 


CHAPTER   II. 

CONNECTION   AND    INFLUENCE    OP   THE   BODY 
UPON    THE    MIND. 

SKCTIOI  X,  ^ 

1.  The  mysterioag  union ••« ^•m>292 

2.  Power  of  temporal  death ;■......'.'. . : ..... ;-. ..'.  ;'^ . . . .  292 

3.  Final  result  of  death 292 

4.  Its  power  over  the  soul 292 

5.  Its  power  over  knowledge 292 

SECTION    II. 

1.  Intellectual  action — when  imperfect 203 

2.  Conceptions  of  the  correctness  of  such  actions 293 

3.  Future  condition  of  an  idiot 293 

4.  Irregularity  of  mental  action  when  caused  by  disease 294 

SECTION    III. 

1.  Internal  operations — how  affected-...  • 294 

2.  Extent  of  the  effect  caused  by  disease 294 

8.  Nervous  system — how  affected 295 

4.  Mental  excitement — effect  on  the  body .". 295 

SECTION    IV. 

1.  Effects  of  excited  imagination  and  conceptions .295 

2.  Results  of  such  influences 296 

3.  Effects  of  excited  imagination  caused  by  disease 296 

CHAPTER  III. 
APPARITI  0*N  S  , 

SECTION    I. 

1.  Apparitions  defined 298 

2.  Effect  of  disease  upon  the  eye 298 

3.  Effect  of  disease  upon  the  nerves 299 

SECTION    II. 

1.  Affection  of  the  retina  or  optic  nerve 299 

2.  Change  of  the  optic  nerve  by  disease  •  * * 299 

3.  Changed  by  internal  excitement 299 

CHAPTER  IV. 

SPECTRAL    ILLUSIONS. 

SECTION    I. 

1.  Spectral  illusions — how  to  be  regarded 801 

2.  An  instance  recorded 301 

8.  They  often  originate  in  dreams 802 

4.  Impressions  in  solitude  often  t^pear  real 302 


J 


4:80  INDEX. 


SECTION    II. 

1.  Spectral  images — how  accounted  for 304 

2.  Origin  in  connection  with  mental  excitement 304: 

3.  Majority  of  them  can  be  accounted  for 304 

4.  Effect  of  anodynes  and  opiates 305 

*  SECTION    III. 

1.  Nyctalopia — power  or  extent  of  such  influence 305 

2.  Brain  affected  by  wrong  impressions 306 

3.  Influence  of  epileptic  tits 306 

4.  Influence  of  febrile  diseases 306 

5.  Influence  of  excited  imagination 307 

6.  The  senses — how  influenced 307 

7.  Evidence  furnished  by  the  preceding  facts 307 

CHAPTER   V. 

SPIRIT-RAPPINGS. 

SECTION    I. 

1.  Connection  of  necromancy  with  mental  science 308 

2.  Spirit-rapping  delusive 308 

3.  Mystery  of  involuntary  writing  solved 308 

4.  Why  have  spirits  delayed  their  work  so  long? 309 

SECTION    II. 

1.  Can  spirits  reveal  facts  to  us  ? • 310 

2.  Object  and  character  of  such  messages 310 

3.  Ideas  of  purity — the  result 310 

4.  Character  of  such  messages 310 

SECTION    III. 

1 .  The  result  when  such  tidings  are  contrary  to  truth 311 

2.  False  if  from  Satan 311 

3.  Demonology — how  a  result 311 

4.  Such  facts  contrary  to  spirit-rappings -311 

CHAPTER    VI. 

EXCITED  CONCEPTIONS  BORDERING  ON  INSANITY. 

SECTION  I. 

1.  Excited  conceptions  defined 313 

2.  Connection  of  vigorous  minds  with  weak  nerves 313 

3.  Influence  of  physical  defects 314 

4.  Effect  of  general  debility ' 314 

SECTION     II. 

1 .  Such  conceptions  impossible  to  mind  abstractly 314 

2.  Such  conceptions  from  sense  of  sight 314 

3.  They  may  arise  with  some  emotion  of  spirit 315 

4.  They  may  arise  from  great  joy 315 

5.  When  caused  by  grief 315 


INDEX. 


4lf 


SBOTIOK     III. 

Paok. 

1.  How  caused  by  the  effect  of  disease 315 

2.  Origin  of  excited  conceptions  of  sound 316 

3.  Such  conceptions — instances  given 316 

4.  Acute  hearing  in  affliction 317 

SECTION    IV. 

1.  Excited  conceptions  and  sense  of  touch 317 

2.  Similar  facts  in  regard  to  other  senses 318 

8.  Caused  by  the  nervous  system 818 

4.  Caused  by  affections  of  the  brain 319 

5.  Caused  by  febrile  influence 319 

CHAPTER   VII. 

PARTIAL    INSANITY. 

BECTIOK     I. 

1«  Influence  of  partial  insanity ...320 

2.  The  mind — when  partially  insane 320 

8.  Its  relation  to  recent  facts  and  those  of  early  life 321 

4.  Defective  action 821 

SECTION    II. 

1.  Insanity  caused  by  the  judgment 321 

2.  Its  origin  with  suggestion 322 

3.  Caused  by  imperfect  association 322 

4.  Caused  by  imperfect  reasoning 323 

5.  Evidenced  by  hasty  reasoning 323 

SECTION    III. 

1.  Physical  organs  of  sense — how  influenced 324 

2.  Insanity  not  natural  to  spirit : 824 

8.  Its  connection  with  belief 324 

4.  It  exists  in  loss  of  confidence .325 

5.  Caused  by  indolent  habits 326 

SECTION    lY. 

1.  Caused  by  too  great  physical  efforts 326 

2.  Caused  by  too  intense  study 326 

3.  Caused  by  unnatural  excitement 327 

4.  Effect  of  repeated  mental  excitement 327 

CHAPTER   VIII. 

TOTAL    INSANITY. 

SECTION   I. 

1.  Total  insanity  defined 829 

2.  Its  influence  over  mental  states 329 

3.  Restriction  of  mental  action 329 

4.  Influence  of  only  one  impression 330 

5.  Mental  abstraction— how  effected 33Q 

41 


4:82  INDEX 


SECTION    II. 

Page. 

1.  Mania — how  varied 330 

2.  Hallucination — when  incurable 331 

8,  A  characteristic  of  maniacs 331 

4.  Total  insanity — results 332 

SECTION    III. 

1.  Degrees  of  insanity — ^how  connected 332 

2.  Unnatural  vividness  of  thought 333 

8.  Greatest  peculiarity  of  insanity 333 

4.  Indisposition  to  change  belief 334 

SECTION    IV. 

1.  Power  of  mental  hallucinations 334 

2.  Extremes  and  modulations  of  insanity 335 

8.  Insanity  in  the  case  of  the  maniac 336 

4.  General  character  of  derangement 336 

6.  Malicious  insanity 335 

CHAPTER  IX. 

INSANITY— MELANCHOLIA. 

SECTION   I. 

1.  Melancholia  defined 837 

2.  DiflFerence  between  melancholia  and  mania 338 

3.  Tendency  of  melancholia  to  suicide 338 

4.  Maniacs  do  not  commit  suicide 338 

SECTION    II. 

1.  Melancholia  leads  to  suicide 339 

2.  Suicide  a  voluntary  act 339 

8.  He  who  commits  suicide  has  the  use  of  reason  •  •  • '.  -339 

4.  Proof  that  they  are  not  insane  •  • 339 

5.  Such  persons  know  what  they  are  going  to  do 340 

SECTION     III. 

1.  Melancholia  hallucination -^ 341 

2.  Intended  suicide—when  abandoned • 341 

8.  The  mind  totally  insane  can  not  commit  suicide 341 

4.  Impression  of  the  criminality  of  suicide 342 

CHAPTER  X. 

INSANITY.  ^. 

SECTION    I.  joSM 

1.  Degrees  of  insanity  • 344 

2.  Slight  alienation— how  judged ••  • 344 

3.  Cause  of  insanity 844 

4.  Ambition  a  cause  of  insanity • * ■ 845 


INDEX.  iSi 


BBOTIOH   II. 

1.  Influence  of  the  mind  on  the  body  ••.•••••••■ 345 

2.  Constitutional  tendency  to  insanity 345 

3.  Influence  of  high  fevers 346 

4.  Effect  of  injuries  of  the  skull * 34^ 

SECTIOW    III. 

1.  Hereditary  insanity — how  conditioned 847 

2.  Intense  action  of  the  mind — when  of  insane  tendency 848 

8.  Tendency  to  insanity  by  dwelling  on  only  one  idea 848 

4.  Influence  of  sudden  events 848 

SECTION    IV. 

1.  Too  intense  habit  of  study 349 

2.  Healthy  influence  of  plain  facta. •^. 349 

8.  Highest  number  of  insane  are  the  lovers  of  flctioii 849 

4.  Caution  in  punishing  the  insane 850 

CHAPTEB  XI. 

IDIOCY. 

8BOT10KI. 

1.  Idiocy  defined 351 

2.  Fatuity — that  which  it  includes 35I 

3.  Cretinism — what  its  meanings 851 

4.  Another  class  with  evidences  of  intellectual  action 851 

5.  That  which  characterizes  an  idiot 353 

SEOTIOK    II. 

1.  Condition  of  an  idiot's  mind 353 

2.  Insanity  differs  from  idiocy 353 

8.  Idiocy  incurable  in  this  life 353 

4.  Extent  of  physical  influence 353 

SECTIOK    III. 

1.  Cause  of  delirium  not  wholly  in  the  mind 354 

2.  The  mind  not  naturally  insane 355 

3.  Cause  of  idiocy  not  in  the  essence  of  mind 35g 

4.  There  can  be  no  essential  loss  of  mental  elements 856 

SECTIOK    IV. 

1.  Evidence  of  destructive  bodily  influence 357 

2.  Its  effect  on  the  power  of  hearing 357, 

8.  Its  effect  on  the  organ  of  sight .i35jt 

4.  Cause  of  idiocy  connected  with  the  physical  powers 853 


4:84  INDEX 


CHAPTER    I. 

INTERNAL   ORIGIN   OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

SECTION    I. 

1.  The  soul  has  knowledge  in  itself 360 

2.  It  has  power  of  knowledge  within  itself 360 

3.  Primary  power  of  knowledge 361 

4.  Knowledge  from  the  senses 361 

5.  Apprehending  of  facts  internal  in  origin 361 

SECTION    II. 

1.  Knowledge  is  of  internal  origin 362 

2.  Origin  of  knowledge 362 

3.  Ideas  of  internal  origin 362 

4.  They  may  arise  in  connection  with  the  power  of  intuition 363 

6.  Primary  origin  of  knowledge 863 

6.  Complex  ideas  of  internal  knowledge 363 

CHAPTER   II. 

THE    DOCTRINE   OF   PSYCHOLOGY   AND   ANTHROPOLOGY 

CONTRASTED   IN    THE   EXAMINATION   OF   THAT 

WHICH  RESEMBLES   MIND  IN  BRUTES. 

SEOTIO  N    I. 

1.  Extent  of  our  inquiry 364 

2.  Connection  of  mind  and  matter — ^how  conditioned 364 

8.  Matter  without  mental  power 365 

4.  Life  connected  with  vegetation 366 

SECTION    II. 

1.  Animated  existence  or  life 36 

2.  Brutes  either  wholly  matter  or  they  have  minds 36 

3.  Inertness  essential  to  matter 36/ 

4.  Brutes  possess  animation  different  from  matter 367 

SECTION    III. 

1.  Brutes  diflfer  from  inert  entities • ? 867 

2.  Their  power  of  self-action— how  diflferent  from  matter 368 

8.  Power  of  the  senses  in  brutes  - 368 

4.  Internal  superior  power  of  brutes 368 

SECTION    IV. 

1.  Volition  in  reference  to  animals 369 

2.  Their  power  of  self-preservation 369 

8.  Their  knowledge  of  courses ■> 369 

4.  Knowledge  of  a  horse  or  dog 370 

6.  Their  power  of  judging  and  comparing 370 


IKDEX.  4)S5lf 


8BCT10N    V. 

Pa»b. 

1.  Brutes  have  some  kind  of  spiritaal  natures  •••• '•  mni»»»^i(m*itu>i:kK*Sll 

2.  Character  of  brute  intelligence. k»i.  ...i'.»  ..*. -871 

3.  PoAver  to  select  food 372 

4.  Instinctive  intelligence  of  bees 372 

8B0TIOX'   VI. 

1.  DiflFerence  bet^reen  the  powers  of  man  and  that  of  brutes 873 

2.  Natural  inclination  to  look  for  the  cause  of  an  effect 373 

8.  Human  mind  scientific • ....373 

4.  It  is  capable  of  progressive  improvement-. 374 

SECTIOir     VII. 

1.  That  which  is  essential  to  the  human  jpind 374 

2.  That  which  is  not  possessed  by  brutes 376 

8.  Man  subject  to  moral  feelings..  ••..••'•'•'••  ••••••,♦ •B75 

4.  Contrast  of  mind  in  man  with  that  of  the  brute. •••  • ^.375 

5.  The  brute  has  a  spirit  and  a  body 376 

SECTION    VIII. 

1.  The  brute — how  capable  of  being  taught 876 

2.  The  dog  can  be  taught 376 

3.  Animals  have  been  learned  to  dance 376 

4.  Memory  in  man  differs  from  brute  memory 377 

SECTION    IX. 

1.  Memory  of  the  horse • •....• '^T^ 

2.  I^he  active  power  of  brutes  can  not  be  mattejf '•••.••••'■'•••  •  .'•.••.  •'^878^ ' 
8.  Further  evidence  of  brute  mind • 378 

SECTION    X. 

1.  The  Hebrew  term  ruach,  in  Scripture,  proves  that  bmtes  have  spir- 

its or  souls _• ."..... 378 

2.  The  brute  has  a  soul ♦.r.ji  ..^,.jr«j|^;<i.<,i&ij> 879 

3.  Beasts,  before  the  fall  of  man,  had  purity  and  fireedom  from  death  •  •  379 

4.  They  could  not  have  been  created  only  to  be  annihilated 380 

CHAPTER  III. 

INTUITIONS. 

SECTION    I. 

1.  Mental  intuition  defined -381 

2.  Intuition  faculties  give  origiu  to  original  action 881 

8.  Powers  of  the  mind  can  be  intuition  faculties 381 

4.  The  reciprocal  relations  of  intuitions 381 

SECTION    II. 

1.  Ideas — relation  to  original  elements 382 

2.  Simple  ideas — how  arise-. * 382 

8.  General  ideas — how  arise 382 

41* 


486  INDEX. 


SECTION    III. 

Page. 

1.  Spontaneous  action  anterior  to  attention 383 

2.  When  such  action  is  voluntary 383 

3.  Intuitive  conviction  of  self 383 

4.  Origin  of  self-apprehension 383 

SECTION    IV. 

1.  Instinct  defined 384 

2.  Mind  with  instinctive  power 384 

3.  Instinct  can  not  be  separated  from  mind 384 

CHAPTER  IV. 

COMMON    SENSE. 

SECTION    I. 

1.  Common  sense  defined 385 

2.  The  immediate  decision  of  correct  reason 385 

3.  This  process — how  modulated 385 

4.  Mental  affirmations  common  to  all  minds 385 

SECTION    II. 

1.  Importance  of  this  mental  power 386 

2.  Common  sense  is  of  the  real  affirmations  of  the  mind 386 

3.  It  is  dependent  upon  reason  and  judgment 387 

4.  It  involves  a  general  understanding  of  facts 387 

SECTION     III. 

1.  This  power  is  common  to  all  minds 388 

2.  Its  use  in  arriving  at  facts 388 

8.  It  can  be  cultivated • 388 


^ihisian    Mlzhtnt^. 


CHAPTEE   I. 

VOLITION. 

SECTION    I. 

1.  Volition  defined • 890 

2.  The  act  of  willing  or  of  determining  choice 390 

3.  Criticism  on  volition 890 

4.  Its  nature  is  freedom 891 

SECTION    II. 

1.  Certainty  of  such  a  power 891 

2.  Doctrine  of  necessitarians  absurd 891 

3.  Volition  not  simple  action  only 892 

4.  It  is  an  internal  power 39:3 


INDEX.  ,.  487 


SECTION    m. 

Paob. 

1.  Volitions  diflFer  from  volition — in  what  respects 393 

2.  Nature  of  volition  can  not  be  defined 393 

3.  Volition  can  exist  either  with  or  without  an  object 393 

4.  If  it  can  only  exist  with  an  object,  then  it  may  become  non-exist- 

ence   394 

5.  It  can  not  exist  wholly  in  action 394 

SECTION    iv. 

1.  It  exists  of  its  essential  nature 395 

2.  It  exists  either  with  or  without  what  we  believe  to  be  in  our 

power 395 

8.  Volition  differs  from  volitivc  action 396 

SECTIOK    V. 

1.  Volition  differs  from  desires 396 

2.  This  power  exists  in  the  mind 397 

3.  Desire  defined 897 

4.  Desire  differs  from  volition 397 

SECTION    ▼!. 

1.  Volition  differs  from  desires  in  sudden  changes 898 

2.  It  is  not  governed  by  the  strongest  desire 398 

8.  Character  of  motive — how  varied 399 

4.  Influence  of  pure  motive ^899 

CHAPTER  II. 

VOLITION,    CONTINUED. 

SECTION    I. 

1.  Volitive  power — degrees  of  strength — ^how  varied 401 

2.  Degrees  in  force  of  action 401 

3.  It  can  vary  with  our  feelings 402 

4.  It  differs  from  feeling 402 

SECTION    II. 

1.  Relation  of  volition  to  self-action 402 

2.  Volition  implies  more  than  mere  action 403 

3.  It  differs  from  choice 403 

4.  It  has  power  to  act  or  to  refuse  action 404 

SECTION    III. 

1.  Volition  anterior  to  choice 404 

2.  Antecedent  volitive  power 405 

3.  The  act  of  choosing  free • --405 

4.  Volition  has  either  self-freedom  or  it  is  of  necessity 406 


488  INDEX. 


SECTION    IV. 

Paok. 

1.  Criticism  on  a  false  proposition  used  by  necessitaxians 406 

2.  Influence  of  motive  on  the  volitive  power 407 

8.  The  origin  of  motive-action  presupposes  volitive  action 407 

4.  Volitions  spontaneous  and  independent 407 

CHAPTER   III. 
'  VOLITION,    CONTINUED. 

SECTION    I. 

1.  Motive  can  not  control  the  Divine  mind 409 

2.  Motive-law  leads  to  materialism  as  taught  by  fatalism 409 

3.  It  can  not  govern  volition 410 

SECTION    II. 

1.  Motive  and  choice  control  contrary  to  consciousness 410 

2.  We  feel  that  our  action  in  choice  and  in  relation  to  motive  is  free- -411 

3.  Evidence  in  the  impossibility  of  doubting  our  accountability 411 

SECTION    III. 

1.  Voluntary  choosing-motive  r 412 

2.  Resolving  to  act  with  the  strongest  motive 412 

3.  Motive-control,  impossible ! 413 

4.  Evidence  in  the  law  "of  self-preservation 413 


SECTION    IV 


1.  The  law  of  motive-necessity  contrary  to  conscious  feeling 414 

2.  Volitions  spontaneous  and  free ..-.. 414 

3.  Convictions  of  liberty  in  relation  to  past  events 415 

4.  Consciousness  of  liberty  in  deciding  upon  the  acts  of  others 415 

SECTION    V. 

1.  Conscious  liberty  in  relation  to  acts  of  present  time 415 

2.  Criticism  on  an  incorrect  proposition 416 

3.  Volition  is  spontaneous  liberty-power • 416 

4.  It  is  the  power  of  inotion 416 

5.  Power  of  determining  and  enforcing  action 416 

6.  It  is  the  ground  of  accountability  •  •  •• 416 

'..  It  is  natural  to  mind 417 

SECTION     VI. 

1.  Opinion  of  Mr.  Stewart  incorrect 417 

2.  Volition  is  not  action  only 418 

8.  Objections  to  the  opinion  of  Mr.  Upham-.  ••• 418 

4.  Volition  and  the  will — how  the  same 418 

6.  That  which  is  implied  in  the  use  of  the  term  volition - 418 

6.  That  to  which  the  term  will  refers - 418 


INDEX.  48ft 


CHAPTER   I. 

•  THE    WILL. 

SECTION    I. 

Paok. 

1.  The  will  defined 420 

2.  It  is  in  its  nature  the  liberty-power  of  the  mind 420 

3.  It  is  free  with  determining  power 420 

4.  The  mind  is  controlled  by  the  will 421 

SECTION    II. 

1.  Connection  of  the  will  and  the  judgment 421 

2,  The  understanding  can  not  control  the  will 421 

8.  Reason  can  not  control  the  will 421 

4.  The  will  is  a  commanding  power 421 

SECTION    III. 

1.  Objection  to  the  classification  of  the  mental  powers  as  used  by 

others 422 

2.  Relation  of  the  will  to  other  faculties 422 

3.  Feeling,  thinking,  and  willing  distinct  powers 422 

4.  Laws  of  the  will  incorrect 423 

SECTION    IV. 

1.  There  is  nothing  in  matter  that  can  control  the  will 423 

2.  Laws  of  the  material  universe  can  not  control  it 423 

3.  Such  teachers  can  not  refer  this  controlling  power  to  Deity 423 

4.  It  can  not  be  governed  by  other  faculties 424 

CHAPTER  II. 
NATURE   OF  THE  WILL.     ' 
SECTION    I. 

1.  Laws  of  the  will  absurd 425 

2.  It  is  governed  by  its  own  law 425 

3.  Contingent  action  of  the  will — ^how  incorrect 425 

4.  Freedom  the  condition  of  mental  action 425 

SECTION    II. 

1.  Laws  of  the  will  preliminary  to  that  of  its  freedom,  as  taught  by 

Mr.  Upham — how  incorrect 426 

2.  Mr.  Upham  says  the  will  is  subject  to  laws — ^how  incorrect 426 

3.  Statement  of  the  condition  of  such  arguments 427 

4.  The  will  is  not  subject  to  laws 427 


4:90  INDEX. 

SECTION    III. 

1.  The  will — ^how  influenced  by  desire 428 

2.  What  is  desire,  and  its  influence 428 

8.  Desires  may  arise  voluntarily  and  involuntarily 428 

4.  Desire  can  only  invoke  volitive  action 429 

SECTION    IV. 

1.  The  will  governed  by  choice— how  incorrect 429 

2.  The  very  nature  of  choice  implies  volition 429 

3.  Choice  is  either  of  natural  necessity  or  the  mind  has  natural  volitive 

power 430 

4.  Choice  can  not  control  the  will 430 

SECTION    V. 

1.  Mr.  Upham's  view  of  motive  governing  the  will— how  incorrect--  ••431 

2.  Motive  defined  and  limited  from  its  very  nature 431 

8.  If  motive  could  govern  the  will,  how  it  would  be  done 431 

4.  An  inert  object  can  not  control  the  will 432 

SECTION     VI. 

1.  Incorrect  conclusions  of  Mr.  Upham  and  Mr.  Edwards 432 

2.  Motive  in  the  Divine  mind  subordinate  to  volitions 433 

3.  Motive  has  no  power  to  control  the  will 433 

4.  The  will  is  as  the  greatest  apparent  good,  according  to  Mr.  Ed- 

wards— how  incorrect 434 

6.  That  the  will  is  free  is  established  by  the  consciousness  of  man- 
kind   435 

CHAPTEK   III. 
k;  liberty  of  the  will. 

SECTION    I. 

1.  The  will  is  strictly  neither  free  nor  bound ♦ 437 

2.  The  will  subject  to  the  law  of  self-liberty 437 

8.  Doctrine  of  liberty  clearly  established  by  consciousness 438 

4.  Volitive  power  to  choose 488 

SECTION     II. 

1.  The  will  knows  no  law  only  that  of  liberty 438 

2.  Further  proof ' 438 

8.  The  effort  to  sustain  the  law  of  necessity  involves  reasoning  in  a 

circle 439 

4.  The  position  of  Mr.  Edwards  that  every  act  of  the  will  is  excited  by 
some  motive — how  incorrect 439 

SECTION     III. 

1.  The  spirit  of  dependence  can  not  exist  under  the  law  of  necessity. 440 

2.  This  doctrine  can  not  mellow  our  feelings 440 

8.  A  dreadful  sentiment  of  Dr.  Chalmers 440 

4.  A  design  of  man's  creation,  that  he  might  voluntarily  serve  God.  •  -441 


INDEX.  4W. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

POWER    OF    THE    WILL. 

BECTION    I. 

1.  Difference  between  liberty  and  power 442 

2.  Mr.  Upham'g  view  of  the  will  not  independent — how  incorrect 442 

3.  Power  and  freedom  of  the  will  evidenced  in  self-preservation 443 

4.  Liberty  of  the  will  in  the  remembrance  of  past  facts 443 

SECTION    II. 

1.  The  will  has  self-determining  power 443 

2.  Criticism  on  a  position  of  Mr.  Upham 444 

8.  Mr.  Edwards's  objection  to  the  idea  of  the  will  determining  the 

will 444: 

4.  Volitions  are  spontaneous 445 

BEOTIOK    III. 

1.  The  superior  power  of  the  will 445 

2.  That  which  is  the  ground  of  offense  before  God 445 

3.  It  is  connected  with  voluntariness 445 

4.  The  doctrine  of  the  will— how  confused 446 

8«CTI0K    IT. 

1.  Mandatory  power  of  the  will 446 

2.  Office  of  the  will 446 

3.  Error  of  necessitarians  in  confounding  the  will  with  the  sensibili- 

ties  446 

4.  We  can  will  to  perform  impossibilities,  which  is  evidence  of  liberty -446 

5.  Such  is  the  will,  the  free  liberty -power  of  the  mind 447 


END   OF  VOL.   I. 


m 


•'». 


L 


^rff^ 


■#■ 


#1? 


-%■ 


*^Br 


^W^' 


^ 


'*fii 


i 


0 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DjESK JRQM^WmCIjLBQBJ^ 

LIBRARY 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or 

on  the  date  to  which  renewed. 

Renewed  books  are  subject  to  immediate  recall. 


7  DAY  USF 


<^ni^M£R 


DURING 


SESSIONS 


f^k   2      1963 


^/iv  ifiRrna 


MAR  18  1965 


MARS    RCCD  2P 
MAR  3  0  1965 


W- 


:D-2 


QSl 


JUN18  1965 


LD  21-50m-12,'61 
(04796sl0)476 


General  Library 

University  of  California 

Berkeley 


U.C.  BERKELEY  LIBRARIES 

I!|||||il!ll  I'll! -"I '^  liii"   ilili  III 


llllllllllii   II  ii 


II  III   li  I 


CDETM7flDTb 


